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There are complexities inherent to the subjective experience of life that render real-world prob-
lem solving exceedingly subtle and difficult. Yet, all too often, it is not the complex nature of
problems that result in their persistence, but rather the ineffective fashion in which practitioners
dedicated to their resolution respond thereto.
The process of real-world problem solving comprises three parts: The development of a formal
formulation of a problem considered, the identification of an adequate response thereto, often
by means of analytical modelling, and finally, the practical implementation of that response. In
the history of real-world problem solving, the first of these phases has often been neglected and,
as a result, solution methodologies dedicated to the formulation of problems, complicated by
the dynamics of human nature, have failed to address several phenomena relevant to the success
of problem resolution. Accordingly, the work documented in this dissertation is dedicated first
to the identification of such phenomena, and then to the development and application of a
meta-methodology dedicated to their management.
The phenomena addressed include the identification of stakeholders relevant to a given instance
of problem solving, the dissimilar states in which real-world systems exist and the effect thereof
upon the resolution of problems therein, the sociological paradigm-based limitations of a select
group of problem formulation methods, and the mitigation of irrational influences on human
decision making. In an attempt to uncover dynamics relevant to the formulation of real-world
problems hidden from a purely qualitative analysis, the unique utility of mathematical modelling
is additionally employed to describe the context for which the proposed meta-methodology is
designed.
In order to illustrate the practical applicability of the meta-methodology proposed in this dis-
sertation, several of its components are applied, first in a hypothetical fashion, to the context of
the South African education system during the period of the fees must fall movement and then






Daar is kompleksiteite inherent aan die subjektiewe ervaring van die lewe wat werklike pro-
bleemoplossing uiters subtiel en moeilik maak. Tog is dit al te dikwels nie die komplekse aard
van probleme wat hul volharding veroorsaak nie, maar eerder die ondoeltreffende manier waarop
praktisyns toegewy aan die oplossing daarvan, daarop reageer.
Die proses van werklike probleemoplossing bestaan uit drie dele: Die ontwikkeling van ’n formele
formulering van die probleem wat oorweeg word, die identifisering van ’n gepaste respons daar-
voor, dikwels deur analitiese modellering, en laastens die praktiese implementering van die re-
spons. In die geskiedenis van werklike probleemoplossing is die eerste van hierdie fases al te
dikwels verwaarloos, en as gevolg daarvan het oplossingsmetodologieë vir die formulering van
probleme, gekompliseer deur menslike natuurlike dinamika, soms nie daarin geslaag om ver-
skynsels aan te spreek wat relevant is tot die sukses van die probleemoplossing nie. Gevolglik
word die werk wat in hierdie proefskrif gedokumenteer is, eers op die identifikasie van sulke
verskynsels toegespits, en daarna aan die ontwikkeling en toepassing van ’n meta-metodologie
vir hul bestuur toegewy.
Die verskynsels wat aangespreek word, sluit in die identifisering van belanghebbendes wat re-
levant is vir ’n gegewe probleemoplossing, die uiteenlopende toestande waarin werklike wêreld-
stelsels bestaan en die effek daarvan op die oplossing van probleme daarin, die sosiologiese
paradigma-gebaseerde beperkings van ’n bepaalde groep probleem formuleringsmetodes, en die
teenwerking van irrasionele invloede op menslike besluitneming. In ’n poging om dinamika te
identifiseer wat relevant is vir die formulering van werklike probleme wat in ’n suiwer kwalitatiewe
analise verborge bly, word die unieke nut van wiskundige modellering ook ingespan om die
konteks waarvoor die voorgestelde meta-metodologie ontwerp is, te beskryf.
Ten einde die praktiese toepaslikheid van die meta-metodologie wat in hierdie proefskrif voor-
gestel word, te illustreer, word verskeie komponente daarvan eerstens op hipotetiese wyse in die
konteks van die Suid-Afrikaanse onderwysstelsel gedurende die periode van die fees must fall -
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1.1 Background
It has long been recognised that the subjective experience of everyday life is exceptionally
complex. Likened to the current of a turbulent stream, humanity often finds itself carried along
by a dynamic flux of events, ideas, relationships, emotions, and actions — all mediated through
the slippery agency of communication and all continually changing. Simply put, the natural
state of the world constitutes a messy state of affairs.
Despite the obvious truth of the above statement, history testifies that practitioners dedicated to
the solution of real-world problems were surprisingly dilatory in recognising both the importance
and the difficulty of formulating such problems in a manner that actually facilitates their effective
resolution. In fact, the intricacies of problem formulation only entered the fray of academic
and professional debate some time during the mid-20th century [234]. As the discipline of
systems thinking constitutes the theoretical foundation upon which the aforementioned group
of practitioners often based the resolution of problems, much can be learnt about the manner in
which the consequential nature of problem formulation entered the realm of conscious awareness,
by delineating the paradigms of enquiry that have dominated systems thinking throughout the
course of its historical development.
The paradigm of enquiry that “put systems thinking on the map,” so to speak, has come to
be known by the generic name hard systems thinking — in essence, a paradigm that prioritises
the notions of rationality, efficient means and control. The first documented instance of hard
systems thinking is often attributed to the period during and immediately after World War II,
constituting a time of crisis during which military planners recognised the utility of scientific
methods in supporting wartime decision making [233]. Significantly, the majority of the methods
designed and applied during this period were based upon the principles of hard systems thinking,
and furthermore, were employed with considerable success. As a result, the hard systems school
1
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of thought became the dominant paradigm of enquiry associated with system theorists and
real-world practitioners alike during the decades that followed.
Interestingly, it took approximately 15 years of practical application and academic scrutiny,
before the limitations of hard systems thinking came to be recognised [234]. To elucidate,
during the mid-20th century the methods of hard systems thinking slowly made their way into
the volatile context of corporate endeavour and, as a result, met their match. One of the
fundamental assumptions associated with the hard systems school of thought is that problems
are naturally inclined to their formulation and, as such, solution methodologies based thereupon
hardly ever include considerations of the process of problem formulation [99]. In the punctilious
context of its inception, this lack of attention may have been inconsequential, but not so in the
more human-centric context of corporate endeavour. The plethora of human-induced dynamics
often relevant to the solution of corporate problems, seems to have rendered such problems of
the kind for which a solution approach based solely on the analytical methods of hard systems
thinking is rather ill-suited [42, 475].
Ironically, in the history of real-world problem solving, it was thus the failures of hard systems
thinking (a paradigm based upon the assumption that problem formulation is superfluous) that
firmly established (at least in the mind of several theorists) the need to address the difficulties
that surround the formulation of real-world problems. Accordingly, several theorists of the
time (including renowned academics such as Churchman and Ackoff [232]) elected to distance
themselves from the conceptions of hard systems thinking, and proceeded to develop a paradigm
of enquiry based upon the general principles of systems theory that is capable (according to
them) of accommodating the noted, nuanced complexities related to the formulation of real-
world problems. Significantly, the development of this paradigm, which came to be known as
soft systems thinking, became for the notion of problem formulation what one may describe as
a place to call home in the realm of academic endeavour.
In view of the aforementioned manner in which both the difficulty, and the importance of
problem formulation historically entered into the realm of conscious awareness, the obvious
question of interest is simply: Did such awareness actually result in the development of practical
solution methodologies capable of accommodating the noted difficulties in formulating real-world
problems of the kind saturated by the dynamics of human nature? The answer to this question
is both yes, and no. Solution methodologies dedicated to the formulation of real-world problems
have certainly been developed [233], but as Jackson delineates in his book Systems methodology
for the management sciences [232], the field of problem formulation has by no means matured
to the point where its methods are indeed capable, in general, of formulating problems in a
manner that truly facilitates their resolution [234]. Accordingly, the work documented in this
dissertation is an attempt to further the field of problem formulation some way towards its
maturity.
1.2 Problem statement
Solution methodologies dedicated to the formulation of real-world problems of the kind com-
plicated by the dynamics of human nature often fail to address several phenomena relevant to
the success of their application. Accordingly, the aim in this dissertation is first to identify such
phenomena, and then to develop, and demonstrate the application of, a meta-methodology ded-
icated to their management, which may be employed in conjunction with existing methodologies
that are designed to facilitate the initial phases of real-world problem solving.
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1.3 Dissertation objectives
The following ten objectives are pursued in this dissertation:
I To conduct a thorough survey of the academic literature related to:
(a) human decision making under conditions of uncertainty,
(b) human decision making in the context of social stimuli,
(c) common approaches to debiasing,
(d) paradigms of thought in systems theory,
(e) problem solution methodologies,
(f) typologies for the classification of real-world problems, and
(g) stakeholder selection theory.
II To develop a generic method for identifying stakeholders relevant to a certain instance of
real-world problem solving.
III To delineate the dissimilar states in which real-world systems exist, the mechanisms by
which these states come about, and the strategies according to which they may be dealt
with.
IV To propose, based upon the work conducted in pursuit of Objective III, a method designed
to support practitioners in minimising the cost of real-world systems in chaos.
V To present, based upon the literature review of Objectives I(c)–(f), an analysis of the
problem structuring methods that exist in system literature, toward supporting their case-
specific selection.
VI To design, based upon the literature review of Objectives I(a)–(c), a decision-making
checklist aimed at mitigating the irrational influence on human decision making.
VII To formulate a meta-methodology for the formulation of real-world problems, based on
the work carried out in pursuit of Objectives II–VI.
VIII To model mathematically the competitive interaction of entities relevant to the context
of use for which the meta-methodology of Objective VII is designed, in an attempt to
uncover the mechanisms that govern such interaction, hidden from purely a contemplative
analysis.
IX To illustrate the practical applicability of the methods proposed in pursuit of Objectives II,
IV, and VI by means of either their theoretical application, their practical application, or
the scrutiny of an expert analyst.
X To recommend sensible follow-up work related to the work in this dissertation which may
be pursued in future.
1.4 Scope delimitation
The intricate spectrum of phenomena relevant to the resolution of real-world problems is such
that the pursuit of their delineation has remained elusive throughout the course of scientific
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enquiry. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that the meta-methodology proposed in
this dissertation is designed to address only a select portion of the phenomena relevant to
the solution of real-world problems. In order to elucidate this class of phenomena considered,
consider Figure 1.1, depicting an oversimplified, high-level overview of the activities relevant to
the process of real-world problem solving, namely problem identification, problem formulation,
response formulation and response implementation1. In view of the figure, note that the meta-
methodology of Objective VII, and the respective components that constitute it as outlined
in Objectives II–VI, relate only to the process of problem formulation and, more specifically,
only to aspects thereof not adequately addressed in existing methodologies dedicated thereto,
as determined later during the literature review in pursuit of Objective I.
Figure 1.1: A high-level overview of the process of real-world problem solving.
In addition, the work presented in this dissertation is also limited to a certain context of appli-
cation. More specifically, Objectives II–X are pursued only in the context of real-world systems
that exhibit the following property: The entities contained therein are forced to collaborate
despite pursuing conflicting outcomes. Note that this kind of system may exist for one of sev-
eral reasons, including, but not limited to, the following: If multiple entities of the system are
fundamentally linked to its purpose, if legislation governing such a system prohibits the exclu-
sion of certain entities, or if no entity contained therein is capable of forcefully (and lawfully)
extinguishing the presence of another.
In view of the above scoping delimitations, the work presented in this dissertation is adequately
described as an attempt to support analysts during the initial phases of real-world problem
solving purely by supplementing a selection of pre-existing solution methodologies dedicated to
the formulation of problems.
1.5 Dissertation organisation
In addition to this introductory chapter and the one that follows, which is dedicated to a
discussion on the research methodology adopted, the work presented in this dissertation is
organised into three parts, collectively comprising a further thirteen chapters. The first part,
Part I, contains six chapters and is dedicated to a review of the academic literature related to
matters relevant to the topic of this dissertation, as described in §1.3. To elucidate, Part I opens
in Chapter 3 with a brief introduction into the mechanisms of human cognition in §3.1, and
this is followed by a discussion on the intricacies of judgement heuristics in §3.2. This sets the
stage for an account of the cognitive biases that accompany the application of such heuristics
in §3.4–3.8, after which Chapter 3 comes to a close with a short summary in §3.9.
The next chapter, Chapter 4, is dedicated to an enquiry into the social nature of human decision
making. After this topic is briefly introduced in §4.1 with a discussion on the paradoxical nature
of group behaviour, the social dynamics related to decision making in the presence of relevant
others is explicated in §4.2–§4.4. The chapter then concludes with a brief summary in §4.5.
1Problem formulation represents the process of developing a formal representation of a problematic situation
that adequately facilitates the pursuit of an appropriate response to the problem considered, while response
formulation represents the process of actually developing an appropriate response by means of analytical modelling.
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In accordance with the objectives pursued in this dissertation, Chapter 5 is dedicated to an
enquiry into the field of debiasing. The chapter opens with a brief introduction to the field in
§5.1, after which the schools of thought that underlie the methods employed therein are reviewed
in §5.2–§5.4. After a collection of methods based upon the reviewed schools of thought has been
reviewed in §5.5, the chapter comes to a close with a short summary in §5.6.
Chapter 6 embodies quite a shift in the focus of discussion, opening in §6.1 with an account
of the origins of systems theory. Excluding a short summary of matters discussed in §6.10,
the remainder of the chapter is dedicated to a review of the paradigms that dominate systems
theory, as well as the respective solution methodologies related thereto, in §6.1–§6.9.
Chapter 7 opens with a brief introduction of the notion of dissimilar problem types in §7.1,
which is followed by a description of three unique problem typologies for the classification of
real-world problems in §7.2, §7.3 and §7.4, respectively. The chapter finally closes with a short
summary in §7.5.
Chapter 8, with which Part I concludes, is dedicated to a review of the methods that dominate
the field of stakeholder selection theory. The chapter opens in §8.1 with a review of several
methods that facilitate the identification of stakeholders, and this is followed in §8.2–§8.5 by
an analysis of a collection of methods considered to facilitate the classification of stakeholder,
and in §8.6 by a discussion of a collection of methods that facilitates an investigation into the
network of relationships among stakeholders. In §8.7, a high-level comparison of the methods
discussed is presented, and the chapter is thereafter brought to a close with a brief summary in
§8.8.
Part II is the heart of the dissertation and consists of a further five chapters, starting in Chapter 9
with a delineation of the novel meta-methodology proposed. Accordingly, the chapter opens with
a brief overview of the phases that constitute the proposed meta-methodology in §9.1, setting
the stage for an in-depth discussion on each of its phases in §9.2 and §9.3. The chapter concludes
with a concise summary of matters discussed in §9.4.
Chapter 10 contains an account of the first stage of evaluation of the proposed meta-methodology.
This involved its hypothetical application in the context of a theoretical case study in retrospect.
The chapter commences with an account of the selected context of application in §10.1, and this
is then followed by the hypothetical application of the proposed meta-methodology in that
particular context in §10.2. Thereafter, an additional phase in the meta-methodology, designed
to address a potentially detrimental phenomenon uncovered during its hypothetical application,
is introduced in §10.3. The chapter finally comes to a close with a short summary in §10.4.
In Chapter 11 the proposed meta-methodology is subjected to the critique of an expert analyst.
The chapter opens with a brief account of the feedback received from the analyst, in §11.1, and
this is followed by the presentation of an updated version of the meta-methodology in §11.2.
The chapter then comes to a close with a short summary, in §11.3.
Chapter 12 is dedicated to the documentation of the final phase of evaluation of the proposed
meta-methodology — its application to a practical case study. Accordingly, the chapter com-
mences with a brief description of the context in which the meta-methodology is applied in §12.1,
and this is followed with an account of its actual application in §12.2 and §12.3. The chapter
finally comes to a close with a brief summary, in §12.4.
In the final chapter of Part II, the subject matter becomes slightly more mathematical. More
specifically, Chapter 13 comprises an analytical model developed to describe (to a certain extent)
the competitive interaction among the entities relevant to the context of application for which
the proposed meta-methodology is designed. The derivation of the model commences with
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
the introduction of a governing assumption in §13.1, and this is followed by a mathematical
description of the relationship between several elements of interest in §13.2–§13.3. The notion
of infeasibility is briefly discussed in §13.4, after which an analysis of the proposed model is
conducted in §13.5. Next, an extension to the model is presented in §13.6 and §13.7, and this is
followed in §13.8 by the generalisation of a result related to the manner in which entities compete
in an endeavour, depending on the properties that characterise it. The chapter is finally brought
to a close with a short summary in §13.9.
The final part of this dissertation, Part III, consists of two concluding chapters. The first,
Chapter 14, contains a summary of, and a reflection on, the collective body of work presented
in the dissertation, and the second, Chapter 15, comprises a suggestion of potential avenues of
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This chapter is dedicated to a discussion on the particular research paradigm and research
methodology adopted in this dissertation. Importantly, the particular selections made in this
regard were subject to, and approved by, an expert in such matters1.
The chapter opens in §2.1 with a discussion on the theoretical vantage point adopted, and this
is followed in §2.2 with an brief overview of the research methodology utilised. In §2.3, another
expert analyst is introduced whose opinions are later considered during a validation process
followed in respect of the meta-methodology put forward, and then the chapter is brought to a
close with a brief summary in §2.4.
2.1 The research paradigm
During the initial phases of a research project, a series of decisions must be made pertaining
to the paradigm of enquiry adopted. The first such decision, dedicated to the selection of
a theoretical vantage point from which phenomena are to be studied, entails delineating the
particular ontological and epistemological points of view that govern the process of acquiring
knowledge. Individually, these elements address the assumed state of reality, and the nature
of knowledge, respectively. Collectively, they embody what is here called a research paradigm.
Several such paradigms exist in the academic literature [196, 397, 428], but two appear dominant,
namely the positivist-objectivist paradigm and the interpretivist-constructivist paradigm [397].
Before specifying which of these paradigms are, in fact, adopted to govern the work documented
in this dissertation, it is beneficial to briefly delineate the qualities that characterise them.
Perhaps the most defining property of the positivist-objectivist paradigm is that it assumes
independence between the predefined perceptions of a researcher and properties of a studied
phenomenon. That is, objective, value-free research is considered possible [428]. In its view of
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knowledge, meaning is deemed independent of observation, in the sense that the recognition of
a particular phenomenon does not suddenly grant it meaning — rather, the process of discovery
simply represents the detection of an objective, hidden truth that was there all along. On the
opposite end of the spectrum, one finds a paradigm in which knowledge of the world is considered
influenced by, and dependent upon, the particular perspectives of the observer, which, in turn,
are considered the product of both reflected upon and lived experiences — the interpretivist-
constructivist paradigm [353]. In contrast with positivist-objectivist tradition, this paradigm
holds that insight is the product of exploring (not discovering) the social world of individuals
from the subjective vantage point of the observer. The research process associated with the
paradigm in question is, furthermore, largely inductive in the sense that its purpose is to generate
theory from data rather than using data to test theory [397]. Finally, in the interpretivist-
constructivist paradigm, the predefined perceptions of a researcher and the nature of what is
observed are viewed to be interdependent such that totally objective, value-free research is
considered impossible.
In accordance with the above discussion, and the nature of the work conducted in this dis-
sertation, the interpretivist-constructivist paradigm is selected as the governing paradigm of
enquiry.
2.2 The research methodology
Following the establishment of a particular research paradigm, an appropriate research method-
ology has to be selected. To that end, a design framework formalised by Herman [211] in 2018
for aiding researchers in the development of multidisciplinary solution methodologies is adopted
to guide the research conducted in this dissertation. Notably, the framework in question is an
adaption of the well-known conceptual framework analysis procedure proposed earlier by Jaba-
reen [228] and, as may be seen in Figure 2.1, consists of four main parts, namely research the
design aims and make sense of the literature, formulate a preliminary framework, evaluate and
adapt the framework, and finally, finalise the framework and management tool.
Figure 2.1: A design framework for facilitating the development of multidisciplinary solution method-
ologies [211].
Part 1 of the above framework is designed to aid analysts in exploring the research landscape
and academic literature related to a topic of enquiry, and is separated into four distinct phases,
namely describe the research question, specify the research aims, conduct a background litera-
ture review, and conduct a structured literature review, as depicted in Figure 2.2. As the labels
suggest, these phases involve formalising the research question underlying the development of a
particular methodology, describing the specific objectives that are pursued in pursuit of address-
ing the stated research question, reviewing the academic literature in order to filter relevant from
irrelevant documentation, and finally, conducting an in-depth review of the literature deemed
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relevant2. Excluding the third phase of this process, which is alternatively described as an in-
formal, undocumented review of the academic literature, the execution of these phases relate to
the work documented in §1.2, §1.3, and Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7 of this dissertation, respectively.
Figure 2.2: A schematic depiction of the constituent phases of Part 1 of the design framework adopted,
as adapted from Herman [211].
Part 2 of the framework consists of four components that are collectively designed to facilitate an
analysis of existing solution methodologies, similar to the one proposed, such that the insights of
past researchers may be drawn upon to guide the development of the methodology proposed. As
depicted in Figure 2.3, the constituent phases of Part 2 are conduct focused conceptual literature
review, identify existing methodologies and models, evaluate and assess current methodologies and
models, and develop preliminary methodology. Once again, some of these phases are conducted
in an undocumented fashion as they simply inform the execution of the phases that proceed
them. More specifically, only the execution of the third and fourth phases are presented in this
dissertation in Chapters 5 and 8, and in Chapter 9, respectively.
Figure 2.3: A schematic depiction of the constituent phases of Part 2 of the design framework adopted,
as adapted from Herman [211].
Researchers often adopt the term validation3 when discussing the regimen of review adopted in
a particular study. Due to the nature of the work documented in this dissertation, however,
its validation in the traditional sense of evaluating the utility thereof with several benchmark
case studies in the literature is not possible as no such benchmarks exist. For this reason, the
design framework proposed by Herman [211] is particularly well-suited to the work carried out in
this dissertation. That is, Part 3 of the framework in question involves a multistage evaluation
(instead of validation) process that facilitates the review and refinement of the instrument of
analysis proposed [211]. As depicted in Figure 2.4, this process consists of five phases, namely
conduct a theoretical case study, modify the methodology, conduct interviews, modify the method-
ology, and conduct a practical case study. In the order listed, these phases entail the hypothetical
application of the proposed methodology to a theoretical case study in retrospect with the pur-
pose of identifying shortcomings therein, presenting an updated methodology modified according
to the shortcomings uncovered, subjecting the methodology to the critique of an expert analyst,
2In the context of this dissertation, the in-depth literature review is executed in accordance with the guidelines
provided by Lecy and Beatty [281] in an article titled Structured literature reviews using constrained snowball
sampling and citation network analysis.
3The term validation is considered by Herman [211] to represent the process by which a researcher attempts
to prove the utility and accuracy of a contribution made.
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presenting a second updated version of the methodology, and finally, the applying the updated
methodology to a practical case study in real time. The work conducted in pursuit of these
tasks is documented in Chapters 10, 11 and 12.
Figure 2.4: A schematic depiction of the constituent phases of Part 3 of the design framework adopted,
as adapted from Herman [211].
Before discussing the final part of the framework proposed by Herman [211], there is a tech-
nicality related to the evaluation of the proposed methodology that should be noted. That is,
any shortcoming identified during a particular phase of evaluation is to be subject only to the
remainder of the phases of evaluation and only if the particular addition to, or component of,
the methodology is, in fact, applicable to the phase of evaluation in question. With this in
mind, consider the constituent phases of the final part of the design framework adopted in this
dissertation, as depicted in Figure 2.5. As may be seen in the figure, Part 4 consists of three
phases, namely modified methodology, management tool, and finally, future work. In essence,
the former phases entail taking the most up-to-date version of the methodology proposed and
transforming it into a form that facilitates its use in the hands of future practitioners, while the
latter simply entails the description of potential improvements to the methodology that may
be pursued in future. Notably, the final version of the methodology presented in fulfilment of
Part 3 of the design framework is formulated with the requirements of Part 4 in mind such that
the final version of the meta-methodology proposed in this dissertation may be found in Chap-
ter 11, while potential improvements thereto, which may be pursued in future, are documented
in Chapter 15.
Figure 2.5: A schematic depiction of the constituent phases of Part 4 of the design framework adopted,
as adapted from Herman [211].
2.3 An expert analyst
In the introduction to this chapter it was made salient that the research methodology adopted
to guide the work presented in this dissertation has been approved by an expert in such matters.
The expert referred to then, and the expert referred to in Part 3 of the research methodology
discussed above, are, however, two different individuals. Appropriately, the former is an ex-
pert in designing and conducting research, and the latter, in the actual application of solution
methodologies of the kind proposed in this dissertation. Mr Brink van der Spuy is the second
expert, is a seasoned consultant in applications such as strategy development, change manage-
ment and corporate mediation, and has worked with many of the largest corporations in South
Africa [73]. Mr van der Spuy is, furthermore, considered a particularly well-suited expert, given
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his experience as a lecturer of business strategy and innovation at several esteemed universities,
including Stellenbosch University and the University of South Africa [73].
2.4 Chapter summary
This chapter was dedicated to an account of the theoretical paradigm of enquiry selected to
govern the research documented in this dissertation. Accordingly, the chapter opened in §2.1
with a brief discussion on the particular ontological and epistemological points of view assumed.
Thereafter, a design framework, utilised as research methodology, was described in §2.2. Fi-
nally, an expert analysts, subsequently utilised to critique the meta-methodology proposed, was
introduced in §2.3.
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“Real knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance.” — Confucius
This chapter is devoted to a review of topics in the academic literature that are relevant to
judgement and decision making under conditions of uncertainty. These topics are introduced
in §3.1 by illustrating the dynamics of intuitive and analytical reasoning. Thereafter, several
judgement heuristics that prevail upon the blurred boundary between intuitive and analytical
reasoning are reviewed in §3.2. Finally, a number of cognitive biases that render judgement
heuristics imperfect are considered in §3.3–§3.8, before the chapter closes with a brief summary
in §3.9.
3.1 Intuition or reason
In his Nobel Prize-winning work, Herbert Simon [301, 421] argued that individual judgement is
bounded in its rationality. Although this is a perfectly appropriate statement to the thinkers of
the 21st century, the idea was rather preposterous to the homo economicus traditionalists of the
day. The belief that individual judgement is based upon the rational processing of information
toward the optimal pursuit of a subjectively defined end was at the core of decision theory when
Simon formulated his hypothesis. Yet, his words stood the test of time: In an information-
rich world, the wealth of information signifies the dearth of something else, that thing which
information consumes — the attention of its recipients [301]. That is, a wealth of information
15
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creates a poverty of attention and the need to allocate that attention appropriately, a task that
signifies the first of several steps away from the path of rationality.
Simon’s work encouraged researchers to pursue an understanding of actual decision making —
rather than only focusing on the study of decision making within the vacuum of rationality.
In time, these endeavours inspired two schools of thought within decision theory, namely pre-
scriptive decision theory, and descriptive decision theory [1, 426]. Prescriptive models typically
assume ideal circumstances in order to accommodate the best (i.e. most rational) path a person
can take so as to make the most suitable decision in a specific context. In contrast, descriptive
models of decision making are designed to define how people actually make decisions under
real-world circumstances, regardless of their rationality.
The value of prescriptive models remains largely theoretical — people rarely, if ever, operate
under the presumed circumstances of such theories [186]. In contrast, descriptive models are
of great practical value. Rather than idealising the conditions of a typical decision making
process, scholars are able to study and better understand the internal schemas people actually
use when making decisions [51]. Daniel Kahneman [262, 456], one of the most respected decision
theorists of our time, received a Nobel Prize in part for his work in descriptive theory. A
topic of special interest to Kahneman was the distinction between intuition and reasoning [258].
Kahneman’s work, among those of many others (see, for example, Epstein [145], Hammond [201],
and Jacoby [235]), led to the establishment of a formal typology of cognition. Stanovich and
West [432] were first to suggest the terms System 1 thinking (i.e. intuitive) and System 2 thinking
(i.e. analytical) as descriptors of the typology.
System 1 thinking refers to our intuitive system, which is typically effortless, fast, automatic,
implicit and emotional [44, 51, 215]. Consider Figures 3.1 and 3.2 as illustrations of the working
of System 1 thinking.
Figure 3.1: An illustration of System 1 thinking [51].
Studying Figure 3.1, most analysts are of the opinion (and correctly so) that the second tree
from the left is the tallest. This reflex judgement is a result of System 1 thinking and is of great
practical value [51]. Imagine an employee tasked with the responsibility of identifying the tallest
ten percent of trees in a large plantation. It would be laborious and inefficient to measure the
height of every tree. According to System 1 thinking, some form of intuitive judgement should
instead be utilised to save time and reduce effort [111]. In view of its efficiency it is tempting
to think of System 1 thinking as a robust approach. Consider, however, the second example
of System 1 thinking illustrated in Figure 3.2. After brief consideration, most analysts would
agree that the surface of the table on the right could be described as being more square than
that of the table on the left. This reflex judgement is once again a result of System 1 thinking,
but in this instance it is, in fact, failing the analyst. To illustrate this failure, attempt the
following System 2 strategy: Place a sheet of paper over the drawing and trace the top of either
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table. Align the traced square over the other table and see how the tables align perfectly. The
two illustrations above qualify System 1 thinking as an invaluable tool in the decision makers
toolbox, but also one that should be used with care [51].
Figure 3.2: An illustration of the limitations of System 1 thinking [51].
System 2 thinking refers to one’s analytical system working in tandem with the brain’s central
working memory system, a partnership appropriately described by the words slow, conscious,
laborious, explicit, logical, and sequential in nature [200, 259]. Despite its limited capacity and
slower speed of operation, System 2 thinking permits an analyst to engage in abstract hypo-
thetical thinking, something that cannot be achieved by System 1 thinking [149]. Consider the
case of a vehicle driver, for example, who has to select the appropriate gear during the execu-
tion of a left-turn manoeuvre. The driver could make his or her selection on the basis of past
experience [12] — an intuitive process that requires little reflection. The driver may, however,
also make the decision by constructing mental models of possible future events, hypothetically
testing the effectiveness of several courses of action (i.e. employ abstract hypothetical think-
ing) [149]. Although one could definitely argue that simply relying upon past experience would
be the most effective strategy in many instances of decision making in which time is of the
essence, the distinctly human facility of simulating possible future events is of great importance
— we cannot afford to learn by experience to avoid disasters such as nuclear wars, for example.
In view of the literature reviewed above, it is tempting to argue that the bounded nature of
human decision making is limited to the mechanisms of System 1 thinking. In reality, however,
this is not the case: System 1 and System 2 thinking are not exclusive modes of cognition that
function independently [149]. These modes of thinking form a dynamic partnership with the goal
of making better quality decisions — within the context of this dissertation, decision making is
analysed in this light. In the remainder of this section, various judgement heuristics that form
part of human decision making, as well as the cognitive biases that render heuristic judgement
imperfect, are investigated.
3.2 Judgement heuristics
The human ability to make judgements — to perceive stimuli, filter out relevant information,
assess that information according to some internal criterion, all the while maintaining applica-
bility to the context under consideration — is certainly quite remarkable. Over the years many
philosophers have pondered this ability, weighing its effectiveness and the moral foundations of
its assessment. As these questions remain of interest, this section is devoted to an inquiry into
the practical mechanisms of human judgement.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 Chapter 3. The bounds of human rationality
Toward that end, the following logical principle is noted: The nature of the environment within
which a decision is made constitutes the determinants of the strategies that can be deemed
appropriate. Accordingly, the uncertain nature of the real world results in most human decisions
being based upon a number of beliefs with respect to the probabilistic likelihood of uncertain
events [456]. Typical examples of such decisions include the outcome of an election, the future
value of the South African Rand, or the guilt of a defendant in a court case. It is simply
impossible to know the outcome of these kinds of real-world events with probabilistic certainty,
a fact that begs several questions of importance, such as: What are the origins of the beliefs
that dictate individual decision making? or By which mechanisms do people assess the likelihood
of uncertain events [456]? These questions underlie the theme of this section: The manner in
which people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles aimed at simplifying the complex
task of predicting values and assessing likelihoods. In general, these heuristics are useful, but
occasionally they lead to severe and systematic errors [68].
Various kinds of heuristics are considered in this chapter. Consider a mortgage banker, for
example, who might follow the heuristic of spending only 35% of income on property, or the
poker player who might follow the heuristic of never playing for an inside straight. Although an
understanding of these specific heuristics is important to the aforementioned professionals, their
applicability falls outside the scope of this chapter. This chapter is dedicated to a review of the
more general cognitive heuristics that affect virtually everyone. These general heuristics are par-
titioned into three categories, namely: Simple heuristics, complex heuristics and hyper-heuristics.
Simple heuristics refer to those heuristics that constitute a single rule of thumb used by individ-
uals as a guiding principle in decision making. Complex heuristics, on the other hand, are those
heuristics that utilise multiple rules of thumb (i.e. simple heuristics) and intricate cognitive
processes during judgement actions and decision making. Finally, hyper-heuristics represent the
class of heuristics that approach decision making by selecting, combining and adapting several
simple and complex heuristics. These categories are not formally recognised in the literature,
but are suggested by the author as a beneficial classification of heuristics within the context of
this dissertation.
Finally, it should be intuitively apparent that there are many simple heuristics. There are,
in fact, too many of these heuristics to document effectively. Inspired by the academic liter-
ature, the predominant focus of this section is thus dedicated to the working of complex and
hyper-heuristics, although a select few simple heuristics are also discussed. More specifically,
the following hyper-heuristics are considered: The affect heuristic and the simulation heuristic.
Thereafter, the following complex heuristics are considered: The availability heuristic, the rep-
resentativeness heuristic, the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, and the recognition heuristic.
Finally, the following simple heuristics are considered in closing: The similarity heuristic and
the effort heuristic.
3.2.1 The affect heuristic
Recognition of the affect heuristic [424] is probably one of the most important developments in
the study of judgement heuristics during the past few decades. A strong, early proponent of the
importance of affect in decision making was Zajonc [493], who argued that affective reactions
to stimuli are often an individual’s very first reaction, occurring automatically and guiding
subsequent information processing and judgement. As used here, the word “affect” refers to the
specific quality of “goodness” or “badness” experienced as a feeling state.
At present, there is compelling evidence in the literature confirming Zajonc’s initial proposition
that every stimulus elicits an affective evaluation that occurs before any higher level reasoning
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takes place and frequently forms the basis of subsequent decision making (see the reviews by
Bargh [45] or Zajonc [492, 493] in this respect). This phenomenon by which decision makers
utilise their affective response as a basis for subsequent decision making captures the essence of
the affect heuristic.
As is often the case with anything involving emotions, the affect heuristic does not exhibit
the features of constituent elements of an exact science. There are a number of elements that
determine the degree to which individual decision making is influenced by affect dynamic in
nature. These elements include (but are not limited to): The characteristics of the decision
maker, the characteristics of the decision making task, and the dynamic interaction between the
decision maker and the task. In other words, individuals differ in the way they react affectively
and the extent to which they are inclined to rely on affective feedback; while tasks differ with
respect to their evaluability (i.e. the relative affective salience of information) [424].
3.2.2 The simulation heuristic
During the latter half of the 20th century, computerised simulation techniques have become one
of the dominant methods of optimisation. Interestingly, however, within the realm of optimi-
sation by simulation, the decision sciences have been rather late to the party — the mental
models of human cognition have long since incorporated simulating capacities. Accordingly, the
simulation heuristic describes the cognitive process of constructing mental models of reality in
which hypothetical events take place [374]. These models may be constrained and controlled in
several ways: The starting conditions can be left to equal their realistic default values, or can
be modified to account for some special contingency. Furthermore, the model’s outcomes may
be left unspecified, or a target outcome may be set, in which case the model’s objective would
be to find a path to that state from the initial conditions [263].
Similar to a computerised simulation, a cognitive simulation does not necessarily have to produce
a single story. In fact, the ease with which a model can produce different parallel outcomes is a
critical criterion when judging the likelihood of multiple competing outcomes. More specifically,
the ease with which the simulation of a system reaches a particular state can be utilised to judge
the propensity of the real system producing that state [263]. Consider the following example
which illustrates the working of the simulation heuristic.
During a study on the simulation heuristic, Kahneman [263] presented participants with the
following scenario: “Mr. Crane and Mr. Tees were both scheduled to leave the airport at the same
time, but on different flights. They travelled from a nearby town in the same limousine, were
caught in a traffic jam and arrived at the airport thirty minutes after the scheduled departure
time of their flights. On arrival, Mr. Crane was told that his flight had left on time, while Mr.
Tees was told that his flight had been delayed, and had just left five minutes prior to his arrival.
Who would be more upset? Mr. Crane or Mr. Tees.”
It should come as no surprise that 96% of participants argued that Mr. Tees would be more
upset. What is it that makes this stereotype so obvious? Note that the objective situation of
the two gentlemen are identical — both have missed their flight. In every sense of the word, the
difference between Mr. Tees and Mr. Crane is immaterial. Why then should Mr. Tees be more
upset? Interestingly, Mr. Tees is expected to be more upset, because it would be easier for him to
construct mental simulations in which he could have arrived five minutes earlier, than it would
be for Mr. Crane to imagine how the thirty minute delay could have been avoided [263]. This
example effectively illustrates the way individuals utilise the simulation heuristic to determine
the likelihood of events, based on the ease with which mental models that lead to such events
can be constructed.
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3.2.3 The availability heuristic
The (complex) availability heuristic was established to capture one of the most widely shared
assumptions in decision making and social judgement research: People estimate the frequency of
an event, or the likelihood of its occurrence, by the ease with which instances of, or associations
with, that event come to mind [455]. For example, a product manager may base his or her
assessment of the probability that a new product will capture the imagination of the market
on his or her recollection of the performance of similar products in the past [51]. This strategy
would be effective in most cases, for the ease with which our minds recall instances of events is
generally proportional to the actual frequency of that event [407].
The availability heuristic is, however, fallible — the availability of information in an individual’s
memory is influenced by multiple factors that are unrelated to the objective frequency of an
event. For example, an event that evokes emotions is easily imagined and will be more easily
available in memory than an event that is unemotional, bland, difficult to imagine, or vague [51].
Similar to the other heuristics discussed in this section, the fallibility of its nature renders the
availability heuristic a tool that should be understood and employed with caution.
3.2.4 The representativeness heuristic
The literature describes the representativeness heuristic as being descriptive of an individual’s
cognitive processes when making judgements about an object or person by comparing them
with representations, stored in memory, of other objects or people [183, 455]. Simply put,
when making judgements about an individual, people tend to look for recognisable traits that
correspond with previously formed stereotypes [456].
Consider an individual, Mr or Mrs X, who has been described as introverted, meek, meticulous
and solemn. Given a set of occupational roles (e.g. salesman, farmer, pilot, librarian, physician),
how would one evaluate the likelihood of Mr or Mrs X engaging in each of the respective occu-
pations? When faced with these kinds of linking judgements, individuals typically employ the
representativeness heuristic and proceed to measure the similarity between the given character-
istics of Mr or Mrs X and the stereotype of each occupation, ordering the occupations by the
degree to which Mr or Mrs X is an accurate representation of the respective stereotypes [51].
In some cases, like the situation described above, the representativeness heuristic can be a
useful decision making tool, but this heuristic can also lead to serious errors in judgement. For
instance, it took a long time for the medical society to accept the germ theory of disease [51].
Physicians found it difficult to accept the notion that viruses or bacteria could cause such
devastating consequences as tuberculosis or measles. Instead, because they were relying on the
representativeness heuristic to inform judgement, it was believed for centuries that disease was
caused by malevolent agents, such as magic spells or evil spirits [51].
Interestingly, there seems to be a correlation in the literature between the representativeness
heuristic and the study of transference within the field of social psychology. Transference refers
to the phenomenon whereby assumptions and experiences learned during past relationships
resurface in present-day relations [175]. In the socio-cognitive model of transference, this notion
is defined in terms of the activation and use of a significant-other representation in an encounter
with a new person [19]. The activated significant-other representation is typically utilised to
make various assumptions about the encountered individual, not unlike the representativeness
heuristic (see Chen et al. [105] for a discussion in this respect).
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3.2.5 The anchoring and adjustment heuristic
Studies have shown that when asked, respondents typically do not know the exact year George
Washington became the first president of America. They do know, however, that it had to have
been after 1776, as the declaration of independence was signed in 1776. Thus, while calculating
their answer, individuals tend to use the year 1776 (i.e. what they know with certainty) as a
starting point. Respondents simply add a few years to their initial estimate until they reckon
that they have reached a plausible answer [419].
In the face of uncertainty, as illustrated in the above example, individuals tend to make judge-
ments by starting from an initial position that is then adjusted to yield a final answer. The
initial position may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, the experience of the ana-
lyst or may be the result of a partial computation [456]. This tendency to utilise what is known
as an anchor while exploring the unknown captures the essence of the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic [143].
Like other heuristics that enable efficient decision making, the anchoring and adjustment heuris-
tic can cause serious errors in judgement [143]. In one of the best-known anchoring studies [456],
research participants were given a random number between zero and one hundred. The partici-
pants were then asked to indicate whether the percentage of African nations that were members
of the United Nations were higher or lower then the respective value they were given. Results
clearly illustrated that the final estimates were influenced by the random number provided ini-
tially [437]. This finding, that an absolute numerical judgement may be assimilated toward
the standard of a preceding comparative judgement, has been replicated multiple times in the
literature (see, for example, Cervone and Peake [95], Jacowitz and Kahneman [236], Northcraft
and Neale [351], and Plous [362]).
3.2.6 The recognition heuristic
Every day people wander through streams of sights, sounds, odours, tastes, and tactile impres-
sions, some of which are novel while others have been experienced previously. The cognitive
mechanism for distinguishing between novel and previously experienced stimuli seems to be
rather specialised and robust [120, 405]. The recognition heuristic utilises this intricate mecha-
nism in order to determine the value of multiple, competing stimuli. Furthermore, the following
rule of thumb is utilised in this sifting process: If one of two objects is recognised, then the
conclusion is drawn that the recognised object has a higher value with respect to the relevant
criterion [191]. Consider the following example of this basic assumption.
In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Final Problem, Sherlock Holmes finally faces his arch enemy,
Professor Moriarty. While describing Moriarty to Watson, the following conversation takes
place: “You have probably never heard of Professor Moriarty, have you Watson?” “Never.”
“Aye, there’s the genius and the wonder of the thing! The man pervades London, and no one
has heard of him. That’s what puts him on a pinnacle in the records of crime” [354]. Sherlock
Holmes is clearly implying that extraordinary things can usually not avoid being known and
thus, being recognised. The fact that Watson had not heard of Professor Moriarty would have
been much less surprising if he was insignificant. In other words, it is assumed that recognition
is often proportional to importance with respect to a specific criterion [354].
The recognition heuristic needs to be distinguished from the availability heuristic, as described
in §3.2.3 [455]. The availability heuristic is based on recall, not recognition. People are able
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to recognise far more items than they can recall [354]. Furthermore, availability is a graded
distinction between items in memory that is measured by the ease with which instances of, and
associations with, an event come to mind [455]. The recognition heuristic, on the other hand,
does not address comparisons between items in memory, but rather the difference between items
in and out of memory [190].
3.2.7 The similarity heuristic
The law of similarity, as a general principle, captured the attention of modern psychologists
during a study on the response of educated Americans (i.e. undergraduates) to disgusting stim-
uli [391]. As described by Frazer [171] and Mauss [226], the law of similarity can be defined
by the following statement: Like causes like, which essentially holds that causes resemble their
effects. This statement forms the basic assumption of the (simple) similarity heuristic that
individuals utilise in judgement and decision making.
An example of the “like causes like” principle can be found in modern medicine. The modern
medical predilection is to assume that the treatment of a disease will have some surface relation to
the presumed cause of the disease. Thus, in order to discover a cure for a disease, pharmaceutical
scientists initially focus on the cause of the disease in the hope that the cause will illuminate or
suggest the cure [188].
Interestingly, there seems to be a strong overlap between the similarity heuristic and the repre-
sentativeness heuristic [456], as described in §3.2.4. During application of the representativeness
heuristic, an entity or event is assigned to a category based on the similarity of its principal
features with other members of that category. If the category in question is causes and their
effects (e.g. the process of identifying the damage to a vehicle by analysing the symptoms), the
similarity heuristic seems to partner with the representativeness heuristic and work in tandem.
3.2.8 The effort heuristic
The notion that effort influences judgement is an old and important idea in social psychol-
ogy [275]. Some of the earliest work in dissonance [157] and self-perception [58] demonstrated
that the more effort individuals invest, whether in the form of time, money or physical exertion,
the more positively they evaluate the product of that effort [275]. In other words, individuals
utilise effort as a heuristic to determine quality.
A common phenomenon in an education system is that students often complain about poor
grades. Occasionally, such protests stem from errors in the grading system or strategic attempts
by students to “work” the system, but normally, the grades are correct, and the protest sin-
cere [275]. As a matter of fact, this protest is a result of the effort heuristic — the student’s
inherent assumption that because he or she had invested a great deal of effort, the outcome of
the effort should have been great as well.
As the previous example illustrated, the quality of an item can be difficult to determine. For
example, the quality of a managerial decision, the theoretical contribution of an academic
manuscript or the monetary value of a painting, can all be difficult qualities to assess. Conse-
quently, individuals utilise effort as an indicator of quality [275]. All else equal, paintings that
receive the lion’s share of an artist’s attention tend to be of a superior quality when compared
with those that receive less attention. Note, however, that the relationship between effort and
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quality is inconsistent. As any artist knows, a moment of inspiration can occasionally rival what
would otherwise take hours to produce.
3.3 Cognitive biases
The human mind carries spectacular power in its modest one and a half kilogram of mass.
With little effort, people are able to accomplish sophisticated tasks, such as recognising faces or
catching a ball. Most people are, however, largely unaware of how their minds accomplish these
complex tasks. This lack of insight into the dynamics of our minds might seem insignificant,
but such ignorance has the potential to result in profound consequences [51]. Without an
understanding of the dynamics that drive decision making, it is impossible to anticipate when
cognitive processes, which normally serve us well, are leading us astray. The focus in the previous
section was on a number of judgement heuristics employed in pursuit of understanding decision
making. This section furthers that pursuit with a review of a number of cognitive biases that
render these heuristics imperfect.
A cognitive bias refers to the systematic pattern of deviation from rationality in judgement and
decision making, whereby assumptions about other people or situations are made in an illogical
fashion [205]. There are many cognitive biases [51, 68, 205, 456]. In fact, there are too many
to investigate exhaustively in detail. In the following section, only the most relevant cognitive
biases are discussed. Furthermore, mimicking the general approach in the academic literature,
these biases are reviewed with respect to the heuristics they influence. Table 3.1 contains a
synthesis of all documented cognitive biases the author could uncover in the literature.
3.4 Biases emanating from the affect heuristic
There is no dearth of evidence to substantiate the claim that individuals perceive reality accord-
ing to two distinct modes of thinking — System 1 and System 2 thinking (described in §3.1) [425].
While these modes of thinking function interdependently, they remain fundamentally unique.
A defining characteristic of System 1 thinking is its affective foundation [424] and, more specif-
ically, its employment of the affect heuristic. Section 3.2.1 was dedicated to the affect heuristic
and contained a strong case in favour of its use, portraying it as the centrepiece of the System 1
mode of thinking. Like other heuristics, however, reliance on the affect heuristic can also lead one
astray. Although not formally coined as judgment heuristics, several phenomena documented in
the literature render this heuristic imperfect. These phenomena are discussed in the remainder
of this section.
3.4.1 Manipulation of affect in our daily lives
Being vulnerable to affective influence is the doorway to many beautiful human qualities, such
as empathy and altruism. The danger of affective manipulation, however, is that it often takes
place subconsciously — rendering us slaves to its influence [425]. Consider, for example, the
subtle influence of affect-laden tags, such as “new,” “organic,” and “improved,” often printed on
commercial products, or that of the affectively pleasing stage-names entertainers tend to adopt.
One wonders whether the careers of John Legend, Avicii and Bruno Mars would have been as
successful if they were to perform under their real names — John Stephens, Tim Bergling and
Peter Hernandez, respectively. Objectively, these affectively pleasing tags and names do not add
any kind of value, yet they dynamically influence our judgements [425].
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Table 3.1: List of cognitive biases.
Bias Description References
Failures of the affective sys-
tem
The tendency to overvalue affectively
pleasing stimuli.
[158, 295, 423, 425]
The optimistic bias The phenomenon where people’s pre-
dictions about future events tend to be
optimistically biased.
[77, 188]
The ease of recall bias The tendency to overestimate the fre-
quency of an event because of the vivid-
ness, recency or familiarity of a memory
associated with an event.
[51, 407, 456]
The retrievability bias The tendency to overestimate the fre-
quency of an event because of the struc-
ture of the search set.
[51, 457]
The illusory correlation bias The tendency to overestimate the fre-
quency of co-occurrence with respect to
phenomena that are similar to prede-
termined natural associations.
[97, 455]
The insensitivity to prior
probability of outcomes bias
The tendency to ignore base rate infor-
mation.
[11, 51, 261, 329]
The insensitivity to sample
size bias
The tendency to underestimate varia-
tion in small samples.
[43, 151, 260, 456]
The misconceptions of chance
bias
The tendency to view chance as a self-
correcting process in which a deviation
in any direction induces a deviation in
the opposite direction.
[51, 59, 260, 456]
The illusion of validity bias The phenomenon whereby people make
categorical predictions, but fail to ques-
tion the validity of input information.
[261, 260, 456]
The insensitivity to predictive
accuracy bias
The phenomenon whereby people make
numerical predictions, but fail to ques-
tion the validity of input information.
[261, 260, 456]
The misconceptions of text
regression bias
The belief that outcome should be max-
imally representative of input, which
results in inaccurate future predictions.
[181, 209, 261, 456]
The anchoring bias The tendency to rely too heavily on a
single piece of information during deci-
sion making.
[144, 143, 336, 456]
The belief bias The tendency to evaluate the logical
strength of an argument by the believ-
ability of its conclusion.
[150, 271, 303, 342]
The confirmation bias The tendency to ignore information
that contradicts one’s beliefs.
[272, 363, 344]
The conjunction fallacy The tendency to assume that more spe-
cific conditions are more likely than
general ones.
[363, 457]
The distinction bias The tendency to view two options as
more distinct when evaluated simul-
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Table 3.1 (continued): List of cognitive biases.
Bias Description References
The framing effect The phenomenon where people draw
different conclusions from the same in-
formation depending on how it is pre-
sented.
[154, 286, 299]
The hindsight bias The tendency to overestimate the pre-
dictability of an outcome after it has
occurred.
[24, 110, 363]
The illusion of control bias The tendency to overestimate one’s in-
fluence over external events.
[140, 448]
The negativity bias The psychological effect by which indi-
viduals have a greater recall of unpleas-
ant memories than positive ones.
[89, 197, 392]
The omission bias The tendency to judge harmful ac-
tions as less moral than equally harmful
omissions.
[48, 381]
The outcome bias The inclination to judge a decision ac-
cording to its eventual outcome instead
of by the quality of the decision making
process.
[47, 202]
The overconfidence bias The general tendency to have excessive
confidence in one’s personal solutions to
problems.
[66, 139, 363]
The consistency bias The tendency to incorrectly remember
one’s past thoughts, perspectives, val-
ues and behaviour as resembling one’s
current self.
[83]
Cryptomnesia A form of misattribution where mem-
ory is mistaken for imagination.
[403]
The fading affect bias The phenomenon where emotions asso-
ciated with a negative memory fades
quicker than emotions associated with
a pleasant memory.
[380, 472, 473]
The peak-end rule bias The tendency to evaluate an experience
not by its sum, but according to the
average of what it was like at its peak
and when it ended.
[257, 321]
The picture superiority te
effect
The manner in which concepts that
are learned by visual imagery are more
readily and frequently recalled than
concepts that are learned by reading.
[126, 308, 416, 482]
The availability cascade A self-reinforcing phenomenon in which
a collective belief gains plausibility
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3.4.2 Failures of the affective system
The failures of the affective system are not exclusively the result of external manipulation. The
affective features that become salient in a judgement or decision making process can be faulty
as a result of a number of inherent, internal, uniquely affective biases [424]. One such bias seems
to surface when the affective system is tasked with the responsibility of discriminating between
minor and substantial changes in the environment. For example, the affective system seems
wired to sensitize individuals to small changes in their environment, at the cost of making them
less able to respond appropriately to larger changes in their environment (e.g. the difference
between 0 and 1 deaths in some accident, compared with the difference between 570 and 670
deaths) [425]. Fetherstonhaugh et al. [158] referred to this insensitivity to the magnitude of
change as “psychological numbing.”
Similar to magnitude, time has an interesting effect on the affect heuristic. It seems that decision
makers are unable to appropriately evaluate changes that take place over a long period of time or
are remote in time [425]. Today’s hunger, pain and anger are palpable, but the same sensations
anticipated in the future receive little weight [295]. The irrationality of the decision to start
smoking is a prime example of such a failure to weight future consequences appropriately [423].
During a survey, Slovic [423] asked participants the following question: “If you had to choose
all over again, would you start smoking?” More than 80% of young smokers (ages 14–22) and
about 85% of adult smokers answered “no,” dramatically illustrating the failure of the affective
system to account for the impact of change that takes place over a long period of time.
3.5 A bias emanating from the simulation heuristic
Muhammad Ali captured the grandeur of our ability to imagine when he said, “The man who
has no imagination has no wings.” In addition to its inspiring potential, the human imagination
is often employed in rather mundane tasks. One such task is the assessment of the frequency
of an event whose instances are not stored in memory, but have to be generated (i.e. simu-
lated) according to a given rule [263]. In such instances, an individual would typically employ
the simulation heuristic, as defined in §3.2.2, by generating several hypothetical outcomes and
evaluating the likelihood of those outcomes by the ease with which they were generated [456].
Unfortunately, the ease with which outcomes are generated does not always reflect their true
frequency. This mode of evaluation is susceptible to several biases, one of which is the optimistic
bias.
The optimistic bias is at the heart of the most robust findings in the psychology of predictive
judgement, which is that people’s predictions about future events tend to be optimistically
biased [188]. Although it is a wonderful thing to be optimistic, it has been found by a number of
metrics and across a variety of domains that people assign higher probabilities to the attainment
of desirable outcomes than either logical analysis or objective criteria would warrant. Empirical
studies of the planning fallacy have, for example, shown that people expect to complete projects
in less time than it actually ends up taking [77]. This inherent sense of optimism which deters
a more realistic simulation of future events can result in unpleasant consequences.
Surveys concerning the risk of falling victim to auto-mobile accidents [386], crime [479], and se-
rious disease [203] have found that people believe their risk is less than average. While this belief
may result in exaggerated feelings of safety and security, it also inhibits precaution. Evidently,
too many people recognise the danger of certain behavioural patterns only after they fall victim
to these patterns.
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3.6 Biases emanating from the availability heuristic
In general, availability is a useful tool for determining the frequency or probability of an event.
The availability of an event in memory is, however, influenced by a number of dynamics other
than the frequency and probability of that event [456]. Consequently, relying on the availability
heuristic leads to predictable errors in judgement (i.e. biases), some of which are reviewed in
the remainder of this section. These biases include the ease of recall bias, the retrievability bias,
and the illusory correlation bias.
3.6.1 The ease of recall bias
In pursuit of identifying the dynamics of the availability heuristic, Bazerman [51] presented
participants with a list stating the five most common causes of death in the United States
during the ten year period from 1990 to 2000. The following causes were listed: Tobacco, poor
dietary habits and physical inactivity, motor vehicle accidents, firearms, and illicit drug use.
The participants were asked to rank these causes of death from most common to least common.
In general, when tasked with such an assignment, an effective strategy would be to utilise the
availability heuristic and attempt to retrieve instances (in memory) of the respective causes of
death, consequently ranking the causes proportionally to the ease with which instances of the
respective causes were retrieved [455]. In this instance, however, this strategy caused participants
to underestimate the likelihood of death due to tobacco and poor diet, while overestimating the
number of deaths resulting from motor vehicle accidents, firearms and illicit drug use [51]. It
may come as a surprise that the causes of death listed in the previous paragraph are, in fact,
listed in order of frequency [328]. Why then, would participants conclude otherwise? This
deviation in judgement is a result of the vividness that is often associated with deaths resulting
from motor vehicle accidents, firearms or drugs. In the same way that seeing a house burn down
will have a greater impact on a subjective estimate of the probability of such incidents than
merely reading about a fire in a local paper, the increased vividness of deaths resulting from
motor vehicle accidents, firearms and illicit drug use increased the availability of such instances
in the memories of the participants. This increased availability is, however, not proportional to
the objective likelihood of such events [51].
In addition to vividness, there are other factors that affect the retrievability of an event. For
example, recent events are expected to be more easily available in memory than earlier events.
Furthermore, the familiarity of the item being retrieved from memory dramatically influences
its retrievability. In an elementary demonstration of this phenomenon, Tversky [456] exposed
subjects to lists of well-known male or female celebrities. In some of the lists, the women were
relatively more well-known than the men, and in others the men were relatively more well-
known than the women. After being read out loud, participants were asked to judge whether a
list contained more male or female celebrities. In every instance, participants incorrectly judged
the class consisting of the better known celebrities to be the more numerous [456].
3.6.2 The retrievability bias
Suppose a word is sampled at random from a selection of the English literature. What is the
probability that the word will start with the letter r, compared with r being its third letter?
Individuals typically attempt to solve this problem by recalling words that begin with r (e.g.
rabbit) and words that have r as its third letter (e.g. bar). They consequently judge the relative
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frequency of the respective cases to be proportional to the ease with which the two types of
words come to mind [455].
Note the potential for bias in the above strategy. People are better at retrieving words from
memory using a word’s initial letter than a word’s third letter [51]. This is simply a result of the
way in which the human brain structures information in memory. Tversky and Kahneman [457]
demonstrated this retrievability bias beautifully, by showing that individuals estimated the fre-
quency of seven-letter words ending with the more memorable suffix ing to be greater than
the frequency of seven-letter words with the letter n in the sixth position. This is clearly in-
correct as all seven-letter words ending with ing, have the letter n in the sixth position. This
example illustrates the subtle way in which the structure of information in memory, and the
structure of the world itself, interact to weaken one’s search strategies, establishing the origin
of the retrievability bias.
Note that the retrievability bias is fundamentally different from the ease of recall bias discussed
in the previous section. While the ease of recall is determined by the character of that which
is being recalled, the ease of retrieval is determined instead by the interaction between the
structure of the brain and the structure of things searched for. In other words, the retrievability
bias does not regard the emotional intensity of a memory, for example, but only considers the
structure of that memory in the brain and how that structure influences the ease of its retrieval,
deeming the documentation of both biases appropriate.
3.6.3 The illusory correlation bias
Chapman and Chapman [97] chronicled an interesting bias in the judgement of the frequency
with which two events co-occur. In a particular study, Chapman and Chapman presented
inexperienced participants with the clinical diagnoses and test material of several hypothetical
patients. After a given time during which participants could study the respective documents,
they were asked to estimate the frequency with which each diagnosis (e.g. suspiciousness or
paranoia) had been accompanied by certain symptoms (e.g. peculiarities in the expression of
the eyes). The results indicated that subjects overestimated the frequency of co-occurrence
with respect to phenomena that were similar to predetermined natural associations, such as
suspiciousness and peculiar eyes. This effect was labelled illusory correlation. The illusory
correlation effect proved exceptionally resistant to contradictory data and prevented participants
from identifying relationships that were actually present [97].
The availability heuristic provides a natural explanation for the illusory correlation effect. The
boundaries between the specific instance being investigated and the more generally available
memory are blurred. Judgement of how frequently a diagnosis is accompanied by certain symp-
toms in a specific instance is biased by the more general associations that are predetermined
(more available) in memory. According to this view, the illusory correlation between suspicious-
ness and peculiar eyes, for example, is a result of the fact that suspiciousness is readily associated
with an individual’s eyes [455].
Life-long experience teaches one that the associative connections between events are strength-
ened when they co-occur frequently. As a result, individuals have developed fitting strategies to
determine the co-occurrence frequency of events by the ease with which relevant mental oper-
ations of association can be performed. As the preceding examples demonstrate, however, this
valuable decision making procedure is vulnerable to systematic errors.
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3.7 Biases emanating from the representativeness heuristic
First described by Tversky and Kahneman in the 1970s [455], the representativeness heuristic is
a decision making strategy that employs the use of past experiences to guide decision making.
More specifically, the representativeness heuristic is employed when individuals make judgements
about an object or person, by comparing them with representations, stored in memory, of other
objects or people (see §3.2.4 for a more comprehensive description) [183]. This approach to
judgement and decision making may lead to serious errors — several factors that should be
taken in account when evaluating likelihood plays no role in judgements of similarity. Notably,
the following biases are considered: The insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes bias, the
insensitivity to sample size bias, the misconceptions of chance bias, the insensitivity to predictive
accuracy bias, the illusion of validity bias, and the misconceptions of regression bias.
3.7.1 The insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes bias
One of the elements that has a major effect on probability, but no effect on representativeness
is the prior probability of an event. Consider once again the example of §3.2.4 in which an
analyst was asked to identify the day job of a Mr or Mrs X from a set of occupational roles
(e.g. farmer, librarian, pilot, salesman or physician) based on a brief personality portrait. The
fact that there are many more farmers than librarians in the general population, for example,
should have entered into any sensible estimate of whether Mr or Mrs X is a farmer or librar-
ian [11]. Unfortunately, however, considerations of the similarity between Mr or Mrs X and
typical stereotypes pay no attention to prior probability, rendering the typical analysis incom-
plete. Ignoring prior probability in this way may result in many unfortunate implications [51].
Prospective entrepreneurs, for example, typically have far too much confidence in their future
success and far too little appreciation for the prior probability of business failure. Many of these
entrepreneurs end up loosing their life savings as a result [329].
In an experiment that related to the prevalence of the prior probability bias, Kahneman and
Tversky [261] presented participants with the following excerpt: “Dick is a 30 year old man. He
is married with no children. A man of impressive ability and high motivation, he promises to be
quite successful in his field. He is well liked by his colleagues.” The participants were furthermore
told that the group from which this description had been sampled consisted of seventy engineers
and thirty lawyers. The description had been designed to convey no information relevant to
the follow-up question, which was whether Dick was an engineer or a lawyer. Consequently,
participants were expected to judge the probability of Dick being an engineer to be proportional
to the distribution of engineers in the group. The participants, however, judged the probability
of Dick being an engineer to be 0.5 regardless of the stated proportion of engineers in the group
being 0.7.
Evidently, people are surprisingly insensitive to the prior probability of an outcome. And al-
though the representativeness heuristic is a powerful decision making tool, its weaknesses should
be kept in mind.
3.7.2 The insensitivity to sample size bias
Errors and biases in judgement under uncertainty are a major source of data for mapping the
boundaries of a person’s statistical intuition. In a series of ingenious experiments, Kahneman
and Tversky [260] elucidated a section of this boundary by demonstrating people’s insensitivity
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to the effects of sample size on probability. Subjects were presented with the following example:
“A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each
day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you know, about 50%
of all babies are boys. The exact percentage of baby boys, however, varies from day to day.
Sometimes it may be lower than 50%, sometimes higher. For a period of one year, each hospital
recorded the days on which more than 60% of the babies were boys.” Which hospital do you
think recorded more such days?
Most of the participants (56%) judged the number of recorded days to be the same for the small
and large hospitals. In contrast, sample theory holds that the expected number of days on which
more than 60% of babies were boys, should be much larger for the small hospital. Essentially,
a large sample is less likely to deviate from the mean (i.e. 50%) [43]. This fundamental notion
in statistics is evidently not part of human intuition. Furthermore, this insensitivity to sample
size seems to persist in judgements of posterior probability (i.e. the probability that a sample
has been drawn from a certain population) [260, 456].
Interestingly, the academic literature is not coherent with respect to the insensitivity to sample
size bias. Several researchers, including, Evans and Dusoir [151] and Bar-Hillel [43], repeated the
above experiments only to arrive at results that were not consistent with that of Kahneman and
Tversky [260]. Evans and Dusoir claimed that the tasks employed in Kahneman and Tversky’s
experiments were too complex to support an adequate test of the role of sample size. Bar-Hillel,
on the other hand, did not provide specific critique, but also failed to replicate Kahneman and
Tversky’s original results [43]. In spite of these conflicting findings, the greater portion of the
literature does seem to support the original findings of Kahneman and Tversky.
3.7.3 The misconceptions of chance bias
“Once we realize that imperfect understanding is the human condition, there is no
longer shame in being wrong, only in failing to correct our mistakes.” — George Soros
Our imperfect understanding of the world is, at least in part, the product of inherent incon-
sistencies in the strategies the human mind develops in order to cope with the unpredictable
nature of the world. A case in point is the misconceptions of chance that are generally present
in the intuitive analysis of statistics [59]. Evidently, people incorrectly expect that a sequence of
events generated by a random process will represent the essential characteristics of that process,
even when the generated sequence is short [456].
The following question illustrates this misconception: A married couple has had three girls
together. They are now expecting a fourth child, what is the chance of having another girl?
Most individuals have a strong intuitive sense that the probability of having four girls is unlikely.
Therefore, they posit that the probability of having a fourth girl should be less than 50% [51].
The problem with this reasoning is that the gender determination of every newborn baby is
an independent chance event; the sperm that determines whether the baby will be a boy or a
girl has no memory of prior impregnation. This example parallels research by Kahneman and
Tversky [260] who elucidated the fact that individuals expect a sequence of random events to
look random.
Consider the toss of a fair coin, which can either land heads (H) or tails (T). People judge
the sequence HTTHTH to be more likely than the sequence TTTHHH, which does not appear
random. Furthermore, people expect the former sequence to be more likely than the sequence
TTTTHT, which does not seem to represent the fairness of the coin.
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Despite the simplicity of these examples, they convincingly illustrate the fact that people expect
the essential characteristics of a process to be represented, not only globally, but also locally in
each of its parts. In contrast to this belief in representativeness, a locally representative sequence
deviates systematically from chance expectation [456]. In general, chance is commonly seen as a
self-correcting process in which a deviation in any direction induces a deviation in the opposite
direction in order to restore the equilibrium of the system. In reality, however, deviations are
not corrected — as a chance process unfolds, their effect is simply diluted [456].
3.7.4 The illusion of validity & insensitivity to predictive accuracy bias
In their article, Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases [456], Kahneman and Tver-
sky proposed a number of cognitive biases, including the illusion of validity and the insensitivity
to predictive accuracy. After a comprehensive investigation, it has become apparent that these
two biases are fundamentally similar. Both biases become relevant in the context of intuitive
predictions (i.e. when the representativeness heuristic is employed to order outcomes according
to the degree to which they represent the essential features of some input evidence) [261]. Both
biases are rooted in the way people place a great deal of confidence in their predictions, despite
the fact that the information upon which their predictions are based might be unreliable or
outdated. Evidently, the only difference between the illusion of validity and the insensitivity to
predictive accuracy is their context of application.
Kahneman and Tversky classified intuitive predictions into two discrete categories, namely cate-
gorical prediction and numerical prediction [260]. In the categorical case, the prediction is given
in nominal form (e.g. an individual’s future occupation, or the winner of an election). In the
numerical case, the prediction is given in numerical form (e.g. a student’s grade point average,
or the future value of a particular stock). These two categories define the dividing line between
the illusion of validity and the insensitivity to predictive accuracy — the former coming into
play during categorical prediction and the latter manifesting itself during numerical prediction.
During categorical prediction, people typically place a great deal of confidence in their predic-
tion that an individual belongs to a certain class when provided with a description of his or
her personality which matches that of the class stereotype, despite the possible inaccuracy of
information. For example, people place a great deal of confidence in their prediction that an
individual is a librarian, given that a description of his or her personality matches that of a
stereotypical librarian, despite the fact that the description may be unreliable or outdated. This
unjustified confidence in predictive accuracy in the context of categorical prediction is called the
illusion of validity [456].
Numerical prediction elicits a similar effect [261], the only difference being that the prediction
is in the form of a numerical value. Suppose a subject is given a description of a company,
and is asked to predict its future profit. If the description of the company provided is very
favourable, a very high profit will seem most representative of that description. If, however, the
description is mediocre, the representative profit will also be mediocre. Thus, the prediction is
dramatically influenced by the nature of the description. The presence of a good fit between the
description and future value, seems to cause individuals to ignore salient elements that should
be considered when estimating the future value of the company. The unwarranted confidence
that accompanies a good fit between available evidence and possible outcome in the context of
numerical prediction is called the insensitivity to predictive accuracy [456].
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3.7.5 The misconceptions of regression bias
The notion of regression to the mean, as coined by Galton [181], is one of the oldest in modern
statistics, yet it is still regarded as somewhat mysterious. The mystery lies not within its
mathematical definition, but rather in the driving forces behind its occurrence. The phenomenon
that Galton christened “regression” is connected to the occurrence and measurement of the
change in a particular characteristic from one sample to the next. More specifically, reference
is made to the manner in which data points regress toward the mean of a sample from one
generation to the next [456]. Galton originally noted that tall fathers tended to have tall sons.
While taller than average, however, the heights of the sons tended to be less extreme with respect
to the mean (i.e. the average height of the male population) than those of their fathers [209].
Galton described this dynamic by stating that the sons regressed toward the mean.
In more recent times, Kahneman and Tversky [456] investigated this idea of regression from the
perspective of judgement under uncertainty. They argued that the misconceptions of regression
were twofold: First, people do not expect regression in many instances where it is bound to
occur. Secondly, when people successfully recognise the occurrence of regression, they typically
invent spurious explanations for it [261]. Interestingly, Kahneman and Tversky were of the
opinion that the phenomenon of regression remained elusive because it was incompatible with
the popular belief that the outcome should be maximally representative of input [456]. The
failure to recognise the prevalence of regression may result in detrimental consequences, as
illustrated by the following example.
During the training of military fighter pilots, the successful execution of a complex flight ma-
noeuvre is typically followed by a deterioration during the next attempt. Similarly, a failed
attempt is typically followed by an improvement. These dynamics are in perfect harmony with
the notion of regression toward the mean and will occur even in the absence of feedback from the
instructor, although the instructor might conclude differently. Since flight instructors typically
praise a trainee after a good performance, and reprimand him or her after a poor performance,
they are liable to reach the false conclusion that punishment is more effective than positive
reinforcement in shaping behaviour [456].
3.8 A bias emanating from the anchoring heuristic
The nature of everyday life often requires people to estimate quantities that are subject to
uncertainty [142]. Fortunately the human mind has developed a number of strategies for coping
with tasks of this nature. One such strategy, described in §3.2.5, is the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic. Kahneman and Tversky [456], the pioneers of this heuristic, noted that in addition to
its ability to manage uncertainty in decision making, it also led to predictable deviations from
what is generally considered good judgement [143]. One such deviation is the anchoring bias.
In a demonstration of the anchoring bias, Kahneman and Tversky [456] instructed participants
to estimate a number of quantities in the form of a percentage (e.g. the percentage of African
countries that are members of the United Nations). For each question, a starting value (i.e. an
anchor) between 0 and 100 was established by spinning a wheel of fortune. Unknown to the
subjects, the wheel of fortune was rigged to stop at either 10 or 65 percent. After spinning the
wheel, participants had to judge whether the given starting value, as determined by the wheel
of fortune, was higher or lower than their estimate. Finally, participants had to state their final
estimate. It may seem counter-intuitive, but the initial value (i.e. either 10% or 65%) had a
profound influence on subjects’ subsequent estimates. For example, the median estimates for
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the percentage of countries in Africa that were part of the U.N. were 25% and 45%, for the
group of participants receiving 10% and 65% as initial value, respectively [456]. In general, the
starting information, or anchor, seems to exert a drag on the subsequent adjustment process,
resulting in final estimates that are too close to the original anchor.
Researchers have suggested a number of viable explanations for these anchoring effects. Testing
an idea first advanced by Quattrone et al. [370], Epley and Gilovich [143] obtained evidence
that people adjust insufficiently from an initial anchor because they stop adjusting once their
estimate falls within a certain range of reasonable values [144]. Therefore, individual estimates
tend to lie on the anchor’s side of this reasonable range, while, on average, the true value lies
closer to the middle of the range. Mussweiler and Strack [336] provided another explanation for
the anchoring bias by showing that the presence of an anchor elicits information from memory
that is consistent with the anchor, resulting in a similar drag effect.
3.9 Chapter summary
Uncertainty has proven to be one of the few things one can be certain to expect when making
the decisions that everyday life demands. This chapter was devoted to reviewing the critical
nature of the need to understand and be aware of the cognitive dynamics that influence daily
decision making. Ignorance of these dynamics is considered to be one of the root causes of poor
decision making.
The stage was set for a deeper investigation into the dynamics underlying decision making under
conditions of uncertainty by reviewing the notions of intuitive and analytical thinking in §3.1.
Subsequently, §3.2 was devoted to a description of the heuristics that are commonly employed
in judgements related to uncertain events. These heuristics were classified into three categories,
namely simple heuristics, complex heuristics and hyper-heuristics. Finally, several cognitive
biases that render judgement heuristics imperfect were described in §3.3–§3.8.
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“Our ability to reach unity in diversity will be the beauty and the test of our civilization”
— Mahatma Gandhi
Unity within diversity is truly a virtue worth pursuing. This chapter is devoted to a review
of topics in the academic literature that are related to the social dynamics of human decision
making and deemed influential in pre-empting such unity. These topics are introduced in §4.1
in the form of a discussion about the paradoxical existence of group behaviour, and this is
followed in §4.2 by a review of the dynamics internal to each individual member who forms part
of a group. Thereafter, the dynamics that exist between these individual group members are
discussed in §4.3. Finally, the phenomena that dictate intergroup interaction are discussed in
§4.4, before the chapter closes with a brief summary in §4.5.
4.1 The curious case of group behaviour
In the context of Western culture, consistency is a desirable characteristic. People who are
perceived as behaving consistently across a variety of situations are positively affirmed, while
inconsistent individuals are often labelled “two-faced” or “insincere” [439]. As a consequence,
Western theories of social behaviour and personality, such as theories of attribution [267], at-
titude change [31, 157], partner selection [442], and individual traits [322], to name but a few,
assume the importance of consistency between two domains, one related to an individual’s self-
concept and the other to his or her behaviour. Given the centrality of consistency in theories of
social behaviour and personality, it is curious that researchers of group dynamics paint a very
different picture concerning the behaviour of individuals under the influence of social stimuli.
In essence, much research on the dynamics that dominate behaviour in the context of a group
suggest that individuals are relatively pliable when it comes to fitting in and conforming to the
35
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expectations of others1 [223]. This posits an interesting question: Given the assumed impor-
tance of consistency in behaviour in theories of social behaviour and personality, why are people
willing to adapt their behaviour in the context of a group?
At the heart of this contradiction rests a conflict between two fundamental human motivations:
The need to be a consistent, differentiated individual and the need to experience group belong-
ing [223]. On the one hand, there is an abundance of evidence supporting the notion that a sense
of belonging within the context of a group is a powerful source of motivation (see Baumeister et
al. [50] for a thorough review of this notion) and that collective identities can be fundamental
to a person’s self-concept. On the other hand, there is equal evidence of a countervailing need
to differentiate oneself from others in a manner that is consistent with a person’s self-concept,
a process that is considered to be essential in defining the self [466]. Interestingly, the tension
within this paradox can be traced back to the building blocks of an individual’s self-concept —
the individual, relational, and collective self [105].
The areas of study that have contributed most to the discussion on the relationship between
the individual, relational and collective selves are social identity theory [218, 219, 453] and its
extension, self categorisation theory [454]. Advocates of these theories (collectively called the
social identity perspective [223]) argue that an individual’s sense of self is informed, at least in
part, by the groups to which he or she belongs [105]. Consequently, an individual’s self-concept
consists not only of distinct memories, attitudes and behaviours that distinguish themselves
from other individuals, but also includes collective memories, attitudes and behaviours received
from the group to which he or she belongs [72, 408]. Furthermore, self-categorisation theory ar-
gues that the more individuals identify with a salient group identity, the more likely they are to
view themselves and other group members as interchangeable exemplars of the group’s person-
ification [220]. This basic phenomenon is thought to underpin group influence and conformity.
In summary, the literature seems to suggest that people have a fundamental need to belong to
social groups, while at the same time having a fundamental need to differentiate themselves in
a manner consistent with their self-concept. It is within the balance of these fundamental needs
that the phenomena of group behaviour take place.
4.2 The individual in the group
Every group of people, among the billions of groups that exist at this moment in time, is a unique
configuration of individuals, relationships and processes [170]. A study group at a college library,
for example, will differ in a hundred nuanced ways from a rock band performing a well-loved
song, a team on a soccer field, or a board of executives electing a new chief executive officer.
These groups, however, all possess common properties and dynamics despite their distinguishing
characteristics. It follows that when researchers study group behaviour, they are required to
look beyond the unique qualities of the group to the qualities that seem to be consistent across
most groups. One strategy in pursuit of finding these more general qualities is to focus on the
individual in the group — all groups fundamentally consist of several individual members. In
order to understand the dynamics of a group, it makes sense to investigate the dynamics that
each of its members bring to the table. Notably, it is the interaction between the dynamics of
every individual group-member with every other, that produces the predominant dynamics of a
group [223].
1Asch [32], for example, found that people were willing to express judgements that were clearly wrong, if it
meant social acceptance. Similarly, in a study on small-group processes, Deutch and Gerard [130] found that
people would often keep their dissenting thoughts private for fear of social sanction, despite potentially disastrous
consequences [241]. Another case in point is researchers of social identity who posit that when a relevant group
identity is salient, people adapt to the norms and values of the group [444, 452].
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A common approach when studying the dynamics of the individual2, related to the personality
and social psychology literature, is to base investigation on the premise that an individual’s
self-concept consists of three fundamental self-representations, namely the individual self, the
relational self and the collective self [105, 106, 402, 408]. These three selves co-exist to form
a universal self, such that a person can alternate between perceiving themselves as a distinct
individual, a relational partner, or a collective group member [409]. In addition, each self is
important and meaningful to human experience [61]. These self-representations, forming the
pillars that constitute a person’s self-construal, are considered in this section.
4.2.1 The individual self
In general, the individual self refers to aspects of the self that make a person unique and
separate from others3 (e.g. world-view, interests, values, traits, experiences, attitudes and be-
haviours) [411]. It is salient then, that such traits will influence the real-time behaviour of an
individual in the context of a group. In fact, the difficulty of collective decision making often
stems from the nuanced uniqueness of each group member’s individual self [103]. A simple
case in point is the way in which one person’s “bad” is often another’s “good,” or one person’s
“freedom-fighting” another’s “terrorism.” These differences in perspective can be explained by
the uniquely subjective nature of the individual self, and more specifically, the subjective nature
of the criteria according to which such judgements of good or bad are made (which is embedded
in the individual self). These criteria are the product of both an individual’s genetic inheritance
(i.e. the kind of person one is innately) and, more significantly, an individual’s previous experi-
ences of the world [103]. Consequently, to the extent that our genetic make-up and experiences
are unique, our individual self will be uniquely biased accordingly [361, 402].
4.2.2 The relational self
The assertion that the relational conceptions of the self are central to understanding human
behaviour is almost as old as the discipline of psychology itself [238]. While the individual self
illustrates the nature of the self in isolation from others, it is necessary to further define the self
in a way that involves a connection to, rather than a separation from, others. This is where
the relational self (and the collective self, to be considered subsequently) becomes relevant. In
order to define the relational self, it is necessary to draw on the notion of a working self-concept,
which refers to the self-knowledge that becomes available to an individual during specific social
interactions. For example, a person’s self-knowledge in relation to his or her younger sibling may
include idiographic attributes such as fun-loving, or jokester, as well as normative roles such as
authority figure. An individual’s self-knowledge that becomes relevant in this manner proceeds
to influence his or her behaviour in both subtle and dramatic ways [304]. More specifically,
a person can be expected to behave differently in dissimilar contexts, depending on the self-
knowledge that becomes salient — an individual’s entire array of self-knowledge is certainly not
accessible all at once [305].
Utilising this notion of a working self-concept, notice that if a certain significant other were to
behave in a way that caused an individual to feel loved, across a variety of interactions and
over a significant period of time (especially in dyadic relationships), the characteristic “loved”
2Although there are alternative conceptions of the self in the academic literature, the stated conception is
reviewed as it is most prevalent.
3In the context of this dissertation, the individual self represents the unique perspective from which, and the
unique way in which, an individual approaches life.
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would likely become part of that person’s working self-concept with respect to the significant
other [105]. Over time, the significant other would thus no longer have to behave in a way that
caused that person to feel loved; they would simply feel loved as a result of the real or perceived
presence of the significant other — which would activate the individual’s working self-concept
with respect to that significant other, which in this instance includes the experience of being
loved [106]. The relational self can then be defined as the working self-concept that becomes
available in the presence of a specific significant other. This includes one’s emotional experience
when relating to a significant other, the goals one pursues in relationship with the other, the self-
regulatory strategies one adopts in interactions with the other, and the behavioural tendencies
one exhibits in the presence of the significant other [105]. This conception of the relational self
correctly illustrates that people have several relational selves.
An insertion here is necessary. To state that the self-knowledge which becomes available in a
social interaction is simply the product of the social environment, would incorrectly suggest
that a person’s social behaviour can be likened to that of a chameleon. A more accurate way of
understanding these phenomena would be to claim that a person has a relatively consistent global
relational self which constitutes the working self-concept from which an individual approaches
the majority of social interactions [409], but that this global relational self can be overridden
or influenced if specific social stimuli activate a different, more context-specific, working self-
concept (i.e. relational self). Consider the following hypothetical example: Johnny has a highly
critical mother. Johnny’s global relational self can be described by words such as considerate,
competent, and feelings of confidence, while his relational self with respect to his critical mother
is composed of conceptions of the self such as inferior, feelings of rejection, and the goal to please.
It follows that if someone, or something within the social context of Johnny’s daily life, were to
remind him of his mother and successfully activate his relational self with respect to his mother,
he would experience himself like he would in the presence of his mother. This kind of altered
experience of the self can dynamically influence an individual’s behaviour [105]. Evidently, the
relational self holds considerable potential in terms of influencing the real-time dynamics of a
group.
In summary, the relational self is self-knowledge that is linked in memory to knowledge about
significant others; exists at several levels of specificity; is capable of being chronically or con-
textually activated; and comprises self-conceptions as well as a number of other self aspects
that characterise an individual when relating to significant others (see Chen et al [106] for a
thorough discussion). Note, however, that the academic literature dedicated to the relational
self elucidates several perspectives that are dissimilar to the one described above. The most
dominant of these is the inclusion-of-other-in-the-self (IOS) approach [30]. Unlike the current
conception which views the relational self as self-knowledge that is distinguishable from, but
linked in memory to, knowledge about significant others, the IOS approach posits that close re-
lationships involve the incorporation of significant others (i.e. perspectives and attributes) into
the self-concept [29]. According to this view, the closer a relationship, the more the relational
partner would be incorporated into the self. This perspective departs from the aforementioned
view by suggesting that including others in one’s self-concept reflects the internalisation of signif-
icant others into the self-concept, rather than conceptions of who one is in relation to significant
others.
4.2.3 The collective self
The psychologist Carl Jung wrote about the collective unconscious [255], a source of deep,
common knowledge and understanding that every individual seems to draw from. Although
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a discussion on such a collective unconscious is left to more experienced thinkers, the notion
illustrates the manner in which humans have always been drawn to a collective perspective of life,
both philosophically and psychologically. In perfect harmony with this perspective, the collective
self refers to a conception of the self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category,
rather than as being based on the unique attributes that define an individual as separate [411].
This form of self definition constitutes those aspects of the self that are based on some form
of membership to a social group. Unlike the relational self, this membership is not based on
personal bonds to others, but is derived from the shared identification with a specific group [410],
that is, those aspects of the self concept that differentiate ingroup from outgroup members.
For example, an individual may hold a collective identity as an environmentalist — whenever
this aspect of the collective self is activated (similar to the activation of the relational self),
similarities with other environmentalists are emphasised (e.g. a sense of responsibility toward
the environment), while some traits related to the individual self (e.g. being an objective, logical
thinker) may momentarily move into the background [302].
In several experiments, the collective self has been linked to an individual’s behaviour toward
other groups of which that individual is not a member (e.g. prejudice and inter-group stereo-
typing) [121, 450]. The collective self’s potential for influencing the real-time behaviour of an
individual is thus evident.
4.3 Group dynamics
The tendency to join with others in the format of groups is perhaps the single most important
characteristic of humankind. History testifies to the fact that the processes which occur when
individuals unite to form groups tend to leave an ineradicable imprint on their members and
on society in general [169]. Despite its apparent influence, the dynamics within groups (i.e. the
actions, processes, and changes that occur within and between groups [170]) have puzzled sages,
scholars and lay people for decades. Why, it has been asked, do humans so frequently elect
to join with others in groups? Which factors give rise to the sense of cohesion within groups,
and which factors result in the distrust of individuals outside a group from within? And how
do the leaders of a group hold sway over its members? Today, many of these questions have
been answered, while some still pose challenging mysteries. Nevertheless, the inquiry into such
questions has provided a scientific basis for the field of group dynamics, which is the academic
discipline devoted to the study of groups and group processes [94].
Before reviewing the more intriguing topic of group dynamics, an interjection is necessary here.
What is meant by a group? Interestingly, theorists are not of one mind when it comes to the
definition of the word group. Some stress the importance of mutual dependence; others highlight
the key role of communication. It has been suggested that a shared purpose is what turns a mere
aggregate of individuals into a group [170]. Despite the ambiguity of its definition, there are
several qualities specific to groups about which theorists do agree. In no particular order, these
qualities include: Interaction, goals, interdependence, structure, and unity. Short descriptions of
these qualities are provided in Table 4.1. Within the context of this dissertation, a group will be
considered to be a social unit consisting of a number of individuals who stand in definite status
and role relationships with one another and work toward a common goal within a bounded
context.
The fact that humankind stands in debt to the accomplishments of collective groups of individ-
uals deserves repeating. Without the collective contribution of individuals, humankind would
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
40 Chapter 4. Group behaviour
Table 4.1: The qualities of a group, adapted from Forsyth [170].
Feature Description References
Interaction Groups establish, organise, and maintain rela-
tionship and task interactions among members
[40, 41]
Goals Groups typically have an instrumental purpose,
for they facilitate the achievement of outcomes
sought by their individual members
[309]
Interdependence There is a mutual dependence among the mem-
bers of a group, in that each member influences,
and is influenced by each other member
[170]
Structure Groups tend to be organised, with each of their
members connected to other members in a pat-
tern of relationships, roles, and norms
[170]
Unity Groups are cohesive social arrangements of indi-
viduals
[86, 132]
surely never have landed on the moon, built the Burj Khalifa, or have been able to perform
one of Mozart’s magnificent symphonies. An appreciation of these milestones in history should,
however, not overshadow the fact that history also paints a less pleasant picture of group per-
formance. For example, group decision making resulted in the Challenger and Columbia space
mission disasters [156, 193], propped up the apartheid regime in South Africa [292] and con-
tributed to the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Mexican gulf [385]. Individuals who come
together to form groups have the potential of reaching great heights, but to ignore their lim-
itations would be to invite disaster. In the remainder of this section, several dynamics that
undermine group decision making are reviewed, namely shared information bias, group polari-
sation and the well-known groupthink phenomenon. A number of these dynamics are discussed
and elucidated in the context of Case Study 4.1.
4.3.1 The shared information bias
After his inauguration, President JF Kennedy held the power to simply declare war on Cuba
(as described in Case Study 4.1), but instead of acting independently, he formed a committee
to help him review an invasion plan. Historians cannot confirm why Kennedy did this, but the
theoretical reasoning behind utilising group decision making in critical instances is clear — the
increased diversity of knowledge and opinion within a group is believed to enrich intellectual
resources and better represent the diversity that is present within a typical community [464].
Why then, did this plan fail so miserably? One of the phenomena theorists have put forward to
answer this question has been coined the shared information bias [170]. Researchers have found
that participants of group decision making often fail to discuss information that is unique to
individual members [487] and, furthermore, neglect to consider information that is contrary to
the dominant opinion [406]. As it happened, the Bay of Pigs committee spent a considerable
amount of time discussing the incompetence of the Cuban forces and how US citizens would
react to the invasion, spending much less time talking about the more important operations-
level military strategy of the envisaged mission, or the political climate in Cuba [170]. Several
members of the committee, in fact, held information that may have altered the eventual decision.
For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representatives knew that the morale of
the invasion force was very low, but kept this vital information to themselves. Furthermore,
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Case Study 4.1 The Bay of Pigs Invasion, adapted from [170].
The Bay of Pigs Invasion
The US presidential election of 1960 saw
JF Kennedy pitted against then vice-
president RM Nixon. As presidential cam-
paigns go, Kennedy selected several major is-
sues to stress in his campaign, one of these
issues being the spread of communism in the
world, specifically referring to Cuba and the
government of Fidel Castro. After a success-
ful campaign, Kennedy faced one of his first
major decisions: What to do about Cuba?
The CIA responded by suggesting that the
US should launch a covert military operation
to topple Castro’s government. Their plan
was to send a squad of well-trained troops to
capture and defend the strip of land in the
Bah́ıa de Cochinos (i.e. the Bay of Pigs) on
the southern coast of Cuba. From there, the
troops would perform tactical raids in order
to spark a civilian revolt. Kennedy proceeded
to present the CIA’s plan to the executive
committee of the National Security Council.
This committee included several White House
senior advisors and staff members, a number
of cabinet members, and representatives of
the CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (i.e.
military branch leaders) — all highly skilled
individuals with expert training in making
critical policy and military decisions. After a
thorough review, this group advised the pres-
ident to give the Bay of Pigs Invasion a go-
ahead. On the 17th of April 1961 the Bay
of Pigs Invasion took place. It was a total
disaster. The entire US attacking force was
either killed or captured within a matter of
days. Group expert, Irving Janis, described
the decision to invade Cuba as one of the
“worst fiascos ever perpetrated by a responsi-
ble government” [240].
President Kennedy had information from several sources that would have forced the group to
reappraise its decision, but he too kept this vital information to himself [274].
Stasser and Titus [434] studied this phenomenon by providing several four-member groups with
information listing the performance of three candidates with respect to sixteen criteria. Ac-
cording to a rational analysis of the information, Candidate A was the best option with eight
positive, four neutral, and four negative qualities. Candidates B and C both had four positive,
eight neutral, and four negative traits. Initially, the soon-to-be group members were given all the
information about each candidate separately, resulting in 83% of individuals correctly favouring
candidate A. After group formation, however, the groups did not fair so well as the distribution
of positive and negative information was manipulated so that a hidden profile emerged. Stasser
and Titus ensured that each member of every group only knew of two of the eight positive traits
of Candidate A. Participant 1, for example, knew that Candidate A possessed positive qualities
Q1 and Q2, Participant 2 knew that candidate A possessed positive qualities Q3 and Q4, and
so on. All participants, however, were informed about candidate A’s four negative traits. The
collective information within the groups was therefore no different from the initial experiment.
The participants nevertheless failed to share the relevant information and selected an inferior
candidate 76% of the time [434].
It is interesting to note that the shared information bias is not the consequence of collectively not
holding information critical to a decision. It is rather the result of a segregation of information
in a manner that results in a critical part of what is known, being neglected. Consequently,
simply exerting greater efforts with respect to sourcing information will fall short of mitigating
the shared information bias. Real-time group discussion strategies will be required to ensure
that the shared information bias does not inhibit efficient and effective decision making. Toward
developing such a strategy, it may be beneficial to further investigate the relevant underlying
mechanisms.
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In an academic society in which the relation between phenomena that are uncovered at different
times by different researchers sometimes goes unnoticed, it is interesting to notice the potential
relation between the shared information bias and the so called Abilene Paradox [204]. The
Abilene Paradox can be described as the phenomenon whereby a preconceived idea of others’
preferences cause individuals to pretend to hold similar preferences, resulting in a group reaching
a false consensus with respect to an appropriate action plan [204]. In his article titled The Abilene
Paradox: The management of agreement [204], Jerry B Harvey, the father of this paradox,
recalls a memory in which he, his wife and in-laws spent an evening touring a neighbouring
town, despite the fact that all of them secretly wanted to spend the night at home. Prior to
the verbal discussion on whether or not to make the trip, each individual incorrectly assumed
that everyone else wanted to go and consequently pretended to want to go too. Comically, each
individual employed this strategy and the group ended up doing what they all would rather not
have done.
This example illustrates how the Abilene Paradox seems to involve a section of what is known
(i.e. not wanting to go to Abilene) being withheld, not unlike the shared information bias. The
theory surrounding the Abilene Paradox suggests that the reasoning behind its occurrence can
be summarised as a fear of separation, or in other words, social isolation. As described in §4.1,
people have a fundamental need to belong. Therefore, if an individual believes that sharing an
opinion contrary to the norm will lead to social isolation, he or she may be persuaded to remain
silent. Thus, the one possible explanation for the shared information bias is the perceived belief
that the majority of the group holds a position contrary to the implication of held information.
4.3.2 Group polarisation
Why President Kennedy created a committee to help him review the envisaged invasion plan
will always remain a question open to debate. With that inherent uncertainty in mind, it is
worth noting that President Kennedy may have acted on the assumption that a group, when
faced with a choice between a risky alternative (i.e. invade Cuba) and a less risky alternative
(i.e. utilise diplomatic means to influence Cuban politics), would favour the moderate option.
As history portrays, however, this was not the case. Researchers have subsequently determined
that groups do not necessarily nourish restraint; rather, they polarise — often making more
extreme decisions than individuals [170].
The years leading up to the coining of the phrase group polarisation, was characterised by several
confusing findings. Some researchers concluded that groups were more inclined to conservative
decision options, while others found just the opposite [436, 474]. In order to measure this
shift in a group’s attitude toward decision options, researchers frequently employed the Choice-
Dilemmas Questionnaire [170]. This self-report measure of willingness to make risky decisions
can be broken down into the following parts. Initially, participants are presented with an extract
such as the following:
“Mr Anderson is a qualified electrical engineer who has been working for a large
electronics corporation since graduating from university five years ago. He is married
with one child. His current employer has guaranteed him a lifelong job paying a
modest, but adequate salary, including liberal pension benefits upon retirement. It is
highly unlikely that his salary will increase substantially before retirement. During
a local convention, a small, start-up company with a highly uncertain future offered
Mr Anderson a job. This job would provide Mr Anderson with a better salary and
the possibility of shared ownership if the company was to survive [170].”
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After reading the above excerpt, participants are asked to imagine themselves being Mr Ander-
son’s advisor. Provided with the list of possible alternatives in Table 4.2, participants have to
select the lowest probability of the start-up succeeding for which they would deem the move
worthwhile.
Table 4.2: The probability of success.
Probability Select
The chances are 1 in 10 that the start-up will succeed
The chances are 3 in 10 that the start-up will succeed
The chances are 5 in 10 that the start-up will succeed
The chances are 7 in 10 that the start-up will succeed
The chances are 9 in 10 that the start-up will succeed
Mr Anderson should not take the new job regardless
of the probability of success
Several researchers employed this case study, or one similar in structure, with interesting results.
In a manner that seems almost random at first, some researchers concluded that groups typ-
ically make riskier decisions, which they have dubbed the risky-shift phenomenon [368], while
others found that groups consistently advocated a less risky course of action, dubbing this the
cautious-shift phenomenon [474]. Intrigued by these inconsistent findings, subsequent researchers
developed additional choice-dilemmas in order to further investigate these dynamics. They too,
occasionally found evidence of both the cautious-shift and risky-shift phenomenon [133]. Even-
tually, researchers concluded that a shift toward either a risky or cautious decision attitude was
possible, coining these collective phenomena group polarisation [133]. Curiously, the direction
of the shift in attitude to either risky or cautious was determined to be a function of the initial
average preference direction of the group [339]. Figure 4.1 is certainly an oversimplification of
this process, but is appropriate for the purpose of illustrating the manner in which the direction
of polarisation depends upon the initial state of attitudes in a group.
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Figure 4.1: A schematic representation of group polarisation, adapted from Forsyth [170].
Imagine for a moment that President Kennedy had elected to split the gathered group of advisors
into two independently functioning groups (Group 1 and Group 2) and had proceeded to discuss
the invasion plan with each group separately. Suppose, furthermore, that Group 1 consisted of
Individuals A, B, and C (whose attitudes toward invading Cuba were characterised by a 1, 3
and 5 on the sliding scale between Risk and Caution, respectively). Suppose also that Group 2
consisted of Individuals D, E and F (whose attitudes toward invading Cuba were characterised
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by a 5, 7 and 9 on the sliding scale between Risk and Caution, respectively). This would have
resulted in an average preference of 3 and 7 for Groups 1 and 2, respectively. Essentially, because
the collective preference of Group 1 is on the risky side of the sliding scale, they would have
been more inclined to polarise toward that end, while Group 2 would probably have polarised
toward caution as a result of initially being more prone to caution collectively [338]. At this
point, it is important to note that although the initial, collective decision attitude of a group
is a good indication of the direction of polarisation, one should not assume that this trend will
always hold true. It is, nevertheless, interesting to consider how important group composition
may have been to the debate around invading Cuba.
The purpose of the discussion surrounding Figure 4.1 has been to illustrate that the direction
of group polarisation is typically not random — it is rather a function of several underlying
dynamics. One could say that the discussion demonstrated when groups will generally polarise
on the side of risk or caution. At this point, however, the specific social dynamics which underlie
group polarisation have yet to be elucidated. This leads to the next question of interest: What
are the underlying social dynamics that cause polarisation to occur? This question has intrigued
several researchers, of which, Liu and Latané [293] and Friedkin [176] were first to put forward
the characterising phenomena of persuasion, social comparison and social identity.
Within the context of group discussions, persuasive argument theory holds that persuasive
arguments which illicit an emotional response or an intellectual shift have a phenomenal potential
to influence general opinion [176]. Contrary to this perspective, the social identity school of
thought suggests that individuals are not persuaded by the content of arguments, but by an
evident consensus of opinion [67]. In other words, if the members of a group come to believe
that the prototypical group member holds a certain position, those who identify with the group
(i.e. receive some form of social identity from being part of the group) will shift in the direction
of that prototypical position [206].
Finally, social comparison theory holds that individuals spontaneously compare themselves with
others, and if they identify a difference between their view and that of the group, they typically
shift toward the group’s view [401]. When people make decisions outside the context of others,
they do not have the luxury of knowing how others would have responded to similar decision
options. But in the context of a group, individuals can employ those around them as points of
reference in order to evaluate their own position [189]. The presence of a measure against which
to judge one’s position may lead to the shift of position toward that measure [478].
The existence of the two schools of thought, persuasive argument theory and social identity
theory, points toward a constituent of the academic society that proposes a complete divide
between the influence of social identity and persuasive arguments on group discussions [170].
It is, however, suggested here, and supported by several researchers [467, 468], that there is a
fundamental overlap between these influences. Groups typically generate more arguments that
support the position endorsed by the majority of group members than arguments that oppose
the generally accepted opinion [468] (similar to the shared information bias that was discussed
in §4.3.1). As a result, there is an interesting circular influence during group discussion — it is
within this circular influence that the overlap between persuasive argument theory and social
identity theory becomes apparent. In general, individuals are more inclined to voice arguments
that are in line with the social norms of the group. This one-sided tendency in argumentation
makes the generally endorsed position seem even more dominant than it truly is. This, in turn,
results in it becoming even more difficult to voice an alternative opinion as the risk of social
isolation increases — a group essentially persuades itself [81, 80]. It follows that the interaction
between social identity and persuasive arguments may lead to excessive group polarisation.
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In conclusion to this section, consider the fact that group polarisation will not necessarily result
in negative consequences. Depending on the issue at hand, group polarisation may, in fact,
be of benefit if it results in a group exhibiting a greater conviction toward a shared goal in a
context in which that goal would be beneficial. Consequently, one should be aware of group
polarisation and its influence, but to extinguish its presence may not be wise. The way we as a
people are influenced by the opinions of others, in the context of others, may be a unique way
in which individuals are forced to consider alternative perspectives which may otherwise have
been dismissed.
4.3.3 Groupthink
If it were appropriate, groupthink may have been deemed the celebrity of group phenomena.
Several of the greatest failures in group decision making throughout history have been linked
to the notion of groupthink, including France’s defeat during WWII [10], the space shuttle
Challenger disaster [146], the bombing of Pearl Harbor [239], and finally, the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion [170]. President Kennedy’s weary response after he and his advisers had blundered into the
Bay of Pigs invasion was simply, “How could we have been so stupid?” This question intrigued
the well-known social psychologist, Irving Janis, as he studied the situation in the context of
several of the disasters listed above. Stupidity was certainly not to blame — the individuals
who participated in the decision to proceed with the Bay of Pigs invasion represented one of the
greatest assemblies of intellectual talent in the history of American politics [239].
After studying the groups involved in the aforementioned mishaps, Janis came to the conclusion
that the presence of poor decision making was not the consequence of the separate dynamics
of each individual present (e.g. temporary emotional states of elation, anger or fear that reduce
an individual’s mental efficiency), but rather a unique interplay between the members of a
group [170]. Janis coined this interplay groupthink, which he defined as a manner of thinking
in which people engage when they are deeply involved with others in a cohesive group, which
typically results in members’ desire for agreement overriding their motivation to realistically
evaluate alternative courses of action [239].
At the time of its formulation, the notion of groupthink fundamentally challenged the prevalent
perception in social psychology that a stronger sense of group cohesion and harmony resulted in
improved decision effectiveness — the evidence that Janis uncovered suggested just the oppo-
site [240]. In an article titled Groupthink and France’s defeat in the 1940 campaign, Ahlstrom
and Wang [10] explained that when a group is involved in high-stress decision making, strong
group cohesion can contribute to an increased likelihood of decision error, as individuals may
seek to downplay information that could potentially undermine the harmony experienced. The
presence of harmony, however, can be likened to that of jelly on a peanut butter jelly sandwich
— it’s simply nice to have, but should not be allowed to dictate events.
Unlike jelly, however, the effects of groupthink are difficult to mitigate as it is not generally
accessible through direct observation — the only credible way to establish its presence is by
noticing the associated symptoms. Fortunately, Janis [240] held out a helping hand to future
corporate professionals by defining eight symptoms associated with a group’s beliefs and be-
haviour that could indicate whether groupthink was present. Notably, Janis employed the Bay
of Pigs Invasion as one of the case studies to elicit these symptoms. The proposed symptoms
can be related to one of three characteristics, namely an over-estimation of the group’s capabil-
ities, a closed-mindedness, and the presence of pressured conformity. The symptoms that relate
to the foremost characteristic have been coined a belief in the inherent morality of a group,
an illusion of invulnerability, and collective rationalisations. In the wake of these symptoms, a
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group operates under the impression that its decisions will, by definition, be morally correct and
virtually infallible [310]. Encapsulated by closed-mindedness, the symptoms that represent the
second characteristic are a stereotype of outsiders and self-censorship. These symptoms result in
an exclusion of information that does not coincide with the group’s beliefs. Finally, an illusion
of unanimity, a direct pressure on dissenters, and self-appointed mind-guards are the symptoms
associated with the pressure toward conformity [240].
Robert Gates once said that no leader is well-served by everyone singing from the same sheet of
music they think he’s on [36]. This statement has proven to be true throughout the course of
history. In order to ensure the effective functioning of our leading institutions, it is necessary to
come to terms with and learn to mitigate the effects of groupthink and its associated mechanisms.
Janis provided corporate professionals with an initial foothold in order to make the climb toward
doing just that.
4.4 Intergroup dynamics
Social science first dipped its feet into the waters of intergroup relations thinking some time
between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries [280]. This era of research saw the
birth of a field that would bring to bear a variety of methods and theories from the more
general social sciences on a diverse set of intricate social problems [16, 360, 418]. Taken literally,
intergroup relations refers to interactions between and activities among groups of individuals.
Note that the choice of preposition is consequential. Whether researchers study groups only two
at a time, or the interactions among more complex constellations, has a significant influence on
what can be learnt. Furthermore, the study of intergroup relations attempts to explain a broader
range of phenomena than just what takes place at the intersection between several groups.
Studies range from investigations of how individuals think within the context of intergroup
interactions, to how countries deal with one another in the realm of international relations [14].
Although the conflict that occurs between and among groups is one of the most complicated
phenomena studied by social scientists, the objective of greater understanding, which could lead
to reduced conflict, remains an enticing motivation. This section is dedicated to a review of the
relevant contributions in the literature that have been made to that endeavour.
Before entering into the discussion of intergroup dynamics, however, it is beneficial briefly to
adopt a more general approach in order to explain why individuals actually come together in
the form of groups. A review of the relevant literature makes it clear that there are two funda-
mentally different influences behind this phenomenon [170]. These influences can be classified
as being either internal or external. In other words, people come together in groups to satisfy
either some internal need specific to the social psyche of humans, as discussed in §4.1, or indi-
viduals come together to fulfil some external need necessary for survival. This external drive
toward survival is of special interest. From the very beginning of human civilisation, individuals
recognised that it was beneficial to function within groups, with the general purpose of gathering
and protecting resources. Furthermore, most, if not all, of the resources required or desired by
these groups were, and are, available in limited supply. For this reason, any form of intergroup
interaction will fundamentally take place on the foundation of competition (i.e. unless, of course,
the gathering is for the simple benefit of social pleasure) [170].
These two points of view from which the literature approaches intergroup interaction are not
incidental — to truly understand such interaction one must account for both these influences.
Furthermore, one must appreciate that although these influences are fundamentally different,
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they certainty do not take place in isolation. On the contrary, it can be argued that groups
rarely compete for resources without the social element of human psyche influencing discussion.
It is even tempting to claim that the drive to gather and protect resources might be the primary
motive behind group interaction, but the social influences of human psyche is the element that
dictates much of the behaviour within that interaction.
4.4.1 Key developments
Although rather dated, two historic contributions to the study of intergroup interactions are
noted here. The first is Le Bon’s theory4 of The Crowd [280]. Le Bon lived in the politically
volatile French society of the early nineteenth century and, being a man who did not let op-
portunity slip by, took advantage of his context to propose a series of propositions about the
behaviour of a crowd. Some of these propositions addressed topics such as the effect of race
on human affairs, the tension between the masses and the elite of a society, and the manner in
which groups shape the meaning of concepts for their members [14]. As a pioneer, Le Bon was
limited by his time and, as a result, the manner in which he conducted his research is rather
different from what has become the norm in modern social science. Nevertheless, Le Bon’s work
marks a key contribution to the study of intergroup dynamics.
The second contribution worth noting, published in the year 1907, was made by William Graham
Sumner [440] who hypothesised that intergroup interaction in the context of conflict followed
a predictable syndrome-like pattern, which he coined ethnocentrism. In essence, ethnocentrism
encapsulated the mechanism by which one’s own group becomes the centre of everything, to the
extent that all other things are weighed and rated with one’s group as a point of reference [14].
In the many decades of research that followed, Sumner’s theory of ethnocentrism proved exceed-
ingly influential and marks another key contribution to the then developing field of intergroup
research [71, 287].
4.4.2 The discontinuity effect
In modern literature, the phenomenon that is probably the perfect case in point of the tendency
of social dynamics to influence the interaction of competing groups is the discontinuity effect.
The discontinuity effect states that the competitiveness between groups is disproportionally
larger than the competitiveness exhibited by individuals when interacting with other individuals
[485]. Numerous studies have been conducted toward understanding this effect. Insko et al. [227],
for example, documented the discontinuity effect by comparing inter-individual conflict with
intergroup conflict in the context of the well-known prisoner’s dilemma game (i.e. a mixed-
motive game in which two parties are offered a choice between playing the game following either
a competitive or a cooperative strategy). When the game was played by three autonomous
individuals, a total of 7.5% of the responses were competitive. When the game was played by two
interacting triads, however, a significant 36.2% of results were competitive. These experiments
have been repeated in several studies and the results are remarkably consistent [485].
A potential contributor to the reality of the discontinuity effect that has been established in
the literature is called the diffusion of responsibility [170], a phenomenon which can be defined
as the tendency to feel less accountable for decisions made within the context of a group [170].
Meier and Hinsz [313] were the first to make the connection between these phenomena during
an experiment in which they asked participants to squirt any amount of hot sauce onto a plate
4Many social scientists mark this publication as the beginning of intergroup studies.
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that other participants would then have to eat. In some instances participants functioned within
the context of a group, assigning hot sauce to either another group or an individual participant.
In other instances, however, participants acted individually, again assigning hot sauce to either
a group or an individual participant. In short, the study confirmed the discontinuity effect
with groups consistently allocating larger quantities of hot sauce to other participants. Meier
et al. [313] concluded the study by suggesting that a diffusion of responsibility was partially
responsible for participants assigning larger quantities of hot sauce when functioning in the
context of a group.
4.4.3 Power and dominion
One cannot discuss the intricacies of intergroup relations without briefly touching upon the
influence of the struggle for power. In the introduction of §4.4 it was stated that one of the
main drivers toward functioning within groups was originally the desire to gather and protect
resources, and rightly so. This existence of groups, however, introduced a new currency — power.
As Rouhana et al. [390] put it, groups do not only attempt to monopolise scarce resources,
they also strive to gain control over other groups’ resources, land and people. In fact, the very
definition of power suggests a separation, a divide between individuals on the basis of association.
This phenomenon is mentioned here only in passing and will be addressed further in subsequent
chapters.
4.4.4 The ingroup-outgroup bias
The sociologist, William Graham Sumner believed that humans are, by their very nature, a
species that joins together in groups [440]. With equal conviction, he also noted a second,
equally powerful human tendency — favouring one’s own group above all others [440]. In
Sumner’s own words, “Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior,
exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders” [440]. This tendency was called
the ingroup-outgroup bias [170]. As a side-note, Sumner believed that the ingroup-outgroup bias
went hand-in-hand with ethnocentrism, a phenomenon discussed in §4.4.1.
Interestingly, the ingroup-outgroup bias is really two biases combined into one: The selective
favouring of one’s ingroup, its members and products, and the derogation of the outgroup, its
members and products. These biases, however, rarely function independently and are, therefore,
defined as one. The extent to which these biases influence behaviour depends on a host of
situational factors, including the level of ambiguity with respect to each group’s characteristics,
and the level of group members’ identification with the group [170]. Overall, the subtlety of the
ingroup-outgroup bias nevertheless renders it robust [160, 214].
After combing through the literature, it became clear to the author that several context-specific
cases of the ingroup-outgroup bias are documented as if they are psychological dynamics in their
own right. It may seem unnecessary to document such cases, but a brief review is beneficial as it
effectively illustrates the practical impact of the ingroup-outgroup bias. The first such dynamic
is the existence of double-standard thinking [170], a mechanism that employs the human tendency
to judge the intentions of others. Group members typically judge their own group’s actions as
fair and just, while condemning similar conduct by another group as unfair and unjust [135].
One group calls their warnings requests, while the other group calls them threats. A group may
consider themselves courageous for pushing an agenda, but may be viewed as being stubborn by
other groups [135].
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A classic example of this can be found in the way Palestine and Israel view one another with
respect to the major Middle East wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. In an article titled Mis-
perception in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the psychologist RK White described how he discovered
that both Palestine and Israel believe that the other side had been the aggressor in all four
wars [481]. In two of these wars (the wars of 1956 and 1967), Palestine believed that Israel had
attacked without any incitement. In the remaining two wars, Palestine admitted to having initi-
ated hostilities, but claimed they did so only because they were forced to by Israel’s expansionist
politics [170]. Conversely, Israel felt that the first and final war of 1948 and 1973, respectively,
were both examples of blatant, unqualified Palestinian aggression, while their actions in 1956
and 1967 had indirectly been caused by threats received from Palestine. Clearly, there are
considerable polarities in the perceptions of these opponents [481]. This tendency to utilise a
separate sliding scale when judging the actions of one’s own and other groups constitutes the
first more specific case of the ingroup-outgroup bias.
The next documented case of the ingroup-outgroup bias can be described by stating that when
individuals categorise (i.e. judge) others, their perceptions are influenced more by their own
predefined, category-based expectations than by what the available evidence suggests about an
individual [417]. Practically, this eludes to the fact that individuals view the members of their
ingroup with a certain measure of individuality, but perceive the members of an outgroup as
being extensively homogeneous. This inclination is coined the group homogeneity bias [291]
and, similar to the biases that were discussed in Chapter 3, sets the stage for a number of
errors in judgement. The first of these is called the group attribution error, a phenomenon by
which individuals generalise the characteristics of a small number of people to a larger group
of which those individuals are perceived to be representative [369]. A classic example of this
is the way travellers are able to deem an entire country discourteous after being treated rudely
by a single native [369]. Named by Pettigrew [359], another such error is called the ultimate
attribution error, which prompts individuals to attribute the actions of other individuals to their
characters, rather than to the constraints of a situation [213].
It is important to take note of the natural tendencies documented in this section, for their
influence is certainly greatly aggravated by the freedom of the subconscious. In some ways the
ingroup-outgroup bias is naturally human, but its influence should remain appropriate. History
tells many devastating tales of cruelty enacted by one society upon another and one wonders
whether these tales would have ended differently had the actors been aware of the mechanisms
dictating their behaviour.
4.5 Chapter summary
It would seem that when individuals come together to form groups, the result, more often than
not, lies on the extreme ends of the spectrum between glory and disaster. The main question
is: What pre-empts these extremes? This chapter was dedicated to a review of the attempts by
academics to answer this question. The academic literature eludes to the fact that researchers
have approached this question on one of three different levels of abstraction, namely the dynamics
of the individual, the dynamics of the group, and the dynamics between groups. These levels
constituted the foundation upon which the structure of this chapter was based, with §4.1 and
§4.2 dedicated to a review of the dynamics of the individual, while §4.3 and §4.4 were dedicated
to a review of the dynamics within and between groups, respectively.
A central theme in this chapter was that group interaction and conflict go hand in hand —
conflict within the needs of an individual, but more notably, the conflict that exists among
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interacting groups. Mark Twain eluded to this conflict when he claimed that “the very ink with
which history is written is merely fluid prejudice” [422]. It was illustrated in §4.4 that one of the
driving forces behind this conflict is the naturally human tendency to protect what is experienced
as an extension of the self, namely, the ingroup. In conclusion, it is acknowledged that although
this phenomenon is naturally human, its employment as a starting point for the derogation of
others by opinion or deed should by no means be excused because of its natural origin. In order
to progress toward the considerable potential of group performance, it is necessary to educate
our tendencies. Such change starts with a certain measure of awareness. And awareness is
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It was Baruch Fischhoff, father of the discipline known as debiasing, who suggested that whenever
a behavioural phenomenon is identified in some experimental context, it is nothing other than
appropriate to question the robustness of that phenomenon, thereby determining the limits of its
governance [159]. The preceding chapters were dedicated to a review of the academic literature
related to cognitive and social phenomena that tend to govern the process of human judgment
and decision making. In the spirit of Fischoff’s proposition, this chapter is dedicated to a review
of the academic literature related to the discipline of debiasing such phenomena. Accordingly,
§5.1 is dedicated to an introduction to the field, §5.2–§5.4 are devoted to a review of dominant
debiasing taxonomies contained therein, and §5.5 contains a review of the literature related to
studies aimed at investigating the effectiveness of debiasing methods in practice. The chapter
finally comes to a close with a short review in §5.6.
5.1 The methods of debiasing
If the study of cognitive and social bias represents an attempt at clarifying the sources and
limits of the apparent wisdom of human judgement, then the study of debiasing represents an
attempt at clarifying the sources and limits of its apparent folly [159]. The discipline of debiasing
originated formally around 1981 when Fischhoff published an article, titled Debiasing [159], in
an attempt to delineate how social scientists could go about conducting bias-proof experiments.
He did so by presenting a typology of methods dedicated to that task. Since this publication by
Fischhoff, theorists have continued to propose alternative typologies for distinguishing between
the various methods used in the field of debiasing. Although a number of these methods are
irrelevant to the work presented in this dissertation, either because they cannot be generalised to
the context of this work or because they simply fail to hold water [429], a study of the literature
uncovered three typologies that seem to dominate existing taxonomies of debiasing methods.
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These are the original typology proposed by Fischhoff, a typology proposed by Larrick [278],
and a typology proposed by Soll et al. [429]. In the remainder of this chapter, the aforementioned
typologies are reveiwed, in the order listed.
5.2 A typology proposed by Fischhoff
Although the implications of Fischhoff’s work have been generalised to a wider range of appli-
cations, the discussion thereof in this section is conducted in respect of the context for which
it was originally intended — the task of experimental design. In this context, Fischhoff elected
to distinguish between debiasing methods according to whether their working presumes that
decision biases are a symptom of (1) the task executed during the experiment (i.e. a faulty
task), (2) the nature of a judge participating in the experiment (i.e. a faulty judge), or some
mismatch between the two [159].
5.2.1 A faulty task
In order to describe the features related to the design of a faulty task, Fischhoff distinguished
among two such task-based errors: Unfair experimentation, in which case the task contained
in an experiment is unfairly designed, and dubious experimentation, in which case the task
contained in an experiment is easily misunderstood [159]. Based upon this distinction, Fischhoff
proceeded to delineate the bias-inducing features related thereto, and the manner in which such
features may be mitigated.
Unfair experimentation
In respect of debiasing unfairly designed experiments, Fischhoff [159] offered as a first line of
investigation the identification of what he called putative methodological artefacts (i.e. bias-
inducing features that result from the unfair design of an experiment). In order to guide an
analyst’s search for such artefacts, the following list of suspect features was provided:
(a) Subjects may have failed to care enough about the execution of the experimental task,
(b) subjects may have been confused by the task,
(c) subjects may not have been convinced by the experimenter’s assertions about the nature
of the experimental task and perceived a pay-off structure other than that intended by the
experimenter,
(d) subjects may have been unable to express what they know, or
(e) subjects may have been asked too many questions and thus developed stereotypical re-
sponse patterns to help them get through the task.
Fischhoff did not stop at the identification of putative methodological artefacts, but proceeded
to delineate the following artefact-specific strategies according to which they could be mitigated:
In the case of (a), analysts should raise the stakes accruing to good performance. In the case of
(b), it should be sufficient to provide more careful instruction and/or more familiar stimuli. In
the case of (c), analysts are to provide subjects with the assurance that their best guess at the
right answer is all that is of interest and that they should respond accordingly. In the case of
(d), analysts should attempt to use more familiar and/or more pliable response modes. Finally,
in the case of (e), analysts should simply ask fewer questions [159].
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Dubious experimentation
Interestingly, Fischhoff stated that while artefact studies (described above) carry an “implicit
aspersion of experimental malpractice” (i.e. the allegation that the experimenter should have
known better), an experimenter’s failure to understand respondents’ phenomenological or con-
ceptual universe is far less condemnable [159]. Essentially, the occurrence of dubious experimen-
tation is a product of features related to the execution of an experiment that are often difficult
to control and thus their mitigation is a rather tricky task. In an attempt to address this kind
of error, Fischhoff [159] presented four dynamics related to their occurrence:
(a) Participants may be pursuing additional unsolicited goals that require sub-optimal perfor-
mance in the examined task,
(b) participants may possess alternative definitions for key terms other than that held by the
experimenter,
(c) the execution of the experimental task may depend upon participants fortuitously making
assumptions that accidentally concur with those made by the experimenter, or
(d) an experimenter may simply be insensitive to courses of action selected by participants
that are, in fact, reasonable.
Interestingly, Fischhoff chose not to provide case-specific strategies for the mitigation of the
aforementioned phenomena, instead simply proposing that analysts identify and then demon-
strate their existence1.
5.2.2 A faulty judge
According to Fischhoff, if the quality of an experimental task has been verified, and the bias
remains, the suspicion of culpability then falls upon the respondent. This would imply one
of two scenarios: (1) Participants are performing suboptimally because of the sheer difficulty
of perfecting human performance, or (2) the limitations of human judgement are rendering
participants fundamentally incapable of executing the experimental task. Fischhoff called these
errors perfectible judges and incorrigible judges, respectively [159]. The strategies he suggested
toward their mitigation are discussed below.
Perfectible judges
In order to address the issue of perfectible judges, Fischhoff adopted what is described as an
escalation approach. The approach is considered escalating in the sense that it involves proposing
a set of bias-reducing strategies, where each successive strategy reflects an increasing pessimism
about the possibility of perfecting human performance in the context of experimentation [159].
In other words, if the first strategy fails, proceed to employ the (more radical) one proposed
thereafter. The following strategies were incorporated into the approach:
(a) Warn participants about the possibility of bias without specifying its nature,
1Fischhoff seemingly assumed that the identification and subsequent demonstration of the listed phenomena
will naturally result in their mitigation.
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(b) describe the direction (and perhaps the extent) of the bias that is typically observed2,
(c) provide a dose of feedback, thereby personalising the implications of the prior warning, or
(d) offer participants extended training with feedback, coaching, and any other form of teach-
ing that may afford the respondents cognitive mastery of the experimental task3.
This kind of approach to debiasing differs fundamentally from that suggested in respect of faulty
tasks in that it is based upon the assumption that the error that has occurred is systematic and
that respondents need specific instruction, as opposed to merely a fair chance, in order to succeed.
Incorrigible judges
At some point during experimentation, an analyst may conclude that a participant’s success-
ful execution of the experimental task is impossible, or rather, that it is only attainable via
procedures that essentially coerce the participant to respond properly. In such a situation,
Fischhoff [159] considered one of three responses appropriate:
(a) Replace the people participating in the experiment with some superior answering device,
(b) recalibrate fallible judgements (assuming that the amount and direction of errors are pre-
dictable), or
(c) acknowledge the imprecision in people’s judgement and plan actions based on them.
Although this kind of conclusion to scientific experimentation is certainly undesirable, Fischhoff
wrote that, “the decision maker or decision analyst who has given up on people in any of
the above ways may still contribute to our understanding of judgement by assessing the size,
prevalence, and resilience of such indelible biases” [159].
5.2.3 A mismatch between judge and task
The final kind of experimental bias identified by Fischhoff results neither from the design of
the task contained therein, nor from the nature of the judge participating therein, but from
the mismatch of these two elements. In other words, despite possessing all requisite skills, the
manner in which a participant interacts with a task causes that participant to fail in actually
putting his or her skills to use [159]. According to Fischhoff, successfully eliminating this kind
of error entails making the experimental person-task system as compatible as possible which,
in turn, requires either restructuring the experimental task, or replacing the current group of
participants [159].
2In contrast to Strategy (a) and Strategy (b) proposed to supplement perfectible judges, Babcock and Loewen-
stein [38] illustrated that simply knowing about a potential bias is not enough to result in its mitigation. In order
to mitigate the effect of a certain bias, participants had to not only be aware of its potential influence, but also
understand the underlying mechanisms according to which it operates.
3Although the benefit of educating participants in normative rules, such as statistical principles, seems rather
intuitive, several theorists have painted a slightly less optimistic picture. Nisbett et al. [346] and Fong et al. [166]
both found that the benefit of teaching individuals how to use statistical rules, for example, is limited to the
domain in which such rules were learnt and that they failed to have a general effect on the quality of individual
decision making.
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Restructuring the experiment
With respect to the former of these approaches, Fischhoff argued that as a mechanically sound
aircraft requires sufficient instrument design in order to be flyable, an honest experimental task
will only become tractable once it has been structured so that it actually allows respondents to
put their cognitive skills to good use [159]. After acknowledging that addressing this form of
bias is often context specific, Fischhoff [159] suggested the following general approaches to its
mitigation:
(a) Force respondents to express what they know explicitly (instead of letting their thinking
remain “in the head”),
(b) encourage respondents to search for discrepant evidence, rather than only focusing on
details that corroborate a preferred answer,
(c) offer ways to decompose the experimental task into more tractable components,
(d) get the respondent to consider alternative situations related to the one under consideration
in order to better understand the situation at hand, or
(e) present the participant with alternative formulations of the presented problem.
Replacing participants
In contrast to the strategies suggested above, the latter approach toward addressing a mismatch
between judge and task pays no attention to the experimental task, and simply entails replacing
the current group of individuals participating therein. The thinking behind this strategy is es-
sentially that although the current group of participants are failing to complete the experimental
task, it would, in fact, be possible for another group of participants to do so. In response to this
scenario, Fischhoff [159] considered the following responses appropriate:
(a) Use experts who, along with their substantive knowledge, have acquired some special
capabilities in processing information under conditions of uncertainty, or
(b) use a new breed of individual, one that has been educated from an early age to think
probabilistically.
As this strategy may seem similar to that suggested in response to the case of incorrigible
judges (i.e. train the participants), it is worth noting that Fischhoff distinguished between these
responses in that the education of participants from a young age (suggested above) focuses on
developing general capabilities, while the training of individuals focuses upon the development
of a specific skill set [159].
5.3 A typology proposed by Larrick
Interestingly, the typology proposed by Larrick [278] was published under the same title as the
one proposed by Fischhoff [159] (i.e. Debiasing). Other than that, however, the typologies are
quite distinct. Unlike Fischhoff, Larrick neglected to clarify the underlying feature that governs
the distinction of dissimilar debiasing approaches in the typology he proposed. He simply
went about introducing the following three strategy classes: Motivational strategies, cognitive
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strategies and technological strategies. To be precise, it should be noted that Larrick did, in fact,
distinguish between these strategy classes by stating that while motivational debiasing strategies
are based on the assumption that individuals possess normative decision making strategies (and
will use them if the benefit of doing so outweighs the cost), cognitive and technological strategies
are based on the assumption that an individual’s intuitive judgment is imperfect, and need to
be supplemented by alternative strategies that approach normative standards. These qualities
are, however, not used to distinguish formally between the aforementioned strategy classes, they
are simply mentioned in a passing fashion [278]. In order to clarify how these strategy classes
differ, they are further discussed in the sections that follow.
5.3.1 Motivational strategies
Although not formally stated, motivational debiasing strategies seem to represent any attempt
at debiasing that entails altering the level of an individual’s “drive” to perform well. Larrick
defined two subclasses into which such strategies may be classified, namely incentives and ac-
countability [278].
Incentives
As the name suggests, incentive-based debiasing strategies involve raising the monetary stakes
associated with good performance — the assumption being that higher stakes will cause indi-
viduals to spend more energy on reflection and calculation [278]. Interestingly, after introducing
this class of strategy, Larrick proceeded to argue that such strategies are generally ineffective
in the task of debiasing. To support his argument, he referred to the assumption that seems to
underlie motivational debiasing strategies (i.e. that individuals do, in fact, possess effective deci-
sion making strategies, but simply fail to put them to good use because they lack the motivation
to do so [278]). Larrick argued that, more often than not, this assumption fails to hold water4.
In fact, he quoted Camerer and Hogarth [85] who stated, in an oft-cited article titled The effects
of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labour-production framework, that
“there is no replicated study in which a theory of rational choice was rejected at low stakes in
favour of a well-specified behavioural alternative, and accepted at high stakes.”
Accountability
The second class of motivational debiasing strategies (i.e. accountability) is in many ways similar
to the first. The only difference, really, is that the motivation-soliciting promise of potential
benefit takes the form of social status instead of monetary incentive [278]. According to Larrick,
the principal mechanism according to which accountability may improve an individual’s decision
making is that of pre-emptive self-criticism. The idea being that individuals will, in preparation
of justifying their decisions to others, anticipate and identify the flaws in their own arguments,
and thereby improve their decision making process and outcomes [278]. Like incentive-based
debiasing strategies, however, this effect has been found to be limited primarily to tasks for
which individuals do, in fact, possess appropriate decision making strategies and are simply
4Despite this general warning against the use of incentives as debiasing strategy, Larrick proceeded later in the
discussion to delineate a limited number of studies that did, in fact, find certain kinds of decision making tasks to
benefit from incentive-based debiasing strategies. The most recent study listed was conducted in 1995 by Stone
and Ziebart [435]. These authors found that the use of incentives with respect to the execution of multi-attribute
choice tasks lead individuals to search more extensively for information, and process that information more by
alternative than by attribute, resulting in improved decision making.
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failing to put them to use (see Lerner and Tetlock [285] for a review of studies related to this
topic). Despite being similar to the use of incentives, the social nature of accountability as a
debiasing strategy does make it unique in a number of ways. One interesting difference noted
by Larrick is that accountability tends to evoke a strong need to appear consistent to others,
and although rigid consistency can be detrimental to many kinds of decision making tasks, an
increased measure thereof has been shown to improve tasks that involve prediction (where the
inconsistent weighting of reliable cues is a major source of error) [420].
As Larrick made clear, despite being potentially useful, there are unfortunately a number of
dangers associated with the indiscriminate application of accountability as a debiasing strategy.
First, accountable decision makers tend to “give people what they want” (i.e. if an individual is
aware of his or her audience’s preference, the individual’s decision could be biased toward that
outcome [74]) [278]. Secondly, instead of motivating an individual to verify the appropriateness
of his or her decisions, accountability may simply motivate him or her to construct a preselected
justification for the current course of action [415].
5.3.2 Cognitive strategies
The second category of debiasing strategies in Larrick’s typology is reserved for any strategy that
involves altering a decision maker’s cognitive approach to a decision making task. Interestingly,
Larrick selected not to divide this class of debiasing strategy into additional subclasses5, but
simply proceeded to discuss three specific kinds of cognitive debiasing strategies, namely consider
the opposite, training in normative rules, and training in representation [278].
Consider the opposite
By necessity, cognitive debiasing strategies often take the form of context-specific rules tailored
to address only a limited number of biases (e.g. the law of large numbers [62] or the sunk cost
rule [26]). It is thus all the more impressive that the simple strategy of “consider the opposite”
has been documented to reduce several biases effectively, including the overconfidence bias [25],
the hindsight bias [27] and the anchoring effect [337]. The strategy consists of nothing more than
asking oneself the following question [278]: “What are some reasons that my initial judgement
might be wrong?” As Larrick delineates, this strategy is considered to be effective because it
counteracts the basic problem with oft-employed association-based decision making strategies —
attention being paid to an overly narrow sample of evidence [278]. Despite the potential benefit
of this debiasing strategy, it is worth noting that Larrick concluded his discussion thereof by
warning that it should be applied with caution, as asking a individual to list “too much” counter-
evidence could bias his or her decision in the opposite direction [278].
Training in normative rules
In a series of studies that took place between 1983 and 1993, a group of researchers, lead by
Nisbett [345], went about exploring the debiasing potential of training individuals in the use
5In a paper dedicated to a review of the academic literature related to debiasing methods, Kaufmann et
al. [266] suggested further dividing the class of cognitive strategies in Larrick’s typology according to the feature
such strategies attempt to alter. More specifically, Kaufmann et al. [266] suggested categorising this class of
debiasing strategies based upon whether they entail (1) altering the structure of the decision-related information
to suite the natural strengths of human cognition, (2) enriching an individual’s self-centred perspective by getting
him or her to consider the perspective of an “outside” party, or (3) drawing attention to alternative outcomes [266].
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
58 Chapter 5. Debiasing methods
of specific decision making rules. Although not formally defined, a decision making rule seems
to represent any “rule of thumb” prescribed to simplify and support a certain decision making
task. The work pioneered by Nisbet produced several significant discoveries. In summary, it
was illustrated (1) that the application of normative decision making rules could indeed be
successfully taught (often with relatively brief training), (2) that concrete examples of abstract
rules facilitated such training, and (3) that simplicity and/or familiarity with the general logic
of a certain rule greatly facilitated learning (see Fong et al. [166], Fong and Nisbett [167], Jepson
et al. [243], Larrick et al. [279] and Nisbett [283] for a review).
Training by representation
The second paradigm of training, and final cognitive strategy, discussed by Larrick (i.e. training
by representation) seems to have been inspired by the discovery that people tend to reason more
accurately when thinking in terms of frequency, compared to probability [187]. This discovery
led the theorist Sedlmeier [412] to determine whether an individual’s superior skill in frequency-
based reasoning could be leveraged and used as a debiasing strategy. To elucidate, Sedlmeier
went about conducting several studies in order to determine whether an individual could, in fact,
be trained to translate probabilistic reasoning tasks into the language of frequencies, thereby
improving his or her performance [412]. In summary, these studies involved testing participants
on three probability-based tasks, respectively related to the conjunction rule, Bayes’ rule and
conditional probabilities. Interestingly, Sedlmeier found that participants who had been trained
in frequency-based methods of reasoning outperformed those trained only in probability-based
methods [412], thereby illustrating the capacity of training by representation as a debiasing
technique.
5.3.3 Technological strategies
Interestingly, Larrick [278] went about introducing a number of debiasing strategies belonging to
the technological class of strategies without first formally defining the manner in which this class
of strategies differs from those discussed before it. But, based upon the author’s interpretation of
the strategies proposed to belong to this class, they seem to represent any debiasing method that
involves altering some aspect of a decision making task that is external to the decision maker,
in order improve the accuracy with which the task is executed. Unfortunately, the prototypical
examples of such strategies that were discussed are so specific that a detailed review thereof
fails to add value to the current discussion. As such, these strategies are simply listed as
follows: (1) Make decisions collectively (i.e. in groups), (2) use decision analysis techniques such
as linear models and multi-attribute utility analysis to support decision making, and (3) use
decision support systems to supplement decision making, thereby leveraging the capabilities of
computer-based decision support [278].
5.4 A typology proposed by Soll et al.
Although less well known than the work of Fischhoff [159] and Larrick [278], the typology
proposed by Soll et al. [429] in an article titled A user’s guide to debiasing has received some
attention from theorists working in the field of debiasing. Like Larrick [278], Soll et al. [429]
distinguished between debiasing methods according to the aspect of a decision making task that
is the focus of debiasing. More specifically, Soll et al. [429] proposed that debiasing methods
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be classified into one of two general categories: Those that are designed to modify the person
partaking in a decision making task, and those that are designed to modify the environment in
which the decision making task takes place [429].
5.4.1 Modifying the person
Soll et al. [429] listed three kinds of debiasing strategies to constitute the strategy class of modify
the person, namely education, the use of cognitive strategies, and the use of models to decide [429].
Similar to the work of Fischhoff [159], Soll et al. listed two distinct kinds of education: Training
in domain-specific decision rules, and education in general. Unfortunately, Soll et al. said very
little more regarding these forms of education. They simply argued that although education
in general has been shown to be of some value toward debiasing, the most promising form of
education remains to be the adoption of domain-specific decision rules. Before discussing the
next kind of debiasing method included in the general class of modifying the person (i.e. cognitive
strategies), the following logical inconsistency between it, and the presentation of education as
its own strategy class, should be noted. Per definition, educating individuals in domain-specific
rules represents a kind of cognitive debiasing strategy. Yet, Soll et al. elected to present this
form of education and the adoption of cognitive strategies (discussed below) as two separate
strategy classes. In the author’s view, the separation of these strategy classes constitutes an
error in logic.
Moving on to the discussion of cognitive strategies, four specific debiasing strategies were pro-
posed to constitute this class of strategy, namely generate alternatives, temper optimism, improve
judgement accuracy and assess uncertainty [429]. As Soll et al. put it, “having a good set of
alternatives from which to choose is at least as important as choosing wisely.” The idea behind
the generation of alternatives seems to be that the process of doing so will enable a decision
maker to view a problem from alternative points of view, thereby resulting in a more informed
final decision. Although Soll et al. [429] did not discuss the matter in detail, they suggested
that the process of generating alternatives is often facilitated by doing so with respect to each
objective related to the decision task individually.
The next kind of cognitive strategy (i.e. tempering optimism) seems to represent any attempt
at counteracting the manner in which individuals tend to overestimate their chance of success
with respect to their future endeavours. According to Soll et al. [429], this dynamic results
when individuals subconsciously limit the scope of information considered with respect to some
decision task to only that portion of evidence supporting some initial, preferred hypothesis (see
§3.5 for a discussion on the related optimistic bias) [330]. In order to temper optimism, Soll et
al. proposed a technique, initially published by Russo and Schoemaker [395], called prospective
hindsight. The technique entails imagining having time-travelled into the future and looking back
at one’s prior decision making with the knowledge that the course of action previously selected
had failed [429]. As several studies have illustrated, this form of contemplation often facilitates
the identification of additional “causal paths” not recognised during the initial analysis, thereby
resulting in a more realistic analysis of future events [324].
Naming a category within a typology dedicated to methods designed to improve decision accu-
racy “improving judgmental accuracy” is rather illogical, but the technique represented thereby
remains of interest. The technique seems to have been inspired by the idea of the “wisdom of
crowds” as studied by Galton [182] during the early 19th century. Galton found that if a large
number of people were asked to participate in some judgement task (e.g. guessing the number
of beans in a jar), the collective average of their estimates outperformed any individual’s es-
timate [182]. Interestingly, this finding led theorists to question the effectiveness of leveraging
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what they decided to call “the crowd within.” The idea was that taking the average of several
judgements made by an individual (separated by a time delay [471]) should outperform any
single estimate [429]. The technique has indeed been illustrated to reduce bias in individual
decision making [300] and, as such, forms part of the class of modifying the person, proposed
by Soll et al. [429].
The final strategy in the class of modifying the person (i.e. assess uncertainty) is rather unin-
volved. It essentially entails refining the manner in which a decision task is structured so that its
structure facilitates the execution thereof6. The technique is portrayed in terms of two kinds of
judgement tasks: Interval judgements (e.g. estimating with 80% confidence that a certain house
will sell for between 250 and 275 thousand dollars) and time series forecasting (e.g. estimating
that the value of gold will be 40 dollars per gram in 3 months’ time). As Soll et al. [429] delin-
eated, assessing uncertainty in terms of interval judgements would entail asking an individual
to provide not one, but several, interval estimates, each related to a different level of confidence.
With respect to the above example one could, for example, ask an individual first to estimate the
interval that will contain the price of the house in question with a 10% level of confidence, then
for a 50% level of confidence, and finally for a 80% level of confidence (which is the only level
that is truly of interest). On the other hand, assessing uncertainty with respect to time series
forecasting would entail progressively increasing the period over which individuals are expected
to make estimates. In terms of the above example, one could, for example, ask an individual
to first estimate the price of gold in one months’ time, then in two months’ time, and finally in
three months’ time (the only period that is actually of interest) [429]. The reasoning behind this
kind of strategy seems to be similar to that of the generation of alternatives (discussed above)
— helping individuals to consider a broader range of evidence when making decisions.
After reading the discussion of the final kind of cognitive strategy presented by Soll et al. [429]
(i.e. the use of models to decide), it was unclear to the author why Soll et al. elected to classify
this class of strategy as belonging to the more general class of modifying the person. To elucidate,
the use of models to decide, as presented by Soll et al., is very similar to the use of decision
analysis in the typology proposed by Larrick [278] (see §5.3.3) — it entails using mathematical
modelling techniques to inform decision making. Nevertheless, Soll et al. did indeed (for some
unknown reason perhaps) characterise the use of models to decide as a modification to the
decision maker and, as such, it is mentioned here.
5.4.2 Modifying the environment
Soll et al. [429] portrayed the modification of the environment within two main strategy classes,
namely the provision of incentives and selection of an appropriate choice architecture. A dis-
cussion on incentives will add little value to the work reviewed in this chapter as Soll et al.
simply rephrased Larrick’s discussion thereof in the typology he proposed (reviewed in §5.3.1).
Accordingly, this section contains only a discussion on the matter of choice architecture.
As described by Soll et al. [429], the term choice architecture is related to the configuration of a
decision task and refers to the manner in which decision alternatives and/or relevant information
is presented to a decision maker. Soll et al. referred to this kind of debiasing rather elegantly by
characterising it as a nudge in the direction of improvement. Importantly, to qualify as a nudge,
the selected configuration of a decision task may neither restrict a decision maker’s freedom of
choice nor alter the fundamental elements that constitute the decision task (e.g. the purchasing
price of items in a product selection task) as that would unfairly influence a decision maker’s
6As this strategy entails altering an aspect of a decision task external to the decision maker, it is unclear why
Soll et al. [429] presented this technique as belonging to the strategy class of modifying the person.
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behaviour. Instead, a choice architect7 must make use of psychological principles to influence
behaviour for the good in a subtle fashion [445]. Soll et al. proposed four classes of nudges,
namely defaults, nudges that induce reflection, nudges that induce future-focused thinking and
nudges that kindly shape information.
Defaults
In countries where post-mortem organ donation is the default and citizens have to take the
time to opt out of donating, donation rates are approximately 90 percentage points higher than
in countries where citizens must opt in to become donors [245]. Soll et al. [429] cited this
phenomenon as an example of the potential effectiveness of using defaults to nudge decision
makers in the “right” direction (assuming that being a organ donor is the right thing to do).
Defaults are argued to work because
(1) they leverage a decision maker’s inertia — those who procrastinate, are preoccupied, or
otherwise oblivious and are automatically included [429],
(2) they tend to establish a point of reference in a decision maker’s mind that loss aversion
makes difficult to sacrifice [244], and
(3) decision makers tend to perceive defaults as being representative of expert advice [311].
After listing these dynamics that make defaults a rather powerful debiasing strategy, Soll et
al. [429] presented a word of caution regarding their use. The main criticism raised was that
their use often results in a select group of individuals defaulting to a course of action ill-suited
to their personal preference. Essentially, the one-size-fits-all quality associated with defaults
has the potential to benefit many people, but at the expense of seriously harming a few [427].
Despite these drawbacks, Soll et al. concluded their discussion of defaults by stating that they
certainly “have a place in the debiaser’s toolkit.”
Nudges that induce reflection
According to Soll et al. [429], many decision biases relate to an over-dependence upon the
expertise of System 1 thinking, rather than that of System 2 thinking. As such, they posit that
debiasing may be promoted by making use of nudges that induce deeper reflection (see §3.1
for a review on the working of System 1 thinking and System 2 thinking). Three such nudges
are proposed, namely planning prompts, planned interruptions and active choice. As the name
suggests, planning prompts represent nudging an individual in the direction of specifying the
when, where and how of an intended action [429]. The articulation of concrete plans in this
manner is argued to be effective as it represents a commitment that is both psychologically
difficult to break and memorable [192]. The outcomes Soll et al. list to benefit from planning
prompts include physical training [318], meeting deadlines [131] and getting a flu-shot when
appropriate [315].
The second kind of nudge introduced to mitigate bias related to an under reliance on System 2
thinking (i.e. planned interruptions), entails interrupting an individual’s execution of some task
and thereby encourage added reflection [429]. Interrupting the consumption of pre-cooked food,
for example, by storing it in several containers, has been shown to reduce mindless eating [104].
The reasoning behind planned interruptions seems to be that breaking a decision making task
7A choice architect refers to the person responsible for designing the structure of a decision task [445].
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into a collection of “smaller” decisions will induce deeper reflection [429]. The final kind of nudge
dedicated to inducing deeper reflection (active choice), represents an alternative to the use of
defaults. To elucidate, Soll et al. argue that by forcing individuals to select a certain decision
option, instead of simply accepting some default, improves decision making. Two examples are
provided to support this argument: A study in which prescription drug users were required to
make an active choice between having to pick up medication at their local pharmacy, or by
home delivery, which increased home delivery rates by 35 percentage points8 [63], and a study in
which newly hired employees were required to make an active choice between whether or not to
sign-up for the 401k enrolment savings plan, increasing enrolment rates by 28 percentage points
over an opt-out choice scheme [90].
Nudges that induce future focused thinking
The tendency to over-emphasise immediate gratification, despite the long-term consequences of
doing so, is a well documented phenomenon related to human decision making. This tendency
has been linked to problems ranging from obesity [316] to insufficient retirement savings [352]. In
the remainder of this section, a series of nudges, proposed by Soll et al. [429], are briefly reviewed
as it has been claimed that they can reduce the potential effects of such “near sightedness.” The
following techniques are discussed: Choose in advance, precommitment and temptation bundling.
Based on an in-depth investigation, there seems to be no difference between the first two tech-
niques listed above (i.e. choose in advance and precommitment). Both embody the utility of
prompting individuals to make, and commit to, a certain decision option in advance of having
to make a decision in real time [429]. An example of applying this technique would be selecting
to put one’s savings in a commitment account9, thereby encumbering one’s ability to overspend
in future [35]. According to Soll et al. [429], this kind of technique is particularly valuable in
the context of self-control problems that pit an individual’s long-term interests against his or
her short-term desires. The final kind of nudge proposed to belong to this category of debiasing
methods (temptation bundling) is again similar to those discussed before it. It is, in a way, a
compromised kind of precommitment. To elucidate, temptation bundling entails a precommit-
ment to engaging in instantly gratifying activities only if they are coupled with behaviours that
have long-term benefits [429]. An example of temptation bundling would be the commitment
to pair eating sweet foods with physical exercise.
Nudges that kindly shape information
The reasoning behind the final kind of debiasing technique is that people tend to make better
decisions when they have access to the “right” information which is, furthermore, packaged in an
intuitively comprehensible and compelling format [429]. Several techniques have been proposed
that build upon this proposition, namely transform the scale, frame messages appropriately and
use kind representations for probabilities.
To illustrate the logic underlying the transformation of the scale according to which information
is presented, imagine having to select between the purchase of two equally priced vehicles, namely
vehicle A and vehicle B. The following information is provided: Vehicle A is considered a more
fashionable vehicle, but in terms of fuel efficiency, runs 1 mile per gallon less than Vehicle B.
8Individuals participating in the study were offered a discount if they selected home delivery, which is rather
odd as such an incentive may cause bias in the final results.
9A commitment account is a special kind of account that only allows the account holder to withdraw money
under certain predetermined conditions.
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In this scenario, one may be tempted to neglect the “slight” loss in terms of fuel efficiency (i.e.
1 mile per gallon), for the sake of owning a more fashionable vehicle. Conversely, consider an
individual’s response if the fuel efficiency of the respective vehicles were presented according to
an alternative scale: Gallons per hundred miles. Using this scale, Vehicle A’s fuel efficiency is a
total of 17 gallons per hundred miles less efficient than Vehicle B. According to Soll et al. [429],
altering the scale according to which numerical information is presented in this manner, and
thereby exaggerating important differences between decision options, has the potential to nudge
individuals onto an improved course of action.
Since the emergence of prospect theory [262], scholars have found the effect of framing upon
individuals’ responses to stimuli to be rather dramatic. According to Soll et al. [429], this
calls attention to the potential of framing as a debiasing tool. Rothman and Salovey [388]
illustrated this potential in the context of healthcare communication. In essence, they found
that loss-framed messages elicited more effective illness-detection behaviour, and that gain-
framed messages were more effective in eliciting illness-prevention behaviours (see Rothman and
Updegraff [389] for more information). It follows from studies such as this, that framing may
be utilised to promote certain, more appropriate responses to stimuli.
The final debiasing approach listed above concerns the misinterpretability of probabilistic infor-
mation. This phenomenon is widely documented. In 2000, Hoffrage et al. [216] found that indi-
viduals are uniquely willing to participate in an activity when information about the occurrence
of an unfortunate event (during its progression) is communicated in probability terms as com-
pared to frequency (e.g. 0.01% versus 1 in 10 000). In a similar study, Galesic et al. [180] found
that visual representation is another particularly effective way of communicating probabilistic
information (e.g. colouring a 10 × 10 grid to depict the probability of some occurrence [153]).
Soll et al. [429] drew upon these studies to suggest that this kind of representation of probability
information as debiasing tool.
5.5 A collection of debiasing methods in the literature
Despite an extensive search of the academic literature, no debiasing method designed specifically
for the context of interest in this dissertation could be found. Nevertheless, to illustrate that the
novel debiasing method proposed subsequently does not exist in academic isolation, several such
methods, tailored to alternative contexts of use, are described in the remainder of this chapter. In
the order discussed, these methods relate to the task of audit judgement, legislative judgements
of auditors’ legal liability, fingerprint identification, and supplier selection in manufacturing.
5.5.1 Audit judgement and accountability
In 1992, Hogarth and Einhorn [217] demonstrated that belief revision (the task of re-evaluating
one’s judgements on a matter) consists of a sequential anchoring-and-adjustment process whereby
a prior belief (i.e. an anchor) is revised on the basis of new information. Based upon the real-
ity of this mechanism, they proceeded to illustrate that under certain conditions10, a decision
bias, appropriately named recency, starts subconsciously influencing decisions made such that
information received later in a sequence is over-emphasised. More formally, recency was shown
to violate the normative requirement that the net effect of encountering information A followed
by information B, must equal that of B followed by A [347].
10The conditions in question are characterised by the complexity of a judgement task, the amount of information
related thereto, and the processing strategy utilised therein [217].
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Among the tasks that have proven vulnerable to the effects of recency, auditing is unique in
that it has received some attention from the debiasing research community. That is, in the
autumn of 1993, Kennedy [268] demonstrated the utility of a particular information processing
strategy in conjunction with accountability, which was defined as the requirement to justify
one’s actions to another, in reducing the effects of recency. In essence, what Kennedy proposed
is rather simple: When auditing, auditors should adopt an end-of-sequence strategy whereby
judgements are postponed until all relevant information has been reviewed, and furthermore,
they should attempt to justify their conclusions to a colleague before making them known to a
client. During a discussion on why the above strategy proved to be effective, Kennedy suggested
that its usefulness was in counteracting the tendency whereby auditors adopt a step-by-step
inspection strategy according to which information and judgements are reviewed in sequence,
as this was most likely what made them vulnerable to the effects of recency [268]. Notably,
this explanation leaves the reader wandering to what extent the respective components of the
aforementioned strategy contributed to the mitigation of recency.
5.5.2 Judges’ evaluation of auditor decisions
The difficulty of adjudicating the legislative liability of auditors after the occurrence of some
unforeseen, undesirable financial mishap has received considerable attention in the academic
literature. The conditions that characterise the decision instance in question seemingly make it
particularly vulnerable to biases associated with retrospective judgement. In 1997, Anderson et
al. [20] contributed to the pursuit of making evaluations of legislative liability less prone to bias
by publishing an article titled The mitigation of hindsight bias in judges’ evaluation of auditor
decisions in which they documented an enquiry into the utility of two debiasing techniques in
mitigating the influence of a bias identified to pervade the task in question (i.e. the hindsight
bias, see Table 3.1 for a review). The techniques considered are summarised as follows: Before
making a final judgement concerning the appropriateness of an auditor’s actions, a judge should
consider (1) alternative outcomes that may have followed from antecedent conditions related
to the audited party, and (2) alternative parties (other than the litigant) who may have been
harmed if the auditor had behaved otherwise. Notably, these methods both belong to the
class of debiasing strategies called restructuring the experiment, reviewed in §5.2.3. Somewhat
surprisingly the authors found the effect of the former strategy to be statistically insignificant,
while the latter method was shown to be of considerable utility [21].
5.5.3 Fingerprint identification
Forensic science was long touted as being infallable [327]. In recent years, however, academic
critics have begun to realise that there may be “surprisingly little science in what is called
forensic science.” Notably, the science of fingerprint identification is not excluded from this
accusation [377]. In an article titled The vision in ‘blind’ justice: Expert perception, judgement
and visual cognition in forensic pattern recognition, Dror and Cole [137] described the case of
Brandon Mayfield as exemplar of this reality. Mayfield, an attorney from Portland, Oregon, was
falsely linked to a 2004 terrorist bombing in Madrid, Spain as fingerprint examiners from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation determined with 100% certainty that his fingerprints matched
the prints found at the scene of the bombing [137]. In reality, however, Mayfield had not even
been in the country. Nevertheless, it was only after much drama (during which Mayfield spent
two weeks in prison) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was willing to admit that the
prints in question, although extremely similar, did, in fact, not match [137].
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In response to occurrences such as the one described above, debiasing researcher Reese [377]
went about designing a collection of debiasing methods specifically aimed at facilitating the
mitigation of decision biases associated with the task of fingerprint matching. She grouped
these strategies into one of two categories, namely debiasing the decision making task or debiasing
the decision maker11. A total of six debiasing strategies were proposed (evenly split between
the aforementioned categories), namely sequential unmasking, evidence line-ups, simplification,
consider-an-alternative, perspective taking and devil’s advocate. In the remainder of this section,
the respective strategies contained in each of the aforementioned categories are briefly discussed.
Sequential unmasking
Whether a result of incompetence or ignorance, as motivation to the first debiasing method listed
above, Reece [377] provided evidence of the fact that fingerprint analysts are often exposed to
domain-extraneous information during an examination (i.e. details of a crime not relevant to
the task at hand). This is considered problematic as this kind of information could bias a
fingerprint analyst’s examination. Pinpointing this potential for error upon the decision making
task, Reece proceeded to propose a debiasing technique called sequential unmasking. According
to this technique, during both the initial and verification phases of a fingerprint analysis, all
information should be unmasked (i.e. revealed) to the examiner in sequence, and only when
necessary [377]. In this way, Reece [377] suggested that unnecessary exposure to potentially
biasing domain-extraneous information could be prevented.
Evidence line-ups
A domain-specific instance of the confirmation bias (see §3.3 for a review), academics have
shown that fingerprint examiners fall victim to what is called the prosecutorial bias, defined as
the expectation that the prosecution’s perspective on a case is, in fact, the correct one [433].
Toward mitigating the adverse effects of this phenomenon, Reece [377] proposed a debiasing
method called evidence line-ups. In essence, the method entails introducing what are called foils
into a fingerprint examination. That is, the fingerprints that are actually of interest are mixed
with several similar-looking, but irrelevant prints [378]. The task of the fingerprint examiner is
then to determine which, if any, of the prints provided match the evidence found at the scene
of a crime. According to Reece [377], since an examiner would know from the structure of the
evidence line-up procedure that most of the pieces of evidence are not related to the prosecutor’s
case, the base rate expectation that the prosecutor’s take on a case will be confirmed, should be
reduced12.
Simplification
In reaching a verdict in respect of a particular fingerprint, forensic scientists are limited to one of
three possible outcomes: Identification (representing a 100% match), exclusion (representing a
100% mismatch), or inconclusive (representing the case in which an examiner is unable to reach
a decisive verdict) [377]. In other words, examiners are prohibited from making probabilistic
judgements. Reece [377] considered this limitation an unfair complication of the task in question
— one that exaggerates various decision biases [377]. As such, she proposed that during the
initial phases of a forensic investigation, fingerprints should be partitioned into one of two
11Notably, these categories correspond with the debiasing typologies reviewed earlier in this chapter.
12Two other researchers, Risinger [378] and Miller [317], have each separately advocated the debiasing strategy
in question.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
66 Chapter 5. Debiasing methods
categories, those that are relatively simple to identify, and those that are unduly dubious. In the
remainder of the analysis, examiners should then be allowed to provide probabilistic estimates
in respect of fingerprints belonging to the second category, thereby reducing the complexity, and
hopefully the degree of bias, associated with the task in question.
Consider-an-alternative
The debiasing strategy called consider-an-alternative is equivalent to the second debiasing tech-
nique reviewed in §5.5.2, but applied in the context of fingerprint identification. Although Reece
made salient that there are several use-cases for the technique in question, she provided an ex-
ample of only one. That is, whenever a fingerprint analyst examining a latent print identifies
what he or she believes to be a manutiae point13, instead of immediately drawing a conclusion
based upon that suspicion, (s)he should pause and actively considering the possibility that what
has been uncovered is simply an artefact14, and vice versa. According to Reece [377], doing so
may reduce the chance of bias in decision making.
Perspective taking
The penultimate technique Reece [377] considered of utility to the task of mitigating decision bias
in fingerprint matching is called perspective taking. As the name suggests, the technique entails
attempting to consider a decision instance from the perspective of each entity related thereto
before drawing any general conclusions regarding a verdict [377]. This may sound similar to the
above consider-an-alternative technique, although perspective taking involves the consideration
of an alternative point-of-view, and not an alternative scenario. Like before, Reece provided
only a single example of how the technique in question may be applied. That is, if during the
course of an examination, a fingerprint analyst is made aware of the fact that the prosecution
expects a certain set of prints to match, thereby inducing the potential for bias, the analyst
should pause, attempt to imagine that the print in question had been submitted by the defence,
or even that he or she may be expected to testify on the defence’s behalf, and only then proceed
with the examination [377]. By doing so, the potential of falling victim to the aforementioned
prosecutors bias would, according to Reece, be reduced [377].
Devil’s advocate
In the final, devil’s advocate debiasing technique, a second party, the “devil’s advocate,” is given
the formal mandate to question and argue against a fingerprint analyst’s initial conclusions [210].
Reece [377] argued that the cognitive exploration involved in this process of premeditated debate
would aid analysts in uncovering inadequacies in their decision making. Notably, the devil’s
advocate method is similar to the aforementioned consider-an-alternative technique. The only
difference is that in this case, the dissent process is formalised in the form of a second individual.
5.5.4 Supplier selection in manufacturing
Behavioural supply management has recently emerged as a research stream in the field of supply
chain management. In essence, it is considered the study of how judgements made in the context
13A feature found in a fingerprint, such as a ridge ending, a bifurcation, or a dot [377].
14A random disturbance originating from dirt or from other prints that were on the surface from which the
latent print was lifted [377].
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.6. Chapter summary 67
of manufacturing deviate from the assumptions of the homo economicus school of thought [93].
In an article titled Debiasing the supplier selection decision: A taxonomy and conceptualisation,
Kuaffmann et al. [266] endeavoured to document the entire collection of methods dedicated to the
task of debiasing the decision of supplier selection in the context of supply chain management.
They proceeded to identify a total of 68 methods, each belonging to one of five method classes,
namely decomposing, put yourself in the shoes of, draw attention to alternative outcomes, devil’s
advocate, and general bias awareness. As is evident from the labels assigned to each of these
categories, the methods documented by Kuaffmann et al. [266] are simply alternative versions
of the methods that have already been reviewed in this chapter. More specifically, a discussion
on these methods will be of insignificant utility to the purpose of this chapter and, consequently,
such a discussion is deemed outside the scope of this chapter.
5.6 Chapter summary
This chapter was dedicated to a review of the academic literature related to the field of debiasing.
It commenced in §5.1 with a brief introduction to the field in question, and this was followed in
§5.2–§5.4 by a detailed review of the dominant debiasing taxonomies utilised therein. Finally,
several debiasing methods similar to the one proposed later in this dissertation were briefly
described in §5.5.
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“If you can’t describe what you’re doing as a system of things, you don’t know what
you’re doing.” — Edwards Deming
The interconnected nature of the world is often remarkable in its subtlety, yet enduring in
its presence. This chapter is dedicated to a review of the academic literature related to this
interconnected nature of things and, in particular, a field of inquiry that established itself under
the title of systems theory is of interest. This research topic is introduced in §6.1 with a short
discussion on the philosophical roots of the systems movement, which is followed by a review of
the general applications of the movement in §6.2. Narrowing the focus of discussion, §6.3–§6.9
contain an explication of the various paradigms that exist within the systems movement specific
to the context of organisations theory, and finally, the chapter closes with a short summary in
§6.10.
6.1 The origins
In many Eastern religions enlightenment follows from a recognition that everything is intercon-
nected [234]. This sense of mutuality is, however, not unique to Eastern thinking — one also
finds its origins deeply rooted within the Western philosophical tradition [234].
As with many other paradigms in the Western tradition of thinking, the first attempts at systems
thinking were made by the ancient Greeks. More specifically, Aristotle first employed systems
69
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thinking in order to elucidate the mechanisms that govern the relationship between body and
soul, proposing that the soul provides the body with purpose and, consequently, its identity as
an entity [393]. The eye, for example, can only see when it is connected to the rest of the body.
Employing the same logic, Aristotle proceeded to transfer this notion of an organic whole to
the context of politics, his conjecture being that as the body is to the eye, the state is to the
individual — it shapes its purpose [393]. In general, what Aristotle claimed is that the whole is
prior to the constituent parts and that the parts only obtain meaning within the purpose of the
whole, and furthermore, that this principle holds true whether they are applied to the intricacies
of the body and soul, or to the mechanisms of society at large [234].
Given the prominence of Aristotle within the realm of philosophy, it is unsurprising that the
writings of many later philosophers (such as Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Marx and Hegel [221, 393])
are dominated by system ideas. Along with the original oeuvres of Aristotle, these writings
constitute the origins of systems thinking.
As one might expect, many of the aforementioned philosophers redefined the principles of systems
thinking in their own words, and as a consequence there are several somewhat unique descriptions
of this paradigm. For the sake of consistency, the following general definition is adopted within
the context of this dissertation: Systems thinking is founded upon the belief that the world is
a conglomeration of systems which, in turn, constitute a cohesive collection of interrelated and
interdependent parts, either natural or man-made. Furthermore, systems thinking holds that
every system is portrayed by its spatial and temporal boundaries, surrounded and influenced
by its environment, described by its structure and purpose, and expressed in its manner of
functioning [232].
6.2 The systems movement
Living in the midst of interacting events, thoughts, and actions, reality as experienced from
our subjective point of view, is rather complex. Humans have, however, never allowed the
complexities of life to diminish their ambition toward changing the natural state of the world.
The systems movement constitutes a notable part of this endeavour toward change — toward
improvement. In fact, the scope of its application has been so extensive that bringing order
to the burgeoning literature related to it, is in itself a monumental task. In order to facilitate
a high-level overview of the literature on systems thinking, it is therefore beneficial to make
an initial distinction between work concerned with the study of systems so as to further the
theory itself and work in which systems thinking has been applied to a specific field of study
(see Checkland [100]). As depicted in Figure 6.1, these categories have been labelled general
systems theory and applied systems theory, respectively. As the context of this dissertation
overlaps considerably with that of organisations theory, the second category is further classified
into system ideas which have been applied to organisational theory and system ideas which have
been applied to other disciplines (see Figure 6.1 for a list of such disciplines). The remainder of
this chapter is dedicated to an exposé of systems theory as applied to organisational theory.
6.2.1 Organisational systems theory
In the Political thought of Plato and Aristotle [46], it is explained how Aristotle argued that in
any society in which people continuously interact, divergent interests are the order of the day.
For a society to remain coherent over time (i.e. not break up into destructive factions), those
divergent interests must, therefore, be accommodated — they will not simply disappear. In the
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The systems movement













Figure 6.1: A schematic representation of the systems movement, adapted from Checkland [100].
modern world, accommodating these divergent interests is often the business of politics [254].
One of the primary mechanisms for managing such pursuits, however, originated not at the
hands of politicians, but was the academic product of the economic growth that took place
during the industrial revolution, a field called organisations theory. Organisations theory was,
in a sense, the manual to the vehicle of economic pursuit of the time.
At the denouement of the revolution, three models of management were competing for prece-
dence within this newly coined field, namely the traditional approach, human relations theory
and systems theory. Based upon Taylor’s scientific management theory, Fayol’s administrative
management theory and Weber’s bureaucracy theory [375], the traditional approach to modelling
management argued that an organisation could be likened to a machine, and modelled accord-
ingly. This view was, however, subjected to severe critique from several commentators [232],
specifically for its alleged failure to take account of the human influence within the workings
of an organisation. Finding council in these critiques, theorists like Mayo, Herzberg, Maslow
and McGregor endeavoured to develop a view of organisations theory that put the dynamics
of humans at the centre of analysis [212]. This was the birth of human relations theory. At
its introduction, human relations theory brought with it the untamed excitement that often
accompanies any form of novel discovery. This excitement was, however, short-lived. By de-
veloping human relations theory in response to the shortcomings of the traditional approach,
these theorists polarised their views toward the other end of the spectrum — paying attention
to human needs at the expense of almost everything else [357]. Credit must, nonetheless, be
given where deserved — human relations theory made salient several elements of importance in
the study of organisations.
By the 1960s, the systems movement had truly made its way into the theory of organisations. A
paradigm of obvious superiority, the systems approach quickly came to dominate management
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theory [232]. System theorists responded to the shortcomings of preceding endeavours by criti-
cising their limited focus upon one or two of the many aspects within an organisation necessary
for optimal performance (i.e. the traditional approach only paid attention to task and structure,
while human relations theory focused solely upon human needs). Conversely, systems theory
adopted a holistic approach that considered all aspects of an organisation and recognised the
fact that organisations were open systems, constantly interacting with their environment [234].
Within the context of organisations theory, the systems thinking paradigm produced several
theories of management, each better suited for a certain context of application. Table 6.1
contains a summary of these developments, linking schools of thought to applicable methods.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a review of the various theories of management which
constitute organisational systems thinking, namely hard systems thinking, cybernetics, machine
learning, soft systems thinking, emancipatory systems thinking, and critical systems thinking.
Table 6.1: An explication of the theories that constitute organisational systems thinking.
Paradigm Methodology Class/Method
Hard systems Systems analysis [234] Analytical modelling [486]
thinking [234] Systems engineering [198] Quality function development [326]
Traditional operations Analytical modelling [486]
research [115]
Cybernetics [232] Organisation cybernetics [232] Beer’s viable system model [234]
Management cybernetics [53] Black box technique [232]
Negative feedback technique [232]
Variety engineering [232]
Machine Supervised learning [273] Decision trees [356]
learning [88] Support vector machines [273]
Unsupervised learning [185] k-Means clustering [356]
Principle component analysis [185]
Semi-supervised learning [96] Kernel density estimation [356]
Reinforcement learning [441] Policy iteration [441]
Value iteration [441]
Soft systems General Soft systems methodology [102]
thinking [100] Social system design [113]
Strategic assumption surfacing
and testing [232]
Social systems sciences [7]
Soft operations research [168] Strategic choice [178]
Strategic options development
and analysis [3]
Emancipatory General Critical systems heuristics [458]
systems Community operations research [246]
thinking [127]
Critical systems General Total systems intervention [234]
thinking [127]
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6.3 Hard systems thinking
It is interesting to note that the term hard systems thinking did not appear in the academic
literature until Checkland employed it in 1975 to justify the development of soft systems thinking
(to be discussed later in this chapter) [98]. This is interesting because the paradigm that the
term came to represent was certainly around long before its coinage. The first strands of hard
systems thinking is often traced back to a period during, and immediately after WWII — a
period during which scientific research methods were being applied to the study of operational
processes rather than natural phenomena.
Delving into the depths of the hard system’s history of thinking is a daunting task, as the philo-
sophical and theoretical points of view that underpin its development are often so taken-as-given
that they are rarely declared explicitly. It is, however, possible to elicit such understanding by
studying the similarities among the problem solving methodologies that are held to be repre-
sentative of the hard systems school of thought, namely traditional operations research, systems
analysis, and systems engineering [234]. An in-depth explication of these methodologies and
the methods they contain would, however, not be a wise endeavour, as several books could be
written on the methods within each. The focus in this section is, therefore, restricted to a brief
review of each methodology, with the purpose of illustrating the more general hard systems
school of thought underlying each. To that end, consider the following definitions:
Operations research can be defined as the application of scientific methods to complex prob-
lems arising in the pursuit and management of organised systems of people, machines,
material and capital within several contexts of endeavour. The distinctive characteristic of
this methodological approach is the development of scientific models of the system under
consideration in order to predict and compare the outcome of several potential courses of
action [233].
Sytems analysis is a manner in which to study complex problems of choice under conditions
of uncertainty by eliciting the costs, risks, and utility associated with alternative courses
of action. It finds application in decision aid of public and private decision makers [323].
Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach towards designing complex systems in
such a manner that the subsystems of its composition are combined, verified, and operated
in the most effective way [56].
To the trained eye, these definitions reveal various characteristics. First, it can be seen that the
purpose of scientific inquiry, as employed above, differs from that with which it was traditionally
associated (i.e. the advancement of knowledge for its own sake). Hard systems thinking finds
purpose, not in the endless pursuit of new knowledge, but in the application of what is known
in and about real-world instances, with the general purpose of serving the interests of decision
makers [233]. A second characteristic belonging to the class of hard systems thinking relates to
the proposition that models, predominantly of a mathematical nature, are able to do for the
management sciences what laboratories do for the natural sciences — provide a controlled space
within which the methodological study of phenomena can take place [233].
This belief in the practice of modelling exhibits several underlying assumptions inherent to hard
systems thinking with respect to the state of the real world. The work of Peter Checkland [99]
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comes to mind as an excellent elucidation of these assumptions. Checkland argued that there are
four basic assumptions that constitute the thinking behind the hard systems approach, namely:
1. There is a present state of a system, S0,
2. there is a desired future state of a system, S1, which is known,
3. there are alternative ways of getting from S0 to S1, and
4. the analyst’s role is to identify the best way of getting from S0 to S1.
These assumptions lie at the heart of the hard systems approach, constituting the backbone of the
methodologies that represent this paradigm. By likening the purposeful, social activity of human
beings to the naturally forming physical systems of nature [127], hard systems thinking employs
these assumptions to argue that the world can be modelled to represent a conglomeration of
subsystems, each entertaining its own clearly defined purpose through routine and repetitive
operation toward realising predetermined goals [127].
Before moving on to a discussion on the next systems thinking school of thought, it is worth
discussing the methods that function within the methodologies presented above. Table 6.1
contains several such methods. Although not exhaustive, these methods are considered to be
relevant within the context of this section. Most of the methods that function within the hard
system paradigm reside in the class of techniques called analytical modelling, which can be
defined as the mathematical replication of the logical relationships that are believed to govern
the behaviour among the components of a system under investigation [486]. Models that belong
to this analytical class can be divided into four categories, depending on whether or not they
model behaviour in a discrete or a continuous manner, and whether that behaviour is modelled
deterministically (i.e. according to a fixed set of rules) or in a stochastic manner (i.e. according
to a statistical distribution of probability). Figure 6.2 contains a schematic representation of
some of these categories and a suggestion of how a limited number of modelling paradigms can
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Figure 6.2: Types of modelling disciplines.
Taking another step down the staircase of classification, one can see that within each of these
modelling paradigms, there are what may be called typical problem types (i.e. problems typically
associated with these modelling paradigms). Table 6.2 provides an (incomplete) explication of
such problem types (again as interpreted by the author).
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Table 6.2: Typical problem types tackled within selected modelling paradigms.
Modelling discipline Problem types modelled
Calculus Inventory management problems
Queuing theory problems
Design theory Experimental design problems
Sport tournament scheduling problems
Difference equations Population dynamics models
Differential equations Blending problems
Control problems
Game theory Problems of strategy formulation





Group theory Enumeration problems
Linear algebra State transition problems











Multi-criteria decision analysis Preference modelling
Trade-off analyses
Simulation Warehousing management problems
Production process management problems
Resource flow problems





In conclusion, it can be said that early systems theory, as presented by the hard systems ap-
proach, reflects a positivist epistemology (i.e. the belief that observable evidence is the only form
of defensible scientific discovery), with the methods therein focusing on prediction and control
as inspired by the natural sciences [233]. This manner of inquiry has proven itself useful in the
study of several kinds of systems, although it should be stated that the scope of its applica-
tion must be selected with care. For example, when it comes to the study of complex human
problems (e.g. poverty) the application of hard systems thinking may be inadequate [230]. To
defend this statement, an assertion made by Watson et al. [127] is paraphrased: Through trial
and error, systems researchers have concluded that social systems are too complex to be studied
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by the black and white methodologies of hard systems thinking, the result more often than not
being an inaccurate and unsuitable interpretation of the world. The intended purpose of this
statement is not to belittle the capability of hard systems thinking as a solution methodology,
but rather, to accompany its considerable potential with an appropriate level of caution.
6.4 Cybernetics
Etymologists have traced the origins of the expression cybernetics to the Greek word kybernetes
— meaning the art of steermanship [232]. At the time of its coinage, kybernetes referred princi-
pally to the piloting of a vessel, an exceptionally dangerous occupation in those days. Around
the time of Plato, philosophers expanded its applicability by employing it to refer to the act of
steering the ship of state, a role typically assumed by the acting head of state. Throughout the
history of the term kybernetes, the golden thread of its use has been the implied act of control,
whether that be in a technical or a political sense. During his time at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute for Technology, Wiener became the first mathematician to take this notion of control and
apply it to a specific field of study. His book titled Cybernetics: Control and communication in
the animal and the machine [483], published in 1948, marked the exact moment of this transi-
tion. As the title of his book suggests, Wiener defined cybernetics as the science of control and
communication [233].
Ashby, another pioneer of the cybernetic discipline, published his best-known book titled An
introduction to cybernetics in 1956 [33]. In its initial chapters, Ashby goes about introducing a
notion that became for many the “Newtonian law of management,” namely the law of requisite
variety [232]. This law states that only variety can destroy variety, or in more practical terms,
if order is to remain in a system, the variety of the controlling mechanism must be at least
as large as the variety of the system it is controlling [34]. Interestingly, this notion seems to
coincide with a dimension of system complexity as defined by Jackson [232] (i.e. the number of
states a system or its output can assume). This overlap, between the nature of complexity in a
system and the purpose of cybernetics is, in fact, not accidental or surprising — cybernetics was
developed to accommodate systems of extreme complexity, self-regulation, and probabilism [52].
Cybernetics as a discipline stretches far and wide — so wide, in fact, that its boundaries cannot
properly be illuminated within the scope of this chapter. Fortunately, the basic building blocks
that constitute the cybernetic methodology remain constant regardless of the context of appli-
cation. As such, the remainder of this section is devoted to a review of the core principles of the
cybernetic methodology as applied to the context of management (i.e. organisations theory).
The methodology can be divided into three main building blocks, or rather, three main methods
of dealing with different kinds of complexity in a system, namely the black box technique, the
negative feedback technique, and variety engineering [233].
6.4.1 The black box technique
During its development, the proponents of management theory recognised that one can effec-
tively manage what one can predict with a certain measure of certainty. While hard systems
theorists responded to this insight by designing an approach that depended upon an in-depth
understanding of a system in its entirety [234], the cybernetic school of thought recognised that
it was not always necessary to understand why every part of a system behaves the way it does.
In fact, cybernetic theorists argued that there are instances in which exceedingly complex com-
ponents within a system should not be modelled in the hard systems sense of the word, and
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that modelling such components would only result in an inaccurate representation of the real
world [232]. In other words, complex systems are frequently more than the sum of their parts
— in some instances, the parts of a system cannot be described in a manner that reproduces
the pattern of behaviour exhibited by the system as a whole. As Ashby put it: “The way not
to proceed in approaching an exceedingly complex system, is by analysis” [33].
The cybernetic solution to this extensive measure of complexity is to define certain parts of
a system as a black box [232]. Then, utilising a method of input manipulation and output
classification, data can be collected that are representative of the system’s behaviour. These
data may then be analysed to discover any regularities in behaviour that could represent the
black boxes mechanisms. By doing this, an analyst is essentially developing a model of the
black box, but in a very different sense than the hard systems approach would encourage. It
is important to note that a black box does not necessarily have to contain a whole system
— certain exceedingly complex subsystems within a greater system can be described by various
black boxes even if the systems within which they operate are described analytically. A schematic
representation of the black box technique is provided in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: The black box technique, adapted from Jackson [232].
In conclusion, note that within the context of cybernetics the black box technique is subjective.
The judgements made in respect of regularities discovered within the behaviour of a black box
are based on subjective experience. It is, therefore, important that an analyst does not jump
to any conclusions prematurely. A system must be studied for a sufficient period of time before
attempting to describe the behaviour thereof [54].
6.4.2 Negative feedback
As discussed in the previous section, the black box technique’s main purpose is to generate a set
of patterns by which a system’s behaviour can be predicted. The strategy of negative feedback
is rather different in its purpose — instead of prediction, it focuses on control. More specifically,
negative feedback is a mechanism by which a system can reach a state of self-regulation [232].
The negative feedback technique is typically employed in a situation where it is possible to
model the components of a system, but the optimal strategy for managing the behaviour of the
system is exceptionally difficult to identify. Essentially, negative feedback then gives a system
the ability to regulate its behaviour based on observation of the real-time state of the system.
As depicted in Figure 6.4, its operation can be summarised as follows: The output of a system
is continuously compared with some predetermined goal. If the system is not achieving its goal,
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the margin of error (i.e the negative feedback) is employed as the basis for adjustments to the
system, which then brings it closer to its goal [234]. This kind of closed-loop control system is
exceptionally effective, since any deviation from the predetermined goal automatically sets in
motion adjustments to the system aimed at bringing it back on track [404].
Figure 6.4: The negative feedback technique, adapted from Jackson [232].
A final point should be made before closing the discussion on negative feedback. This section
has only touched on simple, first-order feedback systems [404]. More sophisticated (i.e. second-
order and third-order) feedback systems also exist. These systems are capable of choosing among
several responses to changes in a system and can even change the goal state of the system in
response to feedback processes [232].
6.4.3 Variety Engineering
“The world is woven from billions of lives, every strand crossing every other. What
we call premonition is just movement of the web. If you could attenuate to every
strand of quivering data, the future would be entirely calculable. As inevitable as
mathematics.” — Sherlock Holmes
The above iconic quote from the British television series Sherlock captures a version of reality not
common to man. Managers of the 21st century are typically unable to make accurate predictions
about either the organisations they manage or the environments within which they function.
Consequently, organisations must develop the ability to respond to these uncertain occurrences
if they are to be successful. Fortunately, Ashby held out a helping hand to managers when he
coined the concept of variety [34], which can be defined as the number of states a system can
adopt. It is, therefore, a measure of complexity [234]. As Ashby’s law of requisite variety put it,
only variety can destroy variety. Thus, in order to control a system’s behaviour, one’s response
to a system needs to possess as much variety as the system itself. The cybernetic solution to
this dynamic is to either reduce the variety of the system (i.e. variety engineering) or increase
the variety of one’s responses to changes in the system (i.e. variety amplification) [232]. This
process of balancing variety constitutes the core principal of variety engineering [54].
In conclusion, the development of the field of cybernetics represented significant progress, it
equipped managers with the capacity to better respond to the uncertain environment within
which they function. Accordingly, cybernetics has been heralded as a unique paradigm within
the systems movement.
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6.5 Machine learning
The ability to learn, to develop an understanding of stimuli and respond in an appropriate
manner, is an intricate, multi-faceted phenomenon. For a long time, this ability was thought
to be unique to living organisms. Since the mid 20th century, however, this belief is no longer
appropriate. In 1959, Arthur Samuel, a pioneer of the digital machine age coined the term
machine learning, defining it to be the field of study that equips computers with the ability to
learn without being explicitly programmed [400]. The onset of this new age, heralded a new
dawn in both industrial and scientific inquiry. Interestingly, including machine learning as one
of the system thinking paradigms has not been standard practice within the academic literature.
By the end of this chapter, the author hopes to have illustrated why such an exclusion of the
machine learning paradigm is inappropriate.
6.5.1 Machine learning meets cybernetics
There has been much debate about where machine learning, as an academic discipline, actu-
ally fits in. This confusion is believed to be due to a lack of knowledge about the somewhat
lesser-known paradigm of cybernetics. To the attentive eye, however, there is an undeniable
connection between machine learning and cybernetics. This connection is hinted at, but not
explicitly established in the existing academic literature. It is nevertheless formally suggested
here that cybernetics was the precursor of machine learning. More specifically, machine learning
borrowed and built upon two concepts that were first developed within the cybernetic paradigm,
namely the black box technique and the negative feedback technique. These concepts were for-
mally defined in §6.4, but to summarise: The main reason for adopting the black-box technique
was to be able to model exceedingly complex real-world systems, while the main purpose of
employing the negative feedback technique was to identify a policy by which to manage ex-
ceedingly complex, dynamic real-world systems. Within the machine learning paradigm, these
methods have maintained their purpose, but have adopted a new nature — the ability to learn
autonomously.
Going into slightly more detail, the black box technique gave analysts the ability to model
exceedingly complex systems without having to explicitly model the system under consideration
(in the hard systems sense) [232]. This meant that instead of having to define the elements and
relationships that governed the behaviour of a system, analysts could simply study the system’s
inputs and outputs as data descriptive of its nature. Within the cybernetic paradigm it was the
responsibility of the analysts to study the data with a view to identifying patterns that related
the inputs to the outputs. These patterns would then become a model of the real-world system,
enabling analysts to predict how new inputs would be transformed into outputs [483]. This
mechanism of prediction was, however, greatly limited by the cognitive capacity of the human
mind to recognise appropriate patterns.
The negative feedback technique was in its own right a powerful method of coping with the un-
certain environment within which most systems operate. Instead of demanding foreknowledge of
the future, negative feedback gave the analyst the ability to build a measure of flexibility into a
system that was more capable of dealing with uncertainty [483]. But once again, this mechanism
of control was rather limited by the analyst’s ability to design an appropriate measure of flexibil-
ity (i.e. a policy) that could respond to unexpected disturbances of a system. These limitations
on the part of the analyst created a niche for the machine learning paradigm. Machine learning
responded to the cognitive limitations of the human mind by stepping outside its domain, into
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the domain of artificial intelligence [394]. Instead of expecting analysts to identify the patterns
that model a system, or a policy that optimally manages a system, machines were given the
ability to identify such patterns and uncover such responses autonomously.
6.5.2 Predominant paradigms
As the field of machine learning matured, four main paradigms of autonomous learning emerged.
These paradigms are supervised learning, unsupervised learning, semi-supervised learning, and
reinforcement learning. In the supervised learning paradigm, a machine is presented with labelled
data corresponding to dependent and independent variables with the end goal of approximating
an underlying function (i.e. pattern) which is best able to link input features (i.e. independent
variables) to the output variables (i.e. dependent variables) [273]. Supervised and unsupervised
learning are rather similar — in fact, the only difference is the feature that the data provided
to the machine are unlabelled [65]. In other words, no guidance is given as to the underlying
function that best describes the system being modelled. Semi-supervised learning is a hybrid
of supervised and unsupervised learning that employs a combination of labelled and unlabelled
data [96].
The paradigms of supervised, unsupervised and semi-supervised learning were (it would seem)
all modelled on the black-box technique. The paradigm of reinforcement learning is, however, a
method of a different kind — one that was modelled according to the negative feedback technique.
Reinforcement learning is concerned with how a software agent (i.e. the machine) should take
actions within an environment so as to maximise some notion of cumulative reward [441]. This
process takes the form of a negative feedback cycle. Evidently, reinforcement learning differs from
the other paradigms in its overall focus on control, compared to a specific focus on prediction
within the other machine learning paradigms.
In summary, machine learning took the building blocks of the cybernetics paradigm and gave it
the capacity to be applied to systems of greater complexity and scale than ever thought possible.
As cybernetics built upon the foundation of hard systems thinking, machine learning built upon
the foundation of cybernetics. It is not claimed here that machine learning is a subfield of
cybernetics, or that the two are one and the same. Simply put, it is suggested that cybernetics
was one of the foundational building blocks of the machine learning movement — a movement
which has proven its capacity to facilitate the study of exceedingly complex real-world systems.
6.6 Soft systems thinking
During the mid-19th century, an active debate ensued as to the objectivity of the systems
movement’s problem solving techniques. Several well-known theorists, such as Rittel [382],
Webber [382], Ackoff [6] and Checkland [100], later made significant contributions to this debate.
Arguably, the most notable of these contributions was by Rittel and Webber in an article titled
Dilemmas in a general theory of planning, in which they differentiated between tame and wicked
problem types. The general points of critique highlighted during the debate were that the
system techniques of the time were limited because of a lack of appreciation of the subjective
nature of the process of problem formulation and the strict prerequisites that had to be met
before being appropriately employed (e.g. predefined objectives) [233]. It is not claimed here
that systems practitioners did not, at times, recognise the need to adapt techniques in order
to accommodate real-world circumstances, but rather that the formally defined, academically
documented techniques did not mirror the same sensitivity to real-world conditions.
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As a result of the elucidated limitations of the systems approach of the time (i.e. consisting
predominantly of hard systems thinking) a family of alternative methods, collectively called
soft systems thinking, was developed with the purpose of supplementing the limitations of its
predecessor [101]. The methods within this family consist of several technical procedures which
are linked together by social interaction. That is, unlike the algorithmic nature of the traditional
problem solving approach, soft systems thinking is largely qualitative in nature [430]. Over the
years, several academics have proposed novel methods within the soft systems paradigm, some
of which have stood the test of time, while some turned out to be but sifting sand under the
weight of professional scrutiny.
As in previous sections, the scope of this section renders infeasible a detailed description of the
methods that are dominant within the soft systems approach. Instead, in a manner pioneered
by Jackson [232], the discussion is built around the aphorisms proposed by Churchman toward
capturing the essence of soft systems thinking. More specifically, introducing the aforementioned
aphorisms attention is afforded to a discussion on each of the three methods that are held to
be representative of the soft systems approach [232], namely soft systems methodology (SSM),
strategic assumption surfacing and testing (SAST), and social systems sciences (SSS). The sec-
tion finally closes with a short review of a relatively recent field within operations research,
called soft operations research, that was developed in response to the elucidated limitations of
the hard systems paradigm within which traditional operations research functioned.
6.6.1 Churchman’s social systems design
The systems movement [114], published by Churchman in 1979, was the product of several
years of philosophical speculation and is truly difficult to summarise. Fortunately, in the closing
chapters, Churchman described several propositions which capture the main message of the
book — a message that became for many the building blocks of the soft systems philosophy.
The first of these aphorisms is:
“The systems approach begins when first you see the world through the eyes of an-
other.”
For Churchman, the soft systems approach begins with an understanding that the world can be
viewed from several radically different perspectives that typically accompany conflicting philo-
sophical positions. As Kant put it, no matter the view of the world one holds, it is inevitably
based upon several taken-for-granted, a priori assumptions [265]. In this way Churchman en-
couraged system practitioners to embrace the fact that distinctly different evaluations of social
systems can and do exist [233]. The only way to develop a wholesome understanding of a system
is to study it from as many perspectives as possible [112]. Churchman supported this claim with
a second aphorism:
“The systems approach goes on to discover that every world-view is terribly re-
stricted.”
In The design of inquiring systems [113], Churchman defends the above aphorism by considering
several perspectives from which five highly intelligent philosophers might describe a system —
ultimately concluding that each description in isolation, is incomplete [113]. The only way
to move closer to an objective understanding of a system was to combine as many subjective
descriptions of a system as practically feasible. Importantly, Churchman followed this statement
with the conjecture that an individual’s adopted world-view is exceptionally difficult to change,
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in other words, individuals find it difficult to accept the fact that their world-view is limited.
In the data-rich modern state of the world, it is tempting to claim that individuals need only
be exposed to information contrary to their world-view for them to acknowledge the limitations
thereof. The effect of such exposure is, however, diluted as any apparent contradiction is simply
interpreted, and thereby corrected, according to their fixed presuppositions [112]. According to
Churchman, it is only through dialectical debate that one can truly expose decision makers to
the restricted nature of their world-view.
Formally defined, the process of dialectical debate adopts a form of inquiry first employed by
the German philosopher Hegel [232]: Propose a thesis, challenge that thesis with an antithesis,
synthesise the thesis and antithesis into a new, improved thesis, and repeat the process. In the
context of a dialectical debate, a thesis would be a world-view that gives meaning to a system,
an antithesis would be a second relevant world-view based on entirely different assumptions, and
the synthesis would be the process of considering both world-views and bringing them together
in a way that produces a view of the system that is greater than the sum of its parts (i.e. the
original world-views) [233]. This iterative process of moving closer and closer to an objective
understanding of a system brings the current discussion to Churchman’s final aphorism:
“There are no experts in the systems approach.”
This warning is one that should be taken to heart most seriously by systems practitioners
themselves. Because of the human-infused state of real-world systems, the aims and objectives
being pursued during problem solving will inevitably involve ethical considerations of moral
judgement, an area of consideration in which there can be no expert [232].
6.6.2 Soft systems methodology
Doubtless, it is unwise to claim that any methodology of scientific inquiry has matured to the
point of perfection. Such a claim would simply illustrate a misunderstanding of the scientific
discipline. The truth, rather, is that many methods of scientific inquiry have become so taken-
as-given that they seem in some sense permanent. To the soft systems theorist, SSM is certainly
one such method [103].
Casually defined, the SSM can be divided into four phases, with each phase connected to every
other phase, as depicted in Figure 6.5. This interconnectivity is not accidental — its purpose is
to illustrate that the activities of the SSM process do not constitute a once-off sequence of steps.
For example, employing the activity models of phase 2 during phase 3 will ultimately lead to the
discovery of new problem elements — deeming a return to phases 1 and 2 necessary [102]. Thus,
SSM is fundamentally an iterative process. The father of SSM, Peter Checkland, developed
it in this manner so that it would be able to accommodate the unique, continually changing,
conflict-laden nature of human interaction [103]. For a complete discussion on the SSM, the
reader is referred to Checkland [102].
6.6.3 Strategic assumption surfacing and testing
A methodology for approaching ill-structured problems, SAST can be applied as a dialectical
approach to policy and planning problems. It was designed to facilitate an exploration of the
underlying assumptions that constitute the status-quo within a given context. SAST is typically
employed when the formulation of a problem is of a messy nature [232]. Its four core principles,
namely adversarial debate, participation, integration and managerial-minded support can be
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1. Find out about the problem 2. Make purposeful activity
    models
3. Employ models to investigate
    the situation
4. Define actions to improve the
    situation
Figure 6.5: A schematic representation of the SSM process.
summarised by claiming that ill-structured problems are best understood when the conflicting
perspectives of as many individuals as are affected by a problem are integrated into a higher-
order synthesis which, in turn, deepens the managerial understanding of the organisation [307].
The four basic steps that constitute the SAST methodology are summarised in Figure 6.6. For

















Figure 6.6: A schematic representation of the SAST process, adapted from Mason and Mitroff [307].
6.6.4 Social systems sciences
In like manner to Churchman, Ackoff [8] rejected the notion that objectivity can be obtained
by constructing value-free models of a system. He believed that the only way a measure of
objectivity in opinion can be obtained is by the open interaction of individual subjectivities [234].
This belief gave rise to the formalisation of a process that became the central operating tool of
Ackhoff’s SSS, called interactive planning [232].
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Interactive planning is built upon three principles that are incorporated into five phases of
activity [8]. The first principle, namely the participative principle, speaks to the importance of
including relevant stakeholders throughout the planning process. The second principle is that
of continuity, which emphasises the fact that organisations should be able to adapt in harmony
with the ever-changing environment within which they function. The final principle, the holistic
principle, warns analysts to not lose sight of the big picture, and to include all levels of activity
within their planning [232]. Ackoff took these three principles and made them practical in the
form of five phases of activity, schematically represented in Figure 6.7. These phases constitute
a continuous, iterative process — they are never completed, only abandoned. For a complete












Figure 6.7: A schematic representation of the SSS process, adapted from Jackson [232].
6.6.5 Soft operations research
One of the most interesting developments to take place as a result of the elucidated shortcomings
of the hard systems approach was the development of a field which came to be known as soft
operations research [232]. In many ways, the development of soft operations research was an
attempt at bridging the gap between the methods of the traditional systems paradigm and
the intricacies of real-world problem solving by combining the analytical advantages of the
traditional approach with the soft paradigm’s priority of accurately capturing and structuring the
intricacies of a problematic situation. There are two approaches to structuring problems in this
manner which tend to dominate the realm of soft operations research, namely the strategic choice
approach (SCA), and strategic options development and analysis (SODA). In the remainder of
this section, these approaches, as well as a third approach which is of interest, are briefly
discussed.
Strategic choice approach
When Friend and Hickling wrote Planning under pressure: The strategic approach [178], it was
the first methodically mature exposition of the strategic choice approach. In the years since,
the approach has gathered support among many operations research practitioners [177]. At its
core, the strategic choice approach is dedicated to the management of uncertainty in a strategic
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manner [319]. As depicted in Figure 6.8, the SCA can be divided into four main modes of
thinking, namely shaping, designing, comparing and choosing. These modes of thinking are
concerned with the shaping of problems, the designing of possible courses of action, a set of
techniques for comparing those courses of action, and finally a set of techniques for choosing a
course of action, respectively. On a lower level of operation, each of these modes of thinking can
be broken down further into several phases of purposeful activity. These activities are designed
to respond to three different kinds of recognised uncertainties, namely uncertainties within the
working environment, uncertainties pertaining to guiding values, and uncertainties related to
the decision space [234].
Figure 6.8: A schematic representation of the SCA process, adapted from Friend et al. [178].
Interestingly, the phases within which responses to these uncertainties are contained do not
constitute a well-defined process of investigation. It is more accurately represented by an as-
sembly of several logically successive activities. In other words, the SCA does not attempt to
micro-manage the way in which its activities are implemented and conducted. The designers
of the approach argue that the real world is too complex to justify a planning approach which
incorporates an exact methodological process [177].
Strategic options development and analysis
SODA is a method dedicated to the methodic exploration of problems by means of cognitive
mapping (i.e. by formally constructing a means-ends network). What differentiates it from all
other cognitive mapping approaches is its use of bipolar constructs that facilitate the clarification
of meaning. Similar to the SCA, SODA does not constitute a precise sequence of methodological
steps. Instead, it is a collection of investigative techniques logically following one another. The
SODA methodology contains four mutually interacting theoretical perspectives that inform these
techniques, namely the individual, the group, the consulting practice, and technology [3]. The
interaction among these perspectives is what drives the core notion of SODA — the construction
of a representative, publicly viewable problem model, amenable to continuous change according
to the development of the endeavour.
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Problem structuring for multi-criteria decision analysis
In 2010, Stewart et al. [57] published an article titled Problem structuring and multi-criteria
decision analysis. In it they presented the results of an attempt at connecting the methods of
traditional operations research with the problems of the real world. Depicted in Figure 6.9,
the proposed methodology was divided into five main categories, namely identification of the
problem, problem structuring, model building, use model to inform and challenge thinking, and
finally develop an action plan. This methodology will be built upon within the novel framework
presented later in this dissertation.
Figure 6.9: A high-level overview of a soft operations research solution methodology [57].
In conclusion, if cybernetics gave systems practitioners the capacity to tackle problems that are
further along the dimension of non-human aspects of complexity, then soft systems thinking
represented a step forward with respect to tackling problems that are further along on the
dimension of complexities involving people (e.g. world-views, culture and interests). The scope
of soft systems thinking is, however, not unlimited. A criticism levelled at soft systems thinking is
the fact that it does not consider the effect of inequality within a given context. One can question
the appropriateness of employing soft systems thinking in a context where several members hold
the majority of power [234]. What then would be the point of discussion? Or should one rather
ask why soft systems theories neglect to consider the influence of power, thereby neglecting the
opportunity to guide analysts with respect to managing its influence. An interesting thought to
note before closing is whether the existing paradigms of systems thinking may be combined in
some sense to be more than the sum of its parts and supplement the respective limitations of
the constituent paradigms.
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6.7 Emancipatory systems thinking
For most of its history, the notion of emancipation was not one naturally associated with the
objectives of management science. As Munro [333] explains, the concept of emancipation is one
derived from the Latin word emancipo, which was employed by the Roman empire to refer to the
liberation of a child from the legal control of its guardian. The publication of Werner Ulrich’s
Critical heuristics of social planning [458], however, stands as a landmark of the inclusion of
emancipation within the scope of management science. More specifically, it marks the first time
a systems approach recognised the need to pay attention to the influence of power upon the
objectives pursued in a given context [234].
In pioneering this new paradigm, Ulrich distanced himself from the predominant theories of
the time. He considered the existing theories limited in that they were only applicable when
asking how to do things, never addressing the question of what one ought to do [234]. Toward
addressing this latter question, the emancipatory approach embraces three major commitments,
namely critical awareness, social awareness, and human emancipation. Critical awareness speaks
to the importance of closely examining the assumptions and values that underlie any existing
system or any newly proposed system design. Social awareness addresses the fact that analysts
should be wary of the organisational and societal structures and norms that dictate the generally
accepted manner of conduct. And finally, a commitment to human emancipation seeks to attain
for all individuals the opportunity to progress in relation to their ability [232]. Within this
general paradigm, Ulrich developed a practical methodology as a means to a more general end.
To date, this methodology remains emancipatory systems thinking’s greatest achievement [232]
and so it is held to be representative of the approach and discussed accordingly.
Ulrich called his approach critical systems heuristics (CSH), interpreting each word in like
manner to the well-known philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Being critical is to reflect upon the
presuppositions that facilitate both the search for knowledge, and the pursuit of purposeful
action. The acknowledgement of the system nature of the proposed methodology refers to the
totality of elements (e.g. political, ethical, ideological and metaphysical) upon which decisions
should be based. Finally, heuristics refer to the continual commitment to being critically aware
of assumptions that govern activity [264].
CSH is built around the notion of what Ulrich called boundary judgements — those judgements
that determine what is inside the system being studied and what belongs to its environment [233].
Essentially, these judgements elude to what the analyst believes to be relevant to the system
under consideration. From the perspective of emancipation, these are key questions during
the design of a system. In an attempt to address the lack of comprehensiveness that typically
accompanied system designs, Ulrich formalised twelve questions designed to facilitate the process
of boundary identification. The questions, listed in Table 6.3, are arranged around the distinction
between those involved in the endeavour (i.e. the client, the decision maker and the designer)
and those affected but not involved (i.e. the witnesses). The questions are designed to be asked
in an is and an ought mode, contrasting the elicited responses so that the gap that exists between
the way things are done and the way they ought to be done is illuminated [234].
Unlike soft systems thinking, CSH exhibits a sensitivity to the effect of inequality upon the
process of problem formulation. Where soft systems thinking pays attention to the presence of
conflicting interests [100], CSH goes a step further to recognise that the existing power distri-
bution dynamically influences the manner in which conflicting interests are dealt with during
an endeavour toward improvement. Essentially, CSH is a structured process of questioning the
appropriateness of this effect of power upon the objectives pursued [234].
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Table 6.3: The boundary questions of the CSH approach, adapted from Jackson [232].
Boundary question in ought mode
1. Who ought to be the client of the system?
2. What ought to be the purpose of the system?
3. What ought to be the measures of success of the system’s performance?
4. Who ought to be the decision makers?
5. Which system components (i.e. resources and constraints) should be con-
trolled by the decision maker?
6. Which system components ought to be part of the systems environment (i.e.
not controlled by the decision maker)?
7. Who ought to be included as designer of the system?
8. Which kinds of expertise ought to flow into the design of the system?
9. Who ought to be be considered the final voice of the system’s design?
10. Who ought to belong to the witnesses representing the general citizens who
will be affected by the system?
11. To what degree and in what way ought the affected to be given the chance
of emancipation?
12. On which world-views, of either the affected or the involved, should the
system’s design be based?
Several critiques have been levelled against the CSH. The most dominant of these originated
from philosophers and sociologists of a materialist persuasion. These critics argued that the
CSH was built upon a philosophy that ignored the effect of the existing societal structures
upon the ideologies that dominate societies at particular times [234]. In other words, CSH does
not question the social structure of society, only the manner in which the existing structure is
employed toward improvement. Because of this, it has been argued that the applicability of
CSH is limited. It should be acknowledged, however, that these criticisms are rather harsh.
Although CSH does not attempt to change the foundational structures of society, it goes some
way to reveal when such structures are misused by those in power to benefit their own interests.
6.8 Critical systems thinking
Historically, critical systems thinking (CST) is a child of the 1970s, which is typically a period
remembered for its musical genius, but fortunately, the genius of the late 20th century was
not limited to the entertainment industry. Systems pioneers of the time are remembered for
the radical shift in methodological approach they introduced during this period — a shift that
came in the form of CST. Before the introduction of CST, the development of novel system
methodologies had followed a particular pattern — critiques of existing approaches, followed
by responses to these critiques in the form of newly developed methodologies [233]. CST was,
however, a methodology of a different kind. The critique offered by the pioneers of the critical
approach was not directed at the inherent value of a particular methodology, but was rather
aimed at making salient the importance of matching methodology to problem. In other words, as
a paradigm, CST recognised that solution methodologies are generally not correct or incorrect,
but well-suited or unsuited to specific problem types (i.e. no single solution methodology is
appropriate for solving every kind of problem). Thus, CST included within its intention the
capacity to employ (when appropriate) other paradigms of inquiry [165].
This was a truly significant shift in the way practitioners had traditionally approached problem
solving [469]. For the first time, the focus was not on the shortcomings of existing approaches,
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but upon the collective value of employing methodologies when appropriate. As a means to
that end, CST embraced five core commitments, namely critical awareness, social awareness,
human emancipation, wholesome development, and wholesome selection [232]. Critical awareness
represents the importance of closely examining the assumptions and values that are included
within any existing system or any newly proposed system design. Similarly, social awareness
addresses the fact that practitioners should remain weary of the organisational and societal
norms and structures that dictate the generally accepted manner of doing. Human emancipation
as a commitment, seeks to attain for all individuals the opportunity to progress in relation to
their ability [164]. Wholesome development is the formal representation of the manner in which
CST dedicates itself to incorporating alternative theoretical positions within its philosophy.
Finally, wholesome selection represents CST’s commitment to the complementary and informed
use of alternative system methodologies.
As the reader might have noticed, the first three commitments listed above are identical to
the commitments of emancipatory systems thinking (discussed in §6.7). This is because CST
employed the core idea behind emancipatory systems thinking as inspiration and proceeded to
develop that idea into the new paradigm typified by its fourth and fifth commitments. In 1991,
two of CST’s founding fathers, Flood and Jackson, published a methodology that became in
every sense representative of the CST movement, namely a paper titled Total systems inter-
vention [164]. It did not take long for total systems intervention to be heralded as a dominant
approach when tackling planning and designing problems within the context of organisation
theory. By 1995 the approach had received so much exposure to practice that Flood published
an updated version of the methodology, this time under the new title Local systems interven-
tion (LSI) [162]. In the remainder of this section, this updated version of the methodology is
discussed.
A proper explication of the LSI methodology would be rather extensive. In order to shorten the
discussion, attention is focused on the formally defined principles that embody the methodology
and the actual process by which these are pursued, at the expense of discussing the philosophi-
cal foundations that constitute it (for a complete discussion, the reader is referred Flood [161]).
There are four principles unique to LSI, namely being systemic, achieving meaningful partici-
pation, being reflective, and working toward human liberty [163]. Being systemic represents the
belief that the world consists of interacting parts that function on several levels of abstraction.
The second principle is rather self-explanatory — it represents a commitment to include all
entities that are affected by the outcome of an endeavour within the endeavour. The reflective
principle, on the other hand, describes two specific aspects that should be reflected upon during
the endeavour: First, the nature of the relationship between divergent organisational interests
that are pursued, and secondly, the reason for the dominant approaches being employed dur-
ing the intervention. Finally, the principle of human liberty seeks for all the opportunity to
progress according to their ability [233]. Interestingly, these principles interact and build upon
one another. For example, the foundational principle of studying the world as if it were sys-
temic is enabled and enriched by the second and third principles of meaningful participation
and reflective inquiry.
As depicted in Figure 6.10, these principles are embodied by a process that involves a systemic
cycle of inquiry, with iteration back and forth between three phases, namely creativity, choice,
and implementation [165]. Starting with the creativity phase, the process in the clockwise
direction works as follows. The main purpose of the creativity phase is to elicit issues to be dealt
with by employing several methods of inquiry (e.g. brainstorming and descriptive organisational
metaphors), which are then passed to the choice phase. The purpose of the choice phase is to
select the methods that are best suited to manage the identified issues. Finally, the task of the
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implementation phase is to connect the selected methods with the identified issues and to manage
their interaction until a point in time at which specific change proposals have been identified.
This outcome is once again passed to the creativity phase and the cycle is repeated [163]. In the
anticlockwise direction, reflection on the appropriateness of the previously completed phase is
formally investigated and established. Note that LSI can be thought of as a singularity — it is
an integrated whole. Every phase focuses on one kind of activity, although it should be stressed
that no phase exists independently [161]. The purpose of separating the phases is simply to

































Figure 6.10: A schematic representation of the LSI process [163].
Note that the above description of the LSI methodology is an incomplete summary of its working.
In its full glory, the methodology is rather extensive, providing guidance on how to uncover
relevant issues, how to select appropriate methods related to those issues and even guidance
on implementing the uncovered improvements. As mentioned before, however, an in-depth
discussion on LSI is too broad in scope for the purpose of this chapter. The purpose of this
chapter is to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the more general paradigms that
exist within systems theory, not to describe the methods that function within these paradigms
in detail.
In conclusion then, it is beneficial to describe the purpose for which the LSI methodology was
designed. As Flood clarified in his formal critique of the initially proposed methodology (i.e. total
systems intervention), this purpose is threefold: The design of effective and efficient processes
and organisations, the debate of human and technical issues that arise in organisations, and the
disempowerment of individuals from dominating organisational designs [163]. These objectives
are essentially a response to three foundational questions of inquiry, respectively: How should
we do it? What should be done? And finally, why should it be done? These questions constitute
the core inspiration of LSI.
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6.9 System dynamics
“Systems thinking is a discipline for seeing the structures that underlie complex sit-
uations . . . Ultimately, it simplifies life by helping us to see the deeper patterns lying
beneath the events and the details” — Peter Senge
In his book Systems thinking: Creative holism for managers, Jackson [233] selected the quote
above to open his chapter on system dynamics, thereby exemplifying its ability to facilitate the
discovery of those mechanisms that underlie the behaviour of a system. Within the systems
movement, system dynamics has been accepted as a unique paradigm of endeavour. This is,
however, somewhat surprising. Table 6.4 provides a summary of the key differences between the
paradigms that have been discussed in this chapter. It can be seen that there is a significant
difference in the manner in which each approaches problem solving. System dynamics, on the
other hand, is better described as a unique modelling method, but in the view of the author
there is no characteristic that justifies its inclusion as a unique paradigm within the systems
movement. Within the context of this dissertation, systems dynamics is, therefore, taken to be
an approach to modelling the non-linear behaviour of complex systems [234] and not a separate
paradigm of endeavour. Accordingly, its working falls outside the scope of this chapter.
Table 6.4: A summary of the key differences between the system paradigms described in this chapter.
System paradigms Key difference
Hard systems thinking Traditional approach
Cybernetics Black box modelling and feedback control
Machine learning Autonomous learning
Soft systems thinking Focus on the human component
Emancipatory systems thinking Human liberation
Critical systems thinking Combined paradigms described in this chapter
6.10 Chapter summary
There are several details that should be noted before closing the chapter. First and foremost,
the manner in which the chapter has been structured may be misleading in respect of the
relationships between the various system paradigms. For the sake of facilitating a description
thereof, the system paradigms were chronicled in a categorical manner. The true state of things
is, however, much more intertwined. From the origin of the systems movement, which was
described in §6.1, its development has not been a perfectly sequential story. Its development
can, in fact, accurately be likened to a fuzzy network of developments, all contributing to the
overall development of the systems movement, as illustrated in §6.2. For example, the manner
in which §6.2.1 was dedicated to the formal classification of methods into one of the paradigms
reviewed was simply that — a formal classification of its core characteristics — many methods
were developed within each paradigm, but have since evolved to the point where it is no longer
possible to limit their working to a single paradigm.
Finally, CST was defined as a paradigm that endeavoured to employ every other paradigm in
an attempt to match problem type to solution methodology. Similarly, the novel framework
proposed later in this dissertation shares this objective. Consequently, it can be said that the
work contributed in this dissertation belongs (for the most part) to the critical systems paradigm.
Although the match is not quite perfect, it is one that is well suited to provide this work with
a place to call home.
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“What you perceive depends a great deal upon where you are standing” — CS Lewis
These words, penned by the British academic CS Lewis, require a certain measure of experien-
tial understanding on the part of the reader. The truth of subjective perspective is one that is
typically met with resistance by those who would rather live according to a limited, but absolute
perception of the world — something system thinkers cannot afford to do. This chapter is dedi-
cated to a review of the academic literature related to existing problem typologies which attempt
to maintain a measure of objectivity in terms of solution methodology. A brief introduction in
§7.1 sets the stage for the subsequent discussion on the specific problem typologies. In all, three
problem typologies are discussed in §7.2, §7.3 and §7.4, respectively. Finally, the chapter comes
to a close with a short summary in §7.5.
7.1 A typology of problems
Logic holds that the more complex a task, the more intricate the machine required to complete
that task. Accordingly, the brilliance of the human mind suggests something about the context
in which we live. The subjective experience of everyday life is exceptionally complex [87]. The
general response to this complex flux called life, is not to simply experience it — we have an
inherent desire to see life as being meaningful [270]. Akin to the economic status of an individual,
meaning is a comparative measure — it can only be understood in comparison with something
greater or less than itself. Consequently, a part of this meaning attribution is to conceptualise
certain parts of our experiences as separate from other parts, to define certain boundaries that
characterise a certain period of time as a situation [103]. These boundaries, which are the result
of our subjective perception of reality, make it possible to assign a unique measure of meaning
to separate periods of time. Furthermore, some of the situations we perceive move us to feel a
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desire to change them, to improve them [103]. In order to improve these situations, it is often
necessary to introduce some form of structure into the raw state of the world.
What is meant by structure? Certainly, more than will be discussed here. Nonetheless, when
discussing such a multidimensional subject, the best place to start is at the beginning. Within
the context of this dissertation, one of the initial stages of introducing structure into a problem-
atic situation is believed to be the classification of problems into appropriate categories. The
salient reason for distinguishing among different types of problems is the assumption that solving
different kinds of problems requires distinct skill sets, that is, a unique solution methodology
is associated with each type of problem. In this chapter, three of the more general problem
typologies found in the academic literature are discussed.
7.2 Tame or wicked
In the year 1973, design theorists Rittel and Webber published an article that was to change
the course of design theory [379]. In this article, titled Dilemmas in a general theory of plan-
ning [382], the authors argued that there existed a whole spectrum of problems that could not
be solved using the traditional analytical solution methodologies of the time. It is important
to note that at the time of its publication, traditional operations research techniques were be-
ing applied to every kind of problem. Unwittingly, the hammer and nail analogy, in which a
problem is interpreted from the perspective of the solution methodology at hand, was the norm
of the day. Rittel and Webber [382] were among the first to officially recognise the value of
distinguishing between different kinds of problems. More specifically, they deemed it necessary
to distinguish between two kinds of problems, namely wicked and tame problems.
At first glance, what Rittel and Webber meant by wicked problems is not apparent. This
ambiguity is most likely the result of the multidimensionality of characteristics that define a
wicked problem. Therefore, before attempting to define these characteristics it is beneficial to
define the kind of problems that reside on the opposite end of the spectrum to wicked problems,
namely tame problems [382]. There are several generally accepted characteristics associated
with tame problems. These include a relatively well-defined problem statement, a definite goal,
a solution that can be judged as being correct or incorrect, and finally, tame problems tend
to remain solved once solved [379]. These characteristics pertain to problems of a Newtonian
nature. The games of chess and go are tame problems, for example [208].
If a tame problem can be likened to the controlled and predictable flow of water from a tap, a
wicked problem is appropriately likened to a mountain river after rain, it is nearly impossible to
contain. Wicked problems are ill-defined, ambiguous and saturated with strong moral, profes-
sional and political issues [379]. Above all, wicked problems are constantly evolving — they are
intricate, with interrelated issues that interact and evolve in a dynamic, social context [208]. In
order to facilitate their identification, Rittel and Webber [382] defined ten criteria according to
which wicked problems could be characterised. These criteria are discussed below.
7.2.1 No definitive formulation
For any given tame problem, it should be possible to provide an exhaustive formulation such
that the information required to solve the problem is either explicitly stated or implicitly avail-
able [79]. When it comes to wicked problems, however, this is not the case. The problem
statement of a wicked problem could never contain all the information required to solve it, as
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the required information depends upon the adopted solution approach. Essentially, problem
understanding and problem resolution are concomitant to one another [382].
Consider, for example, attempting to identify the root cause of poverty in third-world countries.
It is tempting simply to say that poverty is caused by low income, and in part that is true,
but one must proceed to ask what the determinants of low income are. Is it a deficiency in
the cognitive or occupational abilities of the workforce, or is it a deficiency in the regional
and national economies of the country? If it is the former, then the problem statement and
subsequent solution should incorporate a country’s educational system. Once again, however,
within the education system one must investigate where the real problem lies. Does it include
poor physical and mental health, spatial dislocation, cultural deprivation, or poor political and
social skills? If an analyst were to succeed in formulating a problem such that he or she could
capture the root causes of the difference between the present state of the world and what ought
to be, then (s)he would thereby also have formulated the solution. In other words, what is
being claimed is that the formulation of the wicked problem is to a large extent the problem
itself [382].
Essentially, the process of formulating a wicked problem and developing its solution is equivalent,
as every specification of the problem is fundamentally a stipulation of the scope within which
solutions are considered. Because of this dependence between the definition of a wicked problem
and the solution procedure, there is no definite formulation for a wicked problem [79].
7.2.2 No stopping rule
When two opponents face one another over a game of chess, they both have a very definite
goal in mind, a very definite point at which the game will be either won or lost, namely the
situation of checkmate. It is not so with wicked problems. The reason for this lies in the
fact that solving a wicked problem is synonymous with understanding its nature [383]. The
greater an analyst’s understanding of the problem, the more effective solutions can typically be
proposed. Unfortunately, there are no criteria for sufficient understanding, and no end to the
casual connections that link interacting open systems, within a typical wicked problem space.
Thus, an analyst can always do better — there is always the possibility that additional effort
may lead to additional benefit.
In conclusion, the analyst pursuing a solution to a wicked problem does not terminate the search
process once he has found a Pareto optimal solution. Instead, he or she terminates the solution
process based on considerations external to the problem, such as running out of money, time,
or patience, or stopping when the stakeholders are satisfied with a proposed solution. The final
solution to a wicked problem is therefore given within the context of doing the best one can
within the limitations of a project [382].
7.2.3 No theoretically correct solution
How does one qualify the correctness of a newly proposed fishing quota with respect to companies
catching bluefin tuna in the pacific? Or the effectiveness of a newly developed plan toward
reducing crime in the urban suburbs of a city? It is simply impossible to judge such proposals
as being correct or incorrect [382]. Instead, the quality of such decisions is often only discovered
long after their implementation [208]. When practitioners tackle wicked problems, they do not
have the luxury of depending on a conventional criterion for objectivity in terms of which a
solution can be deemed to be correct or incorrect. In fact, employing the term correct within
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the context of wicked problems is of no value. To speak of a correct solution communicates a
perfect fit between the problem and a proposed solution, it implies that the solution will cause
the problem to have been solved indefinitely. Such solutions simply do not exist within the
context of wicked problems.
Normally, when qualifying a solution to a wicked problem, there are several parties who are
equally equipped and entitled to judge the quality of a solution, each prioritising conflicting
goals. It is through the aggregate of these subjective opinions that the quality of a solution
is typically determined. Consequently, it is more appropriate to use terms such as good or
satisfying when describing the solution to a wicked problem [383].
7.2.4 No ultimate test of solution quality
When analysts investigate the quality of a proposed solution to a wicked problem, they do not
consider the actual effect of implementing the solution — they rather consider the predicted
effect of implementing the solution. This is because the impact of implementing a solution
to a wicked problem can be likened to throwing a pebble into a pond, it will generate waves
of consequences that are virtually unbounded [382]. Consider, for example, implementing a
relaxed fishing quota with respect to catching bluefin tuna in the pacific. The full effect of such
a change in strategy cannot be known at the time of implementation. It will likely take years
before the local ecosystem will suggest a glimpse of its impact. Furthermore, the damage done
when implementing such a solution can typically not be undone easily.
Essentially, the full impact of implementing a solution to a wicked problem cannot be evaluated
before all the waves of repercussions have run their course [79]. And there is no practical way
of tracing all the waves of influence to all the affected lives within a limited time frame. Hence,
no ultimate test of solution quality exists.
7.2.5 No room for trial and error
Imagine a scientist tasked with the responsibility of developing a new kind of concrete. Within
the development process it is the unique combination of theoretical understanding and the pro-
cess of testing several prototypes that produces a final product. If the geometry of deformation
of prototype 1 is not according to specification, the scientist can simply return to the drawing
board and try again. Not so with the development of a solution to wicked a problem [383]. The
solution to a wicked problem typically has irreversible, real-world consequences — trial-and-
error is simply not ethically defensible [79]. One cannot build a freeway in order to determine
its effectiveness — such an action leaves traces that cannot easily be undone. Whenever the
consequences of implementing a solution have an irreversible influence on the context of the real
world and the lives of people within that context, chances are that one is dealing with a wicked
problem [382].
7.2.6 No exhaustively describable set of solutions
The element of surprise that exists within a game of chess is not the product of a player executing
a move that has never been attempted before — instead it is simply the failure of an opponent to
anticipate such a move. This is because the game of chess has a limited set of rules within which
every possible situation that can occur is contained. In a technical sense, the word innovative
has no place in the context of chess. Not so in the world of wicked problems. An exhaustive
set of strategies for dealing with crime in the streets, for example, never has, and never will be
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documented [382]. The life of social policy does not function according to such a set of definable
rules, or rather if it does, humanity has failed in the pursuit of its identification. In such fields of
ill-defined problems and consequently ill-definable solutions, the set of feasible solutions depends
upon the capacity to judge new ideas realistically [383].
7.2.7 Every wicked problem is essentially unique
No matter how similar, for any two problems at least one distinguishing property should be
identifiable, for otherwise the two problems are, in fact, the same problem. Every problem,
therefore, is unique in a trivial sense, although something quite different is meant by essentially
unique [79]. As Rittel and Webber [382] put it, no matter how long the list of similarities between
two wicked problems, there will always be an additional distinguishing characteristic that is of
overriding importance. This quality of essential uniqueness is part of what makes solving wicked
problems a form of art — no amount of experience will ever render a wicked problem simple to
solve, a measure of innovation will always be required.
To put it another way, there are no classes of wicked problems in the sense that the salient
principles of a solution can be adapted to fit all members of that class. For example, the
conditions of a subway construction project in two cities may look similar, but the designers
would be ill-advised to apply the same blueprint to both cities. Differences in commuter habits
could far outweigh the apparent similarities in the physical conditions surrounding the project.
Essentially, despite the apparent similarities among wicked problems, one can never be quite
certain that the particulars of the problem do not override the commonalities it shares with
problems encountered before [208].
7.2.8 Wicked problems are consequential
If one finds oneself on one side of a river while actually wanting to be on the other, without the
means of getting there, one has a problem. If one cannot find a polite way to formulate the fact
that there is no potential in a proposed business plan, one has a problem. Whenever there is a
gap between the current state of affairs and the state as it ought to be, and there is no salient
way of bridging that gap, one has a problem [207]. The process of solving a problem starts with
the business of identifying a casual explanation of the discrepancy (i.e. the gap between where
one wants to be and where one is), followed by an attempt to eliminate this discrepancy [383].
In the context of wicked problems, however, this process typically elucidates a new problem of
which the original problem is a symptom. Again, this new problem can be considered a symptom
of yet another, higher-level problem. That is the nature of wicked problems — they can each
be considered to be the symptom of another problem [382]. Crime in the streets, for example,
can be considered to be a symptom of several higher-level phenomena, such as moral decay, the
distribution of wealth, or whatever casual explanation one considers defensible.
This multi-level quality of wicked problems implies that there is not a natural level on which to
solve wicked problems. During the solution process, it is simply advisable that an analyst main-
tains the balance between addressing critical symptoms, and making the problem too general,
and thus, too complex.
7.2.9 The analyst has no right to be wrong
In The logic of scientific discovery, Karl Popper [365] proposed as scientific principle the fact that
solutions to problems are only hypotheses offered for refutation. This proposal was grounded in
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the fact that, by definition, there are no proofs for hypotheses, only potential refutations. The
longer a hypothesis can withstand the test of time, the better its corroboration is considered
to be. Accordingly, the scientific community typically does not hold academics accountable for
proposed hypotheses that are later refuted. In the context of wicked problems, no such immunity
is morally defensible [382].
When solving a wicked problem, the purpose is not to find truth. It is rather to narrow the
gap between the present state of the world and the way it ought to be — to improve some
characteristic of the world in which people live. Accordingly, analysts are accountable for the
consequences of implemented solutions.
Rittel and Webber [382] proposed one further defining characteristic of a wicked problem: “The
existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways.
The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution.” This characteristic
has, however, been deemed redundant as is fails to narrow down the scope of wicked problems
in any additional way and is therefore not discussed here.
Before concluding this section, however, consider the effectiveness of the typology of Rittel and
Webber for classifying problems in a manner that facilitates a solution process. At the time
of its formulation, the purpose of this typology was to shed light upon the fact that not all
problems could be considered equal in nature — that the same solution methodology could not
be applied to every problem encountered. For this purpose, the typology is perfectly suited, but
for the purpose of elucidating the more nuanced elements influencing a problematic situation,
the typology is of limited use. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the typology provides
a valuable foundation for the further classification of problems.
7.3 The dimensions of a problematic situation
In the world of design, whether it be the design of a new product or a novel problem typology, it
is often the synthesis of many, different ideas from several sources that yields the most ingenious
results. Following this logic, the second typology discussed here was synthesised more than it
was formulated. In his PhD dissertation titled Student perceptions of problems’ structuredness,
complexity, situatedness, and information richness and their effects on problem-solving perfor-
mance, Lee [282] described the manner in which he noticed an ever-increasing agreement in the
academic literature in respect of the dimensions that define a problem. Drawing on this academic
consensus, Lee proposed a framework that, he argued, included the core elements characterising
a problem, namely structuredness, complexity and situatedness. Unlike Rittel and Webber [382],
Lee did not coin these terms, nor did he define them in a novel way. Instead, Lee endeavoured
to synthesise the work of several academics into a single framework. More specifically, the work
of Wood [490], Jonassen [250], Meacham et al. [312] and Bassok [49] formed the foundation of
Lee’s proposed problem typology. In the remainder of this section the dimensions of a problem,
as synthesised by Lee [282], are discussed.
7.3.1 Problem Structuredness
Lee [282] elegantly described a problem’s structuredness as the intrinsic value of its internal
structure. Arguing that this internal structure found form through a unique blend of several
problem elements, including its initial state, goal state, constraints and operators, Lee claimed
that the degree of a problem’s structuredness can be determined by recognising the nature of
these elements [15, 248, 490]. The history of determining a problem’s structuredness is an
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
7.3. The dimensions of a problematic situation 99
interesting one — it tells the tale of several academics working toward its formal coinage. It was
Wood, however, who in 1983 was the first to formally define this dimension in an article titled
Inquiring systems and problem structure: Implications for cognitive development [490].
Wood established the spectrum of structuredness by defining the extremes that contain it. On
the one end of the spectrum, he coined the term well-structured and on the other end the term
ill-structured. Following this terminology, several academics have defined and redefined these
categories. Lee [282], however, adopted the following definition. A well-structured problem is one
that presents all the information required for its solution in the problem representation, contains
a known goal state, requires a limited number of regular and bounded rules which are organised
in a prescriptive and predictive manner, possesses a correct, convergent answer and admits a
prescribed solution process [250, 490]. An ill-structured problem, on the other hand, is one that
typically exhibits a highly intricate structure and cannot be solved in predictable or obvious
ways, requires solutions that are interdisciplinary in nature, involves conflicting objectives, and
contains a considerable amount of uncertainty [247, 312].
When defined in such a formal context, the difference between well-structured and ill-structured
problems may seem apparent, and yet the intricacies of their real-world contexts often cause
decision makers to hesitate when characterising the structuredness of a problem. Accordingly,
the process of elucidating a problem’s structuredness should be approached with caution.
7.3.2 Problem complexity
The stem of the word complexity (i.e. complex) is composed of the Latin words com, meaning
“together” and plex, meaning “woven” [314]. In general, therefore, complexity is characterised
by the degree to which the respective elements of a system are interwoven and interrelated [282].
In order to incorporate this dimension into the proposed problem typology, Lee had to make
its definition specific to the context of real-world problems. To that end, Lee [282], once again,
drew upon and combined the work of several authors. Among these, Lee paid special attention
to definitions proposed by Wood [491] and Jonassen [251], which are discussed below.
Wood [491] defined complexity along three dimensions: component complexity, coordinative
complexity and dynamic complexity. Respectively, these dimensions represent the number of
distinctly recognisable acts required to perform a task, the nature of relationships among these
tasks, and the degree to which the relationships among these tasks are transformed by changes
in the problem’s external environment. In other words, Wood believed that complexity is a
function of every problem component, the reciprocal interactions between these components
and the effect of external factors on their interactions.
Jonassen and Hung [251] built upon Wood’s [491] initial definition and described problem com-
plexity in terms of what he called relevant internal and external factors. Internal factors are those
on the problem solver’s level of experience as well as the breadth and depth of domain-specific
knowledge required to solve the problem. External factors, on the other hand, include the rela-
tional complexity among domain concepts, the problem’s level of transparency (i.e. the number
of unknowns in the problem space), the heterogeneity of possible problem interpretations, and
the legitimacy of alternative solutions.
Interestingly, Lee did not select a single definition, but employed a synthesis of the definitions
described above in a casual manner. Built upon these definitions, Lee incorporated a classifica-
tion proposed by Rose [476], which categorises the continuous spectrum of complexity into one
of two categories, namely simple or complex. These terms find meaning in view of the defini-
tions described above. To illustrate this point, consider the definition proposed by Wood [491],
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who defined complexity along three dimensions, namely component, coordinative and dynamic
complexity. A complex problem will be characterised by a high rating with respect to each of
these dimensions.
There is an interesting thread of discussion in the academic literature surrounding the overlap
between the complexity and the structuredness of a problem [248]. Intuitively, it follows that the
less apparent the inherent structure of a problem context, the more intricate one can expect the
relationship between elements to be. A low level of structuredness does not imply no structure.
Instead, it implies that the connections between these dimensions are exceptionally difficult to
elucidate in the sense that structuredness represents the network of dimensions in the problem
space. In other words, structuredness describes the ease with which the elements of a problem
and the casual relationships between these elements are identifiable, while complexity describes
not only the depth of relationships between elements, but also the nature of those relationships
and the influence of external elements on those relationships. Clearly, although these dimensions
overlap, they are rightfully defined as two separate dimensions in the problem typology proposed
by Lee [282].
7.3.3 Problem situatedness
As Wood [490] so elegantly put it, “The context in which a problem is embedded becomes a
significant part of the problem and necessarily part of its solution.” Evidently, it is the influence of
context that defines the situatedness of a problem. In other words, the situatedness of a problem
represents the meaningfulness of a problem’s context as interpreted by a problem solver’s prior
knowledge and real-time experience while solving a problem [13, 387]. Intuitively, it follows that
the context of a problem (i.e. the situatedness) is related to problem solving performance [249].
The academic literature is, however, rather ambiguous in attempts at describing this relationship.
For example, Chi et al. [107] argued that the more situated a problem turns out to be, the easier
it is to define and represent it, and therefore, results in an increased possibility of successful
problem solving. In contrast, Jonassen [250] argued that workplace engineering problems are
made more difficult to solve because high levels of situatedness result in unanticipated problems
— a situation may be constrained by several overlapping contexts.
Lee [282] did not, however, consider an exact definition of the relationship between situatedness
and problem solving performance critical. His priority was simply to accommodate this dynamic
relationship in the proposed typology. Accordingly, Lee adopted the following categorisation
of situatedness: The contextualised problem, which is highly dependent on the dynamics and
flexibility of the external environment, and a decontextualised problem, which lacks meaningful
contextuality within itself [28, 297]. Similar to structuredness and complexity, these categories
do not constitute a dichotomy, but represent the extremes along a spectrum of situatedness.
The decontextualised problem is the classic, theoretical problem typically found in academia.
It does not require domain-specific knowledge for solving, nor is there a correct moment in
relation to the external environment when decisions toward problem solving should be made.
The elements (i.e. the initial state, goal state, constraints, and operators) are not situated,
they are abstract and isolated. And finally, the solutions to decontextualised situation problems
are generally accepted. The contextualised problem, on the other hand, takes place in the real
world, has an underlying story and emerges from a specific domain. Problem solvers are expected
to respond to the problem in a time-appropriate manner — decisions should be made at the
appropriate moment with respect to the needs of the external environment. Finally, the solutions
to highly situated problems remain fuzzy, coated in a measure of uncertainty [13, 312, 490].
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Consider the effectiveness of this dimension within Lee’s [282] proposed typology. Interestingly,
the effectiveness of situatedness depends, by definition, upon the defined boundaries of a system.
The situatedness of a problem varies as the boundaries which define the problem varies. Fur-
thermore, it seems as if the definition of situatedness could be included within the definition of
complexity, the only difference being the location of application. For example, the situatedness
of a system can be redefined as the nature of interaction between the elements within the system
that defines the problem, and the elements outside the system, which is rather similar to the def-
inition of complexity. In other words, it would seem that this dimension may be redundant, not
because of the characteristics it attempts to categorise, but because the scope of problem com-
plexity includes the capacity to categorise this characteristic. Lee, however, evidently thought
differently, considering situatedness worth including within his typology [282].
7.3.4 Problem information richness
In 1991, Confrey [118] described problem solving as the act of taking the information describing
a problem and synthesising it in a novel way. If this claim is accepted, it follows that there exists
a dynamic relationship between problem solving performance and the information richness of
a problem. Intuitively, this seems to make sense: A lack of information may certainly be the
source of ambiguity with respect to the nature of problem elements. Initially, Lee agreed with
this logic and considered information richness worth including in his proposed problem typology,
classifying problems as either information lean or information rich, as defined by Quesada et
al. [371].
After the validation phase of his research, however, Lee [282] concluded that information richness
did not add enough latitude to the typology to justify its inclusion. Hence, it was not included
in the final typology. This might come as a surprise — intuition informs our logic of the value of
information toward solving problems. It should be noted, however, that Lee did not claim that
information has no value, but instead that the first three dimensions defined above, adequately
describe the information richness of a problem.
In conclusion, Lee’s [282] final typology incorporated three dimensions, namely structuredness,
complexity and situatedness. According to the discretely defined categories within each of
the dimensions, the typology contains eight categories into which problems can be classified.
While these categories do well in describing the nature of the system within which a problem is
embedded, it falls short of adequately describing the nature of the social aspects of a problem.
For the purposes of this dissertation, an adequate representation of the social reality of a problem
is critical to successful problem solving. Consequently, the next typology discussed is one that
pays more attention to the soft side of problematic situations.
7.4 Beyond a system of systems methodologies
The final typology reviewed in this chapter, proposed by Jackson and Keys [229], was developed
over many years (1984–1990), with several versions being published during this time. This
literature study is, however, only concerned with the final version of the typology as published
in the 1990 article titled Beyond a system of systems methodology.
The inspiration for the proposed problem typology can be traced back to the work of the
renowned academic, Russel Ackoff. More specifically, it can be traced back to a list of com-
plications that often occur within problematic situations as documented by Ackoff [5] in his
well-known work titled Scientific method: Optimising applied research decisions. By examining
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this list, Jackson and Keys determined that complications to problems (i.e. issues that make
problems tricky to solve) are a consequence of changes in either the nature of the system in
which a problem is located, or the nature of the decision makers participating in the solution
process [231]. Consequently, Jackson and Keys determined that these two dimensions were an
effective way of classifying problems.
7.4.1 Complexity
Over the years, academics have categorised the nature of the system within which problems
are embedded along several dimensions. Notably, complexity has found itself employed within
these classifications more often than not. Jackson and Keys followed this school of thought and
employed a mechanical-systemic classification to describe the level of complexity associated with
the system that provides context to a problem. After selecting these categories, Jackson and
Keys issued an interesting note of caution — depending on the point of view adopted, the same
system can be viewed as mechanical or systemic (i.e. simple or complex) [229]. Take the labour
market, for example, which when contemplated from a highly aggregate point of view, can be
treated as a simple supply-demand system. This highly aggregated point of view is typically
adopted when the problems being studied are related to macro-economic issues like inflation,
levels of export trade, or interest rate fluctuations. But the labour market can also be studied at
a much lower level of abstraction, with individuals acting as parts of a highly complex system.
This micro point of view is typically adopted when the problem being addressed concerns the
individual [117].
Granted this observer-dependent nature of the mechanical-systemic criterion, Jackson and Keys
provided a brief description of the main characteristics that characterise the complexity of a
problem. On the one end of the spectrum, a mechanical system is typically perceived as con-
sisting of a small number of elements that interact with one another in regular and predictable
ways [229]. Within the context of a systemic system, however, the attributes that constitute
its parts and the relationship between these parts are not directly observable. As a result, it
is difficult to understand the nature of the system (e.g. the network of the problem causations
or the possible effects of implemented solutions). Furthermore, Jackson and Keys make it clear
that a systemic system will change as a function of time, the evolution of which can typically be
accredited to the continuous interaction between a systemic system and its environment (which
is continuously changing as a function of time). As a result, if a representation of the law govern-
ing the interaction between the parts of the system can be derived, it will always be probabilistic
in nature. Finally, Jackson and Keys concluded their description of the prototypical systemic
system by stating that such a system will be influenced by behavioural factors (e.g. political,
cultural or ethical issues) [229].
7.4.2 The nature of progress
A classification of problem contexts would be incomplete without addressing the human compo-
nent that saturates real-world problems. People are exceedingly intricate beings with countless
dynamic, internal workings. Fortunately, many of these dynamics are not detrimental to suc-
cessful problem solving. Accordingly, the right set of classifying dimensions should elucidate the
dynamics that are pertinent to the process of problem solving, while ignoring the dynamics that
can be considered irrelevant [229].
Within the context of Jackson and Keys’ work, the nature of progress is considered to be one such
dynamic [231]. More specifically, the question of interest is concerned with the tactics required
for the formal establishment of the objectives to be pursued within an intervention. Consider,
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for example, a problematic situation where participants are in genuine agreement with respect
to the objectives to be pursued, have compatible values and beliefs, and share common interests.
It follows that the tactics to be employed to encourage progress within such a context will be
very different from a context in which, for example, participants have conflicting objectives.
Accordingly, where there exists genuine agreement among participants, a problematic context
can be described as being unitary. If the state of things can be described by conflicting world-
views and, to some extent, divergent objectives, but it remains possible to facilitate discussion
to a point of genuine compromise and agreement, a problematic context can be described as
being pluralist. Finally, if there is limited common interest among participants, if there is a
fundamental air of conflict, and the only way in which progress can be made is through the
exercise of power and domination, a problematic context can be called coercive [232].
It is worth mentioning that the final aforementioned category within the nature of progress (i.e.
coercive) was not present within the initial formulation of the proposed typology. It was only
in the years following its first publication that practitioners provided the necessary feedback to
justify its inclusion. Practitioners found that identifying the coercive tactics employed within
a problem space is sometimes critical to selecting an appropriate solution methodology [231].
Jackson and Keys responded to this development by adding a third and final category to this
dimension in order to classify the coercive character of problematic situations.
Thinking of problematic situations, it is intuitively true that most, if not all, such instances are
accompanied by a measure of competition. The manner in which participants elect to respond
to this competition forms the foundation of subsequent interaction. It is, therefore, fitting that
Jackson and Keys incorporated the nature of progress into the proposed problem typology,
something that was rather novel in the world of problem typologies.
At the time of its formulation, the typology proposed by Jackson and Keys was rather innovative
on several accounts. Most notably, the attention it granted the human component of professional
problem solving was rather uncommon at the time. This typology was published in the era
following the 1950s and the dreary sixties, a period during which traditional systems thinking
had retreated from the foreground of social issue management [232]. This makes their pioneering
effort back to the issues of strategic social management all the more commendable. Finally, this
typology is deemed rather mature in its mission to accommodate the identification of issues
that, if ignored, may potentially undermine an employed solution methodology.
7.5 Chapter summary
The manner in which our understanding of the world is framed, determines the effectiveness of
our response to its mysteries. In order to respond appropriately to real-world problems it is,
therefore, of paramount importance to frame our understanding of such problems appropriately.
In order to simplify this task, academics have endeavoured to formulate typologies which effec-
tively elicit the most influential characteristics within a problem space. After being introduced
in general in §7.1, three such typologies were reviewed, namely tame or wicked in §7.2, the di-
mensions of a problematic situation in §7.3, and beyond a system of systems methodologies in
§7.4. These typologies were evaluated in terms of their effectiveness and it was recognised that
the efficacy of a typology will, to some extent, always depend upon the appropriateness of its
use within a specific context. No single typology has the ability to elicit all the relevant char-
acteristics of a problem space for every problem type. Practitioners would do well to remember
that any typology remains but a tool in the practitioner’s toolbox, and so it remains the re-
sponsibility of the practitioner to utilise it appropriately. Nonetheless, the typologies discussed
in this chapter are of high quality.
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It is often difficult to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant in the context of real-world
problem solving. Frequently, more people are affected by the occurrence of a problem than can
practically be included within the process of its resolution. Simply put, the act of real-world
problem solving involves the selection of stakeholders — a process that has proven critical to
the sustained resolution of real-world problems [172].
In an article titled Who’s in and why? A typology of stakeholder methods for natural resource
management, Reed et al. [376] argue that the methods of stakeholder selection theory may be
classified into one of three categories according to whether they are designed to aid analysts in
(1) identifying stakeholders, (2) differentiating between and categorising stakeholders, or (3) in-
vestigating the network of relationships among stakeholders. In the years since its formulation,
many theorists have adopted the above classification and, as such, it is employed to organise
the work presented in this chapter. Accordingly, §8.1 is dedicated to an analysis of stakeholder
methods that belong to the first category listed above, while §8.2–§8.5 are dedicated to an
analysis of methods that belong predominantly to the second category listed above, and §8.6 is
dedicated to a discussion of stakeholder methods that belong to final category of methods listed
above. In addition, §8.7 contains a high-level comparison of the stakeholder methods discussed
according to the qualities that distinguish them. Finally, the chapter is brought to a close with
a brief summary in §8.8.
8.1 Focus groups, interviews and methods of sampling
In the article mentioned above, Reed et al. [376] argue that the methods contained in the stake-
holder selection literature fail to address the difficulty of stakeholder identification adequately —
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that methods designed to facilitate the selection of stakeholders focus predominantly on either
the categorisation of pre-identified stakeholders, or the analysis of the network of relationships
among them, without ever addressing how analysts are to go about identifying the stakeholders
involved in such an analysis [376]. As this section is dedicated to the description of methods that
belong to this, less well-addressed activity of stakeholder identification, there are a limited num-
ber of methods to review and, as such, it is possible to present the entire collection of methods
employed by analysts to facilitate the activity of stakeholder identification. More specifically,
by synthesising the methods proposed by Reed et al. [376] in 2009, and by Valerio et al. [462]
in 2016, to be representative of the academic literature related to stakeholder identification,
the following methods of stakeholder selection are considered: Focus groups, semi-structured
interviews, snowball sampling, purposive sampling and convenience sampling. Although this list
of methods may seem substantial, it will become clear during the exposition that, as Reed et
al. suggest, they often fail to address the issue of stakeholder identification adequately. Before
commencing their description, it is brought to the reader’s attention that the aforementioned
methods are only discussed to the extent that their ability to facilitate the identification of
stakeholders is made salient.
The description of the term focus group, proposed by Freeman in an article titled Best practice
in focus group research: Making sense of different views [173], suggests that a focus group is
best characterised as a kind of group interview with strategically selected individuals according
to “a carefully designed topic guide,” with the purpose of eliciting information in respect of a
specific issue of interest [173]. This description of a focus group is consequential as it reveals
the dependence thereof upon secondary methods of investigation (i.e. “a carefully designed
topic guide”). In other words, when stakeholder theorists suggest the use of a focus group as a
method capable of independently facilitating the identification of stakeholders, they misinterpret
the nature and purpose thereof. More specifically, a focus group is more accurately described
as a general approach to qualitative enquiry and not a methodology designed specifically for
the identification of stakeholders. The lack of a “carefully designed topic guide” to facilitate
stakeholder identification thus remains an unaddressed issue despite the notion of a focus group.
Accordingly, the discussion progresses to the next method of interest.
In a book titled Key methods in geography, Longhurst [296] states that a semi-structured inter-
view represents a kind of guided verbal interchange between an interviewer and an interviewee
with the aim of gaining insight into a certain topic of interest [296]. The idea behind this kind of
interview seems to revolve around the construction of a list of predetermined questions designed
to guide an interview in such a way that interviewers are able to respond and adapt to a dis-
cussion as it unfolds [136]. Unfortunately, despite its potential in other spheres, based upon the
above description, this method of analysis does little more to address the issue of stakeholder
identification than the one described before. To elucidate, the list of guiding questions men-
tioned above may be interpreted to represent a special kind of methodology according to which
analysts attempt to structure their enquiry. The construction of these questions is, however,
left to an analyst and, as such, in like manner to a focus group, a semi-structured interview is
better described as a general approach to the acquisition of knowledge, and not a methodology
specifically designed to facilitate the identification of stakeholders [136].
Although elementary, the next approach to stakeholder identification, called snowball sampling,
is certainly more of a self-contained method for the identification of stakeholders than those
described before it. In essence, snowball sampling is a non-random sampling technique in which
primary data sources (i.e. an initial group of key stakeholders), identified according to a set
of distinguishing characteristics, are employed as tracers to identify additional data sources by
means of chain referral [64]. More specifically, the initially identified key stakeholders are asked
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to peruse the network of their connections in an attempt to identify entities that conform to
a set of distinguishing characteristics deemed descriptive of stakeholders [75]. Despite being a
method specifically designed to facilitate the form of sampling that is stakeholder identification,
snowball sampling leaves much unaddressed. For one, the criteria according to which analysts
should identify relevant stakeholders is left open to interpretation and, in addition, no aid is
given as to how entities are to go about exploring the network of their connections. Because of
these shortcomings Reed et al. [376] presumably considered the task of stakeholder identification
inadequately addressed despite the existence of the method of snowball sampling.
The final two sampling methods, called purposive sampling and convenience sampling, respec-
tively, are rather uninvolved. The first of these “methods” simply suggests that analysts rely
upon their subjective judgement when distinguishing relevant from irrelevant stakeholders [147]
and, in an equally one-dimensional fashion, the second suggests that analysts should select stake-
holders according to the convenience of their availability, and nothing else [155]. Accordingly,
Reed et al. [376] warns that the use of either of these methods may result in an excessively
homogeneous selection of stakeholders (adding that the success of their application should im-
prove as analysts become more experienced in their use) [449]. If anything, the methods of
purposive sampling and convenience sampling seem to be well-suited to the kind of endeavour
in which stakeholder identification is both a trivial and inconsequential task. Unfortunately,
however, stakeholder identification is often not only exceedingly difficult, but consequential in
nature [242] and, as such, it remains a task inadequately addressed by the methods of stake-
holder selection theory. For whatever reason, there is a clear gap in the academic literature in
this regard — a gap that the work presented later in this dissertation attempts to fill.
8.2 Toward a theory for stakeholder identification and salience
In the years that followed the release of Freeman’s oft-cited book titled Strategic management:
A stakeholder approach (1984) [172], the notion of a stakeholder became rather popular among
those working in the sphere of corporate management [325]. Unfortunately, however, in addition
to the unaddressed difficulty of practically identifying stakeholders, as discussed in §8.1, the
popularity of the term did not coincide with a general understanding of precisely how analysts
could go about determining the relative relevance of two dissimilar stakeholders. It was only in
1997 (15 years later) when Mitchell et al. [325] proposed a framework for the classification of
potential stakeholders toward facilitating their case-specific selection, that significant progress
was made in that regard. The core contribution made by Mitchell et al. [325] was twofold:
First, they proposed three dimensions according to which analysts could attempt to determine
the relevance of an entity as a stakeholder, namely power, legitimacy and urgency, and secondly,
they formalised a typology of unique stakeholder classes according to which they proceeded to
prescribe which kind of entities managers should consider as stakeholders1. In the remainder of
this section, these contributions are discussed in turn, starting with the first dimension defined
to govern the notion of stakeholder relevance (i.e. power).
Since the mid-20th century, most definitions of power have been based upon the early Weberian
notion that the measure of an entity’s power essentially represents the probability that the entity
in question will be able to carry out its will in the face of an adversary [477]. In general, it would
seem that Mitchell et al. [325] adopted a similar concept of power, but in order to describe their
notion of power in a manner that actually facilitated the consideration of a entity’s relevance as
a stakeholder, the authors had to endeavour beyond such a general definition and ask a more
1The stakeholder classes proposed by Mitchell et al. [325] were based on the aforementioned dimensions.
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fundamental question: What grants an entity the actual ability to exert its will, or alternatively,
what are the actual bases of power? To answer this question, Mitchell et al. turned to the work
of sociologist Amitai Etzioni who, in 1964, defined the notion of power along three dimensions,
namely coercive power, representing power based on the physical resources of force and violence,
utilitarian power, representing power based on material or financial resources, and normative
power, representing power based on symbolic resources. In other words, Mitchell et al. argued
that the measure of an entity’s power can be determined according to the extent to which it
has, or has access to, coercive, utilitarian and normative means by which to impose its will (see
Etzioni [148] for an in-depth discussion).
The second dimension of stakeholder relevance proposed by Mitchell et al. [325] (i.e. legitimacy)
is rather less precisely defined. In essence, Mitchell et al. determined that the notion of power
differs from that of authority in that authoritative entities are those that, in addition to being
powerful, are at liberty to employ their power according to the social norms that underlie their
context [477]. By interpreting this dynamic, the authors argued that an entity with authority
is a more relevant stakeholder than merely the powerful and, as such, defined the notion of
legitimacy to represent the extent to which the consideration of an entity’s priorities, and thus
its inclusion as a stakeholder, is in line with the socially accepted norms of the prevailing context
(i.e. the socially constructed system of beliefs, values and definitions to which the instance
of stakeholder identification relates) [438]. In addition to an entity’s power and legitimacy,
Mitchell et al. proposed one final dimension of stakeholder relevance, namely urgency. Simply
put, the notion of urgency is intended to facilitate the classification of stakeholders according
to how “pressing” their demands are. More specifically, the urgency of an entity’s demands are
determined according to (1) how time-sensitive they are, and (2) how important their realisation
is (as subjectively determined by the related entity) [325].
By synthesising the dimensions described above, Mitchell et al. [325] put forward a typology of
stakeholder classes containing seven unique categories, namely a dormant stakeholder, a discre-
tionary stakeholder, a demanding stakeholder, a dominant stakeholder, a dangerous stakeholder,
a dependent stakeholder and a definitive stakeholder2, as depicted in Figure 8.1. Based on these
classes, Mitchell et al. proceeded to argue for, or against, the consideration of entities as stake-
holders. In general, they did so according to the following proposition: Stakeholder salience will
be low, moderate or high depending on whether managers perceive one, two, or three of the
aforementioned stakeholder attributes — power, legitimacy or urgency — to relate to a specific
entity, respectively [325]. For a more in-depth discussion on the arguments made in respect of
each stakeholder-class, consider the following summarised version thereof.
As may be seen in Figure 8.1, dormant stakeholders are characterised by a possession of power,
but the lack of both legitimacy and urgency. According to Mitchell et al., such entities remain
inactive (i.e. dormant) with respect to a related firm’s activities and, as such, should not be
considered as stakeholders to the firm. As a concluding word of caution, however, the authors
do advise managers to keep such entities in their periphery, in case they acquire additional
stakeholder attributes. The second group of stakeholders, called discretionary stakeholders,
possess the attribute of legitimacy, but neither power nor urgency, which makes them a rather
interesting class of stakeholders from a social responsibility point of view (i.e. they are most likely
to be recipients of what Caroll [91]) calls corporate philanthropy [488]. Regardless, the key point
made by Mitchell et al. in respect of discretionary stakeholders is that, in the absence of power
and urgency, there is “absolutely no pressure on managers to engage in an active relationship
2To clarify, note that Mitchell et al. employ the term stakeholder to describe dissimilar kinds of entities,
regardless of whether or not they actually argue for the consideration of said entity as a stakeholder to a firm (in
a practical sense) [325].
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Figure 8.1: A classification of unique stakeholder classes according to the dimensions of power, legiti-
macy and urgency [325].
with such a stakeholder” [325]. Interestingly, Mitchell et al. do not pay much attention to
the class of stakeholders characterised solely by the urgency of their claim, called demanding
stakeholders, describing them to be the mosquitoes buzzing in the ears of managers: Irksome,
but not dangerous, bothersome but not warranting significant attention, if any at all [325]. To
conclude their discussion of such stakeholders, the authors describe a lone millenarian picketer
marching in front of a firm’s headquarters with a sign that warns of the firm’s pending doom as
a prototypical example of this class of stakeholder.
When introducing the general category of stakeholders who possess not one, but two of the
three stakeholder attributes described above, Mitchell et al. make an interesting proposition. In
essence, they suggest that when entities possess any two stakeholder attributes, they progress
from a passive to an active disposition and that this transformation embodies the vehicle of their
increase in relevance with respect to stakeholder selection. Accordingly, the first such class of
stakeholder, those that possess not only legitimate claims, but also the ability (i.e. the power)
to act on those claims, called dominant stakeholders, is argued to be of significant importance
to a firm as they constitute what is called its dominant coalition [123].
Mitchell et al. call the next class of stakeholders dependent stakeholders, those with urgent
and legitimate claims, but not the power to pursue those claims. Interestingly, despite being
characterised by the inability to carry out their will independently, the authors urge managers
to consider the concerns of dependent stakeholders actively as they may, and often do, succeed
in gaining the advocacy of more powerful stakeholders [325]. The second to last class of stake-
holder, called dangerous stakeholders, is rather an unpopular sort of entity. Mitchell et al. [325]
describe this class of stakeholder (those characterised by considerable power and urgency, but
not legitimacy) as the kind of entity that may employ coercive and possibly dangerous means
to influence a firm. The advice given in respect of how managers should go about dealing with
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such an entity is two-sided. On the one hand, the authors criticise this class of stakeholder,
stating that they are uncomfortable with the idea that dangerous stakeholders be afforded a
measure of legitimacy on the back of the typology they propose, but at the same time, the
authors state that a failure to identify dangerous stakeholders may result in the more disastrous
failure of neglecting to counteract their influence [325]. Accordingly, Mitchell et al. suggest that
dangerous stakeholders be considered, but with the sole purpose of ensuring the mitigation of
their cause. Not much need be said regarding the final class of stakeholder, called definitive
stakeholders as they are characterised by the entire spectrum of stakeholder attributes and are,
as such, per definition, stakeholders.
Since its publication, the work of Mitchell et al. [325] has become one of the most cited contribu-
tions related to the field of stakeholder analysis3. Accordingly, it is employed as a foundational
piece of literature with respect to the work presented later in this dissertation.
8.3 Making strategy: The journey of strategic management
Methodologies dedicated to the classification of stakeholders in the context of corporate endeav-
our can typically be grouped into one of two general categories: Those that focus an analyst’s
attention upon entities that have an interest in, or are affected by, the strategic future of a firm,
regardless of whether or not those entities possess significant power, and those that regard only
the powerful [141]. The next methodology to be discussed, certainly belongs to the latter of
these categories. In fact, during its introduction, the authors, Eden and Ackerman, explicitly
state that the method they propose is strictly intended to facilitate what they argue to be the
utilitarian aim of identifying entities that have, or can develop, the power either to support or to
sabotage the successful management of a firm4. Power is thus clearly employed as the governing
determinant of stakeholder relevance. Interestingly, however, in the actual method proposed
by Eden and Ackerman, the authors employ the notion of interest as a second dimension of
stakeholder relevance in order to construct a two-dimensional categorisation of potential stake-
holders. More specifically, Eden and Ackerman employ the following dimensions to characterise
the importance of an entity as stakeholder to a firm: An entity’s level of interest in the strategic
activity of the firm, and the measure of its power to influence the achievement of the firm’s
strategic intent [4].
Based on the aforementioned dimensions, the authors proceeded to define four unique stake-
holder classes, namely players, representing affected actors that possess both the intent and the
power to influence the strategic future of a firm, context setters, representing entities charac-
terised by the passive possession of considerable power, subjects, representing entities that would
like to, but do not possess the power to, influence the strategic future of the firm, and finally,
what is called the crowd, representing the unaffected bystander that is of little to no interest to
the firm. These stakeholder classes, when put together, form what Eden and Ackerman call the
power/interest grid, are depicted in Figure 8.2.
As described by Eden and Ackerman, the main purpose of the above categorisation is to aid an-
alysts in the process of separating stakeholders that are relevant to a firm’s strategic future from
those that merely constitute the periphery. The process of identifying a collection of potential
stakeholders from which such key stakeholders may be identified is, however, never addressed
3The article title Toward a theory for stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who
and what really counts is credited with over 12 000 citations on Google Scholar [325].
4The utilitarian approach employed by Eden and Ackerman is certainly in harmony with the purpose that
seems to underlie the method they propose: The identification of key stakeholders in order to manage the strategic
alliances among them.
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Figure 8.2: A classification of stakeholders according to the dimensions of power and interest, called
the power/interest grid [141].
by Eden and Ackerman (which is why the method they propose belongs to the second category
of the typology proposed by Reed et al. [376]) [141]. After introducing the power/interest grid,
the authors proceed to discuss the next phase in the methodology they propose, called the star
diagram. Before proceeding to a discussion of the star diagram, there is one final component
to the power/interest grid that should be noted. Eden and Ackerman remind analysts that in
addition to determining to which class a stakeholder belongs, it is necessary to take note of the
unique disposition of each stakeholder [4]. More specifically, the authors suggest that in addition
to determining the extent of a stakeholder’s power and interest, analysts would do well to note
whether the stakeholder is positively, negatively or variably disposed to the strategic future of
a firm5.
When introducing the star diagram, Eden and Ackerman describe how the application of the
aforementioned power/interest grid may lead to somewhat biased results, because of unques-
tioned assumptions related to its application. Accordingly, the star diagram is presented as
an attempt at mitigating such bias. To elucidate, the star diagram, depicted in Figure 8.3, is
designed to facilitate the process by which analysts may attempt to determine (1) the basis of
a stakeholder’s power, and (2) the basis of its interest, thereby making salient and verifying
any assumptions related thereto6. The construction of a star diagram consists of the following
steps: First, an analyst is required to describe the manner in which stakeholders perceive and
respond to a firm and its planned future endeavours (i.e. its spectacles). Thereafter, he or she
must proceed to describe the manner in which the strategic future of the firm affects the goals
pursued by said stakeholders (i.e. its affected aspirations). Thirdly, the sources of a stakeholder’s
power (i.e. its support mechanisms) should be made salient. Finally, the different ways in which
a stakeholder may select to use its power should be described (i.e. its available sanctions7) [2].
5Eden and Ackerman [141] suggest that analysts indicate the determined disposition of a stakeholder in a
colour-coded fashion within the power/interest grid using the following colour scheme: Potentially hostile stake-
holders should be coloured red, potentially collaborative stakeholders should be coloured green, and finally, stake-
holders whose disposition is different with respect to different parts of a firm’s strategic future should be in
blue.
6As the process of constructing a star diagram can be time-consuming, Eden and Ackerman [141] suggest
only doing so for stakeholders determined to be most important to the strategic future of a firm during the prior
application of the power/interest grid.
7Interestingly, Eden and Ackerman [141] do not describe what they mean by available sanctions in great detail
and, as such, the above description thereof is based, in part, on the author’s interpretation.
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Figure 8.3: A star diagram designed to facilitate the elicitation of the bases of both an entity’s power
and its interest [141].
Eden and Ackerman proceed to discuss what they call actor influence network maps. Essentially,
the authors argue that analysts should, at this point in an analysis, consider the relationships
between potential stakeholders as doing so may elicit the central ‘conduits’ of power within a
select group of stakeholders. The authors do not, however, present a method for facilitating
such an analysis and, as such, the account of Eden and Ackerman’s work is concluded [141].
8.4 A stakeholder circle methodology
Similar to the methods described in §8.2 and §8.3, the stakeholder circle methodology, proposed
by Bourne in her doctoral dissertation titled Project relationship management and the stake-
holder circle [69], is devised to support analysts in assessing the relative importance of a set
of pre-identified stakeholders in order to facilitate their selection. The methodology essentially
consists of a two-phase classification process, one phase dedicated to the classification of poten-
tial stakeholders according to the measure of their power, proximity and urgency, and the other
one dedicated to the classification of potential stakeholder according to both the level of their
interest, and the nature of their disposition [69]. The elements involved in the execution of these
phases are described below.
To open the discussion on Phase 1, Bourne plainly defines the term power to represent the extent
to which an entity possesses the ability to “kill a project,” and then simply proceeds to state
that analysts are to characterise this notion on a scale from 1–4, where 1 implies that an entity
has relatively little power and 4 implies that an entity has a definite capacity to formally enforce
change [69]. Thereafter, Bourne proceeds to present an equally concise characterisation of the
measure of an entity’s proximity8, stating that, like power, analysts should represent this notion
on a scale from 1–4, where 1 implies that an entity is relatively removed from a project, and 4
implies that an entity is directly involved therein. The final dimension of stakeholder relevance
employed during the method’s initial phase is that of urgency. To define this dimension formally,
Bourne adopts a definition proposed by Mitchell et al. [325] in an article titled Toward a theory
of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts
8The notion of proximity is never formally defined by Bourne as she considers it self-explanatory [69].
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(see §8.2 for a discussion thereof). Interestingly, in the discussion on the manner in which
analysts are to characterise an entity’s urgency, they are instructed to do so not by the actual
measure thereof, but by the affect of that measure upon the manner in which analysts are forced
to respond to the related entity’s concerns [69]. More specifically, analysts are instructed to rate
the degree of an entity’s urgency on a scale from 1–5, where 1 implies that analysts need not
pay much attention to an entity’s concerns, and 5 implies that immediate action is warranted,
irrespective of other commitments [69].
The second phase of Bourne’s method is described in no more detail than the first. It is presented
plainly to consist of the execution of two separate analyses, one to elicit the level of an entity’s
interest in a project, and one to elicit the nature of the entity’s disposition toward it [69]. Bourne
neglects to provide any guidelines according to which analysts are to go about conducting these
analyses, simply stating that the level of an entity’s interest should be rated on a scale from 1–5,
where 1 implies antagonism, 3 ambivalence, and 5 commitment9, and similarly, that an entity’s
disposition should be rated on a scale of 1–5, where 1 implies active support, 3 represents a
non-committal entity and 5 implies active-opposition [69].
After introducing the phases described above, Bourne proceeds to present what she calls a
“complex set of Excel spreadsheets” capable of facilitating the visualisation of a potential stake-
holder’s relevance. To elucidate, Bourne developed a collection of Excel spreadsheets that, based
upon the aforementioned ratings regarding the measure of an entity’s power, proximity, urgency,
interest and disposition, is capable of producing as output what is called a stakeholder circle [69].
For the sake of illustration, a hypothetical example of a stakeholder circle in respect of eleven
unique stakeholder groups is depicted in Figure 8.4. The figure may be interpreted according to
the following guidelines: The number of concentric circles between the centre and the shape rep-
resenting a stakeholder symbolises the proximity of that stakeholder to the related project. The
more uniform the colour-scheme of the shape representing a stakeholder, the more homogeneous
the views of the individuals that constitute that stakeholder10. And finally, the size of the shape
representing a stakeholder indicates the extent of its power. As can be seen, there are several
dimensions of stakeholder relevance that formed part of the method proposed by Bourne that
are not incorporated in the stakeholder circle (e.g. urgency, interest and disposition). Bourne,
however, never addresses this lack of representation.
In conclusion, although this chapter would be incomplete without a review of the stakeholder
circle methodology proposed by Bourne, it is unclear why the method has received attention in
the academic literature. The method not only leaves much unaddressed, but fails to present the
methodological components that are addressed in such a way that their working and sociological
underpinnings are adequately elucidated. All in all, the methodology proposed by Bourne is hard
pressed when compared to some of the methods discussed in the previous sections.
8.5 How to do, or not to do, a stakeholder analysis
Varvasovszky and Brugha open the account of their method for the classification of stakeholders
titled A stakeholder analysis [465] with the following description of the general purpose thereof: A
stakeholder analysis represents an attempt at generating knowledge about a select group of
actors toward understanding their behaviour, interrelations and/or interests in order to assess
the general measure of the influence that they bring to bear on the decisions to be made during
9The scale suggested to characterise an entity’s interest is above all else confusing. Not only do the labels
suggested (i.e. antagonistic, ambivalent and committed) relate poorly to the notion of interest, the scales proposed
to characterise the notions of interest and disposition are essentially one and the same.
10Bourne neglects to provide a formal definition for the notion of a stakeholder [69].
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Figure 8.4: A hypothetical example of the output of the methodology proposed by Bourne [69], called
a stakeholder circle. The figure may be interpreted as follows: The number of concentric circles between
the centre and the shape representing a stakeholder symbolises the proximity of that stakeholder to the
related project. The more uniform the colour-scheme of the shape representing a stakeholder, the more
homogeneous the views of the individuals that constitute that stakeholder. And finally, the size of the
shape representing a stakeholder indicates the extent of their power [69].
an endeavour [465]. This rather elegant description of the purpose of conducting a stakeholder
analysis is in many ways representative of the manner in which Varvasovszky and Brugha go
about presenting the method they propose — detailed to the point of being comprehensive.
The method is introduced with what the authors call a set of preliminary questions seemingly
designed to prime the pending analysis. To elucidate, Varvasovszky and Brugha present three
such questions, phrased as follows: “What is the aim and time dimension of the analysis?”
“What is the context of the analysis?” And finally, “at what level will the analysis take place?”
The dynamics these questions are designed to address, as made salient in the discussion related
to their introduction, are depicted in Table 8.1 [465]. As can be seen, a total of six dynamics
are listed in the left-hand column of the table, while the respective options associated with the
consideration of each dynamic are listed in the right-hand column. Analysts are instructed to
determine (1) whether the purpose of their analysis is aimed at evaluation, implementation, or
planning, (2) whether the focus of their analysis is retrospective or prospective in nature, (3)
whether they are interested in the process of design, or simply the objectives being pursued,
(4) whether the scope of their analysis is broad or narrow in focus, (5) whether the time-frame
of the analysis is rapid, short-term, medium-term or long-term, and (6) whether the stage at
which the analysis takes place is pre-implementation, during planning, development or post-
implementation11[465]. Following these preliminary considerations, Varvasovszky and Brugha
proceed to discuss the actual analysis of potential stakeholders.
The discussion on the analysis of stakeholders opens with an account of the dimensions that the
authors argue underlie the notion of stakeholder relevance, namely the extent of their influence,
the level of their interest, and the nature of their disposition. Unfortunately, the authors neglect
11The authors include the notion of an historical analysis in respect of the stage at which an analysis may take
place. This is, however, neglected as its inclusion is illogical — the stage of an analysis cannot be historical as
this would imply that the analysis has already taken place.
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Table 8.1: A list of the dynamics analysts are to consider during the preliminary phases of a stakeholder




















to define these dimensions formally, although they do proceed to discuss a related dynamic
thereto not noted in any other method reviewed in this chapter — the consideration of how the
qualities of an entity may change over time [465]. Consider Figure 8.5, which relates to a case
study conducted by Varvasovszky and Brugha in the alcoholic beverage sector of a country not
named and depicts the manner in which the influence and disposition of four key stakeholders
may change over time. The following stakeholders are considered: The Association of Spirit
Producers (ASP), the National Public Health Institute (NPHI), the Transport and Road Safety
Division of the Police (TRSDP) and the National Institute for Alcohol (NIA). Although the
value of such an analysis is multi-faceted, the authors suggest that it is most relevant to the
identification of key future role players with whom strategic partnerships may be pursued [465].
Following the discussion of this time-based analysis of stakeholders, Varvasovszky and Brugha
proceed to introduce the final component of their method — one dedicated to the selection of
an optimal strategy for the management of stakeholders.
Although not explicitly stated, it seems that the final phase of the method builds collectively
upon the work done in those before it. The working of this component of the proposed method
is best illustrated visually and, to that end, consider Figure 8.6. As can be seen in the figure, the
optimal strategy for managing stakeholders is determined according to the position that charac-
terises them (i.e. supportive, mixed, non-supportive and marginal) which, in turn, is determined
by the measure of a stakeholder’s influence and the nature of its disposition [465]. More specifi-
cally, the proposed “optimal fit” between the position of a stakeholder and the strategy proposed
for its management is to involve supportive stakeholders, defend against non-supportive ones,
collaborate with “mixed-blessing” stakeholders (i.e. those who combine elements of support and
non-support), and finally, to monitor marginal stakeholders (i.e. those that exhibit a low level
of threat and limited potential for collaboration) [465].
In a manner that alludes to the maturity with which Varvasovszky and Brugha approach the
presentation of their work, the account of their method is concluded with a discussion on the
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Figure 8.5: A hypothetical output of an analysis of how stakeholders’ influence and disposition may
change over time, conducted by Varvasovszky and Brugha in a case study in the alcoholic beverage sector
of an unspecific country [465].
Figure 8.6: A grid illustrating the alternative strategies for managing dissimilar groups of stakeholders,
and the consequence thereof [465].
limitations thereof. To elucidate, the authors make salient that any stakeholder analysis, and
so too their method, is fundamentally cross-sectional in nature as it provides but a snapshot of
what may be a rapidly changing context [76]. This quality is portrayed as a potential weakness
as it implies that stakeholder analyses are fundamentally influenced and coloured in by the real-
time elements of their context, including the stakeholder analysis itself. In essence, Varvasovszky
and Brugha warn that analysts should remain weary of the potential bias in any stakeholder
analysis and not fall victim to the trap of finding unwarranted comfort in the guidance of a
method that is simply designed to fulfil the role of support [465].
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8.6 Stakeholder analysis combined with social network analysis
In the multi-dimensional kind of endeavour that often relates to the context of environment
policy making, stakeholder analysis has a well-worn seat at the table. It is thus rather appro-
priate that the final methodology to be discussed, belonging to the second and third categories
of the typology proposed by Reed et al. [376], is one specifically designed for such a more in-
volved kind of context. Proposed by Lienert et al. [288] in an article titled Stakeholder analysis
combined with social network analysis provides fine-grained insights into water infrastructure
planning processes, the methodology addresses both the classification of potential stakeholders
and the analysis of the relationships between them. More specifically, the methodology is a two-
phase process, the first of which, called stakeholder analysis, is dedicated to the categorisation
of stakeholders, and the second, called social network analysis, is dedicated to an analysis of
the relationships among stakeholders [288]. In the remainder of this section, these phases are
discussed in turn, starting with the latter.
There is not much that need be said in respect of the categorisation method presented by Lienert
et al. as it is remarkably similar to that contained in the methodology proposed by Eden and
Ackerman [141] (discussed in §8.3). They too, employ the notions of power (i.e. the ability to
influence) and of effect to characterise dissimilar stakeholders along a two-dimensional spectrum
of relevance. The only real difference is that Lienert et al. select to discretise the spectrum
of stakeholder relevance according to a more refined classification (adopted from Likert [289]).
More specifically, the measure of an entity’s influence is rated as being either 0, 2.5, 5, 7.5 or
10, representing an entity that has no influence, has very limited influence, has influence, has
strong influence, and finally, has governing influence, respectively. Similarly, the degree to which
an entity is affected by an endeavour is rated as being either 0, 2.5, 5, 7.5 or 10, representing
an entity that is slightly affected, is affected, is strongly affected, and finally, is very strongly
affected, respectively [288]. The remainder of phase 1 of the methodology proposed by Lienert
et al. is simply a carbon copy of the classification proposed by Eden and Ackerman [4] and, as
such, the intricacies thereof are not re-documented here.
Social network analysis, as defined by Lienert et al. [288], essentially represents a method de-
signed to support analysts in uncovering the system of relationships among the actors of a
network such that the central players therein are made salient. The authors describe the ground-
work related to such an analysis to consist of first writing the names of potential stakeholders
(as identified during phase 1) onto small cards and then arranging those cards on a large piece
of paper such that the system of relationships among stakeholders can be identified and drawn
in using coloured markers12 [288]. Once the network of relationships has been constructed14,
Lienert et al. state that analysts may determine both the structural importance and the power15
of stakeholders by calculating each stakeholder’s degree centrality and betweenness centrality, re-
spectively. Unfortunately, not much detail is given in respect of the criteria that underlie these
notions, the authors simply state that degree centrality relates to the ties that an actors shares
directly with other actors (whether the number or nature of such ties are of importance is never
clarified), while betweenness centrality is described to represent the number of times an entity
12The authors list four unique kinds of relationships with respect to which such an analysis should be conducted
(represented in dissimilar colours), namely cooperative relationships, financial exchange relationships, pressure
relationships, and conflict relationships13 [288]. By conducting these analyses, Lienert et al. argue that analysts
will be able to elicit the central players within the network of stakeholders related to a problem context.
14Lienert et al. [288] do not provide further guidance as to how analysts are supposed to uncover such relation-
ships.
15Since the notion of power was employed to classify potential stakeholders during phase one of the methodology
they propose, the fact that Lienert et al. employ the term here is rather confusing, especially since they neglect
to define what is meant thereby.
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is present along shortest indirect paths between two, non-adjacent entities [288]. By conducting
these analyses, Lienert et al. argue that analysts will be able to elicit the central players within
a network of stakeholders related to a problem under consideration. To conclude the discussion,
consider a prototypical example of a social network analysis, adapted from Lienert et al. [288]
and depicted in Figure 8.7.
Figure 8.7: A stereotypical example of the output of a social network analysis, where the nodes labelled
A–GG represent stakeholders, and the size of each node indicates the degree of betweenness centrality
related to the stakeholder it represents, adapted from Lienert et al. [288].
8.7 A high-level comparative analysis of the methods discussed
The methods discussed in the preceding sections are held to be representative of the academic
literature related to stakeholder theory. Toward presenting the reader with as detailed a review
of these methods as appropriate, Table 8.3 is dedicated to an illustration of their distinction
according to the features that characterise them. In general, the methods considered16 are
distinguished according to (1) their designed purpose, and (2) the dimensions of stakeholder
relevance they employ. To facilitate its presentation, Table 8.3 is constructed according to the
legend depicted in Table 8.2.
Before concluding this chapter with a brief summary, consider the following shortcoming related
to the methods reviewed therein that utilise the notion of power to distinguish relevant from
irrelevant entities. All but one fail to provide a working description of the components that
constitute power. Given that there is a plethora of definitions for the notion of power in the
literature, this neglect is rather odd. To illustrate the potential utility of such definitions to the
task of stakeholder selection, the work of psychologists French and Raven [174], and of economist
Galbraith [179] is briefly reviewed below17.
French and Raven [174] defined the notion of power according to what they called the five
bases of social power, namely legitimate power, reward power, coercive power, expert power,
16It should be noted that only feature-based methods, as opposed to role-based methods, are considered. Role-
based methods are considered inadequate in the context of the work presented in this dissertation [366].
17For a more general review of contributions made toward defining the notion of power, see De-Moll’s Everyday
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and referent power. These so-called power bases were defined as follows: Legitimate power
represents any form of influence that stems from the internalised values of individuals dictating
that one individual has certain rights over another. Reward power embodies influence granted
an individual because of its ability to induce positive, and/or terminating negative experiences.
Coercive power, on the other hand, addresses the influence granted an individual as a result of
its ability to induce negative, or terminating positive experiences. Expert power is defined to
represent the influence granted an individual because of its knowledge and/or skill in a certain
area of interest, and finally, referent power is granted an individual because of its standing with
other, third party individuals [174].
Galbraith [179] proposed an alternative definition for the notion of power that addresses not
only the sources from which power originates (as French and Raven [174] had done), but also the
forms in which such power may be exerted. Galbraith proposed three sources of power, namely
the personality of an individual, the property it possesses, and the organisational position it
holds, and three forms of exertion, namely condign, compensatory, or conditioned power [179].
In essence, the first of the sources of power above is defined to represent an individual’s intel-
ligence, dominance and ability to inspire, the second simply represents the material resources
possessed by an entity, the third source of power seems to have been considered self-explanatory
by Galbraith as he neglected to formally describe what it represents [179]. In a similar fashion,
the forms of power proposed were only briefly described. In the order listed, they were defined
to represent power that is based on force, power that results from an exchange of resources, and
power that is a product of persuasion [179].
Evidently, the work of researchers such as French and Raven [174] and of Galbraith [179] rep-
resents an opportune foundation from which to develop a definition for the notion of power
tailored to the task of stakeholder selection. It is unfortunate that contributions such as these
were not drawn upon during the development of the methods discussed in this chapter.
8.8 Chapter summary
This chapter was dedicated to a review of the academic literature related to methods designed for
stakeholder analysis. In order to facilitate their discussion, these methods were reviewed in terms
of a typology proposed by Reed et al. [376] for classifying methods into one of three categories
according to whether they were designed to facilitate (1) the identification of stakeholders,
(2) the classification of stakeholders, or (3) the analysis of the network of relationships among
stakeholders. More specifically, §8.1 was dedicated to a review of methods belonging to the
first of these categories, §8.2–§8.5 to methods belonging to the second, and §8.6 to methods
belonging to the third of the aforementioned categories. In addition, §8.7 contained a brief
analysis of several stakeholder methods according to the features that distinguish them.
Based on the work reviewed in this chapter, it is clear that there is much to be desired in the
field of stakeholder selection theory. The lack of methodological maturity is the most obvious in
respect of methods belonging to the first of the aforementioned categories (i.e. those designed
to facilitate the identification of stakeholders). Accordingly, the work presented later in this
dissertation represents, in part, an attempt at taking the field of stakeholder analysis at least
one step closer to maturity.
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As delineated in Chapter 2, the meta-methodology proposed in this dissertation is developed in
accordance with the design framework proposed by Herman [211]. As such, Part II is structured
in the following way: In Chapter 9, a preliminary version of the proposed methodology is
presented. Thereafter, the application of the methodology to a theoretical case study is presented
in Chapter 10, along with several modifications thereto deemed necessary on the back of its
application. In Chapter 11, feedback received from an expert in the application of qualitative
methodologies of the kind proposed, is reviewed and incorporated into a final version of the
methodology. This final version of the methodology is then applied in Chapter 12 to a practical
case study aimed at illustrating its utility. To conclude Part II, an abstract mathematical model
developed in an attempt to uncover dynamics related to the context for which the proposed
methodology was designed, but which are typically hidden from a purely qualitative analysis, is
presented in Chapter 13.
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A systems solution meta-methodology
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This chapter is dedicated to the explication of a meta-methodology designed to facilitate the solu-
tion of real-world problems. A high-level overview of the proposed framework is presented in §9.1,
and this is followed by an in-depth discussion on the various phases of the meta-methodology
in §9.2–§9.3. Thereafter, the chapter is brought to a close with a short summary in §9.4.
9.1 A general depiction of the methodology
In order to stand upon the shoulders of academic giants gone before, it is necessary first to
delve into their accomplishments. The literature review conducted toward that end in Part I is
extensive, both in nature and purpose. Despite this extensive quality, it is possible to capture
concisely the essence of what was discussed as the intricacies of human judgement, the intricacies
of real-world problems, and the technicalities involved in the working of solution methodologies
for accommodating the interaction of these phenomena during the process of real-world problem
solving. In harmony with the philosophy of the critical systems movement, discussed in §6.8, it
has been argued that in order to develop a mature solution methodology, neither the human, nor
the technical elements of the real-world can be neglected — that it is only by synthesising these
phenomena that one can develop a response to real-world problems which is able to accommodate
its intricately nuanced nature. Indeed, the framework for real-world problem solving proposed
in this dissertation has more in common with the critical systems movement than any other
paradigm, although the critical systems movement does not contain it as its commitment toward
human emancipation is somewhat neglected.
Before embarking on an exposition of the proposed methodology, it is necessary to describe the
context of application for which it was designed1. Simply put, the proposed methodology is de-
signed to address the kind of real-world problems that exist in systems exhibiting the following
property: The entities contained therein are forced to collaborate despite pursuing conflicting
1The proposed methodology may well be of utility to address a wider scope of problems than those for which
it has been designed.
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outcomes (i.e. the outcomes pursued by competing entities are conflicting, but interdependent).
As a result of the intertwined nature of this kind of system2, the problems contained therein
are often exceptionally difficult to solve as it is never clear who to consult in order to confirm
the appropriateness of a proposed solution (i.e. it is unclear who the stakeholders of the prob-
lem are) and, furthermore, the process of problem solving3 entails not only the identification of
a solution that is technically appropriate, but one that simultaneously distributes the benefit
to be attained by relevant stakeholders appropriately. Because of these qualities, the activi-
ties that dominate the methodological process of solving these kinds of problems include: The
identification of relevant stakeholders, the determination of outcomes pursued, the prioritisation
of selected outcomes, the establishment of aspiration values, and the selection of an appropri-
ate solution. It is toward facilitating these activities, whereby real-world problems of the kind
described above can be solved, that the meta-methodology proposed in this chapter is aimed.
In general, the proposed methodology is partitioned into three phases4, namely problem for-
mulation, response formulation and response implementation as depicted in Figure 9.1. These
phases represent the process of developing a formal representation of a problematic situation
that adequately facilitates the pursuit of an appropriate response to the problem considered,
the process of actually developing an appropriate response, and the process of practically imple-
menting that response, respectively. As illustrated in Chapters 6 and 8, many academics have
contributed to the collective pursuit of developing methodologies for managing these components
of real-world problem solving (e.g. the methods of the systems movement). The framework pro-
posed in this dissertation is not an attempt at reinventing the wheel, but is, where possible,
built upon the work covered in the literature review. Before preceding, it should be noted that
although the tasks of response formulation and response implementation are included in the
high-level overview of the proposed methodology below, their specific design is not addressed in
this dissertation as it is considered outside the scope of this work, as noted in §1.4.
Figure 9.1: A high-level overview of the phases within the proposed methodology.
9.2 Problem formulation
The manner in which Figure 9.1 has been designed may result in the unintended impression that
the identification of a problematic situation constitutes the first phase within an endeavour5. In
reality, however, what is being implied is simply the acknowledgement of some non-ideal situa-
tion, and that something needs to be done to address it. In other words, the initial identification
of a problematic situation is a naturally occurring event that takes place outside the context of an
endeavour and establishes the need for an endeavour towards addressing this non-ideal situation.
The first phase of this methodology is thus that of problem formulation — a phase characterised
by considerable complexity. In the sections that follow, the components proposed to constitute
2One can describe this kind of system by stating that such entities are linked by a complex network of
interdependent pursuits, activities and resources in which each entity possesses varying degrees of power and
autonomy.
3The problems that surface in this kind of system typically belong to the pluralist and coercive categories of
the problem typology discussed in §7.4.
4The practical distinction between these phases is at times rather ambiguous.
5A term representative of the system in which the process of real-world problem solving is contained.
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the process of problem formulation, namely stakeholder selection and problem structuring, as
well as a feature that relates to all the phases of the methodology, called the decision-making
checklist, are depicted in Figure 9.2 and are discussed in detail in this chapter.
Figure 9.2: A high-level overview of the phases within the proposed methodology together with a
lower-level depiction of the phases that constitute the process of problem formulation.
9.2.1 The identification of relevant stakeholders
Solution methodologies dedicated to the process of stakeholder selection are typically classified
into one of three categories according to whether they are designed to aid analysts in identifying
stakeholders, differentiating between and categorising stakeholders, or investigating the network
of relationships among stakeholders. As made salient in §8.1 of Chapter 8, there is a gap in the
academic literature concerning methods dedicated to the first of these priorities. In the words
of Reed et al. [376], “Much of stakeholder analysis literature has presumed that stakeholders
are self-evident and self-construed, and has focused on categorising pre-identified stakeholders
to understand their interests and relationships. However, before this can be done, it is necessary
to identify who holds a stake in the phenomenon under investigation.” In an attempt to address
this shortcoming, a methodology designed to facilitate both the identification and selection of
stakeholders is proposed. To clarify, this methodology may be utilised as primer to methods
dedicated to the second and third priority listed above (reviewed in Chapter 8), but it is designed
to facilitate both the identification and selection of stakeholders independently.
As point of departure, Freeman’s oft cited definition of a stakeholder is employed [172]. Freeman
defined6 stakeholders to be entities who may affect, or may be affected, by the outcome of an
endeavour [172]. By recognising the building blocks that constitute this definition, two elements
characteristic of potential stakeholders result. This is, the ability to influence the outcome of
an endeavour (defined as a measure of power possessed), and the degree to which an entity
is affected by an endeavour and the activities that surround it (defined as a measure of effect
experienced). Note that these elements are subjective in nature as their description depends
upon human perception. Consequently, it is necessary to provide a formal definition of the
components that constitute the notions of power possessed and effect experienced.
Before attempting to define these elements, a distinction is made between two types of systems.
In any endeavour there exists the real-world system that contains the identified problematic
situation (referred to here as the original system), and then there is the system that contains
6This definition has been paraphrased to suit the context of this dissertation.
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only certain elements of the original system deemed relevant to the problematic situation being
addressed during an endeavour (referred to here as the temporary system). Within this clas-
sification, the original system contains every component of the real world that is involved in
a problematic situation, while the temporary system contains only those components that are
deemed relevant by the entities conducting an endeavour. With this in mind, the notions of
power and effect are defined in the sections that follow.
The notion of power
As made salient in the literature review of Chapter 8, methodologies designed to facilitate the
selection of stakeholders typically utilise some conception of power (among other features) to dis-
tinguish the relevant from the irrelevant. Few such methodologies, however, provide an adequate
description of the dimensions that underlie the possession of power. Toward providing such a
description tailored to the context of an endeavour, the work of the economist Galbraith [179]
(among others) is drawn upon as inspiration7.
To speak of power is to speak of the potential to influence the behaviour of another (i.e. the
decisions made by another). In more precise terms, the phenomena that constitute the existence
of such influence is defined along four dimensions, namely form, source, potential and efficacy.
The first of these dimensions addresses the nature of exerted power and contains two sub-
dimensions, namely coercive and suasive power. As the labels assigned to them suggest, coercive
power represents the exertion of power by means of forcefully enacting one’s will upon another,
and suasive power represents the exertion of power by means of persuasion. The attentive reader
will notice that coercive power is similar to what Galbraith [179] called condign power, and
suasive power to the combination of what Galbraith [179] called compensatory and conditioned
power.
The author does not believe it possible to typologise all sources of power contained in the
mechanisms of influence. Consequently, no such claim is made. Instead, the strategy adopted
is to attempt to typologise only the sources of power that are expected to dominate the power
dynamics within the context of an endeavour. Sources of power are defined as either formal or
informal, and then according to the sub-dimensions contained within each of these categories.
Notably, formal elements of power represent the elements of power that are officially recognised
and described within the formal structure of the original system, while informal elements of
power represent the elements of power that are not officially recognised or described as sources
of power, but do, in fact, contain the capacity to influence the outcome of an endeavour.
7There are two limitations to the description of power proposed by Galbraith [179] that render a novel definition
necessary, one in respect of its structure, and the other in respect of its scope. Concerning its structure, there is an
incoherence between the power source labelled personality and the form of employment labelled compensatory. In
essence, Galbraith defined an individual’s personality to include his or her level of intelligence, ability to inspire,
and overall effectiveness, while the compensatory exertion of power was defined to represent any form of influence
characterised by an exchange of resources. These descriptions allude to a discrepancy in Galbraith’s formulation
of power — it is difficult to imagine how an individual could utilise his or her personality in a compensatory form.
The second aspect of the work of Galbraith [179] that is contested pertains to the sources defined to contain
the notion of power (i.e. personality, property, and organisational position). Not only is there a measure of
interdependence among these categories, but they are also limited in their scope. Concerning the first issue,
Galbraith elected to define an entity’s personality as a separate source of power, thereby failing to realise that
personality plays a decisive role in the exertion of any form of sourceable power. The suggestion that personality,
or any element similar in meaning, be defined a unique source of power, is considered illogical. Concerning the
issue of scope, the listed power sources are considered lacking. They fail, for example, to contain the manner in
which the perceived, pre-empted actions of another may act as a source of influence.
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In the context of an endeavour, the dominant elements of formal power are contained within two
formal declarations of power. The first, more dominant source of formal power resides in the
power structure that exists within an original system, called structural power. More specifically,
this form of power originates from the formal description of the power relationships among en-
tities according to their positions in the structure of the original system (not unlike Galbraith’s
organisational power dimension). The second source of formal power, inspired by the work of
Suchman [438], is called customary power. Customary power represents the influence granted
entities as a result of the official regulations of the society in which an endeavour is being con-
ducted. An appropriate example of customary power can be found in the context of sustainable
development. During the past few decades, the fact that the environment suffers irrevocable con-
sequences because of the nature of human endeavours has become widely acknowledged [222]. In
response to such intellectual developments, many countries have implemented regulating policies
to ensure that human affairs are conducted within the domain of sustainability [39, 78, 199]. As
such, it is often prescribed that an entity, representative of the sustainable mandate, is involved
in decisions made in the context of an endeavour. On the other end of the spectrum, it is argued
that the dominant sources of informal power in an endeavour are contained within the following
elements: status, necessity, and incapacitation.
Of the above sources of informal power, the foremost element is rather similar to elements in
Galbraith’s work, while the two latter elements are quite unique. To elucidate, an entity’s
status represents the material and non-material commodities possessed by that entity, and is
thus somewhat similar to the property dimension defined by Galbraith. An entity’s necessity as
a source of power, on the other hand, is entirely novel and represents its perceived necessity with
respect to the purpose of the original system. In other words, it represents an entity’s ability
to inhibit the purpose of the original system of which it is a part by becoming passive in its
participation. This dimension captures a wide variety of strategic moves within the power battle
of an endeavour. Consider the case of industrial action as an example. It is argued that the
source of power employed by the mechanisms of industrial action rests predominantly upon the
necessity of those participating therein with respect to the purpose of the system at which the
protest is aimed. The final source of power, appropriately labelled incapacitation, shares more
than its novel nature with the notion of necessity. In fact, one could say that incapacitation
and necessity are two sides of the same coin. Whereas necessity represents an entity’s ability
to inhibit the purpose of a system by becoming inactive, incapacitation represents an entity’s
ability to inhibit the purpose of a system by actively disrupting the mechanisms thereof (e.g.
sabotage).
The third dimension of power, its potential, is defined simply as the magnitude of the measure
of an entity’s power with respect to each of the sources of power listed above — the greater
its measure, the greater its potential. This dimension is established formally to ensure that
practitioners remain sensitive to the source-specific measure of power entities possess as some
power sources may be more consequential than others. A slightly more complex dimension,
the efficacy8 of power represents the mechanism by which the impact of a certain measure of
employed power is determined. That is, an entity’s level of skill in harnessing power. The
influence of an entity’s level of skill can be likened to the effect of a foreign exchange trader’s
expertise in trading one currency for another. In the world of forex trading, the ability to create
value simply by knowing how and when to convert one currency into another is known as the
ability to play the market. In like manner, although dependent upon a different skill set, an
entity’s skill in exerting power represents its capacity to “play the market” within the context of
8Note that the efficacy of power incorporates what Galbraith defined under personality as a source of power.
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an endeavour. Stated more formally, the manner in which an entity goes about exerting its power
may result in the effect thereof upon the outcomes of an endeavour being either disproportionally
larger, smaller, or exactly proportional to the potential of its sourceable power.
Power has now been defined according to the four constituent dimensions, namely its form,
source, potential and efficacy (see Figure 9.3 for a summary). It is argued that the collective
scope of these dimensions sufficiently contain the mechanisms that dominate the playing field
during an endeavour. That being said, there is, of course, more to the defined dimensions than
discussed above. For the purpose of stakeholder selection, however, the current exposition is
deemed appropriate. Later in this dissertation, the mechanisms of power will once again become
the focus of the discussion, at which point the intricacies thereof will be explicated in more
detail. As a precursor to this later discussion, there is one more concept that should perhaps
be mentioned at this juncture — that of a power-play. Simply put, a power-play represents the
practical exploitation of a specific source of power, in a specific form. In other words, seeing
that five sources of power have been identified, together with their two potential forms of use,
it follows that there are ten available power-plays. By employing this concept, it is possible to
describe the potential and efficacy of power with respect to a specific power-play.
Figure 9.3: An overview of the elements that dominate the mechanisms of power in an endeavour.
The notion of effect
Establishing an exhaustive classification of the mechanisms by which entities may be affected by
an endeavour has proven to be a persistent challenge in the academic literature [366]. It was Vos
and Achterkamp [470] who argued that the identification of the affected within an endeavour
poses a fundamental problem, as it is impossible to know when all such entities have been
identified. In other words, no exhaustive set of categorical dimensions for the mechanisms of
effect exist within the context of an endeavour. In a manner similar to the explication of power,
no exhaustive description of elements contained within the mechanisms of effect is therefore
given. Instead, the dynamics that dominate the mechanisms of effect are simply described in
as much detail as appropriate9. More specifically, two dynamics are addressed: The criteria
according to which the reality of effect experienced may be identified, and the mechanisms by
which such effect propagates.
The notion of effect experienced is certainly a multifaceted concept. Yet, it is argued that
the reality thereof may be uncovered according to the formal and informal outcomes that en-
tities pursue in the original system in which an endeavour takes place, where the distinction
9Unlike the explication of power, no attempt is made here to define the dominant sources of effect — the
mechanisms of human effect are so intricately entwined that it is not possible untangle them in a manner that
adds value and maintains generality.
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between formal and informal is made according to whether or not such outcomes are formally
documented10. In other words, entities are considered affected if either the formal or informal
outcomes they pursue relate in any way to the issues addressed by an endeavour, or the manner
in which these issues are to be addressed. Once an entity is deemed affected, the severity of
effect experienced may be determined according to the extent to which the outcomes it pursues
are either simplified, or complicated by the issue under consideration. It is acknowledged that
certain outcomes pursued, often formal in nature, deem an entity either affected or unaffected,
without any shade of grade in between.
Describing the mechanisms by which the notion of effect exists is significantly more involved
than simply stating the criteria according to which the severity thereof may be determined. To
elucidate, it is necessary to explicate the very agency by which the effect caused by changes
to the working of a system propagates. To that end, the concept of a functional relationship
is introduced. To define this concept, a notion popularised by practitioners of an approach
often adopted in the study of inter-organisational systems [122], called the network approach, is
employed [366]. More specifically, the original systems containing an endeavour is considered to
consist of a conglomeration of networks of interdependent actors, resources, and activities, where
actors11 are defined to represent human entities (i.e. in the form of individuals or collectives)
who carry out goal-directed activities, which represent the tasks by which these actors are able
to transform and transfer resources toward developing a more aggregated actor, and resources
represent material and non-material commodities of value [284]. Employing these concepts,
the notion of a functional relationship12 is defined to exist between any two elements in the
network of actors, activities and resources described above, if the proper functioning13 of one
element depends upon, or is influenced by, the activity of another (e.g. an actor requiring
a certain resource at a certain point in time). The network of such functional relationships
contained in real-world systems, called the functional network, is defined to constitute the very
agency by which the experience of effect propagates throughout a system to impact certain
entities contained therein. The component of the functional network characterised by formal
and informal interactions is called the formal functional network, and the informal functional
network, respectively.
The practical selection of stakeholders
Investigating the notions of power and effect in the preceding section, the introduction of what
was called a “functional network” proves to be of importance to the process of stakeholder
selection. Simply put, a functional network was defined to represent the agency by which the
experience of effect propagates throughout a system. At first this may seem rather insignificant,
but the fact that this network represents the mechanism by which the experience of effect
propagates, implies that all entities potentially influenced by the outcome of an endeavour are
contained therein. By definition of what it means to be effected, an entity will only be interested
in an endeavour if it is, or is likely to be, effected thereby. Based on this property, and the fact
that all entities that may potentially be affected by an endeavour exist in the functional network
related to it, it follows that all entities relevant to an endeavour exist in the functional network
10For the sake of clarity, note that outcomes formally pursued by an entity essentially represent its documented
purpose within the system in which it exists. Take, for example, an entity working as a police officer. The formal
purpose of a police officer, and thus one of the formal outcomes pursued by the entity working as a police officer,
is to maintain order in society.
11In the context of this dissertation, no distinction is made between the term actor and the term entity.
12The existence of a functional relationship is considered formal if the reality thereof is formally documented,
or informal, if the reality thereof is not formally documented.
13The proper functioning of an entity refers to its ability to realise the formal and informal outcomes it pursues.
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related to that endeavour. This is rather an opportune property as it provides an initial filter
by which to discern relevant from irrelevant entities. Notably, however, the delineation of the
functional network related to an endeavour will only bring an analyst so far — all the entities
relevant to an endeavour may be contained in the functional network related to it, but that does
not mean that all the entities contained therein are relevant. Consequently, it is necessary to
combine the notion of a functional network with some sort of guided search, which is where the
dimensions proposed to govern the identification of relevant stakeholders are of service.
Power and effect are the dimensions defined to govern the selection of stakeholders. It is thus
only appropriate that these dimensions be employed to guide an analyst’s search within the
functional network relevant to it. While designing a method encapsulating such a guided search,
the following dynamic was noted to result from the definition of what it means to be affected:
No matter the measure of an entity’s power, unless it is actually affected by the existence of a
problematic situation related to an endeavour, it remains irrelevant to the resolution thereof. In
contrast to this dynamic, a lack of power fails to render the affected irrelevant14. Because of this
dissimilar quality, the notion of effect is employed as a preliminary constraint on the functional
network under investigation. More specifically, the following cyclic method15 is proposed for
facilitating the identification of potential stakeholders by means of the functional network in
which they exist:
1. Formulate an initial description of the problem being addressed and the activities that
surround it in as much detail as possible at this time.
2. Based on this description, identify and label the core features of the problem.
3. Using the initial description and list of features as a point of reference, construct the
functional network related to it in order to identify affected entities.
4. Once satisfied that all affected entities have been identified, based upon the current descrip-
tion of the problem, proceed to determine which of these entities possess power relevant
to the problem at hand.
5. In view of both the power possessed and the effect experienced by entities, describe the
extent to which, and the manner in which, entities are relevant to the problem at hand.
There are a number of technicalities related to the execution of the above methodology that
have to be addressed. First, note that although the proposed methodology is designed to elicit
relevant stakeholders in both the formal and the informal components of a functional network,
it is likely that the vast majority of relevant stakeholders reside in its formal component. To
elucidate, consider the primary purpose of any formally defined system — the management of
elements pertaining to its purpose [55]. Over time, systems develop to include entities relevant
to their designed purpose. It is, therefore, expected that most of the stakeholders relevant to
an endeavour will be identified by exploring the formal component of the functional network16
related to it. As such, when attempting to identify the affected, it is suggested that analysts first
attempt to construct the formal functional network, and only thereafter, the informal functional
network.
14The refusal to dismiss affected entities because their lack of power is partially inspired by the critical systems
movement — a movement that built its foundations upon the necessity of considering entities regardless of their
ability to influence the system in which they exist.
15An analyst may iterate through the steps of the method as many times as necessary.
16This by no means implies that an analyst need not also explore its informal component.
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The second and final technicality concerns a detail in the description of Phase 4 of the method-
ology that has not been addressed adequately. That is, when is an entity’s power considered
relevant? There are essentially two scenarios that qualify the relevance of an entity’s power.
First, if an entity’s power is of significant utility toward resolving the issue under considera-
tion or managing the activities that surround it, and secondly, if an entity’s power grants it
the capacity to inhibit the implementation of a potential solution to the problem considered.
Importantly, when investigating the relevance of an entity’s power, instead of investigating the
rather ambiguous notion of power in general, the sources of power defined in the preceding
section titled The notion of power should be utilised in order to ground the analyst’s enquiry.
Accordingly, the following pair of questions, collectively constituting a power analysis checklist,
is proposed to facilitate the analysis of an entity’s power:
1. Does the entity possess structural, customary, status, necessity or incapacitation power
that is of utility toward resolving the problem considered or managing the activities that
surround it?
2. Does the entity possess the structural, customary, status, necessity or incapacitation power
to reject a potential solution proposed to resolve the problem considered?
In conclusion, during the review of the stakeholder selection methodologies that exist in the
literature, it was noted that several of these methodologies incorporate a dimension addressing
the actual level of an entity’s interest in an endeavour toward determining its inclusion as
stakeholder. This is, however, somewhat surprising as it is rather obvious that an entity with no
interest in the outcome of an endeavour will not be included as a stakeholder. The intent of the
method discussed above is not to select stakeholders on behalf of an analyst, it is rather to aid
an analyst in identifying potential stakeholders. The actual selection of stakeholders remains
the responsibility of the analyst. Nonetheless, it is claimed that the most relevant stakeholders
may be identified by employing the guidelines introduced above.
The notion of representation
Before closing the discussion on stakeholder selection it is necessary to touch on the notion of
representation [458] — an idea encapsulating the possibility of minimising the number of entities
included in an endeavour by aggregating their involvement to an entity who is representative
of the greater collective. One must act with strategic caution when minimising the number of
entities within an endeavour through representation, for one must ensure that the selected entity
is appropriately representative. More specifically, one should take care not to limit the informa-
tion within an endeavour by employing the notion of representation carelessly. To illustrate this
point, note that if entities within the original system are connected by a functional network,
they may also be connected by a formal power structure (i.e. a formal layout of the power rela-
tionships among entities within a system). In such a case there may exist entities on a higher
system level than the level on which a problematic situation of interest exists, who possess the
formal decision making power to “solve the problem” without the involvement of those entities
on the lower level (thereby representing them). But there is risk involved in this strategy —
the measure to which the formulation of a problem is a true representation of the underlying
real-world problem is critically influenced by the entities one includes within an endeavour.
As systems philosophy holds [163], developing a rich, exceedingly objective picture of a problem
context greatly depends upon the degree to which different, uniquely subjective perspectives are
combined. Consequently, limiting the number of stakeholders may polarise what is understood
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about a problem and subsequently bias the solutions uncovered toward its resolution. In the
author’s view there are only two reasons that would justify such a limiting strategy, the first of
which concerns the value of time. In general, the more stakeholders one includes within an en-
deavour, the longer it will take to reach a state of agreement among stakeholders. Consequently,
one is forced at times to balance the value of developing a rich understanding of the problem
context that may result in uncovering better solutions with the value of time spent on the prob-
lem. The second reason, partially inspired by the emancipatory priority of the critical systems
movement, addresses the case in which a joint body of entities request representation by a third
party in order to supplement their lack of experience in the matters of an endeavour. These
cases do not ignore the possibility that if entities are connected by a formal power structure,
final decision making power resides in the entity who possesses ultimate power. What is argued
is that there may be value in including certain ‘less powerful’ entities in the problem resolution
context, even if it is possible to replace them by moving to a higher level in the original system.
One final point is made in conclusion. The process of identifying relevant stakeholders has
been described as the first step within an endeavour, one that must be completed before one
can continue with the remainder of the endeavour. It is important to note, however, that the
identification of relevant stakeholders should not be terminated after the initial stages of the
endeavour. It may be the primary focus during the initial stages of an endeavour, but that
does not mean that the process should be terminated as the endeavour progresses — however
undesirable it may be, it is always possible that excluded, but relevant, stakeholders may be
discovered during the later stages of an endeavour.
9.2.2 A selection of structuring methods
After completing the preceding phase of the proposed methodology, the purpose of the remaining
phase, the structuring of the problem considered, is twofold: (1) To develop a rich understanding
of the problem at hand, and (2) to decide what to do about it. In other words, it is necessary
to develop a formal formulation of the problem under consideration (that accurately captures
the underlying real-world problem), and to elicit the objectives that may be pursued toward its
resolution. Based upon the review of the literature related to problem structuring methodologies,
it is evident that a considerable amount of work has been done by past researchers to develop
methods capable of facilitating this task. Notably, however, no particular method has as of
yet been deemed best suited to the structuring of every problem type. It would seem that the
distinctness of different problem structuring methodologies render them uniquely equipped to
structure different types of problems. In view of the advance state of progress in the field of
problem structuring, no attempt is made to reinvent the wheel. Instead, a brief analysis of
a select number of problem structuring methods from the literature is presented in order to
support their case-specific selection.
During the initial stages of the research reported here, the methods listed in Table 9.1 were
identified and considered for inclusion within the framework proposed in this dissertation. After
an in-depth investigation, however, several of the methods presented in Table 9.1 were found
to be ill-suited. More specifically, the future workshop [430], drama theory [37], and scenario
planning [358] methodologies are excluded from further consideration because the scope of their
application is too limited. Churchman’s social system design is also excluded, but this time
because it is too general, or rather, it is more accurately described as a collection of philosophical
meanderings rather than a systematic methodology for the structuring of problems [234]. Finally,
the total systems intervention of Flood is excluded because, like the framework proposed in this
dissertation, it is a meta-methodology (i.e. a methodology supporting the selection of several
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methods) [163]. After filtering out the aforementioned ill-suited methods, a total of six methods
remain: SSM, SODA, SCA, SAST, CSH and Interactive planning (the reader is referred to
Chapter 6 for a review on the working of these methods).
Table 9.1: A collection of the structuring methodologies considered for use in the framework proposed
in this dissertation.
Structuring methodology Authors
Soft systems methodology (SSM) Peter Checkland [102]
Strategic options development and analysis (SODA) Ackerman et al. [3]
Strategic choice approach (SCA) Friend et al. [178]
Strategic assumption surfacing and testing (SAST) Mason et al. [307]
Critical systems heuristics (CSH) Ulrich [458]
Social systems sciences (SSS) Ackoff [8]
Total systems intervention (TSI) Flood and Jackson [164]
Social systems design Churchman [114]
Future workshop Jungk and Mullert [256]
Drama theory Howard [224]
Scenario planning Kahn [17]
9.2.3 The theoretical foundation of selected structuring methods
All too often, the linkage of method to task is made not according to how well the design of a
method complements the complexity of a task, but according to an analyst’s history of method
use. As such, the purpose of this section is to describe the sociological paradigms to which the
selected methods in Table 9.1 belong, as well as the theoretical assumptions they incorporate,
in order to elicit their intended purpose. As the author does not have extensive experience in
the use of these methods, the exposition relies heavily upon the academic literature.
The success or failure of a comparison of multiple methods typically rests upon the selected
framework of comparison — in order to succeed in this exposition, the selected framework must
suit both its context and purpose. As this review is aimed at both the theoretical foundations
according to which methods operate, and their practical applicability in dissimilar contexts, the
following strategy is adopted. The relevant methods of Table 9.1 are first classified according to a
framework proposed by Burrel and Morgan [82] toward eliciting the sociological paradigms upon
which they are based and, in the next section, the practical pitfalls associated with methods
that belong to certain paradigms are discussed in view of the problem typologies reviewed in
Chapter 7.
In the oft cited book Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis: Elements of the sociol-
ogy of corporate life, Burrel and Morgan [82] argued that the sociological paradigms upon which
all theories of organisational science are based can be distinguished according to two dimensions:
The philosophy of science they employ, and the theory of society upon which they are based. To
elucidate, a particular philosophy of science is distinguished according to whether the research
conducted therein is assumed objective, or subjective17 in kind. And similarly, alternative the-
17In a rather significant contribution titled Crossroads — Describing differences in approaches to organisation
science: Rethinking Burrell and Morgan and their legacy, Deetz [125] criticised the distinction between sociological
paradigms along a subjective-objective dimension. He argued that such a distinction fundamentally neglects
the subjective element in any approach to organisational science. Although the validity of this argument is
acknowledged — it is unwise to label any form of research as entirely objective — the clarity of definitions
provided by Burrel and Morgan [82] with respect to the typological dimensions they employ (including the
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ories of society are distinguished according to whether they emphasise a mandate of regulation
or radical change. In order to further distinguish between these dimensions, the prototypical
assumptions accompanying their adoption are described below.
If an objective view of social science is employed, social reality is considered to have an objec-
tive, external existence to the individuals that function therein, human behaviour is considered
deterministic18, and quantitative tests are the preferred method for acquiring knowledge. Con-
versely, a subjective view of social science likens social reality to the collective aggregate of sub-
jective consciousness, values the unique perspective of relevant entities, assumes that humans
possess free will, and prefers entering the context of what is studied toward gaining detailed
knowledge [82]. If a mandate of regulation is prioritised, society is essentially viewed as being
consensual, and methods are designed to investigate the mechanisms by which social order (the
status quo) is maintained. Conversely, if a mandate of radical change is adopted, societies are
considered driven by the exploitation of dominated groups, and thus the consensual state thereof
is simply deemed a product of that domination [82]. As such, the status quo is not considered
interesting; instead, methods are designed to elicit the dynamics that govern radical change.
By combining the above-mentioned dimensions, four unique sociological paradigms result, namely
the radical humanist paradigm, the radical structuralist paradigm, the interpretive paradigm and
the functionalist paradigm, as depicted in Figure 9.4 [82]. Before categorising the structuring
methods mentioned above according to these paradigms, it is beneficial to further describe them.
Figure 9.4: Four sociological paradigms for analysing the methods of systems theory [82].
The radical humanist paradigm, depicted in the top-left segment of the framework in Figure 9.4,
is generally characterised by its dedication to sociological change from a subjective point of view.
One of the most basic notions underlying this paradigm is that the consciousness19 of a human
entity is dominated by the ideological superstructures (i.e. the structure of society) in which he
or she exists, and that these structures segregate that human entity from its true consciousness.
subjective-objective dimension) remains of great utility toward distinguishing between the sociological paradigms
according to which the methods relevant to the structuring of problems operate.
18Determined by external circumstances.
19Burrel and Morgan [82] neglected to formally define what they meant by the term consciousness, but according
to the author’s interpretation, this term represents the set of beliefs, attitudes and behaviours associated with a
certain individual.
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The major concern of theorists who operate in this paradigm is to release human consciousness
from the constraints placed thereupon by the existing social arrangements of society — a process
that takes place when individuals rid themselves of the false consciousness with which they have
been indoctrinated [331]. In other words, a problem solving methodology situated in the radical
humanist paradigm operates from the assumption that the real world is designed in a manner
that results in the oppression of one group by another, that the only manner in which to liberate
the oppressed is to reveal and communicate the sources of their oppression to them, and then
to facilitate radical change by facilitating the design of alternative social arrangements. In
harmony with the subjective nature of this paradigm, the preferred way of learning about real-
world systems is to enter their contexts and interact with the entities contained therein [234].
The radical structuralist paradigm, depicted in the top-right segment of the framework in Fig-
ure 9.4, is generally characterised by its mandate for radical change from an objective point of
view. Whilst sharing an approach to science that exhibits many similarities with that of the
functionalist paradigm discussed below, it does so for the purpose of fundamentally different
ends. In like manner to the radical humanist paradigm, the radical structuralist paradigm func-
tions according to the assumption that the world’s design results in the oppression of certain
groups, and thus dedicates itself to the liberation of the oppressed. Interestingly, however, un-
like the radical humanist paradigm, it believes that the catalyst for radical change is not the
enlightenment of the oppressed, but rather, that it, like the oppression of certain groups, is
a natural occurring phenomenon resulting from the structure of society20 [82]. As such, the-
orists who function within this paradigm study the network of elements that constitute the
structure of societies around the world in an attempt to provide explanations for the manner
in which this structure participates in the oppression and the liberation of human entities. As
is characteristic of the objective nature of the radical structuralist paradigm, a belief in the
development of quantitative models, in which human behaviour is determined by contextual
elements, dominates [234].
The interpretive paradigm, depicted in the bottom-left segment of the framework in Figure 9.4,
is generally characterised by a belief in the subjective sociology of regulation. In its approach to
social science, the social structures of the world are considered a product of the entities contained
therein and, as such, it is assumed that the only manner in which to gain insight into the nature
of these structures, and the systems that constitute them, is by investigating the subjective
perspectives of the free-willed human entities that participate in their existence [331]. Dedi-
cated to this pursuit of understanding the world as it is, theorists of the interpretive paradigm
seek insight from the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, and prefer to enter
the context of the studied phenomena, essentially becoming participants in its working. The
interpretive paradigm employs the assumption that the systems governing human affairs are
cohesive, ordered and integrated. Because of this assumption, the problems of domination and
fundamental conflict play no part in the theoretical framework upon which the interpretive
paradigm is based [82].
The functionalist paradigm, depicted in the bottom-right segment of the framework in Figure 9.4,
is generally characterised by a sociology of regulation, approached from an objective point of
view. In the history of science, this paradigm has certainly been dominant in the study of
organisations. The general purpose of the functionalist paradigm is to understand the manner
in which societal order and stability exist and persist, with the end goal of improving one’s
ability to predict and control the behaviour of the related system. A theorist of the functionalist
20Common to most theorists in this paradigm is the view that contemporary society is characterised by fun-
damental conflicts that cause radical change in the form of either the domination of the free, or the liberation of
the oppressed through both political and economic crises [82].
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paradigm would argue that such understanding results when one is able to identify regularities in
the behaviour of a system, and the sub-systems contained therein [234]. More often than not, this
kind of investigation entails the development of analytical models in which human beings present
no more problems than other components. In its overall approach, the functionalist paradigm
is highly pragmatic in orientation, and dedicated to the pursuit of understanding society in a
way that generates knowledge of practical utility. Essentially, it prioritises understanding order
and stability in society, and how these states may be maintained [82].
Before categorising the selected structuring methods according to the paradigms defined above,
there are two issues that have to be addressed. First, a number of researchers have concluded
that problem structuring methods cannot be classified according to the dimensions suggested
by Burrel and Morgan [82]. Essentially, these researchers argue that the practical use of struc-
turing methods may contain both objective and subjective elements, and furthermore, that the
use of structuring methods may further either a sociology of regulation, or radical change [108].
The author agrees with these arguments wholeheartedly. Note, however, that the subsequent
partitioning of methods is not in respect of the practical effect of their adoption, but rather the
(often subconscious) assumptions upon which their designs are based. To that end, the adop-
tion of the framework proposed by Burrel and Morgan [82] is appropriate. The second issue
is of a more theoretical nature. During the past few decades, a growing number of researchers
have concluded that a belief in the classification of system methods according to incommensu-
rable paradigms severely limits the potential for theoretical development in systems theory. The
author also supports this view wholeheartedly. The subsequent method categorisation should
therefore not be interpreted differently. The purpose thereof is purely to elicit the (often sub-
conscious) assumptions upon which the design of a method is based.
Now that these issues have been addressed, consider the linkage of method-to-paradigm pre-
sented in Table 9.2. As may be seen in the table, only the CSH method does not belong to the
interpretive paradigm.
Table 9.2: A list of the sociological paradigms to which the structuring methodologies considered for
use within the framework proposed in this dissertation belong.
Structuring methodology Sociological paradigm
Soft systems methodology (SSM) Interpretive [234]
Strategic options development and analysis (SODA) Interpretive [234]
Strategic choice approach (SCA) Interpretive [234]
Strategic assumption surfacing and testing (SAST) Interpretive [233]
Critical systems heuristics (CSH) Radical humanist [232]
Social systems sciences (SSS) Interpretive [234]
9.2.4 The practical pitfalls of paradigm-based methods
Several authors have attempted to elicit the potential pitfalls related to methods that adopt
certain sociological paradigms. The work of these authors is employed to present the reader with
a guideline for the risks associated with the adoption of certain structuring methods according
to the sociological paradigms upon which they are based. The subsequent discussion is not
intended to discourage the use of structuring methods. It is rather meant to inform practitioners
of the ways in which the performance of the various methods, based upon certain sociological
paradigms, are susceptible to unwanted contextual influences so that their application can be
managed accordingly. As the methods in Table 9.2 belong to only the interpretive and the
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radical humanist paradigms, the subsequent discussion neglects the radical structuralist and the
functionalist paradigms.
The interpretive paradigm
In their purest form, methods that belong to the interpretive paradigm are designed to facilitate
the process of identifying a response to problematic situations which is theoretically desirable,
practically feasible, historically appropriate, culturally viable and politically possible. Although
interpretive methods have certainly established their utility in this regard, there are several cri-
tiques thereof that should be noted. The main critique of methods based upon the interpretive
paradigm is not so much a critique on the methodological processes they employ, but rather a
critique on the manner in which they are employed. More specifically, critics argue that practi-
tioners fail to recognise the limited applicability of interpretive methods [233]. The interpretive
paradigm is based on a consensus world-view in which conflicts of interest can always be settled
through the process of civil debate. Critics argue, however, and rightly so, that many problem-
atic instances do not exhibit this characteristic, and that the ignorant application of interpretive
methods in a coercive context, as described in the final typology of §7.4, will simply benefit the
powerful [232, 320]. Essentially, interpretive methods are not designed with the inherent ability
to accommodate the dynamics of a coercive context and their application should therefore be
managed accordingly.
A further critique of interpretive methods is their reliance upon the idealised interaction of enti-
ties. One of the core principles of the interpretive paradigm is that the discovery of appropriate
solutions is significantly aided by a rich understanding of the related problematic situation which,
in turn, is the product of considering the unique perspective of competing entities. Despite the
truth of this hypothesis, practitioners of interpretive methods typically fail to recognise that
certain entities may be inhibited by internal or external factors from speaking their minds freely
(e.g. in a hierarchical setting) [234]. It is rather obvious that, if left unchecked, powerful entities
may influence and dominate the methodological processes of methods based upon the interpre-
tive paradigm and, as such, their application should be managed accordingly. More specifically,
their adoption may be better suited to problem instances that are unitary, or pluralist in kind,
as described in the final typology of §7.4
The radical humanist paradigm
Designed to address societal issues of oppression, structuring methods based upon the radical
humanist paradigm embody a refusal to accept the inequalities of status, wealth, power and
authority in society. This is no doubt a praiseworthy mandate, but the following question
arises: To what extent are the methods of this paradigm able to deliver?
The main critique levelled at methods of the radical humanist paradigm is rather an interesting
one. Radical humanist methods employ the assumption that oppressed human entities will
attempt to liberate themselves if they are able to recognise the reality and the source of their
oppression. Although this hypothesis is generally accepted, the assumption that such insight
is readily available is not. Critics employ the work of philosophers and sociologists that are
of a materialist persuasion (e.g. Marx and theorists of the Frankfurt School) to illustrate that
values and beliefs develop, that they are related to the political and economic aspects of the
time, and that the very structure of society determines that certain ideologies dominate others
at particular times [233]. Essentially, critics of the radical humanist paradigm argue that it is
exceedingly difficult for either entities participating in an endeavour, who have typically become
so accustomed to their circumstances that they fail to register the need to be liberated, or expert
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analysts, who are predominantly at the mercy of conditioned participants for insight, to identify
and make salient the sources of oppression.
Almost all methods of science contain weaknesses, and in view of the above critique it is clear
that the problem structuring methods considered in this section are no different. Despite these
weaknesses, the analysis conducted in this section should support the selection and use of the
structuring methods in Table 9.2 in a manner that is beneficial. In conclusion, it is wise always
to keep in mind that no mere methodology, which is but words on paper, can guarantee the
success of an enterprise. How successful a particular methodology turns out to be will depend
upon several factors including, but not limited to, the practitioner thereof and the particular
situation in which it is employed.
9.3 A decision-making checklist
It is evident from the literature review of Chapters 3 and 4 that the mechanisms of human
decision making remain vulnerable to irrational influences. As of yet, no attempt has been
made to address the potentially adverse effect of such influences during the application of the
proposed methodology. Toward doing so, a debiasing paradigm proposed by Fischoff [159], titled
A mismatch between judge and task, is of significant utility. In fact, the principles that govern
this paradigm are adopted as the conceptual framework upon which the debiasing framework
presented subsequently is based. The following creed illustrates the perspective adopted in the
aforementioned paradigm: An instance of poor decision making results not from the inherent
ability of decision makers, nor from the structure of a decision making task, but from the
mismatch of these elements21 (see §5.2 for more information).
As reviewed in §5.2, Fischoff [159] proposed five general debiasing strategies for the mitigation of
biases induced by the mismatch of judge and task. Of these, the following three are drawn upon
during the design of the debiasing framework presented subsequently: (1) Force participants
to express what they know explicitly, instead of letting their thinking remain “in the head”,
(2) encourage participants to search for discrepant evidence, rather than only focusing on details
that corroborate a preferred answer, and (3) get participants to consider alternative situations
related to the one under consideration toward better understand the situation at hand. Before
introducing the debiasing framework inspired by the above strategies, it is necessary to explicate
the two types of error, which seem to dominate the irrational influence of human decision making,
that it is designed to address.
The reader is reminded of the notion of cognitive biases which was the predominant focus of
Chapter 3. Cognitive biases were defined as the potential for error inherent in the adoption of
judgement heuristics. In a sense they represent the case in which the cognitive mechanisms of
the mind fail to respond appropriately to a set of decision options presented, thus resulting in
poor decision making. This potential error in the mechanisms of the mind, subsequently called
the cognitive error, represents the first type of error addressed by the proposed decision-making
checklist. The second type of error is somewhat more difficult to describe.
There is a subtlety in the social mechanisms of the self that should be noted. On the one hand,
the social mechanisms of the self act as the foundation from which individuals interact with any
form of social stimuli. On the other hand, built upon this foundation, every stimulus elicits a
response that individuals are able to employ as a guide for subsequent decision making. The
manner in which the use of these responses may result in poor decision making is contained in
21Despite proposing alternative paradigms, Fischoff [159] suggested that a mismatch between judge and task is
likely the most appropriate debiasing paradigm, given the working of the human psyche.
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The tendency to satisfice, even when significantly bet-
ter solutions may be attained with little further effort.
Reconsider the selected decision options. In what way
can these courses of action be further improved? Are
these improvements worth pursuing?
t
The tendency to downplay the consequences of a de-
cision option if those consequences are not personally
experienced, or if they are realised over an extended
period of time.
t
ttttt. Affective failures ttttt..
Reconsider the selected decision options. What are
the long-term consequences of the various decision op-




Illusion of control &
Misconceptions of chance
The tendency to be overly optimistic about the future
and one’s ability to realise outcomes pursued.
Reconsider the selected decision options. Make a list
of the risks and uncertainties associated with the re-
spective options. Are these risks appropriate? What
steps can be taken to render the future less volatile?
The tendency to prematurely accept the validity of
sourced information if that information coincides with
one’s preconceived beliefs, while simultaneously ne-




accuracy & Confirmation bias
Reconsider the information upon which the selected
decision options are based. Is the validity of this in-
formation apparent? Formally state/restate the in-
formation that contradicts the appropriateness of the






The tendency to withhold information believed to be
contrary to the opinion held by the dominant play-
ers in a context, particularly when that information is
possessed only by a single individual.
Reconsider the various decision options. In an anony-
mous fashion, request that participants describe any
issue related to the realisation of the various decision
options that have not yet been addressed sufficiently.
t
The tendency whereby the point of view adopted by an
entity consisting of several members is more extreme
than that of an entity consisting of a single member.
Group polarisation
tt.. & Discontinuity effect tt.
If reaching consensus proves to be a persistent chal-
lenge, and the above tendency is suspected, an analyst
may request that all entities select a single representa-
tive of their cause, in order to organise an “executive
meeting” with only the selected individuals.
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the case of the cognitive error described above. But the manner in which changes in the very
social state of the self, upon which these responses are often based, may result in poor decision
making has yet to be noted. In such cases, the foundation from which decisions are being made
is temporarily misaligned with respect to the objectives an entity would have pursued if he or
she had not been influenced by the social dynamics of the environment. The misalignment of
objectives in this manner, because of a temporary change in the social mechanisms of the self,
subsequently called the social error, represents the second type of error the decision-making
checklist is designed to address22.
Now that all technicalities have been addressed, a decision-making checklist, designed for consid-
eration at strategic junctures during an endeavour, is proposed23. As depicted in Table 9.3, the
decision-making checklist contains several subsections, each addressing a unique set of dynamics
(cognitive and/or social), grouped according to the similarity of the practical consequences in
which they result. Each of these subsections employ the following structure: First, the set of
dynamics being addressed is listed in the column on the left, then, in the column on the right,
a short description of the manner in which the listed dynamics may manifest themselves in the
context of real-world problem solving, along with an enquiry designed to mitigate the influence
of such dynamics, is provided in a colour-coded fashion (framed in purple and green, respec-
tively). For further information on any of the cognitive and social dynamics addressed in the
decision-making checklist, the reader is referred to Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
In conclusion, the decision-making checklist in Table 9.3 is designed to be employed in combi-
nation with the structuring methods discussed in §9.2.2–9.2.4 toward addressing the cognitive
and social dynamics of human decision making that are typically neglected therein.
9.4 Chapter summary
The capacity to comprehend and then formulate a representation of the real-world that can
generally be understood and agreed upon is arguably one of the first steps toward responding
appropriately to the difficulties contained therein. As such, this chapter was dedicated to the
exposition of a meta-methodology designed to facilitate such a formulation. The methodology
was first introduced in §9.1, and this was followed by a two-part discussion on its constituent
components. More specifically, an exposition of the various phases involved in the process
of problem formulation was presented in §9.2, and this was followed in §9.3 by a description
of a decision-making checklist designed to mitigate the irrational influence that exists in the
mechanisms of human decision making.
22Note that not every dynamic described in the literature review of Chapters 3 and 4 is addressed in the
decision-making checklist. The reason for this is simply that certain cognitive and social dynamics are so inherent
to human nature that their influence is nearly impossible to mitigate (e.g. the ingroup-outgroup bias or the
retrievability bias).
23The exact point in time is left to the analyst’s discretion.
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In accordance with the research methodology adopted in the dissertation, this chapter is dedi-
cated to an identification of shortcomings in the proposed meta-methodology during its hypo-
thetical application to a historical, real-world endeavour (i.e. an endeavour that transpired as
a result of a movement, in the South African eduction system, known by the phrase fees must
fall). As this phase in the evaluation of the meta-methodology is hypothetical in nature, only
the method proposed to facilitate the selection of stakeholders is considered. The application of
this method is, furthermore, presented only to the extent that the description and amendments
aimed at mitigating the identified shortcomings are facilitated. The purpose of this chapter
is thus not to provide an entirely accurate or holistic view of the application of the evaluated
method, or the fees must fall movement.
Notably, this chapter also contains the introduction of an additional phase in the proposed
meta-methodology designed to address a potentially detrimental phenomenon uncovered during
the hypothetical application of the methodology.
The reader is provided with a brief overview of the fees must fall movement in §10.1. Thereafter,
the shortcomings of the method proposed to facilitate the selection of stakeholders, as identified
during its hypothetical application in the context of the aforementioned movement, are made
salient and addressed in §10.2. In §10.3, both the technicalities that underlie the design of the
additional methodological phase and the constituent method is introduced. The chapter finally
comes to a close with a short summary in §10.4.
10.1 The fees must fall movement
At the time, the declaration of a democratic South Africa in the year 1994 brought with it the
promise of many good things, including a future in which the joys of education would be available
141
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to all. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, adopted in 1996 [119]:
“Everyone has the right (a) to a basic education, including adult basic education;
and (b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must
make progressively available and accessible” [119].
Unfortunately, after more than two decades, rights of the kind described above are still nothing
more than empty promises [269]. In October 2015, the persistent failure of the South African
government to deliver on such promises finally culminated in the emergence of a movement
dedicated to the liberation of education from the bonds of historical oppression, known by the
phrase fees must fall [290]. As a result of this movement, several primary role-players, including
former President Jacob Zuma, were finally forced to address the dire state of education in South
Africa. The remainder of this section is dedicated to an overview of the fees must fall movement
in an attempt to provide the reader with sufficient insight into its development.
The exact date of the fees must fall movement’s inception is generally dated to the 14th of
October 2015, a day on which students of the University of the Witwatersrand took to the
streets in protest of a proposed 10.5% increase1 in fees for the 2016 academic year, resulting in the
temporary closure of the University of the Witwatersrand [277]. The movement’s primary, initial
goal was that academic fees remain unchanged for 2016 and, unsurprisingly, it did not take long
for protests in support of this mandate to spread. By the 20th of October, the call “fees must
fall” echoed around institutions of higher-education throughout the country, with additional
protests taking place at Rhodes University, the University of Cape Town, the University of Fort
Hare, Stellenbosch University and the Cape Peninsula University of Technology [277]. Many of
these universities responded to protests by employing the service of the police and that of private
security companies to discourage the aspirations of potential protesters2, thereby attempting to
dampen the flame of revival that threatened to engulf the South African education system.
Interestingly, several analysts argue that the employment of police in dealing with protesters
increased the violent nature of the fees must fall movement sevenfold [277, 290].
On the 21st of October, protests continued to escalate with students from the University of
Cape Town, the Cape Peninsula University of Technology and Stellenbosch University collec-
tively marching to the houses of parliament in Cape Town, where former President Zuma and
former Minister of Higher Education and Training, Blade Nzimande, were supposed to ad-
dress them in respect of a memorandum of demands submitted several days prior [355]. When
protesters finally reached parliament, however, neither President Zuma nor Minister Nzimande
were there3. To remedy the situation, in his capacity as acting Minister of Higher Education
and Training, Thula Nxesi attempted to read a response to protesters, but his address was
disrupted by protesters who were upset that neither President Zuma nor Minister Nzimande
were present [355]. In their frustration protesters turned to violence, hurling burning cardboard
boxes (among other objects) at police. After several moments of violent exchange, riot police
dispersed the crowd of protesters using stun grenades, tasers, tear gas and batons [290]. The
following day, protesters in Johannesburg furthered the cause by marching to Luthuli House in
a similar fashion, handing over an additional memorandum of demands to the African National
1The proposed fee increase was predominantly the result of several unavoidable increases in University expenses,
such as a 7% increase in academic staff salaries and increases in foreign-sourced academic material due to the
diminishing value of the South African Rand [372].
2In addition to these measure, the University of Cape Town selected to obtain court interdicts that resulted
in the arrest of several protesting students [290].
3According to certain sources, President Zuma was evacuated because several protesting students had gained
access to the parliament buildings [290]
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Congress (ANC) secretary general, Gwede Mantashe [298]. On the 23rd of October, all the
events described above, and several not mentioned here, finally resulted in former President
Zuma announcing on live television that the demand of no increase in academic fees for 2016
would be met [22].
At this juncture, the entities participating in the protests surrounding the fees must fall move-
ment were no longer limited only to university students. From an outsider’s perspective,
protesters may have seemed of one mind, but under the guise of the fees must fall movement there
were, in fact, several groups of protesters, each with there own, at times overlapping agendas
(e.g. university staff protesting poor retirement plans, and several political groups with agendas
unknown) [431]. Consequently, although several further protests took place in the weeks that
followed then President Zuma’s announcement, many of these were no longer dominated by the
issue of academic fees. In fact, protests dedicated to the cry of fees must fall slowly died down
during this period [431]. This more peaceful period, however, turned out to be like the quiet
eye of a hurricane — it did not last.
Compared to the detailed documentation of the 2015 fees must fall movement, the events sur-
rounding the movement in 2016 are significantly less well documented. The movement’s revival
seems to have occurred in response to a recommendation made by the Council of Higher Educa-
tion to the Minister of Higher Education and Training of the time, Blade Nzimande, with respect
to the planned increase in fees for the 2017 academic year [9]. The council considered another
0% increase in fees to be unsustainable and, as such, recommended that Minister Nzimande
allow universities to employ an inflation-related increase for 2017, adding that it may be wise
to leave the final decision to the management of each university [451]. Almost instantaneously,
this recommendation resulted in the revival of the fees must fall campaign under the hashtag
#FeesMustFall2016. Minister Mantashe attempted to calm students nationwide by pointing out
that no final decisions had been made and that the announcement was merely a preliminary
recommendation, but it was too little too late as protests commenced nationwide [9].
This time, the primary goal of the movement was not merely a 0% increase in fees, but rather,
that the system of higher education in South Africa be “decolonised” and made completely free
of charge4. Significantly, compared to 2015, the 2016 wave of student protests were of a slightly
different kind: In 2016, considerable emphasis was placed on the fact that the fees must fall
movement should remain leaderless5 as the students participating therein apparently despised
the idea of a single individual becoming “the face” of their collective cause [343]. A further, less
political difference between the movement in 2015 and in 2016 is the fact that student protests
in 2016 were significantly more6 violent [152]. Collectively, the aforementioned dynamics seem
to underlie the final dissimilar quality of the #FeesMustFall2016 movement — the presence of
considerable division among the protagonists thereof regarding the means by which outcomes
were being pursued [343].
The distinctive qualities of the #FeesMustFall2016 movement, as described above, also seem
to have been the primary catalyst of its conclusion. To elucidate, as the #FeesMustFall2016
movement progressed, the use of violence by both protesting students and the South African
Police Service seemed to escalate unabated [447, 484] and, as a result, many students were no
longer willing to participate in the protests surrounding the fees must fall movement (either
4Interestingly, a study by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation concluded that the priori-
tisation of these goals (as well as several other factors) contributed to the #FeesMustFall2016 movement being
less successful than the year prior.
5Recall that in 2015 it was clear that the student representative council (SRC) leader Nompendulo Mkhatshwa,
and her predecessor Shaeera Kalla were leading the movement [343].
6One cannot help but wonder whether the excessive use of violence in the fees must fall movement of 2016 was
partially the bi-product of its leaderless nature.
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because of a moral conviction against the means being employed, or for fear of injury at the
hands of the police). Unsurprisingly, this loss of support resulted in the #FeesMustFall2016
movement slowly coming to a halt several months after its revival.
The fees must fall movement may have ended in a rather distasteful fashion7, but since its
conclusion, it has become clear that the protagonists thereof accomplished much of what they had
set out to do. In February 2018, the government finally released a statement officially confirming
that, and how, it planned on aiding students financially. Accounting for all commitments made,
an additional amount R57-billion was allocated to aid students from poor or working-class
families with a combined total annual income of less than R350 000. The planned timeline of
these allocations were as follows: R12.4-billion would be made available in 2018, R20.3-billion
in 2019 and R24.3-billion in 2020.
10.2 The identification of potential stakeholders
Imagine a network of interconnected entities, all contained in, and relevant to, the working of a
certain real-world system. It is rather obvious that although such entities may all be relevant to
the working of the system in which they exist, if a problematic situation were to emerge therein,
some entities would be more relevant to the process of addressing it than others. This nuanced
nature of an entity’s relevance may be rather simple to acknowledge, but the actual separation
of relevant from irrelevant entities is anything but simple. As stated in §9.2.1, the identification
of relevant stakeholders remains one of the significant obstacles in the road of real-world problem
solving. Consequently, the notions of power possessed and effect experienced were suggested as
dimensions that should govern the inclusion or exclusion of entities in an endeavour in order to
support practitioners in this task. More specifically, it was argued that the key to identifying
relevant stakeholders resides in an ability to describe theoretically, and recognise practically, the
building blocks that comprise the notion of power, as well as the features that constitute the
notion of effect. As the purpose of this section is to uncover any shortcomings of the method
proposed in Chapter 9, the phases constituent of the method are summarised below (for the
sake of convenience):
1. Describe the problem considered in as much detail as possible at this time.
2. Based on this description, identify and label the core features of the problem.
3. Proceed to employ these features and the preceding description as points of reference to
conduct a search for entities affected by the problem considered in the formal and informal
functional networks related to it.
4. Once satisfied that all affected entities have been identified, evaluate which of these actually
possess power relevant to the problem at hand.
5. Finally, in view of the analyses conducted during both Phases 3 and 4, describe the extent
to which, and the manner in which, entities are relevant to the problem considered.
From this summarised description, it is again evident that each progressive phase in the proposed
methodology acts as a filter separating relevant from irrelevant entities. That being said, this
filtering process is embedded within a method designed to be executed in a cyclic fashion, thereby
attempting to inhibit the failure to include relevant entities (i.e. during each iteration of the
7Damages to educational infrastructure stood at nearly R800-million by the beginning of 2017 [446].
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methodology, the execution of its constituent phases may be re-assessed and refined accordingly).
To commence the evaluation of the above method, consider the subsequent summary of an
hypothetical application of its first few phases.
As stated in §10.1, the inception of the fees must fall movement8 is generally pinpointed as the
day students from the University of the Witwatersrand elected to protest the increase in fees
planned for the 2016 academic year. Consequently, this period is taken as the juncture at which
to attempt the identification of stakeholders. More specifically, the application of the proposed
methodology is evaluated for the period during which student protests were rampant at the
University of the Witwatersrand, but before such protests became commonplace throughout
the country. Accordingly, in fulfilment of Phase 1 of the proposed methodology, the problem
addressed during this hypothetical stakeholder analysis is described as follows:
A select portion of the student body at the University of the Witwatersrand is unable
to afford the planned increase in academic fees for 2016 and have elected to exercise
their right to protest in objection, demanding that fees remain unchanged.
In view of the above preliminary description of the problem considered, the following con-
tributing features are considered (in fulfilment of Phase 2): Financial issues9, security issues
and operational issues. With a preliminary set of core features identified, the next step in the
proposed method involves constructing first the formal functional network, and thereafter the
informal functional network, related to each feature (in fulfilment of Phase 3). That is, the next
question of interest toward identifying the affected in the system under consideration is phrased
as follows: Which entities in the functional network related to the problem considered pursue
formal outcomes affected thereby?
As the University of the Witwatersrand constitutes the backdrop of the problem considered, the
functional network related to it is employed to facilitate the identification of the effected. For no
specific reason, furthermore, the core features of the problem considered are investigated in the
order listed. Consequently, the above question of interest is rephrased as follows: Which entities
in the functional network related to the working of the University of the Witwatersrand pursue
formal outcomes affected by the financial issues associated with the problem considered? In
pursuit of answering this question, students enrolled at the University of the Witwatersrand are
deemed severely affected by the issue of finance — their primary, formal purpose of attaining a
tertiary qualification would be severely complicated if the proposed increase in tuition fees were
to be formalised10. According to the propagation of effect, furthermore, all entities formally
responsible for supporting students financially are also considered formally affected.
A further group of effected entities uncovered by constructing the functional network related to
the question of interest are those tasked with the responsibility of managing the financial affairs
of the university. Such entities include, but are not limited to, the Council of the university11,
8In the opening section of Chapter 9, the meta-methodology proposed in this dissertation was described as one
designed to address problems that exist in real-world systems in which entities are forced to collaborate despite
pursuing conflicting outcomes. It should be rather obvious that the system of higher education in South Africa
satisfies this property and, as such, is a context well-suited to an illustration of the use of the method proposed
to facilitate the selection of stakeholders to an endeavour.
9The central role of finance in the problem considered is an expected one. As stated in §9.2.1, the primary
function of any formally defined system is the management of elements pertaining to its purpose, and as the
purpose of most real-world systems include some kind of financial incentive, it is only natural that the resolution
of problems contained therein entail a financial dimension.
10As the severity of effect is determined with respect to an entity’s ability to realise the outcomes it pursues,
note that students less able to accommodate the proposed increase in fees are considered more severely affected
thereby.
11The Council of the University of the Witwatersrand constitutes its highest decision making body [460].
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
146 Chapter 10. A theoretical case study
the financial committee of the Council led by the chief financial officer, the Vice-Chancellor’s
team12, the financial aid, scholarships and merit awards committee of the Senate, the financial
aid office, and finally, the university’s fees office [461, 459]. The next instance of effect associated
with the problem considered are the security issues that surround it. Figure 10.1 depicts the
state of the University of the Witwatersrand during the initial protests13 and stands as exemplar
of the potential for chaos hidden in the dynamics that surround protests [138]. By constructing
the functional network induced by this issue, all entities pursuing formal outcomes in close
proximity to protests, and, as a result, all entities formally responsible to defend and protect
society from the kind of dangers that surround protests (e.g. the police force) were identified as
potential stakeholders.
In addition to the issue of security, Figure 10.1 also alludes to one of the operational issues14
caused by student protests — restricted access to the University of the Witwatersrand’s cam-
pus. Access to the university’s campus is fundamentally linked to the realisation of the formal
outcomes pursued by the majority of entities contained in the formal functional network related
to the University of the Witwatersrand. Consequently, by tracing out the functional network
associated with the feature of access to university grounds, the following group of affected en-
tities were additionally identified: Non-protesting students, professors, lecturers, administrative
personnel, and general visitors to the university.
Figure 10.1: A scene captured at one of the entrances to the University of the Witwatersrand campus
during the protests in response to the proposed increase in fees for the 2016 academic year [348].
The hypothetical application of the third phase of the proposed methodology resulted in the
identification of several shortcomings related thereto. As it is deemed beneficial to address these
issues before continuing to the next phase of the methodology, the account of its application is
paused here. The first shortcoming concerns the construction of the formal functional network
related to the identified features of the problem considered. More specifically, while constructing
this network it was unclear at times whether or not a certain entity is able to absorb the measure
of effect it experiences, or whether this effect propagates beyond the entity in question to the
more general network in which it resides. This resulted in being ambiguity in whether or not
certain entities form part of the functional network of interest. A particularly relevant example
of this dynamic relates to the propagation of effect in the context of systems characterised by
12The Vice-Chancellor’s team is responsible for managing the university on a daily basis.
13Figure 10.1 is not an accurate representation of the racial distribution of the students that partook in the
fees must fall movement.
14Note that any operational issue resulting from an underlying financial one is neglected as entities affected by
such issues were identified indirectly during the investigation of financial issues.
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hierarchical levels of governance as this kind of real-world system is essentially designed to limit
the propagation of effect. That is, if a problem occurs on a particular level of governance in such
a system (e.g. provincial authority), the ripples of effect induced thereby only propagate to a
higher level in the governance structure of the system (e.g. national authority) if the entities on
the previous level are unable to address the effect-inducting problem appropriately (i.e. if they
do not possess the power to do so). The difficulty in respect of the execution of Phase 3 is that
the analysis of an entity’s power takes place only during Phase 4 of the methodology and, as a
result, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the propagation of effect should be limited to
a certain entity (i.e. a certain level of a hierarchical system) during the execution of Phase 3.
To illustrate this dynamic in the context of a practical example, consider the following scenario
related to the propagation of effect induced by the inception of the fees must fall movement at
the University of the Witwatersrand.
Section 10.1 opened with an excerpt from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa stating
that every citizen has a right to higher education, which the government, through reasonable
measures, must make progressively available and accessible. Unsurprisingly, the same document
states that the governmental body responsible for ensuring such a state of affairs finds its apogee
in the President of South Africa. To elucidate, the Constitution, dictates that the governance of
education in South Africa is structured such that there exists a department of education in each
of the country’s nine provinces, and that each of these departments is responsible to the minister
of higher education for the state of education in the province in which it resides. The minister of
higher education is, furthermore, responsible to the President, who is responsible to the citizens
of South Africa for the state of higher education in the entire country [129]. By employing
their right to protest, the students of the University of the Witwatersrand essentially caused the
ripples of effect produced by the financial, operational and security issues associated with the
problem considered to propagate into the functional network contained in the aforementioned
structure of governance dedicated to higher education in South Africa. In order to identify the
affected, the question of interest is thus: How far up this governance structure did these ripples
of effect go? The difficulty in answering this question during the initial execution of Phase 3 is a
case in point of the aforementioned shortcoming in the current version of the proposed method.
In order to address this shortcoming, the following strategy is proposed:
Amendment 1. If it is unclear whether or not the experience of effect propagates beyond a
certain entity during the execution of Phase 3, an analyst should proceed by assuming
that the propagation of effect is, in fact, limited to the entity in question. Thereafter,
during the execution of Phase 4, the validity of this assumption should be evaluated. That
is, an analyst should determine whether the entity in question does, in fact, possess the
power required to limit the propagation of effect. If the assumption is found to be wanting,
Phase 3 of the methodology must be repeated and the formal functional network expanded
accordingly.
In the context of the aforementioned scenario, it is thus reasonable to assume, at least initially,
that the experience of effect in the governmental body dedicated to higher education is limited
to the Department of Education in the Province of Gauteng (the validity of this assumption is
evaluated subsequently).
The hypothetical application of the proposed methodology to the context of the fees must fall
movement facilitated the identification of another shortcoming in the working of Phase 3. In the
current version of the proposed method, the task of identifying affected entities contained only
in the informal functional network of interest was found to be excessively difficult. Evidently,
the identification of relevant entities not formally documented requires more from an analyst
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than simply uncovering a number of elusive, but formally documented functional relationships
— it requires an analyst to envisage such interdependencies based upon incomplete informa-
tion. Toward better facilitating this task, a supplementary technique is proposed. Consider the
following phrase penned by Karl Marx [70]:
“History repeats itself, first as a tragedy, second as a farce” — Karl Marx.
The pages of history were found to be exceptionally useful toward providing a starting place for
the identification of the informally affected. From the privileged perspective of hindsight, the
author was able to employ historical examples as a source of insight toward identifying affected
entities not formally documented. For example, by examining the history of tuition fees in the
United Kingdom, prospective students planning on, but not yet enrolled, at the University of the
Witwatersrand were identified as informally affected [373]. Accordingly, the following strategy is
proposed to facilitate the development of the informal functional network related to a problem
considered:
Amendment 2. Analysts are advised to draw upon the utility of history to elicit affected
entities hidden from purely an analysis of real-time information. This can be achieved by
reviewing historical endeavours pertaining to problems similar to the one considered, and
utilising the accompanying documentation as a starting point for the identification of the
informally effected.
With the aforementioned shortcomings related to the working of Phase 3 addressed, the discus-
sion now returns to the hypothetical application of Phase 4 of the proposed methodology. As
stated during the introduction of the proposed methodology in §9.2.1, the purpose of Phase 4
is to determine which of the entities deemed affected during Phase 3 actually possess power
relevant to the problem at hand. To facilitate this process, a power analysis checklist, based
on the two scenarios that render an entity’s power relevant, was proposed. For the sake of
clarity, the pair of questions contained therein are restated: (1) Does the entity possess struc-
tural, customary, status, necessity or incapacitation power that is of utility toward resolving the
problem considered or managing the activities that surround it? (2) Does the entity possess the
structural, customary, status, necessity or incapacitation power to reject a potential solution
proposed to resolve the problem considered? To facilitate the evaluation of these questions in
the context of the current hypothetical stakeholder analysis, a summary of select entities deemed
affected is presented in Table 10.1. Note that the depth of the analysis surrounding dissimilar
entities is varied as deemed appropriate.
During the execution of Phase 4, the formal power structure of the University of the Witwa-
tersrand was found to be of considerable utility. This power structure revealed that a certain
body of governance, called the Council of the university, possesses absolute structural author-
ity to determine the rate of academic fees imposed upon the students of the University of the
Witwatersrand [459]. In view of this reality, it may be tempting to conclude that no other
entity need be included in the process of addressing the problem considered. Such a conclusion
would, however, be detrimental. First, as illustrated in the power analysis checklist, there are
multiple forms of power that must be considered when identifying the relevant, and furthermore,
even if an entity does possess the capacity to formally select a certain course of action, which
does not imply that such an entity is capable of selecting that course of action appropriately.
To illustrate this dynamic which is, in fact, the motive underlying the first of the two ques-
tions that constitute the power analysis checklist, note that throughout a typical year at the
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Table 10.1: Entities deemed affected during the execution of Phase 3 of the initial stakeholder analysis.
General category Description




academic personnel of the
University of the Witwaters-
rand
Council of the university
Financial committee of the Council
The Vice-Chancellor’s team
The financial aid, scholarship and merit awards
committee
University financial aid office
University fees office
Professors, lecturers and administrative person-
nel
textGovernmental body
Gauteng Department of Education
Gauteng Police Department
textGeneral public
Entities in close proximity to the University of
the Witwatersrand
University of the Witwatersrand, its Council deals with only the strategic management of the
university and consists predominantly of individuals not officially employed by the university
(roughly 60%) [460]. Contrast this with another entity formally a part of the University of
the Witwatersrand also deemed affected during Phase 3: The Vice-Chancellor’s team, whose
members are responsible for the management of the university on a daily basis [461]. Because
of the unique nature of the respective roles fulfilled by these entities, it is quite possible that the
members of the Vice-Chancellor’s team, although structurally less powerful than the Council,
are much more informed in respect of the state and working of the university on a daily basis.
Moreover, given their daily interaction with members of the university, it is likely that certain
members of the Vice-Chancellor’s team are acquainted with key role-players in the fees must
fall movement. This kind of consideration regarding information possessed or individuals known
forms part of the analysis surrounding status power, and in view of the above discussion, the
intended purpose of Question 1, and the importance of considering the entire spectrum of power
sources deemed relevant to both Questions 1 and 2 of the power analysis checklist, is evident.
Consider the logic behind the second question proposed to guide the analysis of an entity’s power:
If an entity possesses the power to disrupt the practical implementation of a solution proposed
to a certain problem, the only logical precaution is to involve that entity in the actual process of
resolving the problem considered. In that way, the entity can employ the power it possesses, in
the sense described in Chapter 13, to influence the proposed solution according to its capacity.
Consider the power possessed by the student body at the University of the Witwatersrand. If
it is possible to describe a certain entity as the primary driving force behind an endeavour,
it implies that the entity possesses the power to reject potential solutions proposed to the
problem considered15. Consequently, as the students of the University of the Witwatersrand
undoubtedly constitute the driving force behind the pending endeavour, the question of interest
is therefore not whether the student body at the University of the Witwatersrand possesses the
power to reject potential solutions proposed to the problem considered, but rather where this
power comes from. Without going into too much detail, it follows from the cited documentation
15An entity is only able to cause the organisation of an endeavour if it possesses the power to reject the current
state of affairs, which implies that it also possesses the power to reject any proposed future state of affairs.
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surrounding the fees must fall movement that the majority of power possessed by the students of
the University of the Witwatersrand exists in the form of customary, necessity and incapacitation
power.
The Gauteng Police Department is one of the few entities deemed affected in Phase 3 that exist
outside the formal structure of the University of the Witwatersrand. Interestingly, during the
evaluation of the power possessed by that entity, its power seemed either of considerable utility,
or complete irrelevance, depending on the aspect of the problem considered. This polarity in the
relevance of the Gauteng Police Department is considered the product of a shortcoming in the
current version of the proposed method. This shortcoming led to the formalisation of another
supplementary technique — the segregation of the description of the problem considered into
the parts that constitute it. To elucidate, consider the following three-part segregation of the
problem considered: (1) A certain number of students at the University of the Witwatersrand
are unable to afford the proposed increase in academic fees for 2016, (2) students have elected
to exercise their right to protest in objection to what they considered as excessive academic
fees, and (3) protesting students are demanding that fees remain unchanged for the 2016 aca-
demic year. By segregating the problem considered in this fashion, it is clear that the Gauteng
Police Department is irrelevant to every aspect of the problem considered, except with regard
to Part 2 — student protests. In terms of student protests, the structural, customary, status
and incapacitation power possessed by the Gauteng Police Department causes few entities to be
more relevant. This exemplifies the potential value of segregating multifaceted problems toward
the identification of entities that possess power of significant utility to the resolution of one such
facet, but completely irrelevant to another. Accordingly, consider its formal adoption into the
working of Phase 4 of the proposed method:
Amendment 3. During the execution of Phase 4, analysts are advised to segregate a problem
considered into its constituent parts, thereby facilitating a more nuanced analysis of an
entity’s power with respect to each of these parts.
Before concluding the discussion dedicated to a review of Phase 4 of the proposed methodol-
ogy, recall the assumption made during Phase 3 regarding the propagation of effect within the
governmental body responsible for higher education in South Africa. Simply put, the Gauteng
Department of Education was assumed to be the only entity in this sector affected by the prob-
lem considered. As stated, this kind of assumption is appropriate in the context of Phase 3,
but during the execution of Phase 4, the validity thereof should be questioned. To that end,
note that the Gauteng Department of Education was deemed the subject of the aforementioned
assumption, not by chance selection, but because the formal outcomes it pursues were con-
sidered relevant to the resolution of the problem considered [184]. It is therefore necessary to
confirm that the Gauteng Department of Education did, in fact, possess the power to realise
the formal outcomes it pursues despite the existence of the problem considered. Interestingly,
following a preliminary investigation, it remained unclear whether or not this is the case. To
elucidate, the structural power possessed by the Gauteng Department of Education seems to be
of significant utility to the resolution of the problem considered, but at the same time its lack
of status power16 suggests an inability to contain the ripples of effect caused by the problem
considered [306]. In such cases of uncertainty, it is advisable to consider the aforementioned
assumption invalid. As a result, if this were an actual analysis, it would be necessary to return
to Phase 3 of the methodology in order to reconsider the affected.
In conclusion to the discussion on the execution of Phase 4, note that although the questions
in the power analysis checklist are designed to elicit either a “yes” or a “no” in response,
16In this case, status power represents financial means.
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the power analysis should not be viewed as some form of boolean analysis in which the only
element of interest is the final output. The actual decision surrounding an entity’s inclusion or
exclusion should be based upon the relative measure of that entity’s power possessed (and effect
experienced) with respect to that of all other potential stakeholders, and not on a number of
conceptual criteria of relevance alone. The power analysis checklist is simply meant to ground
the analysis of an entity’s power and act as an initial filter separating potentially relevant from
irrelevant entities based on the measure and form of power that they possess.
All that remains unaddressed with respect to the hypothetical application of the methodology
proposed to facilitate the identification of stakeholders is the execution of Phase 5. There
is, however, not much to discuss in this respect. Essentially, it encapsulates the process of
determining which entities are included as stakeholders to the pending endeavour based on the
analyses conducted during both Phases 3 and 4 of the proposed methodology — a process that is
predominantly at the mercy of an analyst’s subjective interpretation of the information elicited
during the aforementioned analyses. The only technicality worth reiterating before closing this
section is the following: Entities severely affected by the problem considered are deemed relevant
regardless of the measure of power they possess.
10.3 The state of a system
The evaluation of the methodology proposed to facilitate the identification of stakeholders,
briefly summarised in the section prior, did more than simply reveal some of its inherent lim-
itations — it brought to light a potentially detrimental phenomenon not yet addressed in the
proposed17 meta-methodology. That is, the state of the system containing the problematic situa-
tion considered. In hindsight it is clear that in its current form, the meta-methodology proposed
is underlain by the assumption that real-world systems are characterised by what is here called
a state of order, but as evident from the theoretical case study in respect of the fees must fall
movement, real-world systems can also exist in a state of chaos18. These state classes are sub-
sequently further elaborated upon, but in essence, a state of order implies that the entities in
a system are able to coexist in the spirit of collaboration, while a state of chaos implies that
the entities in a system are unable to do so. In order to address the manner in which the state
of a system complicates the resolution of problems that reside therein, the meta-methodology
is expanded to include a methodological phase called Moderate system state, as depicted in
Figure 10.2. In the remainder of this section, this phase is elaborated upon.
Arguably, the most appropriate question with which to open the discussion on the newly added
methodological phase, is why the phase in question is, in fact, beneficial. The answer to this
question contains both a methodological and a practical component. The methodological rea-
soning behind the inclusion of the additional phase essentially comes down to the fact that
the final phase of problem formulation (i.e. problem structuring) is markedly facilitated when
conducted in the context of a system that exists in a state of order. This is made evident by
17The phenomenon in question is seemingly also not addressed in existing system solution methodologies in
general.
18There is a third state in which real-world systems may exist, called a state of disintegration, which is excluded
from the above typology as the meta-methodology proposed will never be employed in the context of such a
system. A state of disintegration represents the case in which a problematic situation has been left unattended
for such an extended period of time that the system containing it has disintegrated, thus terminating its existence.
If the original system no longer exists, the problem contained within it is no longer addressable, and so a system
in such a state is excluded from the discussions that follow. As a distinguishing criterion, note that it is only
possible for a system to enter a state of disintegration if there exists a higher-level system into which such a
system can disintegrate.
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Figure 10.2: A high-level overview of the phases within the proposed methodology with an updated
lower-level depiction of the phases that constitute the process of problem formulation.
formally defining the notion that governs the distinction between order and chaos — the notion
of collaboration.
There are several definitions of the term collaboration in the academic literature: Westley et
al. [480] defined collaboration as the process through which relevant stakeholders, who each
perceive different aspects of a problem, can constructively explore their differences and search
for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible. Roberts et al. [384]
similarly defined collaboration as an interactive process characterised by a trans-mutational
purpose, voluntary membership, joint decision making, agreed-upon rules of interaction, and
a temporary structure. Finally, Wood and Gray [489] defined collaboration as the process by
which autonomous stakeholders engage in an interactive process (according to shared norms,
rules and structure) in order to act or decide on issues related to the relevant problem domain.
Although each of these definitions is valuable, none is entirely satisfactory within the context of
this dissertation. Consequently, the following definition (building upon the above definitions) is
proposed and employed: Collaboration exists among a group of autonomous stakeholders, rele-
vant to the resolution of some problematic situation, if they are able to engage in the voluntary,
interactive process of exploring the differences in their subjective understanding of the related
problematic situation by employing shared rules, norms, and structures to facilitate the process
of searching for solutions that go beyond the limited vision of any single stakeholder in a manner
that is constructive and remains within the domain of civil debate.
In view of the above definition, the utility of conducting the task of problem structuring in a state
of order is evident. In fact, the task of problem structuring, which involves gathering selected
entities to investigate, debate and select a desired course of action, essentially presupposes such a
state of affairs. That is, the methods of problem structuring (discussed in §9.2.2) are built upon
the assumed utility of the social interaction of relevant entities, which is only possible if such
entities are able to gather in the spirit of collaboration (i.e. if the related system is characterised
by a state of order).
The practical motivation behind the methodological phase titled Moderate the system, on the
other hand, is made salient by describing the mechanisms that underlie the presence of chaos
in real-world systems. The first step in doing so, is illustrating that the presence of chaos, or
its absence, is contained within the mechanisms of power, and furthermore, that there is a cost
associated with a system in chaos (affecting all entities therein). During the discussion on the
mechanisms of power in §9.2.1, the notion of a power-play was introduced and put forth as
the medium by which entities in real-world systems are able to compete. This notion is once
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again central as it underlies the manner in which systems transition between states of order and
chaos. More specifically, the presence of chaos in a system is considered the product of what is
here called chaos-inducing power-plays (i.e. power-plays that involve the imposition of a state
of chaos as a fundamental mechanism in the manner in which they induce their influence). In
particular, the coercive employment of either necessity or incapacitation as sources of power is
uniquely associated with the induction of chaos. Consider the employment of necessity in its
coercive form. In essence, this entails the removal of one’s participation from a system in order
to exhibit the extent of one’s necessity to the proper functioning thereof, which is, by definition,
chaos inducing. The employment of incapacitation in its coercive form, on the other hand, entails
not only the removal of one’s participation from a system, but the actual, intentional disruption
thereof, which is, once again, chaos-inducing19. This description of the coercive employment of
necessity and incapacitation illustrates why the induction of a state of chaos comes at a cost
— chaos-inducing power-plays are fundamentally designed to inhibit the proper functioning of
a system. The cost of chaos thus includes the loss of any benefit that would have been derived
from the working of a system if it had remained in a state of order, as well as the cost of any
damages caused to the system in question. The reality of such costs brings the discussion to
the practical motivation behind the aforementioned methodological phase: Aiding analysts in
minimising the cost associated with systems in chaos.
10.3.1 A technical enquiry
Before introducing the method proposed to facilitate the aforementioned task, it is beneficial
to address some of the technicalities that underlie its design. In particular, the purpose of the
subsequent discussion is to illustrate how non-chaos-inducing entities tend to aggravate the cost
of a system in chaos by electing to adopt inappropriate strategies of competition in response
to the employment of chaos by a competitor, and how the proposed method may facilitate
counteracting this effect. To that end, a dynamic related to the employment of chaos-inducing
power-plays is briefly explored below.
In the section prior, it was explained that a system in chaos incurs a certain cost, and further-
more, that this cost is not limited to non-chaos-inducing entities — taking a system into, and
keeping a system in, a state of chaos also comes at a certain cost. The greater this cost, the
more difficult it is to do so20. The attentive reader may thus wonder: Why would entities choose
to employ chaos-inducing power-plays, or for that matter, any power-play whose employment
comes at a certain cost? An entity will only follow this course of action if it deems the cost
of doing so worth the potential benefit. In other words, if an entity in some real-world system
surmises that the benefit21 attainable from the system in question is utterly inferior to that mer-
ited by its power, and elects to rectify this perceived imbalance. It will only draw upon more
radical power-plays (i.e. power-plays that employ chaos as a means) if the potential benefit of
doing so is considered to outweigh the cost. The decision of whether or not to employ a certain
power-play (i.e. whether or not to take a system into a state of chaos and keep it there) thus
constitutes a subjective cost versus benefit analysis22.
19Note that a power-play is only considered chaos-inducing if such a state of affairs is fundamentally linked to
the manner in which it exerts its influence — the chaotic aftermath of an unsuccessfully employed power-play
does not make it chaos-inducing. Accordingly, all other power-plays can be executed in the domain of order.
20This cost includes the loss of any benefit a chaos-inducing entity would have experienced if it had allowed the
related system to remain in a state of order, as well as any losses it had to endure to maintain such a state.
21Benefit represents the positive component of the notion of effect, defined in §9.2.1.
22Note that non-chaos-inducing power-plays do not necessarily become redundant in a system that has entered
a state of chaos. It remains possible for entities to attempt to influence the system in which they are contained
by adopting any power-play available to them, no matter the state of that system.
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The aforementioned cost versus benefit analysis is of central importance to the method subse-
quently proposed as it is relevant not only to an entity attempting to decide whether or not to
cause chaos in a system, but also to a non-chaos-inducing entity attempting to decide how to
respond to a chaos-inducing competitor. More specifically, the method proposed in the section
that follows is essentially designed to facilitate such a case-specific cost versus benefit analysis
in order to encourage entities to select competitive courses of action that best suit their pursued
outcomes. To illustrate the fact that entities do at times fail in this task, consider the subse-
quent discussion on the manner in which the governing bodies of the South African education
system responded to the chaos-inducing protagonists of the fees must fall movement (introduced
in §10.1).
As stated, the South African system of higher education existed in a state of chaos during the
fees must fall movement. In other words, there existed, at the time, a chaos-inducing entity
therein. Although the identity of this entity has yet to be described formally, in accordance
with the review of the fees must fall movement presented in §10.1, the entire proportion of
students in the South African education system that partook in the fees must fall movement is,
for the purpose of this discussion, considered the chaos-inducing entity therein23. To illustrate
that the governing bodies of the South African education system failed in their response to the
aforementioned entity, consider the excerpt below from a report published by the Centre for the
Study of Violence and Reconciliation dedicated to the documentation of how select universities24
responded to the chaos-inducing protagonists of the fees must fall movement [277].
“In all nine chapters in this report, key informants asserted that university man-
agement was highly unresponsive to their demands. This involved Vice-Chancellors
refusing to engage with student leaders or not coming to scheduled meetings. In her
chapter, Sandile Ndelu narrates how the failure of the Vice-Chancellor at CPUT to
arrive at a meeting made students angry, resulting in them rioting and burning uni-
versity property. Similar stories were shared about TUT management being aloof and
distant in their engagement with student leaders. However, some Vice-Chancellors,
such as those at Rhodes and UCT, tried their level best to actively engage with
23Toward illustrating that their use of chaos is in harmony with the above discussion dedicated to why entities
may elect to utilise chaos-inducing power-plays, consider the subsequent description of the power dynamics at
play within the system of higher education in South Africa prior to the inception of the fees must fall movement.
Like many countries around the world, the South African system of higher education is structured so that the
students contained therein typically need not partake in the power battle that exists therein. To elucidate, in
accordance with the constitution adopted in 1996 [119], certain entities within the South African government are
officially granted the formal purpose and power to act as representatives of the country’s student body in order
to ensure that they are treated in accordance with the statutes of that constitution. Importantly, although this
strategy has the potential to truly benefit a country’s student body, it also facilitates their exploitation in the
case where chosen representatives elect to abuse their positions for the benefit of their own informally pursued
outcomes — the system in question leaves little room for students to influence the system that contains them
directly (i.e. without having to rely upon the formal structures designed to represent them). In fact, such influence
resides almost exclusively in the informal power sources of necessity and incapacitation, defined in §9.2.1. In the
case of South Africa, the ability of the aforementioned representatives to exploit their position seems to have been
an all too enticing temptation [84, 414]. As a result, more than twenty years after the adoption of the South
African constitution, many of the promises made therein remained largely unrealised [332, 349, 350]. In view of
such a state of affairs, it is not surprising that the students of the South African education system lost faith in the
formal structures designed to represent them (as is evident from the fact that the fees must fall movement did, in
fact, take place), and concluded that the potential benefit of employing the informal sources of power available
to them, and that in a coercive form (thereby inducing chaos), outweighed the cost of utilising chaos as a source
of influence.
24The following universities were considered: The Cape Peninsula University of Technology, the University of
the Western Cape, Tshwane University of Technology, the University of Cape Town, the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, Rhodes University, the University of Limpopo, the University of Zululand, and the University of the
Witwatersrand [277].
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student leaders. However, divisions and splinter groups within the #FeesMustFall
movement negatively affected some of these engagements. It appears that a common
response by the university management in all the case studies was to get court inter-
dicts against the protesting students. The law was therefore used to silence voices
of dissent as many students were arrested for contravening court interdicts.”
In view of this excerpt, it is evident that the governing bodies of South African universities
failed to respond appropriately to the protesting students of the fees must fall movement. More
specifically, they failed to respond in a manner that dampened the cost of chaos and increased
the measure of benefit attained. Several researchers have argued this point [277, 290].
It is toward mitigating such instances of poor decision making that the methodological phase
titled moderate the system was designed.
10.3.2 Moderate the system
Addressing the state in which a system exists is a notion quite unique in systems theory. The
sections prior, dedicated to this notion, included, among other subject matter, a delineation of
the criteria that underlie chaos, as well as an account of the mechanisms by which, and the
reasons for which, an entity may elect to induce chaos. The purpose of the current section is to
now build upon this body of knowledge and present a method capable of facilitating the task of
developing an appropriate strategy of competition in response to a chaos-inducing competitor,
thereby attempting to minimise the cost of chaos. In order to facilitate the presentation of this
method, a typology of the strategies of competition considered to be available to an entity when
selecting how to respond to a chaos-inducing competitor is presented:
(1) An entity can acknowledge the power possessed by a chaos-inducing entity and grant it
the influence (benefit) its power merits (perhaps by suggesting a compromise between its
own, and the outcomes pursued by the chaos-inducing entity).
(2) An entity can respond competitively by employing either selected power-plays or allowing
the passage of time25 so as to increase the cost of keeping the related system in a state of
chaos. The purpose of such an action would be to coerce the chaos-inducing entity into
either abandoning the pursuit of its outcomes by means of chaos, or simply settling for a
lesser degree of benefit than originally demanded.
The method proposed contains two parts: Part 1 is dedicated to an enquiry into the power-
dynamics that characterise a chaos-inducing entity, and Part 2, to the development of a strategy
of competition that may be adopted in response to the entity in question. These parts are thus
designed to be executed sequentially. Accordingly, consider the steps that constitute Part 1 of
the proposed method below:
Part 1
1.1 Identify and briefly describe the chaos-inducing entity.
1.2 Establish a channel of communication with the identified entity.
25There is a cost associated with keeping a system in chaos. The longer an entity has to maintain such a state,
the larger the associated cost — an entity can rarely afford to keep a system in a state of chaos indefinitely.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
156 Chapter 10. A theoretical case study
1.3 Ascertain its demands, and its willingness to participate in a structured resolution of
the problem considered, given the establishment of a temporary agreement as interim
solution26.
1.4 Delineate the distribution of power in the system in question. Do this separately for each
of the sources of power27 defined in §9.2.1.
1.5 Evaluate the demands of the chaos-inducing entity in accordance with the power it pos-
sesses.
1.6 Describe the current cost of chaos to all entities relevant to the problem at hand.
1.7 Assess the chaos-inducing entity’s ability to maintain a state of chaos in the system in
question28.
As stated, Part 1 of the proposed method, presented above, is designed to facilitate an in-depth
analysis of the power-dynamics that characterise a chaos-inducing entity and should act as input
to the execution of Part 2. Accordingly, consider the steps that constitute Part 2 of the proposed
method:
Part 2
2.1 Gather the non-chaos-inducing entities that were selected as stakeholders to the problem
considered (during the previous methodological phase) that also possess power relevant to
the selection of how the chaos-inducing entity should be responded to.
2.2 In accordance with the information uncovered during the execution of Part 1, facilitate
the selection between pursuing Strategy (1) or Strategy (2), presented above.
2.3 If Strategy (1) is selected:
2.3.1 Proceed to formalise a preliminary agreement to be presented to the chaos-inducing
entity as soon as possible. This agreement should include, but should not be limited
to: The extent to which its demands can be met, the period over which the preliminary
agreement will remain valid, and the steps that are to be taken during that period in
order to resolve indefinitely the problem considered.
2.3.2 Make contact with the chaos-inducing entity and present the preliminary agreement.
This will likely be followed by a period of negotiation during which entities may
debate the contents of the agreement.
2.4 If Strategy (2) is selected,
2.4.1 Specify the goal of responding competitively (i.e. the benefit to be attained).
26The purpose of the above method is not to resolve the problem considered, but simply to facilitate the
establishment of a state of order in the relevant system as soon as possible. Accordingly, the purpose of the second
part of Step 1.3 above, is simply to determine whether or not it is possible to establish a temporary agreement
between the non-chaos-inducing entities and the chaos-inducing entities that will hold for a predetermined period,
during which the next methodological phase of problem structuring can be executed in the context of order. The
execution of this phase may then potentially facilitate the indefinite resolution of the problem considered.
27During the execution of Step 1.4, it is important that analysts aid entities in conducting as fair a review as
possible. Power possessed in the form of necessity and incapacitation are easily undervalued.
28When executing Step 1.7, it is important to consider the historical development of the problem considered.
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2.4.2 List and describe, in some detail, the power-plays that are available toward achieving
these goals.
2.4.3 Proceed to describe the potential cost associated with each of the available power-
plays. This should be done separately in respect of the effect these power-plays will
have upon chaos-inducing and non-chaos-inducing entities.
2.4.4 Given the ability of the chaos-inducing-entity to maintain a state of chaos (assessed
in Part 1), and the perceived manner in which given power-plays will effect the entity
in question, review the likelihood of attaining the goals described in Step 2.3.1.
2.4.5 In accordance with the information uncovered during the steps prior, re-evaluate
whether or not pursuing Strategy 2 is indeed appropriate to the situation at hand. If
so, proceed to select from the available power-plays those that are best suited to the
manner in which the gathered entities wish to compete29.
2.4.6 Proceed to formalise a detailed description of the steps involved in the execution of
the selected power-plays as well as a time-line of their execution.
2.4.7 Finally, specify a predetermined point in time at which the effectiveness of the se-
lected power-plays will be reviewed with the goal of determining whether or not their
employment was, in fact, worthwhile.
In view of the above method, it is acknowledged that there is a slight overlap between the
two strategies of competition utilised. To elucidate, it is possible that during the execution of
Strategy (1), the task of establishing a preliminary agreement satisfying both non-chaos-inducing
and chaos-inducing entities is found to be infeasible as neither set of entities are willing to
compromise to the extent desired by their competitor. In such a situation, non-chaos-inducing
entities may elect to pursue Strategy (2), albeit purely for the purpose of coercing a chaos-
inducing competitor into settling for a lesser degree of benefit.
In conclusion, although it is certainly important to establish a state of order in the system
under consideration as soon as possible, practitioners are cautioned against attempting to do so
prematurely. In order to address the presence of chaos in a system, for example, its source, in
the form of chaos-inducing entities, must first be identified, and then the collaboration of those
entities must be achieved, which typically involves the establishment of some form of temporary
agreement. Consider the wisdom of establishing such an accord without first having identified
all entities relevant to its establishment. In such a case, it is highly likely that the accord may
be deemed unacceptable at a later point in time by several stakeholders not initially considered
— resulting in a conundrum. As such, although it is important to address the presence of chaos
in a system as quickly as possible, this phase of the proposed methodology should be conducted
with care.
10.4 Chapter summary
This chapter was dedicated to an identification of the shortcomings in one of the methods pre-
sented in the meta-methodology of Chapter 9 during its hypothetical application to a historical,
real-world endeavour. To that end, the context of evaluation was briefly delineated in §10.1, and
this was followed in §10.2 by an account of the hypothetical application of, and the improve-
ments made to, the method in question. Significantly, the application of the aforementioned
29If more than one power-play is selected, it is necessary to ensure that their simultaneous execution is, in fact,
feasible.
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method facilitated the identification of a problematic phenomenon not addressed in the initial
version of the meta-methodology proposed. Accordingly, an additional methodological phase
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In accordance with the research methodology adopted in this dissertation, the development of the
proposed meta-methodology necessitated a second stage of evaluation — the presentation thereof
to an expert analyst. The aim of this stage of evaluation is to elicit potential shortcomings in
the methodology that remain despite its hypothetical application in the context of a theoretical
case study, as presented in Chapter 10.
The chapter opens in §11.1 with a brief account of feedback received from an expert analyst in
respect of the working of the proposed meta-methodology, and this is followed by the presentation
of an updated version of the methodology in accordance with this feedback, in §11.2. The chapter
then comes to a close with a short summary in §11.3.
11.1 Expert feedback
The lion’s share of the critique received from the expert analyst (formally introduced in Chap-
ter 2) concerns the design format of the methods proposed to facilitate each of the three con-
stituent phases of the task of problem formulation. In general, the meta-methodology was
considered to be of noteworthy utility, but the expert analyst warned that unless a schematic
representation of its constituent parts is developed, the value thereof could be lost on future prac-
titioners1. That is, in its current form, the value of the methodology is somewhat overshadowed
by the detailed fuzziness of its presentation.
The expert analyst provided two additional points of concern, one related to the method pro-
posed to facilitate the selection of stakeholders, originally introduced in §9.2.1, and the other
related to the decision-making checklist, originally introduced in §9.3. In respect of the first
of these methods, the expert analyst adjudged the fact that no guidelines are provided to fa-
cilitate the practical delineation of a functional network to be a shortcoming that should be
addressed, and in respect of the second, the expert analyst considered one of the sub-methods
1The decision-making checklist, introduced in §9.2.1 was exempt from this criticism.
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contained therein to be somewhat out of place. To elucidate, the final component of the decision-
making checklist contains the suggestion that if the polarising nature of group decision making
is suspected to underlie a difficulty experienced in the establishment of consensus among com-
peting entities, it may be beneficial to request that all entities select a single representative
of their cause, and then organise an “executive meeting” among the selected individuals (see
§9.3 for more information). The analyst brought to light an inconsistency between the formal
description of the decision-making checklist as a framework designed for consideration at strate-
gic junctures during an endeavour, and the case-specific nature of the aforementioned method
contained therein. Accordingly, it was suggested that this final method is removed.
Before proceeding to a discussion on the improvements made to the proposed meta-methodology,
a high-level overview of its constituent phases is again presented here toward facilitating the
reader’s comprehension of the components therein discussed subsequently, as depicted in Fig-
ure 11.1
Figure 11.1: A high-level overview of the phases within the proposed meta-methodology.
11.2 Improvements made
In response to the respective points of concern identified by the expert analyst, several modifica-
tion are made to the proposed meta-methodology. Arguably, the most substantial modification
is the formulation of a schematic representation of each of the constituent methods of the task
of problem formulation. The first such method, dedicated to the task of stakeholder selec-
tion, is depicted in Figure 11.2. As can be seen in the figure, the following colour scheme is
utilised to distinguish different forms of information: Crayon-pink designates the methodological
phase considered, burlywood-brown highlights its constituent parts, and peachpuff-orange indi-
cates supplementary information. Notably, one of the components presented in the figure, called
Constructing a functional network, is included only in response to the second point of concern
of the expert analyst. That is, the lack of guidance given in respect of how a practitioner may
go about visually organising the development of a functional network. In order to rectify this
shortcoming, an exemplar of how this task may be accomplished is presented (a more detailed
demonstration of the technique is provided later in this dissertation).
In addition to the aforementioned exemplar, the components of the method depicted in Fig-
ure 11.2 detail the steps involved in its execution, along with several pieces of supplementary
information. The first component, depicted in the top left-hand segment of the figure, consists
of five steps that underlie the method proposed. In the order presented, these steps involve
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Figure 11.2: A schematic representation of the method titled Stakeholder selection.
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developing an initial description of the problem considered, delineating the features that char-
acterise it, identifying the entities affected thereby, distinguishing the subset of such entities
that actually possess power relevant to its solution, and describing the nature of this relevance,
respectively2. The second component, depicted in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 11.2, is
dedicated to a summary of the properties that qualify the relevance of an entity’s power (utilised
in the execution of Step 4), and the third, depicted along the right-hand border of Figure 11.2,
contains a description of three supplementary techniques that facilitate the execution of the
method proposed.
As the second phase in the formulation of real-world problems, titled Moderate the system, is
included in the scope of the expert analyst’s first point of critique, a visual representation of its
working is presented in Figure 11.3. As can be seen in the figure, the method contains two parts,
one dedicated to an investigation into the nature of a chaos-inducing entity, and the other, the
design of an appropriate response to such an entity. The first part is made up of seven steps
which, in the order depicted, involve identifying the chaos-inducing entity, establishing a channel
of communication with the entity in question, formulating an understanding of its demands,
investigating the power dynamics that characterise the related system, evaluating the extent to
which the demands of the entity in question are proportional to its power, describing the cost
of chaos in respect of all the entities affected thereby, and assessing the chaos-inducing entity’s
ability to maintain such a state, respectively.
As stated in §10.3.2, the steps involved in the second part of the method in question depend upon
the general class of competitive strategy selected by the non-chaos-inducing entities. Notably,
the two strategy classes that are considered available to such entities are depicted along the
right-hand border of Figure 11.3 in the form of supplementary information (i.e. Strategy 1
and Strategy 2, as described in §10.3.2). If Strategy 2 is selected, part two of the method
proposed involves specifying the goal of responding competitively, describing the power-plays
that are considered of utility to the stated goal, assessing the cost associated with their use,
re-evaluating the appropriateness of pursuing Strategy 2, selecting the power-plays that are
to be utilised, formalising a detailed description of their execution, and finally, specifying a
predetermined point in time at which the effectiveness of the selected power-plays are to be
reviewed with the purpose of determining whether their continued use is, in fact, worthwhile.
If Strategy 1 is selected, on the other hand, part two of the method reduces to formalising a
preliminary agreement that is to be presented to the chaos-inducing entity specifying (among
other details) the extent to which its demands can be met, the period for which the agreement
is valid, and the steps that are to be taken during this period in order to resolve indefinitely the
problem considered.
The work presented in respect of the methodological phase titled Problem structuring, is unique
in the context of the proposed meta-methodology. The contribution made therein does not
take the form of a method proposed, but rather, a review of a collection of problem structuring
methods sourced from the academic literature. The purpose of reviewing the methods in question
is to inform practitioners of the sociological paradigm upon which their designs are based and
thereby facilitate their case-specific selection. Accordingly, a schematic representation of the
work presented in this regard is portrayed in Figure 11.4. As may be seen in the figure, this
includes a description of the sociological paradigms of interest, the respective methods related
thereto, and a discussion of the weakness associated with each paradigm. More specifically, a
review of the interpretive and the radical humanist paradigms, along with the methods contained
therein, are presented in the left-hand and right-hand segments of Figure 11.4, respectively, while
2These activities are to be executed in sequence, but may be returned to and revised ex post.
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Figure 11.3: A schematic representation of the method titled Moderate the system.
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Figure 11.4: A review of a collection of problem structuring methods.
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The tendency to satisfice, even when significantly bet-
ter solutions may be attained with little further effort.
Reconsider the selected decision options. In what way
can these courses of action be further improved? Are
these improvements worth pursuing?
t
The tendency to downplay the consequences of a de-
cision option if those consequences are not personally
experienced, or if they are realised over an extended
period of time.
t
ttttt. Affective failures ttttt..
Reconsider the selected decision options. What are
the long-term consequences of the various decision op-




Illusion of control &
Misconceptions of chance
The tendency to be overly optimistic about the future
and one’s ability to realise outcomes pursued.
Reconsider the selected decision options. Make a list
of the risks and uncertainties associated with the re-
spective options. Are these risks appropriate? What
steps can be taken to render the future less volatile?
The tendency to prematurely accept the validity of
sourced information if that information coincides with
one’s preconceived beliefs, while simultaneously ne-




accuracy & Confirmation bias
Reconsider the information upon which the selected
decision options are based. Is the validity of this in-
formation apparent? Formally state/restate the in-
formation that contradicts the appropriateness of the






The tendency to withhold information believed to be
contrary to the opinion held by the dominant play-
ers in a context, particularly when that information is
possessed only by a single individual.
Reconsider the various decision options. In an anony-
mous fashion, request that participants describe any
issue related to the realisation of the various decision
options that have not yet been addressed sufficiently.
a typology of dissimilar problem types is presented in the bottom right-hand corner of the figure
in the form of supplementary information.
In order to rectify the noted inconsistency in the decision-making checklist, the expert analyst
suggested that one of the methods contained therein be removed. That is, the method designed
to facilitate the mitigation of the unwanted effect of group polarisation and the discontinuity
effect. As such, an updated version of the decision-making checklist, in accordance with this
suggestion, is presented in Table 11.1.
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11.3 Chapter summary
In order to refine the meta-methodology proposed, it was subjected to the critique of an expert
analyst. This second stage of evaluation was the topic of interest in this chapter. Accordingly,
the chapter opened in §11.1 with a brief account of the points of concern identified by the expert
analyst, and this was followed in §11.2 by a discussion on the resulting modifications made to
the methodology proposed.
The work presented in this chapter should not be viewed in isolation. That is, the modified
version of each of the constituent parts of the methodology presented remains linked to, and
dependent upon, the more detailed descriptions of their working in chapters prior. Practitioners
are thus cautioned against attempting to apply the version of the methodology documented here
without first reviewing the work documented in chapters prior.
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The meta-methodology proposed in this dissertation is most accurately described as a guideline
designed to support practitioners in the solution of real-world problems. As such, the employ-
ment thereof does not guarantee successful problem solving — its purpose is limited to a role
of support. In a final attempt to evaluate the utility of the proposed meta-methodology in this
capacity, this chapter is dedicated to a documentation of its practical application in the context
of the South African energy sector.
The chapter opens in §12.1 with a brief introduction to the problem considered, and this is
followed in §12.2 and §12.3 with an account of the practical application of the meta-methodology
proposed. In §12.4, the chapter finally comes to a close with a brief summary.
12.1 Background to the problem considered
In the history of electricity production, the South African power utility, Eskom, was long held
in high esteem [413]. Today, however, the pendulum of public opinion has swung to, and has
remained in, the opposite extreme. The variability of Eskom’s power production capabilities is
now considered one of the most significant challenges facing the South African economy [340].
In the words of the South African Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan [396] “Its going
to be a huge struggle for us to overcome this emergency.”
Due to the state of electricity production in South Africa, its distribution systems have, since
the turn of the 21st century, witnessed a rapid increase in what are called small-scale-embedded-
generation (SSEG) facilities, consisting primarily of solar and wind energy generation (e.g. roof-
mounted solar panels on houses) [237]. Formally, entities with SSEG capabilities are called pro-
sumers as they are able to switch between consuming and producing electricity as required [294].
That is, in addition to supplementing their own energy needs, prosumers contribute to alleviat-
ing the general energy load of a region by feeding the energy they produce, but do not use, back
into the grid1, in exchange for a small feed-in-tariff 2, so that distribution network operators can
1The term grid is synonymous with electricity distribution network.
2In 2018, for example, the Municipality of Cape Town paid individuals with SSEG capabilities a feed-in-tariff
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redistribute and resell that energy for a profit [92]. This facility, the local trade of electricity,
is one of the central themes investigated in this chapter. More specifically, the case study pre-
sented here involves a Cape Town-based enterprise3, called Switch, and its founders’ vision of
implementing a particular form of peer-to-peer electricity trading in South Africa [443].
Switch was established in response to the work of Murray [334], who in his master’s thesis
investigated the utility of several electricity trading pricing strategies in the South African
context and determined that a peer-to-peer blockchain-based dynamic fee trading strategy, where
tariffs are determined in accordance with real-time supply and demand information [399], had
the potential to aid South Africa in the recovery of its faltering energy system. According to
Murray [334], such a pricing strategy would incentivise both electricity consumption during
times of high production, and production during times of high demand, thereby aiding network
operators in the difficulties associated with grid-balancing and peak-load shifting [194]. In 2018,
Switch was established to make Murray’s recommendation a reality [443].
At the point in time at which the case study documented here commenced, Switch had been
a year in development and its founders had succeeded in developing an initial version of the
software package required to facilitate the implementation of the aforementioned trading strat-
egy. There were still, however, several technicalities that prohibited its official launch into the
market, including, but not limited to, procuring the capital required to do so, and selecting the
most viable energy trading business model to accompany the selected trading strategy. After
a preliminary investigation, it was determined that the meta-methodology documented in this
dissertation had the capacity to aid in the resolution of the aforementioned difficulties. More
specifically, the first and final methods in the meta-methodology were deemed applicable. The
method for the selection of stakeholders was applied in order to identify the entities, activities,
and resources considered relevant to the avenues of future development available to Switch (in
order to determine their validity), and the decision making checklist was applied in order to
ensure that any decisions made in this regard were, in fact, appropriate. An account of the
application of these methods is presented in the remainder of this chapter.
All case-related information discussed subsequently was gathered via personal communication
with Switch’s founders during the four-month period between February and May 2019 [335].
12.2 Identifying relevant stakeholders
As stated, the purpose of applying the method designed to facilitate the selection of stakeholders
was to aid Switch’s founders in overcoming the difficulties that inhibit them from establishing
Switch as an official player in the South African energy sector. Accordingly, in fulfilment of the
first step in the method in question, the problem considered4 is described as follows:
Switch exists as an informal enterprise. Its founders have developed a blockchain-
based software platform capable of facilitating the local, real-time trade of electricity,
of 84.95 cents (ZAR) per kWh of electricity they fed back into the grid, which they then resold for 185.32 cents
(ZAR) per kWh [116].
3Since the conclusion of the case study documented here, Switch has moved its base of operations to Johan-
nesburg, South Africa.
4It is necessary to qualify the application of the method in question to the problem described above. That is,
it is necessary to illustrate that the system which contains it is characterised by the property that governs the
class of system for which the meta-methodology proposed in this dissertation is designed (i.e. that the entities
contained therein are forced to coexist despite being in competition with one another). It should, however, be
rather obvious that this is indeed the case as the objectives pursued by Switch’s founders are fundamentally linked
to the other entities that exist in the South African energy system.
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but are unsure how to proceed in respect of its future development. The difficulties
they face include access to capital, uncertainty in the particular energy trading busi-
ness model that best suits their enterprise, and the state-dominated nature of the
South African energy sector.
In view of the above preliminary description of the problem considered, three features were
identified that characterise it (in fulfilment of Step 2), namely strategic value offering, financial
needs, and renewable mandate, as depicted in Figure 12.1. In the order listed, these features are
representative of the technicalities surrounding the selection of an appropriate energy trading
business model, the financial requirements related to Switch’s development, and the renewable
energy mandate built into Switch’s value-offering.
Figure 12.1: A schematic depiction of the core features of the problem considered.
The next methodological phase involved constructing the functional network induced by each of
the features listed above. Notably, the network related to the problem considered is extensive
and, as such, the level of detail in which feature-specific components are discussed is adjusted
as deemed appropriate. With this in mind, the first feature of interest is the strategic value
offering associated with the enterprise in question, or rather, the uncertainty that characterises
it. As stated in §12.1, at the point in time when the case study documented here commenced,
Switch’s founders had already selected the energy trading strategy they wished to implement,
but were struggling to settle on an energy trading business model that would actually facilitate
its uptake in South Africa’s energy market. Based upon a preliminary analysis, two energy
trading models were deemed viable, namely third-party trading and wheeling. The essential
difference between these models is that in the context of the former, Switch would become
an energy trading entity (similar to foreign exchange traders) and actively participate in the
trade of electricity (purchasing electricity from prosumers, transporting it through a distribution
network and selling it to consumers) [334], while in the latter, Switch would simply function
as a electricity trading software solution provider that facilitates the direct trade of electricity
between consumers and prosumers within a particular distribution network [334]. In other
words, both models are built upon the dynamic pricing strategy Switch incorporates, but in
the one case, Switch earns its keep by purchasing and reselling electricity, while in the other
Switch simply charges a monthly wheeling fee for the trading platform it provides. Although
these differences may seem subtle, they result in distinct propagations of effect and, as a result,
in an attempt to aid Switch’s founders in an appropriate selection between trading models, the
functional networks related thereto were constructed, as depicted5 in Figure 12.2.
In accordance with the strategy of presentation adopted in this chapter, only the most important
insights uncovered during the construction of the functional network are discussed. The reader
is referred to Table A.1 in Appendix A for a detailed description of each of the labelled arrows in
Figure 12.2. With this in mind, consider first the left-hand segment of the functional network in
Figure 12.2, induced by the third-party energy trading model. As can be seen in the figure, the
5The coloured blocks in Figure 12.2 denote entities relevant to Steps 4 and 5 of the methodology applied.
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Figure 12.2: A functional network induced by the strategic value offering associated with the problem
considered.
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propagation of effect induced by this kind of business model occurs along four main paths (i.e.
network edges). The first such path, labelled T2.1, corresponds with the reality that Switch will
have to compete with, and thus affect, existing third-party energy traders6, while the second,
labelled T2.2, is representative of the legislative requirements associated with third-party energy
trading in South Africa. More specifically, it was uncovered that in order to conduct business
in the capacity of third-party energy trader, an enterprise must possess an appropriate trading
license, in addition to getting the pricing strategy it utilises approved. The National Energy
Regulator of South Africa [341] is the legal body governing these affairs and, as such, is considered
formally affected, as depicted in the figure. The remaining edges considered primary, labelled
T2.3 and T2.4, respectively, correspond to the utility of Switch’s value offering as third-party
energy trader in alleviating several of the difficulties that plague both Eskom and municipal
distribution networks.
The right-hand segment of the functional network depicted in Figure 12.2, induced by the second
energy trading model considered, is in many ways similar to the segment of the network described
above. There are, however, several key differences. For one, although the National Energy
Regulator of South Africa is again considered affected (see link T2.8), this time the propagation
of effect concerns only the approval of the dynamic pricing strategy built into Switch’s software
package — no third-party energy trading licence is required. Additionally, the propagation
of effect from the model in question now occurs along five main edges (not four). That is,
an additional edge, labelled T2.7, which denotes the propagation of effect to what are called
grid-tied micro-grids is now included. Formally, a grid-tied micro-grid is defined as a localised
group of electricity producers and consumers that exist behind a single municipal meter and
operate either connected to, or disconnected from, the general distribution network, as physical
or economic conditions dictate (e.g. an estate with SSEG capabilities) [60]. In the third-party
energy trading model, trading within this kind of micro-grid was deemed infeasible due to the
economies of scale required to function as a third party energy trader [334]. In the wheeling
trading model, however, this technicality is no longer relevant and, as such, grid-tied micro
grids are included in the functional network related thereto. A final key difference between the
network in question and the one described above, is that during a preliminary market analysis
several municipalities were identified to be interested in the dynamic fee trading solution Switch
will be able to provide if it elects to adopt the wheeling business model (see link T3.7).
As may be seen in Figure 12.3, the functional network induced by the second feature deemed
core to the problem considered (i.e. the financial difficulties that characterise it) is slightly less
involved than the one discussed prior. That is, seven entities were deemed affected on the
basis of five potential ways of going about raising capital, namely acquiring a lone, procuring
venture capital, organising an initial coin offering7, joining a business incubator, or partnering
with another organisation. Once again, the reader is referred to Table A.1 in Appendix A for a
detailed description of the labelled arrows in Figure 12.3.
The final feature related to the problem considered (i.e. renewable energy mandate), is rather
unique in the sense that instead of corresponding with a particular difficulty experienced, it
simply characterises one of the outcomes pursued by Switch’s founders — the sustainable de-
velopment of the South African energy sector. As such, the functional network induced thereby
contains several entities that operate in the South African context and share in this pursuit. As
depicted in Figure 12.4, the entities deemed affected include several non-profit support organi-
sations, as well as the South African Department of Energy (see Table A.1 in Appendix A for a
detailed description of each of the labelled arrows in the figure).
6Interestingly, only one such enterprise could be identified, PowerX, a Johannesburg-based energy trader [367].
7An initial coin offering is a type of capital funding using cryptocurrencies [109].
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Figure 12.3: A functional network induced by the financial requirements associated with the problem
considered.
Figure 12.4: A functional network induced by the renewable mandate associated with the problem
considered.
Figure 12.5: A functional network induced by the combination of the financial requirements and the
renewable mandate associated with the problem considered.
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Before continuing to the next phase of the analysis, there is a final segment in the functional net-
work related to the problem considered that has to be discussed. During the execution of Step 3
it was determined that the combination of the financial and the renewable qualities described
above results in a unique subset of affected entities. More specifically, several organisations were
identified to invest only in technology-driven innovations specifically aimed at furthering South
Africa’s sustainable development. As may be seen in Figure 12.5, this includes the South African
National Energy Development Institute and the Development Bank of Southern Africa8. The
reader is again referred to Table A.1 in Appendix A for a detailed description of each of the
labelled arrows in the figure.
The remainder of the analysis consisted of two parts, Step 4, aimed at investigating the nature
and measure of the power entities deemed affected possess, and Step 5, aimed at determining
whether, and if so, why the power these entities possess is, in fact, relevant. Although executed
in sequence, the aforementioned methodological steps are presented in tandem. That is, for each
entity deemed affected, an analysis of the extent, and the relevance of its power is presented in
Table 12.1. As may be seen in the table, the first column contains a numeric label that corre-
sponds with the numeric tag placed in the top right-hand corner of each of the coloured boxes in
the functional network presented in Figures 12.2–12.5, while the second and third columns are
dedicated to a description of the nature, and relevance of entities’ power, respectively. Note that
where applicable, the evaluation of entities’ power is conducted separately for the two trading
models considered.
Based upon the enquiry documented in Table 12.1, a total of fourteen entities were selected as
primary stakeholders to the problem considered9. That is, the National Energy Regulator of
South Africa, prosumers with SSEG capabilities, consumers equipped with smart meters, Eskom,
local municipalities, grid-tied micro-grid owners, Eldo, Blockstarters, the South African Renew-
able Energy Business Incubator, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, PowerX,
Energy Exchange, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, and finally, one of the directors
of the Development Bank of Southern Africa.
In accordance with the power analysis checklist, originally presented in §9.2.1, the aforemen-
tioned entities were selected as stakeholders either because they possessed the power to inhibit
the implementation of a solution proposed to the problem considered, or because they possessed
power of considerable utility thereto. To elucidate, the National Energy Regulator of South
Africa was selected as stakeholder as it is responsible for adjudicating both third-party energy
trading licence applications and the validity of newly proposed energy trading pricing strategies.
Prosumers and consumers were included as they are fundamentally linked to Switch’s success
— unless they are interested in Switch’s value-offering, it will fail. Eskom and local municipal-
ities, on the other hand, were selected because of the measure of control they possess over the
South African electricity distribution network, which, interestingly, grants them the ability to
either frustrate or facilitate the pursuit of Switch’s objectives. Grid-tied micro-grid owners were
deemed stakeholders as they are proprietors of a context seemingly well-suited to the pursuit
of Switch’s future development, while Blockstarters and the South African Renewable Energy
Business Incubator were included due to their expertise in blockchain-based and renewable en-
ergy driven business development, respectively. Of the entities that remain, Eldo was selected as
stakeholder because of its potential as partner-firm, the Development Bank of Southern Africa
was selected because of its capacity to provide capital funding, one of its directors was included
8Significantly, one of the directors of the Development Bank of Southern Africa was identified as being a
personal acquaintance of one of Switch’s founders.
9This does not imply the that remaining entities are irrelevant, simply that a selection had to be made.
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Table 12.1: An analysis of the power possessed by, and the disposition of, the entities deemed affected
during Step 3 of the methodology.
label Power description Power Relevance
1 Status power in its operational infrastruc-
ture (e.g. developed hardware and soft-
ware), clientele, brand reputation, and
domain-specific knowledge.
This entity may be approached as a
source of insight into the difficulties of op-
erating as a third-party energy trader.
2 Customary power in its legislative au-
thority, and status power in its domain-
specific knowledge.
Legally, a lawyer has to certify the power
purchasing agreement Switch’s founders
must submit in order to qualify for a
third-party energy trading licence.
3 As the legal body responsible for ad-
judicating whether or not Switch may
operate as a third-party energy trader
and/or whether it may implement the dy-
namic fee trading strategy it proposes,
this entity possesses considerable struc-
tural power.
Third-party trading: Unless this en-
tity approves Switch’s trading licence ap-
plication and grants it permission to
implement the fee structure it utilises,
Switch will not be able to enter the energy
market as a third-party energy trader. It
is worth noting that there seems to be
significant difficulty in attaining the li-
cence in question. Of the companies that
have applied, only one has been success-
ful [334].
Wheeling Notably, if Switch pursues
this option, no trading licence will be re-
quired, but this entity will still have the
power to disallow Switch from implement-
ing a dynamic-fee pricing strategy.
4 This entity possesses considerable neces-
sity power as Switch’s success depends
upon its willingness to adopt the afore-
mentioned dynamic fee pricing strategy.
Unless this entity is interested in the busi-
ness model Switch’s founders select, the
likelihood of Switch’s success decreases
substantially.
5 Unless this entity elects to utilise the en-
ergy trading platform Switch’s founder
has developed, its vision of an energy
trading South Africa will fail (no mat-
ter the trading model its founders select).
Consequently, the entity in question pos-
sesses considerable necessity power.
This entity is considered a gatekeeper to
the outcomes Switch’s founders pursue.
Switch will only succeed if this entity is
interested in the energy trading platform
its founders elect to implement.
6 This entity falls under the governance of
the department of public enterprises, and
controls a portion of the South African
distribution network. It thus possesses
considerable structural power. Addition-
ally, this entity possesses some neces-
sity power as it is fundamentally linked
to Switch’s future development. Finally,
this entity possesses considerable status
power in its expansive network of connec-
tions.
This entity is considered one of the most
powerful entities in the South African en-
ergy sector. Switch will, for example, not
be able to operate in a certain portion of
the country’s distribution network unless
this entity grants it permission to do so
(no matter the trading model its founders
select).
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Table 12.1 (continued): An analysis of the power possessed by the entities deemed affected during Step 3
of the methodology.
label Power description Power Relevance
7 This entity forms part of South Africa’s
provincial governance structure, and is,
furthermore, the official proprietor of a
large portion of the country’s electricity
distribution network. As such, it pos-
sesses significant structural power. This
entity also possesses considerable neces-
sity power as Switch’s future development
depends upon its willingness to grant
Switch access to the distribution network
it controls. Finally, this entity possesses
considerable status power in the network
of connections it has access to.
This entity is one of the primary gate
keepers of Switch’s future development.
Unless it is interested in the operational
value Switch has to offer, no progress will
be made toward realising Switch’s objec-
tives (no matter the trading model its
founders select).
8 This entity possesses status power as a
result of the domain-specific knowledge it
holds in respect of the South African en-
ergy sector, and the network of connec-
tions it has access to.
This entity could be approached as an ex-
pert in the energy sector in an attempt
to verify the validity of Switch’s business
plan. Additionally, the network of con-
nections it has access to could be utilised
as link to potential investors.
9 This entity possesses a degree of incapaci-
tation power. If it is not satisfied with the
general changes incurred upon the South
African energy sector as a result of the
dynamic fee trading strategy Switch in-
corporates, it may attempt to sabotage
the pursuit of Switch’s objectives.
Depending upon how the electricity mar-
ket responds, this entity may sustain
losses as a result of Switch’s approach
to energy trading. If this occurs, it may
attempt to inhibit Switch’s development.
Although this seems unlikely, the possi-
bility should be noted.
10 This entity possesses considerable neces-
sity power as Switch’s energy trading
software solution cannot be implemented
without its participation.
This entity is another gatekeeper to
Switch’s development. Despite its lack of
structural power, the necessity power it
possesses provides it with the influence to
either seriously deter or facilitate Switch’s
development.
11 Status power in the network of connec-
tions it has access to.
The relevance of this entity’s power is un-
clear. Its network of connections within
the energy sector may lead to valuable in-
sights and/or partnerships.
12 This entity possesses considerable neces-
sity power as it controls a third kind of
distribution network in which Switch may
attempt to establish an energy trading
platform.
While the power possessed by this en-
tity is limited in its capacity to inhibit
Switch’s development, it holds significant
potential in facilitating the realisation of
the goals Switch’s founders pursue.
13 Status power in its operational infras-
tructure, clientele, brand reputation, and
domain-specific knowledge.
This entity may be approached as a
source of insight into the difficulties of
operating as an energy trading software
provider.
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Table 12.1 (continued): An analysis of the power possessed by the entities deemed affected during Step 3
of the methodology.
label Power description Power Relevance
14 Status power in the form of capital. The power possessed by this entity may
grant Switch’s founders access to capi-
tal without having to subdivide the com-
pany’s equity shares. This will, however,
result in the responsibility of having to
pay back a loan over a considerable pe-
riod of time.
15 Status power in the form of capital. Potential source of capital. Procuring
capital form this entity will result in the
loss of equity shares.
16 Status power in the form of capital. Potential source of capital. An advan-
tage of this form of capital funding is that
Switch’s founders may maintain complete
ownership of the company. If done right,
furthermore, it has the potential of bring-
ing in a large amount of money.
17 Status power in the form of business sup-
port and access to a network of potential
investors.
Switch is in the early stages of its devel-
opment and could benefit from the busi-
ness development services that this entity
has to offer. This will go hand-in-hand
with granting it a portion of ownership
in Switch. This may, however, be ben-
eficial — Switch will benefit in terms of
its brand’s reputation, and the network of
connections it has access to.
18 Status power in the form of its expertise
in the development of blockchain-based
software, and its ability to provide busi-
ness support.
Being a blockchain-specific business incu-
bator, this entity is certainly relevant to
Switch’s objectives. It would be able to
support Switch in the process of develop-
ing software, and identifying investment
opportunities. It will expect equity shares
in return.
19 Status power in the form of business sup-
port, the extensive network of investors
it has access to and the reputation of its
brand.
Switch could benefit from the business de-
velopment services that this entity has to
offer. This will, however, involve granting
it equity shares.
20 Status power as a result of its expertise
in the energy sector, the network of con-
nections it has access to, the reputation
of its brand, its network of clientele, and
the capital it has access to.
The power possessed by this entity in-
cludes material resources in the form of
capital. This entity will expect equity
shares in return for capital, but it should
be kept in mind that partnering with the
entity in question may result in additional
benefits such as access to clientele, gen-
eral business support, and the opportu-
nity to build upon an established opera-
tional platform.
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Table 12.1 (continued): An analysis of the power possessed by the entities deemed affected during Step 3
of the methodology.
label Power description Power Relevance
21 Status power in the network of connec-
tions it has access to, its brand’s reputa-
tion, and the amount of capital it holds.
This entity could be approached in the
capacity of potential investor and/or link
to a potential investor. Being invested
in by this entity could have considerable
brand reputation benefits.
22 Status power in its network of connec-
tions and the reputation of its brand.
The network of connections available to
this entity could be utilised to identify po-
tential investors.
23 Status power in the network of con-
nections it has access to, its domain-
specific knowledge and the reputation of
its brand.
This entity could be approached as an ex-
pert in the energy sector in order to val-
idate Switch’s business plan, or as a link
to potential investors.
24 As the official custodian of South Africa’s
renewable energy sector, this entity pos-
sesses considerable structural power. It
also possesses status power in the infor-
mation it holds concerning future devel-
opments in the sector in question, and the
network of connections it has access to.
Similar to the Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research, this entity may be
approached as expert in the energy sec-
tor in order to determine the validity of
Switch’s business plan. It may also be
able to connect Switch’s founders to po-
tential investors.
25 This entity possesses considerable status
power as a result of its expertise in, and
domain-specific knowledge about, the en-
ergy sector, its ability to provide business
development support, and the network of
connections it has access to.
This entity could be approached as an ex-
pert in the energy sector in order to verify
the validity of Switch’s business plan. It
could also be a link to potential investors.
26 Status power in its network of connec-
tions (e.g. it is endorsed by African Heads
of State and Government on Climate
Change [23]), and its ability to provide
general business support.
This entity may be approached as link
to potential investors and/or a source of
guidance in respect of Switch’s business
plan.
27 This entity possesses considerable struc-
tural power as its director is second only
to the President on matters pertaining to
the energy sector [128]. It also possesses
considerable status power in the form of
capital, the network of connections it has
access to, and its ability to sway public
opinion.
This entity could be approached in an at-
tempt to draw upon the structural and
status power it possesses. It also has the
capacity to act as investor. It is worth
noting that this entity seems rather diffi-
cult to access.
28 This entity possesses considerable status
power as a result of its expertise in the
energy sector, its network of connections,
the reputation of its brand, and the cap-
ital it has access to.
This entity may be approached in the ca-
pacity of potential investor and/or source
of guidance in respect of Switch’s business
plan. Being invested in by this entity will
have considerable brand reputation ben-
efits.
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Table 12.1 (continued): An analysis of the power possessed by the entities deemed affected during Step 3
of the methodology.
label Power description Power Relevance
29 This entity possesses considerable status
power as a result of the network of con-
nections it has access to, its ability to pro-
vide business support, the reputation of
its brand, and the capital it holds.
This entity may be approached as poten-
tial investor. It provides capital in one
of three ways: Grants, loans and venture
capital.
30 As director of the Development Bank
of Southern Africa, this entity possesses
considerable structural power. It also
possesses a degree of status power in the
network of connections it has access to.
This entity could be approached in an at-
tempt to utilise its influence in order to
procure capital funding from the Devel-
opment Bank of Southern Africa. It is
worth noting that the entity in question is
a personal acquaintance of one of Switch’s
founders.
simply as a means to that end, while the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, PowerX
and Energy Exchange, were each selected as stakeholders because of the expert knowledge they
possess in respect of matters pertaining to the South African energy sector.
In conclusion to this section, it is worth noting that by meeting with each of the aforementioned
entities, Switch’s founders were able to identify a viable course of action in respect of Switch’s
future development. That is, they elected to implement a wheeling-based trading strategy, to
do so in the context of municipally-owned distribution networks and privately-owned grid-tied
micro-grids, with the assistance of the South African Renewable Energy Business Incubator (in
return for an equity share), in partnership with Eldo, and funded by the Development Bank of
Southern Africa.
12.3 Applying the decision-making checklist
In §9.3, the decision-making checklist was described as a method designed to facilitate the
mitigation of the irrational influence in the mechanisms of human decision making. In order
to evaluate the validity of this claim, the method in question was applied to the context of
interest in this chapter. More specifically, it was deemed strategically appropriate to subject
the decisions made by Switch’s founders in respect of its future development to the version
of the decision-making checklist presented in §11.2. Notably, in the spirit of this chapter, the
subsequent discussion of this evaluation is biased in respect of insight gained.
One of the first insights uncovered during the application of the decision-making checklist con-
cerns the augmentation of Switch’s value-offering to grid-tied micro-grid owners. That is, it was
determined that Switch could rather easily augment its value-offering by further developing its
software application to include functionalities such as water-billing and/or rent-billing, thereby
aiding the aforementioned type of entity. In addition to this realisation, the application of the
method dedicated to affective failures, resulted in Switch’s founders being confronted with the
importance of remaining sensitive to how the South African energy market develops in the near
future as it was possible that third-party energy trading could become more prevalent. When
asked whether this possibility was acceptable, the founders concluded that they had no alterna-
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tive but to pursue the selected course of action as third-party energy trading was not yet feasible
and that time was of the essence.
The application of the fourth method in the decision-making checklist resulted in two rather
interesting discoveries. In respect of the first, recall that one of the core benefits claimed to
characterise Switch’s value-offering, is that it furthers the vision of a more sustainable South
Africa. Although this may be true in general, a technicality was uncovered that may do this
claim some harm in the eyes of potential clients situated in municipally-owned distribution
networks. In particular, it was uncovered that because of the way in which the South African
distribution network functions, clean and dirty energy cannot be distributed separately (there
is only one distribution network). This means that although Switch may be able to facilitate
peer-to-peer energy trading from a remunerations point-of-view (i.e. a specific producer will
be paid by a specific consumer), there is no way of ensuring that the actual energy used by a
particular customer is the (clean) energy produced by a particular producer. Ultimately, this
was interpreted as another factor suggesting that grid-tied micro-grids was a context better
suited to the pursuit of Switch’s development10.
The second insight gained during the application of the aforementioned method concerns the
founders’ decision to partner with Eldo. The method in question entails re-evaluating any
information that contradicts the appropriateness of a selected decision option, and it was during
the execution of this task that one of Switch’s founders revealed that despite the agreement
to partner, Eldo was in the process of developing a product “similar” to its own together with
a competitor (i.e. Powerx). To the surprise of the author, the founders were initially rather
unconcerned by this reality. Based upon further investigation, however, the founders came to
agree that the contract between themselves and Eldo had to include precautionary clauses so
that they could not be hoodwinked.
The final method in the decision making checklist, dedicated to counteracting the tendency
whereby information believed to be contrary to the dominant opinion in a group, revealed two
last points of concern. The first was that Switch’s founders had yet to confirm the compati-
bility of their software with the particular kind of smart-meters utilised in municipally-owned
distribution networks and/or privately-owned grid-tied micro-grids. The second was that the le-
galities surrounding the conversion of power purchasing agreements into blockchain-based smart
contracts had yet to be investigated.
To conclude this section, the reader is referred to Appendix B, containing a copy of a review
provided by one of Switch’s founders concerning the utility of the methods applied to the context
of this chapter.
12.4 Chapter summary
This chapter was devoted to an account of the practical application of the meta-methodology
proposed in this dissertation in a final attempt to evaluate its utility in facilitating the solution
of real-world problems. The chapter opened in §12.1 with a brief introduction to the problem
considered, and this was followed in §12.2 and §12.3 with a discussion of actual application of
the meta-methodology proposed.
Notably, a quality that was particularly salient during its application, was the importance of
a good fit between practitioner and methodology. That is, as a by-product of a dedication to
10In the context of a micro grid, prosumers, consumers and the energy they trade remains isolated from the
general distribution network.
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general applicability, it became evident that there were a few technicalities involved in addressing
the problem considered which had not explicitly been accommodated in the meta-methodology
(e.g. considering the disposition of affected entities in respect of Switch’s development). During
a meeting with the expert analyst introduced in §2.3, it was determined that despite placing a
greater measure of responsibility upon future practitioners, this quality was acceptable as the
scope of applicability associated with the meta-methodology was one of its core strengths, one
that would be lost if any alteration was made thereto in order to tailor it to a specific kind of
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This chapter is dedicated to an inquiry into the dynamics that govern the mechanisms of human
interaction in the context of an endeavour by the mathematical modelling thereof. The inquiry
commences with the introduction of a governing assumption in §13.1, followed by an abstract
mathematical description of the relationship between the mechanisms of gain and power in §13.2
and §13.3. The effect of infeasibility upon this relationship is then briefly discussed in §13.4,
after which an analysis of the proposed model is conducted in §13.5. Next, an extension to
the model is presented in §13.6 and §13.7, and this is followed in §13.8 by the generalisation
of a result related to the manner in which entities compete in an endeavour, depending on the
properties that characterise it. The chapter is finally brought to a close with a short summary
in §13.9.
13.1 Rationality as a governing assumption
It is likely impossible to fully capture the extensive range of dynamics relevant to the meta-
methodological process introduced in the previous chapter. That does not, however, liberate
one from the responsibility of attempting such an exposition. Accordingly, instead of shying
away from the challenge, the scope of dynamics to be considered in this chapter is limited to
a selection of those involved in the competitive interaction of stakeholders in an endeavour,
and furthermore, are studied under highly idealised conditions. Before proceeding with such an
exposition, it is acknowledged that the model presented in this chapter is not a tool designed to
facilitate real-world optimisation; instead its purpose is twofold: To present the reader with a
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manner in which to conceptualise the context of an endeavour, and to venture to uncover certain
dynamics related thereto which may otherwise be hidden from a purely contemplative analysis1.
It should be evident from the literature review of Chapters 3 and 4 that the dynamics which
dominate stakeholder interaction relate to either the cognitive or social mechanisms of the self.
In order to discuss these mechanisms, and subsequently model them, it is necessary to employ
the following governing assumption:
A1. The nature of decision making. Whenever an entity is presented with several decision
options, its intention will be to employ its cognitive capacity in a manner that an objective
party would consider rational — that instances of poor decision making are examples of
occasions on which entities were unable to employ the mechanisms of human decision
making appropriately, and that such cases do not represent the norm, but the exception.
This assumption is the first of several that escort this work from what constitutes reality, to
what one may consider highly idealised conditions. Nonetheless, to illustrate that the above
assumption is not entirely unrealistic, the cognitive and social mechanisms related thereto are
discussed in slightly more detail. Or rather, the most common instances in which Assumption A1
does not hold are discussed to illustrate that such cases are not entirely ubiquitous. Fortunately,
these cases have, in fact, already been described. Recall the notion of a cognitive error defined
in §9.3 to represent the case in which the cognitive mechanisms of the mind fail to respond
appropriately to a presented decision option. And similarly, recall the notion of a social error
defined in §9.3 to represent the case in which certain qualities in an entity’s environment cause a
misalignment between the outcomes it would pursue if it were not influenced by its environment,
and the temporary context-imposed outcomes it pursues. It follows that in order to defend
Assumption A1 it is necessary to illustrate that the cases of the cognitive and the social error
are, in fact, the exception rather than the rule. In terms of the cognitive error this should,
however, be rather obvious as the entirety of Chapter 3 was dedicated to an explication of just
that fact. Consequently, despite the reality of cognitive errors, the governing assumption can
be considered to remain intact in that respect. The case of the social error is somewhat more
difficult to defend.
As described in §4.2.2, the (occasionally) variable nature of the self can be traced back to the
notion of a working self-concept. More specifically, a contextually activated working self-concept
can influence an entity’s inner-working so that the inner variability of its social state manifests
itself in the form of irregular behaviour [105]. In such a case the foundation from which decisions
are being made is temporarily misaligned with the objectives the entity would have pursued if
it were not influenced by the social dynamics of the environment. Toward understanding the
true nature of the variability that exists in the real-time nature of the self, the importance
of consistency in behaviour, as noted in §4.1, deserves repeating. Importantly, the variability
in the social state of the self does not operate in an unrestrained manner, but co-exists with
other conflicting influences, one of which is the inherent value the human psyche places upon
consistency in behaviour. Moreover, it should be noted that an individual’s self-concept is not
contained within only its social component. As defined in §4.2, the universal self consists of three
components, namely the individual self, the relational self, and the collective self. Significantly,
the changing nature of the working self-concept is contained within the mechanisms of the
relational and collective selves. In other words, the individual self represents the part of the
universal self that values consistency in behaviour and stands in conflict with the changing nature
of the collective and relational selves. The question of interest is thus which of these selves can
be described as dominant? Although there is not complete agreement in the academic literature
1Such findings should be interpreted with respect to the idealised conditions under which they are uncovered.
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in this respect, the majority of researchers hold that the hierarchy among these elements is as
follows: First the individual self, then the relational self, and finally the collective self [408]. In
other words, consistency in behaviour dominates variability and consequently, Assumption A1
is appropriate.
In summary, although the discourse in this section is in no way a denial of the fact that human
perception is vulnerable to irrational influences — the entirety of this dissertation, and more
specifically, the two cases discussed above, acknowledges this potential for irrational decision
making. What is, however, assumed is threefold: That entities are never intentionally irrational,
that instances of irrational decision making are the exception rather than the rule, and similarly,
that instances of rational, but poor, decision making are also the exception rather than the rule.
Consequently, the intent of Assumption A1 is not to contradict what has been said before — it
is to argue that individuals will attempt to make decisions in such a way that harmony exists
between their understanding of a problematic situation, their perception of the consequences of
a specific decision option, the outcomes they are pursuing and the actual decision that is made,
and furthermore, that they will attempt to do this in a rational fashion.
13.2 The tracery of rationality
When faced with several decision options, it is considered rational to note one’s pursued out-
comes, relate those outcomes to one’s ability in realising them and proceed to select a decision
option that maximises one’s expected gain within the overlap of gain and ability [134]. This
description of rational choice illustrates the central role played by the ability to realise pursued
outcomes and the expected gain of those outcomes in the selection of a rational decision op-
tion. In order to elicit dynamics related to the interaction between several competing entities,
a good place to start is thus to describe the two elements that tend to dominate each entity’s
individual (assumed rational) decision making process (i.e. an entity’s realisation ability and
the expected gain associated with the outcomes pursued). More specifically, the question of
interest is whether one can mathematically describe the relationship between an entity’s level of
realisation ability and the measure of gain it can expect with respect to outcomes pursued and,
furthermore, whether such a description may be leveraged to uncover intricacies related to the
competitive interaction of individuals that may be hidden from a purely contemplative analysis.
What makes such an exposition difficult is the fact that the nature of the elements constituting
realisation ability and expected gain typically depend on the system in which they are described.
Consequently, the notions by which these elements are represented have to be tailored to the
specific kind of system in which they are employed. It is thus necessary to define two tailor-
made elements by which realisation ability and expected gain can be represented specific to the
context of an endeavour. Before embarking on such an exposition, however, there are several
assumptions, elements, and properties pertaining to the working of an endeavour that require
clarification. First and foremost, the following assumption should be noted with respect to the
model proposed in this chapter:
A2. The theoretical nature of what follows. The current investigation into the dynamics of
realisation ability and expected gain is conducted in a theoretical capacity and, as such,
the elements relevant to it are assumed fully known, and thus, accurately describable.
Secondly, it is necessary to define the notion of an entity formally. An entity represents a single
or collective group of individuals working toward the realisation of a collective set of outcomes
within the context of an endeavour. In other words, the pursuit of a single outcome not shared
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distinguishes one entity from another. Another notion in need of definition is that of a pursued
outcome. In the context of an endeavour, a pursued outcome simply represents a certain objective
i pursued by a certain entity x. For every entity x it is therefore possible to describe a set of
objectives Ix that represents the outcomes pursued by that entity. It follows, furthermore, that
one can define a complete set of objectives I = ∪xIx representing the collection of generally
pursued outcomes within an endeavour. Importantly, among any two objectives2 i, j ∈ I, there
may exist a degree of correlation — a notion not be confused with the practical reality of entities
working together in the spirit of collaboration. The following assumption is made with respect
to the modelling of entities:
A3. The competitive entity. The interaction among the entities of an endeavour is assumed to
be fundamentally competitive — entities are considered to value only the attainment of
their own objectives.
Consequently, the notion of objective correlation cannot be likened to a group of investors
aggregating their capital for mutual benefit3. It simply represents the unintended overlap of the
practical outcomes represented by two or more objectives. With these dynamics in mind, the
elements representative of realisation ability and expected gain may now be introduced.
Toward describing the mechanisms of expected gain, recall the notion of effect, defined in §9.2.1
to represent the degree to which an entity is influenced by the outcome of an endeavour. There
are several points of similarity between this notion, and what expected gain has been designed
to represent. More specifically, the measure of gain of an entity x expected in the pursuit of
an objective i ∈ Ix, denoted by Gix, is representative of any form of benefit anticipated in the
pursuit of that objective in the context of the same functional network employed to define the
notion of effect in §9.2.1. The gain expected in the pursuit of an objective i is thus representative
of the positive component of effect pertaining to the pursuit of i.
In like manner, the description of realisation ability also employs an element previously defined.
The notion of power, defined in §9.2.1 to represent an entity’s capacity to influence the decisions
made by another entity, and the ability to realise outcomes pursued, represent the same dynamic.
As such, the elements that constitute the notion of power represent the mechanisms by which
outcomes pursued are realised within the context of an endeavour. In other words, the ability
of entity x to realise pursued outcomes can be described in terms of power possessed (i.e.
assuming that the measure of an entity’s power can, in fact, be determined according to some
scale). Furthermore, because the measure of entities’ power may differ for different objectives,
it is beneficial to describe its measure with respect to a specific objective i ∈ I. Accordingly,
the realisation ability of an entity x in the pursuit of an objective i is described in terms of its
measure of power possessed in the pursuit of objective i, denoted by P̃ ix. It follows that the
notion of this power links back the dimension defined to constitute the notion of power in §9.2.1.
As one cannot compare apples with pears, the issue of unit conversion must be addressed before
relating the mechanisms of power to that of expected gain. To that end, P̃ ix is normalised in







2The label assigned here to a specific objective refers to its membership of the set of generally pursued objectives
I, and not the entity-specific set of pursued objectives Ix.
3Such a group of investors would be considered a single entity.
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where P ix represents the unitless measure of power contributed toward the pursuit of an objective
i ∈ Ix by an entity x in the unit interval [0, 1]. An important point should be noted here.
Although it is possible to describe the relationship between expected gain and possessed power
in general in terms of P ix, it is deemed unwise to do so at this point in the discussion as such
an analysis would be exceedingly difficult to carry out. A more appropriate strategy is first to
introduce perhaps the simplest mathematical form describing the relationship between possessed
power and expected gain, and then proceed to increase the complexity thereof incrementally.
To that end, a more general element — the total measure of effective power associated with the
pursuit of a particular objective i ∈ I by the entities partaking in the endeavour is denoted by
P i. In other words, while P ix quantifies the power contributed by a single entity x in the pursuit
of a certain objective i ∈ Ix, P i quantifies the total power effective in the pursuit of i (i.e. not
specific to a single entity). As will be illustrated subsequently, P i depends on several unitless
parameters, and it too is unitless.
The notion of power has been described relative to a specific objective, and so it is necessary
to apply a similar modification to the notion of gain expected. Fortunately, however, because
of the nature of the elements that constitute it, an endeavour possesses the rather interesting
property that the measure of gain expected by an entity x in the pursuit of an objective i ∈ Ix is
equal to the combined measure of gain Gi expected in the general pursuit of that objective by all
entities x associated with the endeavour for which i ∈ Ix. As such, although counter-intuitive,
the variables Gix and G
i are essentially equal for all x. To elucidate this claim, objectives by
and large belong to only a single entity because of the competitive nature of an endeavour. The
only case in which entities are able to share in the pursuit of an objective is if they exhibit the
property that the gain attained in the pursuit of that objective can be shared without being





x for any objective i ∈ I, or because of the property above.
In order to describe the relationship between expected gain and power, the variables Gi and P i
are employed. Note the effect of substituting the notion of realisation ability for that of power,
and the notion of an outcome for that of an objective in the description of rational choice with
which this section opened:
When faced with several decision options, it is considered rational to note one’s
pursued objective(s), relate those objectives to one’s measure of power possessed
(with respect to pursuing the objectives in question) and proceed to select a decision
option that maximises one’s expected gain within the overlap of gain and power.
It should be apparent from this description of rational choice that the measure of gain expected
in an entity’s pursuit of an objective depends upon the general measure of effective power
associated with the pursuit of that objective. Because this property holds for each objective
i ∈ I, the gain expected in pursuit of any objective i is proportional to the measure of effective
power generally associated with its pursuit. In other words, noting that Gi and P i represent
these respective measures, it follows that
Gi ∝ P i, i ∈ I. (13.1)
The expected gain Gi is thus an increasing function of P i, such that the pursuit of objectives
within an endeavour can be likened to a balancing act between power possessed and gain expected
— a fact that is certainly insightful, but to truly draw benefit from expression (13.1), it is
necessary to develop it further. Before doing so, however, another point should be made in
respect of the kind of system for which the model proposed in this chapter is relevant. It should
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be apparent that the dynamics related to an endeavour that enters, and remains in, a state of
chaos will not follow the expression in (13.1). As such, the arguments that follow are relevant
only to endeavours that conclude in a state of order4.
13.3 The mechanisms of power
The pursuit of an objective was described in the previous section as a balancing act between
power possessed and gain expected. As power constitutes the independent component of these
elements, it is appropriate to proceed with its explication. The measure of effective power P i
associated with the pursuit of an objective i ∈ I contains two dimensions: The total measure
of power working toward its realisation, denoted by T i, and the total measure of power working
against its realisation, denoted by Ci. In order to define these elements more formally, several
assumptions related to the pursuit of objectives in the context of an endeavour should be noted.
The first of these assumptions addresses the nature of the variable P ix, defined in the previous
section to represent the measure of power possessed by an entity x with respect to the pursuit
of objective i. The following assumption is made in order to model the competitive pursuit of
objectives within an endeavour.
A4. The nature of power possessed. It is assumed that the measure of power P ix of an entity x
with respect to the pursuit of an objective i contains only the portion of its power that
works toward maximising the attainment of i.
As such, the only way in which an entity can reduce the attainment of an objective, is if it
pursues the realisation of another objective negatively correlated to it. The degree of correlation
between two objectives i, j ∈ I is denoted by the parameter δij ∈ [−1, 1], where a positive
value of δij represents positive correlation between the objectives, and a negative value of δij
represents negative correlation between objectives. Now consider an entity x working toward the
realisation of the objectives in Ix. It should be apparent that if provided with such information,
an entity would concern itself only with the objectives in the set I \Ix that are actually capable
of influencing the pursuit of the objectives in Ix (i.e. objectives in I \ Ix that share a degree
of correlation with the objectives in Ix). Furthermore, based upon Assumption A1, it should
be apparent that an entity x would typically not participate in the pursuit of any objective
j ∈ I \ Ix for which δij ≤ 0, for any i ∈ Ix, but that it may, if possible, want to participate
in the pursuit of an objective j ∈ I \ Ix for which δij > 0, for any i ∈ Ix, if doing so furthers
the attainment of i ∈ Ix. Upon defining the set I+x to represent the union of the set Ix and the
set of objectives j ∈ I \ Ix for which δij > 0, for some i ∈ Ix, the following assumption is thus
made:
A5. The case of bounded interest. It is assumed that an entity x will participate only in the
realisation of the select group of objectives in I+x . In other words, the measure of power P ix
possessed by an entity x with respect to the pursuit of an objective i, will only influence
the attainment of i ∈ I directly (i.e. not through the medium of objective correlation) if
it also belongs to the set I+x .
It follows from Assumptions A4 and A5 that the magnitude of T i depends on the measure of
power possessed by entities working toward the realisation of objective i, or some objective j ∈ I
4This assumption does not preclude the potential for chaos to emerge at some point during an endeavour.
Irrespective of what takes place during an endeavour, the discussion presented in this chapter is relevant only to
endeavours that conclude in a state of order.
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positively correlated with i (i.e. if the attainment of objective j increases, that of objective i
will increase accordingly). And similarly, the magnitude of Ci depends on the measure of
power possessed by entities pursuing the realisation of some objective j ∈ I which is negatively
correlated with i (i.e. if the attainment of objective j increases, that of objective i will decrease
accordingly). Before attempting to describe these elements mathematically, it is necessary to
clarify a technicality about the manner in which the measure of an entity’s power is affected by
its employment.
Power was defined in §9.2.1 to exist along four dimensions — form, source, efficacy and potential.
Recall that the dimension labelled source, in fact, contains several formal and informal power
sources. In a practical context, it should be apparent that the employment of such a power
source may result in the reduction of the level of power associated with it (i.e. its potential).
More specifically, if an entity x employs its power P ix towards the realisation of an objective
i ∈ I+x , the power P
j
x possessed by that entity, relevant to another objective j ∈ I+x , may be
affected. Despite the reality of this dynamic, the following assumption is made in order to model
the competitive interaction among the entities of an endeavour:
A6. Independence of power-plays. The employment of the power P ix of an entity x with respect
to the pursuit of an objective i ∈ I+x does not alter that entity’s power P
j
x with respect to
the pursuit of another objective j ∈ I+x , for all i, j ∈ I+x .
The above assumption may seem to be a serious oversimplification of the real world. It should
be noted, however, that three of the five sources of power discussed in §9.2.1 do, in fact, possess
the unique quality that their potential does not diminish with use. More specifically, the only
elements vulnerable to variation as a result of employment are contained in the power sources of
status and incapacitation (and only when they are employed in a coercive fashion). Consequently,
although a simplification, Assumption A6 is more descriptive of the modelled system than not.
With this assumption in mind, two additional variables can now be defined formally. The power






δijP jx , i ∈ I. (13.2)









∣∣∣∣∣, i ∈ I. (13.3)
In (13.2) and (13.3), the reason for summing over only j ∈ I+x and j ∈ I \ I+x , respectively,
lies in Assumption A5. The nature of the elements introduced above is more significant than
it may at first appear. To elicit this significance, it is beneficial to investigate the intricacies of
objective correlation in more detail by means of a hypothetical example.
Example 13.1. Consider the following illustrative example of the nature of objective correla-
tion. Figure 13.1 depicts the correlation of a base-objective A together with three objectives B, C
and D, pursued by four entities a, b, c and d, respectively, according to the following conventions:
First, objectives are modelled as unit-vectors in order to facilitate calculation of the correlation
of one objective with another. Secondly, the degree of correlation δij between two objectives i and
j is represented by the counter-clockwise angle θAj ∈ [0, π] between them, where θAj = cos−1 δAj
for j ∈ {B,C,D} (i.e. if θAj < π2 , then objectives A and j are positively correlated, while if
θAj > π2 , the objectives A and j are negatively correlated).
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Figure 13.1: The alignment of objectives with the base-objective, labelled A.
According to the conventions introduced above, it follows that the degree of correlation between
objective A and any other objective j ∈ {B,C,D} is the vector component of A in the direction
of j, and vice-versa. The degree of correlation between the objectives A and B in Figure 13.1,
can thus be expressed as cos θAB, while sin θAB represents the magnitude of the component of
objective B independent of A, as depicted in Figure 13.2.
Figure 13.2: The vector components of objective B in the direction of objective A and perpendicular
to it, where cos θAB represents the degree of correlation between objectives A and B.
By determining the respective vector components of objectives B,C,D in the direction of ob-
jective A, the interaction between objectives A,B,C and D can be captured with respect to only
the components of objectives B, C and D that are actually relevant to the pursuit of objective
A, as depicted in Figure 13.3.
Figure 13.3: The vector components of objectives B, C and D that are relevant to the pursuit of
objective A.
The practice of neglecting the components of objectives that are independent of one another,
is useful when modelling the interaction between the entities of an endeavour. To illustrate this,
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note that the components of objectives A, B, C and D in Figure 13.3 are, in fact, fundamental
to the measure of TA and CA. More specifically,
TA = cos θAAPAa + cos θ
ABPBa + cos θ
ABPBb + cos θ
AAPAb ,
where PAa represents the power possessed by entity a in the pursuit of objective A, cos θ
AA =
1 represents the degree of correlation between objectives A and A, PBa represents the power
possessed by entity a in the pursuit of objective B, cos θAB represents the degree of correlation
between objectives A and B, PBb represents the power possessed by entity b in the pursuit of
objective B, and PAb represents the power possessed by entity b in the pursuit of objective A.
Similarly,
CA = cos θADPDd ,
where PDd represents the power possessed by entity d in the pursuit of objective D, and cos θ
AD
represents the degree of correlation between objectives A and D. Note that the reason for not
considering5 the power of entities a and b with respect to objective D, resides in Assumption A5.
Like the elements that constitute them, the scalars TA and CA are unitless and, furthermore,
the influence of all objectives relevant to the pursuit of A are contained in these quantities. 
The fact that T i and Ci contain the influence of all objectives j ∈ I relevant to the pursuit of
objective i ∈ Ix make it possible to describe the effective measure of power P i as a function of
T i and Ci. In order to derive the form of the function P i(T i, Ci) it is necessary to elicit the
practical dynamics one would expect from the interaction between P i, T i and Ci. As described
in §9.2.1, stakeholders relevant to an endeavour are selected either because of their capacity
to affect the outcome of that endeavour, or because of the degree to which they are affected
thereby. In other words, if an entity is selected as a stakeholder, the concerns of that entity are
deemed both significant and relevant. As such, the following assumption is made regarding the
system being modelled:
B1. The resilience of power. The measure of power working toward the realisation of an ob-
jective can never be made entirely redundant by the measure of power working against
its realisation. Essentially, the only way an objective can be excluded from consideration
is if the effective measure of power P i associated with its pursuit is zero, and as P i is
determined according to the degree to which the value of T i compares with that of Ci, the
only way that can happen is if the total measure of power T i working toward its realisation
is zero.
As eluded to in Assumption B1, the effective measure of power P i associated with the pursuit of
an objective i depends on the partition of T i into two components (according to the comparative
magnitudes of T i and Ci): One component representing the portion of T i that is effective in
the pursuit of objective i, and the other representing the portion of T i that is ineffective in
the pursuit of objective i, as a result of Ci. According to the definition of P i, it follows that
P i is the component of T i effective in the pursuit of objective i. This can be modelled by
the assumption that P i ∝ T i, where the non-constant coefficient of proportionality is itself
a proportion describing the manner in which the quantities T i and Ci compare. Obviously,
there are many functional forms that may adequately represent this non-constant coefficient of
5Objective C has been neglected from consideration as it plays no part in the pursuit of objective A.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
190 Chapter 13. The mechanisms of interaction
proportionality, while simultaneously satisfying Assumption B1. The simplest of these functional




T i + Ci
)
× T i (13.4)
of the effective power P i associated with the pursuit of an objective is proposed. The expression
in (13.4) captures the dynamics expected from the interaction between P i, T i and Ci adequately
and, as such, is deemed an appropriate example of a form descriptive of the function P i(T i, Ci).
Furthermore, for the sake of an argument subsequently made, note the following assumption
about the nature of the variables T i and Ci in (13.4).
B2. The unconstrained variation of power. The power T i working toward the realisation of an
objective i can be altered without influencing the power Ci working against its realisation.
In view of the assumption above, the expression in (13.4) can now be employed to describe the
relationship between the gain expected in, and the power associated with, the pursuit of an
objective i ∈ I in a more insightful manner. It follows from (13.1) that the gain expected in the
pursuit of an objective i may be expressed as an increasing function of the manner in which T i
and Ci related to that objective compare, as expressed in (13.4), such that Gi is a function of
P i(T i, Ci).
Together, the expressions presented above describe mathematically the manner in which the
notion of power may translate to that of gain in the context of an endeavour. The logical next
step would be to subject these expressions to an in-depth analysis toward eliciting the dynamics
hidden in the mechanisms of their working. Before conducting such an analysis, however, there
is a final phenomenon that has to be considered — the notion of infeasibility.
13.4 The notion of infeasibility
The notion of infeasibility has been neglected from the preceding theoretical exposition on the
relationship between expected gain and possessed power, as it exists only in a practical capacity.
But, as this discussion is intended for the practically minded thinker, its influence is briefly
addressed in this section. Not surprisingly, the possibility of infeasible pursuits in a practical
context has a constraining effect on the relationship between power and expected gain, so that
an entity may be unable to attain the full measure of gain merited by the power it possesses.
In essence, the notion of infeasibility causes expected gain to be non-proportional to power
for certain measures of power. More specifically, the possibility of infeasibility inhibits the
attainment of gain so that the effective measure of power P i associated with the pursuit of an
objective i may increase without an associated increase in expected gain Gi. Uncovering an
exhaustive set of such cases is not possible in general. It is sufficient simply to take note of the
kind of effect infeasibility may have upon the relationship between power and gain. To that end,
consider the two instances of infeasibility presented in Figure 13.4. Note that for the purpose of
illustration, Gi is briefly assumed to be directly proportional to P i.
Figures 13.4(a) and 13.4(b) depict two cases in which the assumption P i ∝ Gi does not hold.
Figure 13.4(a) represents the case in which no practical solution exists on the line Gi = ciP i
for certain measures of power, called the discrete choice problem. Similarly, Figure 13.4(b)
represents the case in which an increase in power is prevented externally from facilitating an
increase of expected gain, for some P i ∈ [p,∞), called the limited resource problem.
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(a) Discrete choice example (b) Limited resource example
Figure 13.4: Two examples of instances in which infeasibility affects the relationship between power
and expected gain.
13.5 An analysis of the mathematical model
In general, the development of a mathematical model is only as valuable as the hidden complexi-
ties of the modelled phenomena it is able to unveil. The model presented in §13.1–§13.3, derived
to capture (to an extent) the interaction among the entities of an endeavour, is no different.
Accordingly, this section is devoted to an analysis of the model with the purpose of uncovering
such hidden intricacies. More specifically, the subsequent analysis is biased toward elements
relevant to the balance that exists between the notion of expected gain, and that of power.
Recall that (13.4) represents the total measure of effective power P i associated with the pursuit
of a single objective i. In view of the aforementioned bias, the elements that constitute this
notion, and more specifically, the manner in which they affect its value, is of particular interest.
Toward uncovering these dynamics, consider the surface plot of the function P i(T i, Ci) exemplar









Figure 13.5: A surface plot of the function P i(T i, Ci) in (13.4) on the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1].
For the most part, the depicted value of P i for T i, Ci ∈ [0, 1] coincides with what intuition
would suggest. The maximum value of P i, for example, is attained when Ci = 0 and T i = 1,
and similarly, the minimum value of P i is attained on the line T i = 0. Significantly, however,
Figure 13.5 also uncovers a rather surprising dynamic — it would seem that P i is more sensitive
to changes in T i than to changes in Ci everywhere on the unit square [0, 1] × [0, 1]. The truth
of this conjecture may be verified by comparing the absolute values of the partial derivatives of
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In other words, ∂P i/∂T i ≥ |∂P i/∂Ci| for all T i ∈ [0, 1] and Ci ∈ [0, 1] — a result that can also










Figure 13.6: A surface plot of the partial derivatives of P i(T i, Ci) in (13.5)–(13.6) with respect to T i
and Ci on the domain [0, 1]× [0, 1].
The fact that P i in (13.4) is more sensitive to changes in T i than to changes in Ci for all
T i, Ci ≥ 0 is an interesting result. It implies that within any endeavour for which the expression
in (13.4) is relevant, an entity would benefit more from increasing the power working toward the
realisation of its objectives by a certain value, than it would from attempting to decrease the
power working against the realisation of its objectives by the same value. From the expression
in (13.2) it is clear that an entity can accomplish such a change in the value of T i in one of two
ways: By increasing the degree of correlation between objective i and any objective j ∈ I for
which the δij > 0, or by increasing the measure of its own power P jx with respect to any objective
j ∈ I+x . Practically, this could encourage entities to attempt to define their objectives in such
a manner that the degree of their correlation is maximised, while simultaneously preserving the
practical outcomes pursued.
The potential significance of the above result begs the question of its general applicability —
is P i more sensitive to changes in T i for all endeavours satisfying Assumptions B1–B2, or only
for those in which the expression (13.4) is relevant? Before attempting to demonstrate the
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
13.5. An analysis of the mathematical model 193
generality of this phenomenon, there are several general properties of the function P i(T i, Ci)
that merit clarification. Note the general6 boundary conditions
P i(0, Ci) = 0, Ci ≥ 0, (13.7)
P i(T i, 0) = T i, T i ≥ 0, (13.8)
imposed on the function P i(T i, Ci), illustrated graphically in Figure 13.7. These boundary
conditions are appropriate as the power P i associated with the pursuit of an objective i represents
the component of T i that is effective in the pursuit of objective i, which, in turn, depends upon
the manner in which the value of T i compares to that of Ci, as stated in Assumption B1.
Figure 13.7: Boundary conditions imposed on the function P i(T i, Ci).
With these boundary conditions in mind, note that Figure 13.7 depicts another dynamic in
need of clarification — the growth behaviour of the function P i at a general point (T i, Ci), more
formally illustrated in Figure 13.8. As stated, P i represents the component of T i that is effective
in the pursuit of objective i. Noting that this effective/ineffective partitioning of T i depends
upon the manner in which the value of T i compares with that of Ci, it follows that the greater
the value of T i, the greater the effective component of T i, and thus, the greater the value of
P i. Consequently, as depicted in Figure 13.8(a), the rate of change of P i as T i increases, for
a constant Ci, is strictly greater than zero. Note, furthermore, that the second-order rate of
change of P i as a function of increasing T i, for a constant Ci, is strictly non-negative. This is
because the second-order rate of change of P i as a function of increasing T i, for a constant Ci,
essentially represents the extent to which the magnitude of P i changes as a result of changing
T i, as T i increases and Ci is held constant. It follows that as T i increases, for a constant Ci,
the effect that Ci has upon the magnitude of P i will become less and less, but never negligible,
and conversely, the effect of T i upon P i will continually increase. In other words, as depicted in
Figure 13.8(a), the second-order rate of change of P i as a function of increasing T i, for a constant
Ci, is strictly non-negative. For Ci equal to some constant c, furthermore, the function P i(T i, c)
is convex and bounded from below by the line P i = T i + q(c), also depicted in Figure 13.8(a).
Consider Figure 13.8(b), depicting the growth behaviour of P i as a function of increasing Ci, for a
constant T i. As can be seen, the rate of change in P i as a function of increasing Ci, for a constant
T i, is strictly negative. The reason for this is once again related to the effective/ineffective
6Although these boundary conditions are certainly satisfied by the specific function P i in (13.4), it is argued
here that the boundary conditions hold in general as a direct consequence of Assumptions B1–B2.
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(a) (b)
Figure 13.8: (a) The behaviour of P i(T i, Ci) as a function of increasing T i for a fixed value Ci = c,
and (b) the behaviour of P i(T i, Ci) as a function of increasing Ci for a fixed value T i = t.
partitioning of T i. It follows that the greater the magnitude of Ci, the smaller the effective
portion of T i, and thus, the smaller the magnitude of P i. Figure 13.8(b) furthermore illustrates
that the second-order rate of change of P i as a function of increasing Ci, for a constant T i,
is strictly non-negative. This is once again because the second-order rate of change of P i as a
function of increasing Ci, for a constant T i, represents the extent to which the magnitude of
P i changes as a result of changing Ci, as Ci increases and T i is held constant. It follows that
as Ci increases, for a constant T i, the effect T i has upon the magnitude of P i will become less
and less, but never negligible, and conversely, the effect of Ci upon P i will continually increase.
Consequently, for T i equal to some constant t, the function P i(t, Ci) is convex for all Ci ≥ 0.
The dynamics discussed in this, and the previous paragraph, relating to the growth behaviour













≥ 0 for all (T i, Ci) ∈ R+2 . (13.10)
There is one more technicality to describe before attempting to prove the general applicability of
the above result. It is necessary to illustrate the behaviour of the partial derivatives of P i(T i, Ci)
at Ci = 0. It follows from the boundary condition described in (13.8) that an increase in the value
of T i by some constant w, will result in an increase of P i(T i, 0) by the same value w. Similarly,
a decrease in the value of T i by some constant w, will result in the decrease of P i(T i, 0) by the
same value w. Furthermore, based on the Assumption B1, the effect of Ci upon the value of P i
is determined according to the manner in which the value of Ci compares with that of T i. In
other words, the effect of Ci on P i is always diluted such that a change in the value of Ci by











for any T i ≥ 0. With the above properties in mind, the following proposition may be established.
Proposition 13.1. Let P i(T i, Ci) be any function that satisfies the properties described in
Assumption B1 with respect to any endeavour that satisfies Assumption B1–B2. Then the value
of P i will be more sensitive to changes in T i than to changes in Ci, for all T i ≥ 0 and all Ci > 0.
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Proof. According to (13.9), the partial derivative ∂P i/∂T i is both strictly positive and strictly
non-decreasing as a function of (increasing) T i (for any Ci ≥ 0). Furthermore, (13.10) implies
that the negated partial derivative −∂P i/∂Ci is both strictly positive and strictly non-increasing








holds for some value Ci = Ci∗(T
i), it follows from the properties in (13.9)–(13.10) that the
inequality also holds for that fixed value T i and all Ci ≥ Ci∗(T i). It follows from (13.11),
therefore, that the inequality (13.12), in fact, holds universally for all T i ≥ 0 and all Ci > 0.
To confirm the significance of Proposition 13.1 it is necessary to illustrate that there are ample
real-world examples of endeavours that satisfy Assumptions B1–B2, and additionally, that it
is possible to employ Proposition 13.1 in the context of such systems in a manner that is of
value. To address the former matter, consider the practical implications of Assumption B1.
Essentially, the assumption admits any endeavour relating to a real-world system in which the
entities contained therein are forced to coexist despite pursuing conflicting objectives. This kind
of system may exist for several reasons, including, but not limited to: If multiple entities within
a system are fundamentally linked to its purpose, if legislation governing such a system prohibits
the exclusion of certain entities, or if no entity contained in such a system is capable of forcefully
(and lawfully) extinguishing the presence of another.
It should be obvious that there are many real-world systems that exhibit the properties described
above. Consider, for example, any system designed to deliver a product or a service to a set
of customers. The entities contained in such a system can generally be partitioned into one of
three categories, namely owners, employees and customers. It follows that the exclusion of any
of the aforementioned role-players would force the related system into a state of disintegration
— these entities are fundamentally linked to the purpose of the system in which they exist and
must therefore coexist despite pursuing conflicting objectives. Another example of the kind of
system described in Assumption B1 can be found in the fishing industry related to numerous
coastal countries around the world. A reality commonly associated with these countries is the
presence of coastal villages in which people survive by means of informal fishing. Unfortunately,
more often than not, these villages come into conflict with commercial fishing firms operating
along the same coastline [253]. According to international regulations, the amount of fishing
allowed in a certain area is regulated by a strict quota system [252]. As such, commercial fishing
firms that catch fish for profit, and small-scale fishermen who catch fish to survive are typically
forced to share the available quota [253]. Obviously, either entity would be better off without
the other, but because of the official regulations of the system in which they exist, they are
forced to coexist despite pursuing conflicting objectives.
The final assumption, namely Assumption B2, has a rather one-dimensional effect on the kind
of real-world system upon which Proposition 13.1 may be applied. It simply states that it must
be possible to change the value of T i without altering the value of Ci with respect to a certain
objective i. Essentially, this implies that the pool of power with which entities may alter the
measure of T i can never be limited to the power contained in Ci, and vice-versa. There are
very few real-world systems that fail to satisfy Assumption B2. More importantly, none of the
systems presented to be descriptive of Assumption B1, fail to satisfy the properties stipulated
by Assumption B2.
As stated, the final step in validating the significance of Proposition 13.1 is illustrating the utility
thereof in the context of the real-world systems delineated above. Therein lies a considerable
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difficulty — there are several technicalities, relevant to the interaction of competing entities,
that are not addressed in the model derived above. To elucidate, consider that the difficulty of
altering the value of T i and that of Ci will likely be dissimilar in practice, but that the reality of
such variation is not addressed in the model. In other words, although P i has been proven to be
more sensitive to changes in T i than to changes in Ci, thereby suggesting that an entity should
rather attempt to increase the value of T i, than decrease the value of Ci in order to increase
that of P i, it may, in practice, be more effective to do just the opposite. Accordingly, until the
mathematical model presented in this chapter is developed further to incorporate such matters,
it is not possible to illustrate the practical applicability of Proposition 13.1 and, as a result, it
is not possible to fully validate the significance thereof.
To address this shortcoming, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to an extension of the
model derived above by considering phenomena that participate in the act of altering the measure
of power associated with the realisation of objectives pursued in the context of an endeavour.
The first step taken to that end is the introduction of a slight modification to several elements
presented thus far in the section that follows.
13.6 Extension of the model into the temporal domain
In order to capture (to some extent) the mechanisms involved in the alteration of the measure of
power related to the pursuit of an objective in the context of an endeavour, a slight modification
to several of the expressions introduced in the sections prior is required. More specifically, in
order to model the notion of change, it is necessary to incorporate the notion of elapsed time
— change necessitates, per definition, the reality of passing time. In other words, it is no
longer sufficient to describe the measure of power and/or benefit associated with the pursuit
of an objective without addressing the temporal dimension related to it. Table 13.1 contains
an elucidation of the manner in which several parameters and variables introduced thus far are
modified in order to be of utility in the remainder of this chapter.
Table 13.1: A list of modified mathematical elements employed in the remainder of this chapter in
order to model temporal changes to the dynamics of power in the context of an endeavour.
Element Description
P itx The measure of power contributed toward the realisation of
an objective i ∈ Ix by an entity x at time t
δijt The degree of correlation between two objectives i, j ∈ I at
time t
T it The total measure of power working toward the realisation
of an objective i at time t
Cit The total measure of power working against the realisation
of an objective i at time t
P it The measure of effective power associated with the pursuit
of an objective i at time t
Git The measure of gain expected in the pursuit of an objective
i if the power dynamics of an endeavour were to remain
unchanged from time t onwards
Employing the modified elements presented above, the magnitude of power T it working toward
the realisation of an objective i at any time t ∈ [0, s], where t = 0 represents the beginning and
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δijtP jtx , i ∈ I, (13.13)
and the measure of power Cit working against the realisation of an objective i at any time








∣∣∣∣∣, i ∈ I. (13.14)
As stated in §13.5 (and obvious from the above expressions) an entity x can go about changing
the measure of power working toward and/or against its objectives in one of two ways: By
altering the degree of correlation δijt between certain objectives i, j ∈ I, or by altering the
measure of power P jtx possessed by certain entities x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, in such a way that T it and
Cit relative to the objectives in Ix increase and decrease, respectively.
The model extension presented in the section that follows addresses only the dynamics related
to altering the magnitude of power possessed by certain entities in an endeavour, and that the
reality of altering objective correlation is deemed work that may be pursued in future. The
structure of the remainder of this chapter is thus as follows: First, an extended model aligned
with the above specification is presented in §13.7, and, only thereafter, is an attempt made in
§13.8 to generalise Proposition 13.1 taking into consideration the additional dynamics considered.
13.7 A mathematical description of the extended model
In order to facilitate a mathematical description of the mechanisms that govern the possession
of power in the context of an endeavour, a strategy similar to the one adopted in the discussion
of the original model in §13.2 and §13.3 is utilised — the complexity of matters considered is
increased incrementally. Accordingly, the discussion commences with a markedly more general
form of an expression for P jtx , the amount of power possessed by an entity x with respect to the
pursuit of an objective j ∈ I+x at any time t during the course of an endeavour. In particular,
it is assumed that




x for all t ∈ [0, s],
where Ψjtx ∈ [0, 1] represents the proportion of the power of entity x that is actually of utility
in the pursuit of objective j ∈ I+x , and P tx represents the total measure of the power of entity
x irrespective of the pursuit of the objectives in I+x . Although this expression is limited in its
representation of the dynamics involved in the act of altering the measure of an entity’s power,
its adoption is of benefit as it facilitates the development of the elements contained therein. More
specifically, the above expression may be refined by further developing the term P tx therein, so
that









for all t ∈ [0, s], (13.15)
where P 0x represents the total measure of power possessed by an entity x at time t = 0 (i.e. the
start of the endeavour), and ∆τx ∈ (−P 0x ,∞) represents any alteration made to the amount of
power possessed by entity x at time τ ∈ [0, t]. Notably, this form of expression for P jtx reveals
a term that is of particular interest (i.e. the term ∆τx) as it presents the mechanism by which
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the alteration of an entity’s power may be induced. Put another way, the task of explicating ∆τx
and the task of mathematically describing the elements involved in the alteration of an entity’s
power are, for the most part, one and the same. Before embarking on an exposition of this term,
there is a technicality concerning the constituent elements that should be noted.
In §9.2.1, the reader was briefly introduced to the notion of a power-play, then defined to consti-
tute the very mechanism by which one entity may attempt to influence another. In this section,
the topic of exerting influence is revisited with the introduction of a collection of dynamics re-
lated thereto, but the link between these dynamics, and the existence of power-plays has not
yet been addressed. Accordingly, consider the similarity between the definition of the term ∆τx
and that of a power-play. The term ∆τx has been defined to contain the alteration of the power
of an entity x in the context of an endeavour, and the notion of a power-play as constituting
the practical mechanism by which the alteration of the power of an entity x may take place.
Evidently, by linking the underlying coherence of these definitions, ∆τx can be viewed as repre-
senting the effect (in terms of power possessed) of any and all power-plays executed at time τ
upon entity x. It thus follows that the term ∆τx should be defined with respect to the dimensions
that characterise power-plays. That is, their form, denoted by y ∈ {coercive, suasive}, and their
source, denoted by z ∈ {structural, customary, status, necessity, incapasitation}7.
13.7.1 The elements involved in the alteration of power
To facilitate the reader’s understanding of the rather convoluted collection of elements that
constitute the term ∆τx, the utility of an analogous model, based on the laws of mechanics,
is utilised. To avoid confusion, note that despite certain advantageous similarities, the model
presented below is not considered a replication of the dynamics of an endeavour. The purpose
thereof is purely to aid in general understanding by providing a manner in which to conceptualise
the dynamics involved in the alteration of an entity’s power8. With this in mind, the physical
model to which the interaction of the elements contained in ∆τx is considered analogous, is that of
competing entities attempting to move two discrete, rectangular shaped objects on a non-smooth
surface9, in opposing directions, where the displacement of the one object (from some original
position) represents an alteration in the measure of power possessed by one entity, say entity x,
and the displacement of the other represents an alteration in the measure of power possessed by
a second entity (in competition with the first)10. More formally, consider Figure 13.9 depicting a
selection of the dynamics related to the movement of one of these objects (the one representing
the power dynamics11 of entity x, for argument sake). In the remainder of this section, the
elements depicted in Figure 13.9, along with the dynamics they represent in the context of
an endeavour, are introduced incrementally. To that end, consider the hypothetical scenario
presented below.
Imagine that the aforementioned entity x (contained in some endeavour) does not possess the
power it requires to attain its goals and, as such, undertakes to alter its position in the distribu-
tion of power related to the endeavour in question. Notably, there are two ways in which entity
x may go about doing so: By increasing the measure of its own power, thereby increasing T it
for certain objectives i ∈ Ix, or by decreasing the measure of power possessed by its opponent,
7For a review on the dimensions of a power-play see §9.2.1.
8Notably, there are several dynamics relevant to the analogous model that are not addressed as they simply
lack utility in the explication of the phenomena of interest.
9Note that these hypothetical objects are sliding along a groove such that their orientation remains fixed.
10Each of the aforementioned entities may only attempt to move a single object at any one point in time.
11In other words, there exists a second rectangular object, in an identical setup to the one in Figure 13.9, that
relates to the power dynamics of the competing entity, but that is not illustrated.
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Figure 13.9: A model, based on the laws of physics, analogous to the actions of entities attempting to
alter the amount of power possessed by an entity x in the context of an endeavour.
thereby decreasing Cit for certain objectives i ∈ Ix. As the dynamics involved in these courses of
action are equivalent, it is assumed (without loss of applicability to the alternative) that entity
x selects to attempt to alter the measure of its own power and not that of its opponent12 (i.e.
induce a positive value of ∆τx over some time interval). Notably, as the laws of mechanics dictate
that altering the position of an object, like the one depicted in Figure 13.9, requires the exertion
of a certain measure of energy, the mechanisms that govern an endeavour dictate that in order
to aggregate more power, an entity, like the aforementioned entity x, must engage in some form
of activity (i.e. the execution of a power-play) and thereby exert a measure of influence over
some time interval toward achieving that goal.
It does not require any mental gymnastics to assert that the same reality holds for the entity
opposing entity x. Notably, for the assumed case in which entity x attempts to increase its own
power, such opposition entails one of two courses of action: Inhibiting the aggregation of the
power of entity x, or following suite by attempting to aggregate its own power. Assuming that
the first of these courses of action is pursued, it follows that the success thereof depends upon
how the measure of influence exerted by entity x over a time period leading up to, and at time t,
denoted by htxyz, compares with the measure of influence exerted over the same time period, but
by its competitor, say entity r, denoted by f tryz. In the context of Figure 13.9, this dynamic is
considered analogous to how the magnitude of the force F1 exerted to shift the depicted object
to the left, compares with the magnitude of the force F2 exerted to shift the depicted object to
the right13 (at time t). Evidently, the interplay of the forces F1 and F2 plays a central role in
determining whether the object in Figure 13.9 moves to the left, to the right, or not at all.
Despite its centrality to the successful alteration of the power dynamics in an endeavour, an
unconstrained exertion of influence does not guarantee success in such an undertaking. Along
with the measure of exerted influence, there are two additional, equally effectual phenomena that
characterise the execution of any power-play. The first relates to an entity’s skill in the execution
thereof and, the second, to the degree of correlation between the power-play in question and
the realisation of some predefined goal. These phenomena, which are both considered somewhat
analogous to the angles A1 and A2 in Figure 13.9, are more formally described below, starting
with the first.
12In the context of the model in Figure 13.9, this is analogous to entity x electing to dedicate its energy toward
shifting the object depicted in the figure which, as stated, symbolises the power dynamics of entity x, as opposed
to attempting to shift a second object (not depicted) symbolising the power dynamics of the competitor of entity
x.
13Accordingly, the position of the object in the figure, denoted by D, is considered analogous to the amount of
power possessed by entity x, the displacement of the object in the figure is considered analogous to the term ∆τx,
and the magnitude of the force F1 and the force F2 is considered analogous to the effort exerted by entities x
and r in order to increase and decrease the measure of power possessed by entity x, respectively.
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In essence, the relationship between skill and effectiveness is such that if an entity’s skill in
the execution of a power-play increases, the effectiveness of that power-play with respect to the
realisation of its designed purpose, for an equal measure of exerted influence, must also increase,
and similarly, if an entity’s skill in the execution of such a manoeuvre decreases, so too must its
effectiveness. In the context of the model in Figure 13.9, this dynamic is considered analogous
to the effect of altering the angles A1 and A2 in Figure 13.9 such that they approach and recede
from being equal to 90 degrees, respectively. It follows that if either the skill of entity x in
the aggregation of power, denoted14 by ktxyz ∈ [0,∞], or the skill of entity r in the degradation
of power, denoted by btrxy ∈ [0,∞], increases, so too must the effectiveness of the respective
power-plays they execute toward the realisation of their respective goals.
Compared to the notion of skill, it is slightly more difficult to explicate the notion that alternative
power-plays may exhibit differing levels of correlation with respect to the effect they have upon
certain predefined outcomes. Toward elucidating this dynamic, note that the discussion thus
far has, in fact, been governed by the assumption that whenever an entity attempts to alter the
amount of power possessed by itself, or some other entity, the power-play it executes to that
end is intended solely for that purpose. In practice, however, this is not always the case. It
is possible, for example, that a power-play executed in an endeavour, only coincidently aligns
somewhat to the act of altering the distribution of power contained therein, without that being
its intended purpose. In such a case, it is likely that only a portion of the total measure of
influence exerted to execute the power-play in question would actually contribute to the related
alteration in power. The reality of this dynamic becomes even more apparent when one considers
the fact that it is possible for some unknowing third party, not even a part of the endeavour in
question, to alter the distribution of power contained therein unintentionally as a by-product of
pursuing its own outcomes in a more general system (containing both the third party and the
endeavour in question). In such a case, it is once again likely that only a portion of the influence
exerted by the entity in question will actually contribute to the resulting alteration in power in
the smaller endeavour considered — qualifying the aforementioned notion of correlation.
Like an entity’s skill in the execution of a power-play, altering a power-play’s correlation to the
realisation of a certain outcome is considered analogous to altering the orientation of the forces
F1 and F2 in Figure 13.9. Accordingly, the relationship between correlation and effectiveness
is equivalent to that of skill and effectiveness. With respect to the aforementioned entities x
and r, it thus follows that if either the correlation of a power-play executed by entity x to
the aggregation of the power of entity x at time t, denoted by Ωxxt ∈ [0, 1], or the correlation
of a power-play executed by entity r with the degradation of the power of entity x at time
t, denoted by Φxrt ∈ [−1, 0], increases, so too must the effectiveness of the power-plays they
execute, respectively.
Denoted by the friction forces F3 and F4 in15 Figure 13.9, there is a final dynamic to introduce
before proceeding to the formal exposition of the term ∆τx. Unlike any dynamic considered thus
far, the effect thereof is considered analogous to the effect of friction, because, as friction is to
movement, this dynamic is to the alteration of power in an endeavour. More specifically, the
alteration of power in an endeavour does not take place in an unconstrained manner. Instead, the
environment16, both contained in and containing an endeavour, induces a regulatory constraint
upon the alteration of power possessed by entities in an endeavour such that the alteration of
one entity’s power may be inherently more or less difficult than the alteration of another’s. To
illustrate the reality of this dynamic, recall the property that characterises an endeavour: The
14Recall that the subscripts y and z indicate the kind of power-play employed in the exertion of influence.
15Note that the gravitational force F5 in Figure 13.9 is included for the sake of accuracy and does not symbolise
any of the dynamics relevant to the competitive interaction of entities in an endeavour.
16The environment comprises various mechanisms, including social norms, world-views and cultures.
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coexistence of competing entities. Significantly, this property implies that there exists some form
of influence in an endeavour (independent of the actions of a targeted entity) that is capable
of constraining one entity’s ability to decrease the power of another’s. This form of restraint is
considered a function of the amount of power a targeted entity possesses, the amount of influence
an opposing entity exerts, and whether such influence is intended to increase or decrease the
former entity’s power. With respect to the aforementioned entities x and r, these dynamics
imply that there exists a measure of environmentally induced influence that constrains17 both
the ability of entity x to aggregate power at time t, and the ability of entity r to decrease the
power of entity x at time t, denoted by αtx ∈ [0,∞).
13.7.2 Formally modelling the alteration of power
Now that all the dynamics involved in the alteration of the power dynamics of an endeavour
have been introduced, it is possible to formally describe ∆τx. For the sake of convenience, the
collection of elements utilised in its description, are summarised in Table 13.2 below. The first
step in describing ∆τx is the introduction of the term W
τ
xyz which represents the net measure of
influence experienced by an entity x as a result of any power-play executed in the form y and










xrτ bτryz for all τ ∈ [0, t] (13.16)
where t ≤ s, the set N contains all entities n contributing to the aggregation of the power of an
entity x, and the set R contains all entities r contributing to the degradation of the power of






W τxyz − ατx(W τx , P τ−1x ) for all τ ∈ [0, t], (13.17)




x , as the former term reveals the nature
and severity of executed power-plays, and the latter indicates the measure of the power of the





design such that its sign convention is always opposite that of W τx .
Now that an expression for the term ∆τx has been established, it is finally possible to present
the expression
















for all t ∈ [0, s], which represents (at least to some extent) the alteration of power of entity x
during the course of an endeavour. As the reader may recall, Ψjtx ∈ [0, 1] represents the propor-
tion of the power of entity x that is actually of utility in the pursuit of objective j ∈ I+x , and
P 0x represents the total measure of power possessed by entity x at time t = 0. Utilising this
expression, a generalisation of Proposition 13.1 is attempted in the section that follows.
17In the context of the physical model in Figure 13.9, these phenomena can be understood in terms of the
coefficients of friction of the non-smooth surface upon which the object in the figure moves, by stating that these
coefficients of friction depend upon both the direction of movement, as well as the location (i.e. displacement D),
of the object depicted.
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Table 13.2: A list of modified mathematical elements employed to model temporal changes in the
dynamics of power in an endeavour.
Element Description
htnyz The measure of influence contributed to the aggregation of
an entity’s power by an entity n by executing a power-play
of form y and from source z at time t ∈ [0, s]
f tryz The measure of influence contributed to the degradation of
an entity’s power by an entity r by executing a power-play
of form y and from source z at time t ∈ [0, s]
ktnyz The level of skill possessed by entity n in the execution of a
power-play of form y and from source z at time t ∈ (0, t]
btryz The level of skill possessed by an entity r in the execution of
a power-play of form y and from source z at time t ∈ [0, s]
Ωxnt The correlation between a power-play executed by an entity
n to the aggregation of the power of an entity x at time
t ∈ [0, s]
Φxrt The correlation between a power-play executed by an entity
r to the aggregation of the power of an entity x at time
t ∈ [0, s]
αtx The environmentally induced resistance to the alteration of
the power of an entity x at time t ∈ [0, s]
13.8 A generalisation of Proposition 13.1
At the conclusion of §13.5 it was evident that, in order to validate the practical applicability
of Proposition 13.1, the model presented in §13.2 and §13.3 had to be extended. The primary
motivation for the extension is that the original model limited the applicability of the aforemen-
tioned proposition to endeavours characterised by the rather uncommon property that equal
influence exerted toward the modification of either the term T it or the term Cit results in an
equal change in their respective measures. Accordingly, the preceding section was dedicated to
a model extension, capable of replicating (to some extent) the alteration of the distribution of
power in an endeavour such that Proposition 13.1 may be generalised beyond the scope of the
aforementioned property. The purpose of the present section is to utilise the extended model in
an attempt to identify the respective states in an appropriate state space, with respect to which
Proposition 13.1 may be generalised, thereby validating its usefulness18.
Considering Proposition 13.1, it follows that the utility thereof may be generalised to any state
for which one can illustrate that the effectiveness of influence exerted toward increasing one’s
power, is greater than, or at least equal to, the effectiveness of influence exerted toward decreas-
ing the power of one’s opponents (in terms of objective attainment). Toward describing this
property mathematically, consider the hypothetical scenario below.
During the course of an endeavour, two entities, entity a and entity b, find themselves
competing with one another as a result of the objectives they pursue, characterised
by set Ia ∈ {A,B} and the set Ib ∈ {D}, respectively, where δABt > 0 and δADt < 0.
18The model extension presented includes only entity-induced alterations to the distribution of power in an
endeavour. Power changes resulting from external forces such as natural disasters, are not included in the scope
of this work.
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Assuming that only the aforementioned entities a and b are able to alter the distribution of
power among them (the effect of additional entities is addressed subsequently), it follows that
the level of attainment, GAt, associated with the pursuit of objective A at time t ∈ [0, s] is a
function of PAt(TAt, CAt), the measure of power effective in the realisation thereof and, as such,
depends upon how the measure of










































for all τ ∈ [0, t]. In view of the elements that constitute these expressions, consider the courses
of action available to entity a toward altering the distribution of power among itself and entity b
such that an increase the level of attainment GAt associated with objective A is affected. If
entity a elects to improve its ability to compete by increasing its power, it will have to engage
in some activity (i.e. the execution of a power-play of a certain form and source) such that the
value of hτayz, in the first expression above, is larger than zero for some period of time [0, t]. The
intention of such a manoeuvre would be to induce a corresponding ∆τa > 0, thereby resulting in
an increase in TAt. Conversely, if entity a elects to alter the distribution of power among itself
and entity b by decreasing the power of entity b, it will have to engage in some activity (execute
a power-play of the same, or alternative, form and source) such that the value of f τayz, in the
second expression above, is larger than zero for some period of time τ ∈ [0, t]. The intention
this time would be to induce a corresponding ∆τb < 0, thereby resulting in an increase in C
At.
Accordingly, the property governing the generalisation of Proposition 13.1 to certain states in







In view of the above expression, the reader may suspect, and correctly so, that a similar strategy
to that adopted in the original exposition of Proposition 13.1 may be adopted to facilitate its
generalisation. That is, utilising the behaviour of certain partial derivates to uncover the most
effective way for entities to compete, depending upon the features that characterise them and
their opponents. Before proceeding to such an exposition, a pair of assumptions (and a resulting
modelling approach) in respect of the environment’s constraining effect upon the alteration of
power in an endeavour are introduced. The first of these assumptions is as follows:
A7. The constrained alteration of power. The less power an entity possesses, the more con-
strained the degradation of its power such that the measure thereof can never be nullified,
and conversely, the more power an entity possesses, the less constrained the aggregation
thereof.
19This inequality is presented under the assumption that entity A exerts influence in the form of hτayz and f
τ
ayz
by utilising power-plays that are of the same form and source.
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Although not a perfect representation of reality, it is deemed reasonable to assume that less
powerful entities would find it more difficult to aggregate power (and vice-versa), and that the
degradation of an entity’s power becomes increasingly more difficult as the measure thereof
approaches zero (this is, in fact, a property of an endeavour). The second assumption is:
A8. The non-discriminant nature of the environment. The constraining response of the en-
vironment to the attempted alteration of the power of an entity is considered invariant
irrespective of the nature of the manoeuvre utilised to that end (i.e. whether its intended
purpose is to increase or to decrease the power of an entity).
In view of the above assumptions, and the manner in which they limit the environment’s re-
sponse to the alteration of power, it follows that there are a considerable number of functions
applicable to modelling the relationship between the environment and the alteration of power.
Among the collection of such functions, there is one that is both particularly well-suited and
rather uncomplicated, commonly called a sigmoid function. Using this kind of function, the








x ∈ (−∞,∞), (13.22)
where






where the parameter η > 0 alters the slope of the function µ, while the parameter κ > 0 shifts the
curvature thereof to the left or to the right, as depicted in Figure 13.10(a) and Figure 13.10(b),
respectively. Notably, these elements are endeavour-specific and should be selected in accordance
with the properties delineated in Assumption A7.
(a) (b)
Figure 13.10: (a) The effect upon µ(P t−1x ) when increasing η for a fixed value of κ, and (b) the
behaviour of µ(P t−1x ) when increasing κ for a fixed value of η.
Now that the above technicalities have been made salient, the prerogative is to investigate the
applicability of Proposition 13.1 to the state space corresponding to an endeavour. To that end,
the expression in (13.22) is substituted for ατa in (13.19) such that
∂TAt
∂hτayz





Ωaaτkτayz − µ(P t−1a )Ωaaτkτayz
)
dτ ,
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Substituting the above expressions into (13.21), the inequality governing the generalisation of






Ωaaτkτayz − µ(P t−1a )Ωaaτkτayz
)
dτ ≥∣∣∣∣δADtΨDtb ∫ t
0
(





Note that the term Φbatbτayz − µ(P t−1b )Φ
baτ bτayz in the above inequality is, per definition, posi-
tive20. Consequently, the above expression may be modified such that the absolute value does







baτ bτayz − µ(P t−1b )Φ
baτ bτayz)dτ∫ t
0 (Ω
aaτkτayz − µ(P t−1a )Ωaaτkτayz)dτ
. (13.23)
Although this form of the inequality does little to reveal any general insight concerning the
generalisation of Proposition 13.1, it does facilitate a case-by-case enquiry into each state of
the state space corresponding to an endeavour. To elucidate, by partitioning the state space in
question according to the elements contained in the above inequality, a state specific enquiry may
be conducted according to the features that characterise the resulting states. Accordingly, the
state space corresponding to an endeavour is partitioned in the manner depicted in Table 13.3.
As may be seen in the table, the degree to which objective A is correlated with the objectives in
Ia∪Ib and the proportion of the power of the entities pursuing these objectives that is useful to
their realisation, is adopted as the first feature on which to partition the state space. The state
space is then partitioned according to the distribution of power among entities a and b, and then
according to the ability of entity a to compete by utilising the courses of action available to it.
Based on this partitioning, the applicability of Proposition 13.1 is investigated individually for
the respective states in the state space of interest in the sections that follow.
13.8.1 State 1
In the context of State 1, characterised by the property that δAAtΨAta + δ
ABtΨBta ≥ |δADtΨDtb |,
it follows that the inequality in (13.23) will hold if∫ t
0
(










The question of interest is thus for which substates in State 1 this is indeed the case.
State 1.1
As depicted in Table 13.3, State 1.1 is characterised by the Property that P t−1a = P
t−1
b . This is
a rather convenient property as it implies that, for an equal measure of influence exerted, the
environment enacts an equal measure of restraint upon the alteration of the power of entity a
and the power of entity b (i.e. µ(P t−1a ) = µ(P
t−1
b )). With this in mind, consider the first substate






baτ bτayz)dτ . In
combination with the aforementioned property in respect of the environment’s restraint upon the
20The term µ(P t−1b ) ∈ [0, 1].
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Table 13.3: A list of the states for which the generalisation of Proposition 13.1 is investigated.

























































































































































thereby confirming that Proposition 13.1 may be generalised thereto. The inquiry into the
remaining substates in State 1.1, State 1.1.2 and State 1.1.3, is facilitated by rewriting the
inequality in (13.24) in the form
(1− µ(P t−1a ))
∫ t
0
Ωaaτkτayzdτ − (1− µ(P t−1b ))
∫ t
0
Φbaτ bτayzdτ ≥ 0.











baτ bτayzdτ , reveals that
the above inequality will hold under the conditions of State 1.1.2, but not those of State 1.1.3.
State 1.2
If characterised by State 1.2, entity a is considered the more powerful entity, which, according
to Assumption A7, implies that µ(P t−1a ) < µ(P
t−1
b ). In view of the exposition of State 1.1,
the applicability of Proposition 13.1 to both State 1.2.1 and State 1.2.2 is thus apparent. Its
applicability to State 1.2.3, however, is not. To facilitate the enquiry into State 1.2.3, the






1− µ(P t−1b )
1− µ(P t−1a )
. (13.25)
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This form of the inequality reveals that although (13.24) does not hold for State 1.2.3 in general,
it holds conditionally if the difference between the measure of power possessed by entity a and
that possessed by entity b is sufficiently large, and/or the difference between the ability of entity a
to increase its power and its ability to decrease the power of entity b is sufficiently small. Thus,
Proposition 13.1 is deemed conditionally applicable to State 1.2.3.
State 1.3
Contrary to the aforementioned state, in the context of State 1.3 entity a is considered the
less powerful entity. As a result, the environment’s restraint upon the alteration of the power
of Entity a is more severe than its restraint upon the alteration of the power of entity b (i.e.
µ(P t−1a ) > µ(P
t−1
b )). Based upon the exposition in the case of State 1.1, it is apparent that
Proposition 13.1 cannot be generalised to either State 1.3.1 or State 1.3.3. Its applicability to
State 1.3.2, however, is conditional. To elucidate, consider the expression in (13.25). This form
of the inequality makes it clear that under the conditions of State 1.3.2, (13.24) will hold if the
difference between the amount of power possessed by entity a and that possessed by entity b is
sufficiently small, and/or if the difference between the ability of entity a to increase its power
and its ability to decrease that of entity b is sufficiently large. Consequently, Proposition 13.1 is
deemed conditionally applicable to State 1.3.2.
13.8.2 State 2
State 2 characterises the decision instance facing entity a, if the objectives pursued by entity a
are weakly correlated, few in number, and such that the power it possesses is of limited use to
their realisation, and furthermore, if the objectives pursued by the opponent21 entity a targets
(entity b in this case) are considerable in number, strongly negatively correlated with objective A,
and such that a significant portion of the opponent’s power is of utility to their realisation.
State 2.1
In the context of State 2.1, entities a and b are considered equally powerful, which, as stated in
§13.8.1, implies that the environment’s restraint upon the alteration of the power of either these
entities is equivalent (i.e. µ(P t−1a ) = µ(P
t−1
b )). That being the case, there is only one substate
in State 2.1 for which the inequality in (13.23) may hold22, namely State 2.1.2. This state is
characterised by the property that the ability of entity a to increase its power is greater than














which makes it clear that (13.23) will hold if the difference between the absolute value of the
term δADtΨDtb and the term δ
AAtΨAta + δ
ABtΨBta is sufficiently small, and/or if the difference
between the ability of entity a to increase its power and its ability to decrease the power of
entity b is sufficiently large. Accordingly, Proposition 13.1 is deemed conditionally applicable to
State 2.1.2.
21That is, if the entity in question elects to alter the power dynamics of the endeavour of which it is a part by
decreasing the power of an opponent.
22Note that in the context of State 2, the conditions stipulated in (13.24) are not sufficient to establish the
applicability of Proposition 13.1.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
208 Chapter 13. The mechanisms of interaction
State 2.2
When characterised by the conditions of State 2.2, entity a is considered the more powerful
entity. This implies that µ(P t−1a ) < µ(P
t−1
b ) and, as such, it follows from the above discus-
sion, concerning State 2.1, that Proposition 13.1 conditionally applies to all three substates of
State 2.2. Consider first State 2.2.1, characterised by the property that the ability of entity a to
increase its power equals its ability to decrease the power of entity b. Under these conditions,
it follows from the expression in (13.26) that the inequality in (13.23) will hold if the difference
between the absolute value of the term δADtΨDtb and the term δ
AAtΨAta + δ
ABtΨBta is sufficiently
small, and/or if the difference between the measure of power possessed by entity a and that
possessed by entity b is sufficiently large. Concerning the remaining substates of State 2.2, it
follows from the properties that characterise them that, in addition to the conditions stated in
respect of State 2.2.1, the inequality in (13.23) will hold for State 2.2.2 if the difference between
the ability of entity a to increase its power and its ability to decrease the power of entity b
is sufficiently large, and for State 2.2.3 if the difference between these measures is sufficiently
small.
State 2.3
Due to the properties that characterise State 2.3, Proposition 13.1 fails to apply to all but one of
the substates contained therein. That is, State 2.3.2, characterised by the property the entity a
is more able to increase the measure of its own power than it is to decrease that of entity b.
According to this property, it follows by the expression in (13.26) that the inequality in (13.23)
will hold under the conditions of State 2.3.2, if the properties characterising the interaction of
entities a and b are such that the difference between the absolute value of the term δADtΨDtb and
the term δAAtΨAta + δ
ABtΨBta is sufficiently small, and/or if the difference between the measure
of power possessed by entity a and that possessed by entity b is sufficiently small, and/or if the
difference between the ability of entity a to increase its power and its ability to decrease the
power of entity b is sufficiently large. Thus, Proposition 13.1 is deemed conditionally applicable
to State 2.2.3.
13.8.3 The effect of additional entities
Before presenting a summary of the results pertaining to the above generalisation of Proposi-
tion 13.1, the effect of additional players upon the validity of the analysis should be addressed.
Notably, the generalisation of Proposition 13.1 was conducted by considering the situation in
which only two entities were considered affected by the alternative courses of action towards
altering the distribution of power in an endeavour (i.e. entities a and b). It should be intuitively
apparent, however, that the dynamics related to these courses of action will be subject to change
if additional entities are taken in account. Consider, for example, the effect of including an en-
tity c which pursues an objective E, where δAEt < 0, and an entity d that pursues an objective
F , where δAFt > 0. In the presence of these entities,
∂TAt
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dτ
for all τ ∈ [0, t]. Each of the above expressions contain several parameters and variables related
to either entity c or entity d, indicating that the generalisation of Proposition 13.1 depends
upon the specific configuration of entities involved in an attempted alteration of power. Al-
though this is somewhat inconvenient, conducting an analysis during which the applicability of
Proposition 13.1 is determined for a specific decision instance (like the one above) is uninvolved.
The generalisation of Proposition 13.1 to such instances is deemed work that may be pursued
in future.
To conclude the discussion on the generalisation of Proposition 13.1 concerning the state space
corresponding to the hypothetical endeavour containing entities a and b, the results related to
this enquiry are summarised in Table 13.4. The following colour scheme is utilised: A state
is coloured green if Proposition 13.1 may be generalised thereto, yellow if Proposition 13.1 is
conditionally applicable thereto, or red otherwise.
Table 13.4: A summary of the results pertaining to the generalisation of Proposition 13.1 in respect of
the state space of an hypothetical endeavour containing two entities, a and b.












































































































































The mysteries surrounding the dynamics that govern the mechanisms of human interaction have
often dominated the pursuit of scientific enquiry throughout history. The fact that this pursuit
remains indefinite suggests that either its methods are failing, or that the phenomenon being
studied is intractably complex. In view of the delineated history of this pursuit, the former
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reason for its continuation is rejected. The work that has been presented in this chapter is the
product of an attempt at moving slightly closer to an adequate description of the mysteries
surrounding human interaction.
In view of the collection of assumptions made during the course of the development of the model
presented in this chapter, the context upon which it is based can only be described as highly
idealised. In accordance, any insight gained should be considered with caution.
The introduction of a governing assumption underlying the nature of human decision making in
§13.1 was the first step of this attempt. This was followed by a mathematical description of the
relationship between the mechanisms of expected gain and that of power possessed in the context
of an endeavour in §13.2–13.3. Thereafter, a brief description of the effect of infeasibility upon
this relationship was presented in §13.4. In §13.5, an analysis of the model was presented, and
this was followed by an extension of the model in §13.6 and §13.7. Finally, §13.8 was dedicated
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This chapter consists of two sections. A summary of the research documented in this dissertation
is provided in §14.1, and this is followed in §14.2 by an appraisal of contributions made in the
dissertation.
14.1 Dissertation summary
Apart from the introductory chapter and its successor, the latter of which was dedicated to
a discussion of the research methodology adopted, the work presented in this dissertation was
organised into three parts, collectively comprising a further thirteen chapters. The first part,
Part I, contained six chapters that were dedicated to a review of the academic literature relevant
to the topic of this dissertation, in fulfilment of Objective I of §1.3. Part I opened in Chapter 3
with a brief introduction to the mechanisms of human cognition in §3.1, and this was followed by
a discussion on the heuristics that are commonly employed in judgements related to uncertain
events in §3.2. These heuristics were classified into three categories, namely simple heuristics,
complex heuristics and hyper-heuristics. The aforementioned investigation set the stage for an
account of the cognitive biases that render judgement heuristics imperfect in §3.4–3.8, after
which Chapter 3 came to a close with a short summary in §3.9.
The next chapter, Chapter 4, was dedicated to an enquiry into the social nature of human deci-
sion making. After this topic was briefly introduced in §4.1 with a discussion on the paradoxical
nature of group behaviour, the social dynamics related to decision making in the presence of
relevant others was explicated in §4.2–§4.4. A central theme in the chapter was that group in-
teraction and conflict go hand in hand — conflict between the needs of an individual, but more
notably, the conflict that exists among interacting groups. Before the chapter concluded in §4.5
with a brief summary, it was illustrated that one of the driving forces behind this conflict is the
naturally human tendency to protect what is experienced as an extension of the self, namely,
the ingroup.
In accordance with the objectives pursued in the dissertation, Chapter 5 was dedicated to an
enquiry into the field of debiasing. The chapter opened with a brief introduction to the field in
§5.1, after which the prevailing schools of thought that underlie the methods employed therein
213
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were reviewed in §5.2–§5.4. After a collection of methods based upon the reviewed schools of
thought were reviewed in §5.5, the chapter came to a close with a short summary in §5.6.
Chapter 6 embodied quite a shift in the focus of discussion, opening in §6.1 with an account
of the origins of systems theory. Excluding a short summary of matters discussed in §6.10, the
chapter was essentially dedicated to an analysis of the paradigms that dominate systems theory,
with the respective solution methodologies related thereto reviewed in §6.1–§6.9.
Chapter 7 opened with a brief introduction to the notion of dissimilar problem types in §7.1,
and this was followed in §7.2–§7.4 by an evaluation of three unique problem typologies for the
classification of real-world problems in terms of their effectiveness in eliciting the characteristics
that are relevant to the process of real-world problem solving. The chapter finally came to a
close with a short summary in §7.5.
Chapter 8, with which Part I concluded, was dedicated to a review of the methods that dominate
the field of stakeholder selection theory. The chapter opened in §8.1 with a review of several
methods that facilitate the identification of stakeholders, and this was followed in §8.2–§8.5 by
an analysis of a collection of methods considered to facilitate the classification of stakeholders,
and in §8.6 by a discussion of a collection of methods that facilitates an investigation into the
network of relationships among stakeholders. In §8.7, a high-level comparison of the methods
discussed was presented, after which the chapter was brought to a close with a brief summary
in §8.8.
Part II of the dissertation consisted of a further five chapters, which started in Chapter 9 with
a delineation of the meta-methodology proposed in fulfilment of Objectives II–VII of §1.3. The
chapter opened with a brief overview of the phases that constitute the proposed methodology in
§9.1, which set the stage for an in-depth discussion on each of these phases in the sections that
followed. More specifically, §9.2 was dedicated to the introduction of a method for stakeholder
selection, as well as an analysis of the sociological paradigms upon which the structuring methods
of the systems literature are based, while §9.3 was reserved for the unveiling of a decision-making
checklist designed to mitigate the irrational influence in human decision making. The chapter
finally concluded with a concise summary of matters discussed in §9.4.
Chapter 10 contained an account of the first stage of evaluation of the proposed meta-methodo-
logy, involving its hypothetical application in the context of a theoretical case study in retrospect.
The chapter commenced with an account of the selected context of application in §10.1, and this
was then followed by the hypothetical application of the proposed meta-methodology in that
particular context in §10.2. Thereafter, an additional phase of the meta-methodology, designed
to address a potentially detrimental phenomenon uncovered during its hypothetical application,
was introduced in §10.3. The chapter finally came to a close with a short summary in §10.4.
In Chapter 11 the proposed meta-methodology was subjected to the critique of an expert analyst.
The chapter opened with a brief account of the feedback received from the analyst, in §11.1, and
this was followed by the presentation of an updated version of the meta-methodology in §11.2.
The chapter then came to a close with a short summary, in §11.3.
Chapter 12 was dedicated to the documentation of the final phase of evaluation of the proposed
meta-methodology — its application to a practical case study. Accordingly, the chapter opened
with a brief description of the context in which the meta-methodology was applied in §12.1, and
this was followed with an account of its actual application in §12.2 and §12.3. The chapter came
to a close with a brief summary, in §12.4.
In the final chapter of Part II, the subject matter became slightly more mathematical as Chap-
ter 13 comprised an exposition of an analytical model developed for describing (to a certain
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extent) the competitive interaction among the entities relevant to the context of application
for which the proposed meta-methodology was designed, in fulfilment of Objective VIII of §1.3.
The derivation of the model commenced with the introduction of rationality as a governing
assumption in §13.1, and this was followed by a mathematical description of the relationship
between the notions of power and potential gain in §13.2–§13.4. In §13.5, an analysis of the
model was conducted and, as a result, the section concluded with an interesting result pertain-
ing to the manner in which entities are to compete in the context of an endeavour (captured in
Proposition 13.1). Next, an extension to the model was presented in §13.6 and §13.7, and this
was followed in §13.8 by the generalisation of the aforementioned proposition to the state space
induced by the extension. The chapter finally came to a close with a short summary in §13.9.
14.2 Appraisal of dissertation contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation were seven-fold. This section is dedicated to a
documentation and an appraisal of these contributions.
Contribution 14.1 A thorough investigation of the paradigms of enquiry relevant to the sys-
tems movement, as well as the solution methodologies contained within those paradigms, as
documented in the academic literature.
The systems movement embodies such a conglomeration of academic disciplines and fields of
practice that it is almost impossible to make sense of the burgeoning expanse of literature related
thereto. In order, therefore, to properly realise the pursuit of Objective V, it was first necessary
to attempt to “bring order” to that literature. To that end, a delineation of the paradigms
of enquiry that embody the systems movement, the methodological approaches related to each
of those paradigms, and the methods that embody each of the approaches may be found in
Chapter 6.
Contribution 14.2 A thorough analysis of the dynamics relevant to the process of human
decision making in the face of uncertainty, and in the context of social stimuli, as documented
in the academic literature.
Although real-world problem solving is fundamentally a human-centric endeavour, the dynamics
that accompany that very quality are barely ever addressed in the structuring methodologies of
systems theory and, as such, the mechanisms of human decision making were a central theme
throughout the exposition of this dissertation. More specifically, the cognitive and social dy-
namics that constitute the mechanisms of human decision making were brought together in a
unique and hopefully insightful manner in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
Contribution 14.3 The development, and application, of a generic method for the identification
of stakeholders that are relevant to a certain instance of real-world problem solving.
Following an investigation of the relevant academic literature, it was discovered that solution
methodologies dedicated to the formulation of real-world problems are typically void of guid-
ance with respect to the identification of stakeholders. The neglect of this task was indeed a
surprise as the appropriate selection of stakeholders depends first on their identification. In
order, therefore, to fill this void in the methods of systems theory, a generic method for the
identification of stakeholders, based upon the general criteria of power possessed and effect ex-
perienced, was proposed in §9.2.1. It was necessary to redefine the notions of power and effect in
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order to construct this method, so as to elicit the mechanisms by which the experience of effect
propagate, and finally, to provide an account of the criteria according to which the severity of
effect experienced and the importance of power possessed may be determined. The efficacy of
these contributions was first illustrated by means of a theoretical case study in respect of the
fees must fall movement and, thereafter, by means of a practical case study conducted in the
context of the South African energy sector.
Contribution 14.4 A delineation of the effect of dissimilar states in which real-world systems
exist upon the resolution of problems therein, as well as the development of a method designed
to minimise the cost associated with one such state.
Problem solution methodologies dedicated to the formulation of real-world problems unjustifi-
ably neglect to address not only that real-world systems may exist in one of several states, but
furthermore, that the state in which a system exists has a profound impact on the resolution of
problems therein. Accordingly, to rectify this neglect, the meta-methodology proposed in this
dissertation was dedicated, in part, to a portrayal of the states in which a system can exist. More
specifically, the dissimilar states in which real-world systems exist, and the mechanisms by which
these states come about, were first described, and then practically illustrated in §10.3. Notably,
the undertaking to aid practitioners in dealing with the states in which real-world systems exist
did not end with the aforementioned contribution. Based upon the body of knowledge uncov-
ered, a method was designed and formally proposed for minimising the cost associated with one
such state (i.e. a state of chaos).
Contribution 14.5 An analysis of the sociological paradigms upon which the design of the
structuring methods of the systems literature are based.
To counteract the cumbersome manner in which real-world problem solvers tend to base their
selection of solution methodologies upon their history of method use, and not according to how
well the design of a particular method compliments the complexity of a certain task, an analysis
of the sociological paradigms upon which the methods of systems theory are based, was presented
in §9.2.3. This was, furthermore, accompanied by a description of the paradigm-based practical
pitfalls associated with a number of structuring methodologies related to the systems movement
in §9.2.4.
Contribution 14.6 A decision-making checklist designed to mitigate the irrational influence in
human decision making.
All too often it is not the complex nature of problems, but the subtle dynamics that exist
among and within problem solvers that result in the persistence of problems considered. The
mitigation of such dynamics has, furthermore, proven remarkably difficult throughout the history
of human decision making as they often operate in the subconscious aspect of the human mind.
Accordingly, to address this aspect of human nature, it was necessary to adopt a strategy that did
not involve the actual identification of the aforementioned dynamics, but simply the mitigation of
their effect. The decision-making checklist presented in §9.3, constitutes the product of adopting
this strategy, and comprises a framework designed to address the social and cognitive dynamics
determined to be most adverse to the process of human decision making.
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Contribution 14.7 The development of a model describing mathematically the competitive
interaction of entities relevant to the context for which the proposed meta-methodology was de-
signed.
The reasons for which the mathematical model presented in Chapter 13 is considered a con-
tribution is twofold. For one, it resulted in the formalisation of Proposition 13.1, which em-
bodies a useful step toward providing the competitive entities of real-world problem solving
with case-specific guidance in respect of how to compete during an endeavour. Furthermore,
the mathematical description of the competitive interaction of stakeholders contained in the
model certainly goes some way towards unveiling the mechanisms that govern similar forms of
interaction in general.
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During the process of conducting the research reported in this dissertation, several avenues of
further investigation were noted and, as such, this chapter is dedicated to their delineation.
15.1 Suggestions related to scoping delineations
Two kinds of future work suggestions are contained in this chapter, and this section is dedicated
to the first of these. More specifically, two avenues of further investigation related to the scope of
the research carried out in the preceding chapters are discussed here. In each case, the suggestion
is stated formally and then motivated briefly.
Suggestion 10.1 Test the effectiveness of the method proposed to facilitate the selection of an
appropriate response to a chaos-inducing entity by means of practically applying it in the context
of a real-world endeavour.
The meta-methodology proposed in §10.3 was developed in response to the recognised difficulty
of responding effectively to an entity that utilises chaos as a means of influence in the context
of an endeavour. Although the logic underlying the methodology was illustrated in the context
of a theoretical case study and its working subjected to the scrutiny of an expert analyst, in
order to further validate it, the methodology should be applied in the context of a real-world
endeavour. Its evaluation by means of practical application thus forms part of the proposed
future work.
Suggestion 10.2 Broaden the scope of the proposed meta-methodology to include the process of
response formulation by means of quantitative modelling.
The meta-methodology proposed in this dissertation is built upon the synthesis of dissimilar
system paradigms (inspired by the critical system school of thought). Accordingly, the proposed
meta-methodology has been developed such that the scope of its application may be extended to
include the process of response formulation, and thus the methods of hard systems thinking. To
219
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elucidate, a natural extension to the work conducted in this dissertation would be to execute an
analysis of the methods in the systems literature dedicated to the process of response formulation,
with the aim of identifying the limitation thereof so that the proposed meta-methodology may
be supplemented with the capacity to facilitate their use. Note that such an extension of the
meta-methodology would also involve investigating and addressing the complexities associated
with the process of transitioning from the problem formulation to the problem response phase
in the context of real-world problem solving.
15.2 Natural extensions of the work presented
In this final section, six possible avenues of further investigation are suggested that follow as
natural extensions to the work documented in this dissertation. In each case, the suggestion is
again stated formally and then motivated briefly.
Suggestion 10.3 Further develop the mathematical model presented in Chapter 13 to incorpo-
rate the capability of altering the amount of power associated with the pursuit of an objective by
altering the degree of correlation between the objectives in I.
It seems reasonable to suggest that the degree of correlation between the objectives pursued in an
endeavour may deviate from some baseline value during the course of its progression. Consider,
for example, two entities attempting to redefine the outcomes they pursue such that the degree of
correlation between the objectives that represent these outcome increases (or decreases) for their
mutual benefit. With this kind of scenario in mind, consider the following question of interest:
When is it more effective for an entity x to attempt to increase the degree of correlation between
the objectives Ix it pursues and the objectives I+x positively correlated thereto, compared to
decreasing the degree of correlation between the objectives in Ix and the objectives in I\I+x that
are non-positively correlated thereto. Toward answering this question, the mathematical model
presented in Chapter 13 may be generalised to incorporate the phenomena involved in the task
of varying the degree of correlation among objectives such that the validity of Proposition 13.1
may be determined in respect of the state space induced by such an extension.
Suggestion 10.4 Review the applicability of Proposition 13.1 to the state space induced by the
assumption that the environment is biased against either the aggregation or the degradation of
an entity’s power.
Proposition 13.1 was established under the assumption that the environment constrains the
alteration of an entity’s power in a manner that disregards the nature of the manoeuvre utilised
to that end (i.e. whether its intended purpose is to increase or to decrease the power of the
entity in question). Certain real-world systems may, however, be characterised by the property
that this form of constraint depends upon the manoeuvre utilised. Consequently, investigating
the applicability of Proposition 13.1 in the case where a unique function µ(P t−1x ) is utilised
to determine the degree of constraint imposed upon influence exerted toward increasing and
toward decreasing the power of an entity, is considered work that may pursued in future. Such
an enquiry may provide insight into when it could be more effective for an entity to attempt to
increase the measure of its own power, compared to decreasing the measure of an opponent’s
power, even when doing so is considered inherently more difficult.
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Suggestion 10.5 Extend Proposition 13.1 to instances of competition involving more than two
entities.
As illustrated in §13.8, the courses of action considered of utility to an entity in the pursuit
of increasing its ability to compete in a particular instance of competition depends upon the
number of entities involved. At present, the applicability of Proposition 13.1 is limited to
such instances involving only two entities, but as endeavours are seldom limited only to two
participants, it is probable that numerous entities may be involved in a particular instance of
competitive interaction. Consequently, the generalisation of Proposition 13.1 to such instances
is considered work that may be pursued in future. To that end, an exemplar of how such an
analysis may be conducted is provided in §13.8.
Suggestion 10.6 Further develop the decision-making checklist by considering additional dy-
namics, elaborating on the manner in which dynamics considered may practically manifest them-
selves, and enhancing the enquiry designed to mitigate their influence.
The decision-making checklist presented in §9.3 consists of three components: A list of dynamics
capable of inhibiting successful real-world problem solving, a description of the manner in which
such dynamics may manifest themselves in a practical context, and finally, an enquiry designed
to mitigate the unwanted influence associated with the dynamics considered. Accordingly, each
of these components may further be developed. The decision making-checklist may be supple-
mented to incorporate the influence of dynamics not currently considered in order to address
additional forms in which the dynamics currently considered could manifest themselves, and
finally, to better facilitate the enquiry designed to mitigate the influence of such dynamics.
Suggestion 10.7 Put together a catalogue of features commonly associated with real-world prob-
lems.
As described in §9.2.1, establishing an exhaustive classification of the dimensions that underlie
the human experience of effect is a task that has remained a persistent challenge in the academic
literature. In like manner, in this dissertation, the mechanisms of effect were found to be
so intricately entwined that it was not possible to untangle them in a detailed manner that
maintained general applicability. In order to better aid practitioners in the development of a
functional network related to a problem considered there is, however, an alternative approach
that may be pursued. That is, the development of a catalogue of potential features from which
practitioners may draw inspiration when attempting to identify features that are central to a
problem considered. In this way, although the dimensions underlying the experience of effect
remain unidentified, the features responsible for inducing such an effect may be made more
salient.
Suggestion 10.8 Further develop the methodological analysis of §9.2.3 by investigating the
actual working of the structuring methods considered.
In its current form, the methodological analysis conducted in §9.2.2 involves the consideration of
only the sociological paradigms upon which the structuring methodologies of the systems litera-
ture are based, and not the actual working of the structuring methods themselves. Accordingly,
the current methodological analysis may further be developed to include an exposition of the
working of the methods considered, and the effect thereof upon the practical contexts in which
they may be of utility.
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This appendix is dedicated to a description of the labels in the functional network presented in
Chapter 12, in Table A.1.
Table A.1: A description of the labels in the functional network related to the problem considered in
Chapter 12.
Label Description
T1.1 Switch’s founders may pursue a third-party energy trading business model.
T1.2 As alternative to third-party energy trading, Switch’s founders may pursue a wheel-
ing energy trading business model.
T2.1 Swift has to compete with existing third-party traders.
T2.2 Switch’s founders require a trading licence in order to operate in the capacity of a
third-party energy trader. Additionally, the dynamic pricing strategy they utilise
has to be approved. The National Energy Regulator of South Africa is the legal
body that adjudicates these affairs.
T2.3 Switch’s value offering as third-party energy trader has the potential to alleviate
many of the difficulties experienced in Eskom-owned distribution networks.
T2.4 Switch’s value offering as third-party energy trader has the potential to alleviate
many of the difficulties experienced in municipally-owned distribution networks.
T2.5 Most of the municipally-owned distribution networks in South Africa still use a
static electricity trading pricing strategy and are thus considered formally affected
by Switch’s novel dynamic fee-based software solution.
T2.6 Eskom-owned distribution networks typically still use a static electricity trading
pricing strategy and are thus considered formally affected by Switch’s novel dynamic
fee-based software solution.
T2.7 Switch software solution seems to be of significant utility to grid-tied micro-grids as
it has the capacity to aid in the redistribution of electricity within such a setup.
T2.8 If Switch becomes an energy trading software solution provider, the fee structure
it proposes will have to be approved by the National Energy Regulator of South
Africa.
T2.9 Depending on how the market responds, existing energy traders may lose or gain
market share if Switch elects to enter the market as an energy trader. Either way,
they will be affected.
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Table A.1 (continued): A description of the labels in the functional network related to the problem
considered in Chapter 12.
Label Description
T2.10 Energy Exchange is currently the only wheeling energy trader in South Africa.
T3.1 PowerX is currently the only third-party energy trader in South Africa.
T3.2 In order to apply for an energy trading licence, Switch must submit a (ready to use)
power purchasing agreement contract that will govern the terms of trade between
all parties involved.
T3.3 This is simply a dummy node to facilitate the presentation of the functional network.
T3.4 If Switch operates as third-party trader in municipally-owned distribution networks,
their dynamic pricing strategy has the potential to disrupt the energy sector —
Eskom may lose market share.
T3.5 The South African Local Government Association is an autonomous association
consisting of the majority of local governments in South Africa (e.g. municipalities).
They exist to oversee the governance of the respective districts in South Africa and
are thus considered formally affected [398].
T3.6 The Association of Municipal Electricity Utilities is an association of regional elec-
tricity utilities and commercial companies that strive to improve the working of
electricity utilities in South Africa [18]. There is an overlap between this pursuit
and Switch’s value offering and, as such, they are considered formally affected.
T3.7 A collection of municipalities already identified to be interested in Switch software
solution offering.
T3.8 If municipalities start adopting Switch’s offering, they will become less dependent
upon Eskom for electricity.
T3.9 Switch software solution seems to be of significant utility to grid-tied micro-grid
owners as it has the capacity to aid in the redistribution of electricity within such a
setup and thereby make this entity less dependent upon Eskom for electricity.
T4.1 A lawyer will be required to formalise the power purchasing agreement.
T4.2 If Switch pursues the option of operating as a third-party trader in Eskom- or
municipally-owned distribution networks, independent power producers will be af-
fected. Switch’s approach incorporates a dynamic fee structure that determines the
price of electricity according to real-time supply and demand information. Conse-
quently, implementing Switch’s solution will induce variability in the amount inde-
pendent power producers receive per mega-watt of electricity.
T4.3 If Eskom or local municipalities grant Switch permission to operate as third-party
energy trader or adopts its wheeling energy trading software solution, the price
per mega-watt of electricity will vary according to demand scarcity (within certain
limits). The lack of a predetermined cost of electricity may make it difficult for
power plants to plan for future production.
T4.4 Implementing the dynamic fee pricing strategy associated with Switch’s value offer-
ing as either third-party trader or software solution provider will alter the amount
prosumers receive per mega-watt of electricity they feed back into the grid.
T4.5 If Eskom or municipalities select to employ Switch as a third-party energy trader,
consumers in the associated distribution networks will be affected as the imple-
mentation of Switch’s solution will alter the cost per mega-watt of electricity as a
function of supply versus demand.
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Table A.1 (continued): A description of the labels in the functional network related to the problem
considered in Chapter 12.
Label Description
T4.6 Switch’s approach to determining the price of electricity will most likely alter the
general price of electricity, and thereby effect all electricity users (even those that
are not associated with Switch).
T5.1 Power-plants are owned by Eskom.
T5.2 Integrating Switch’s software solution with the existing smart-meters will require
interaction with the smart-meter owner.
T6.1 Eskom owns the smart-meters that are located in Eskom-owned distribution net-
works.
T6.2 Local municipalities own the smart-meters in municipally-owned distribution net-
works.
F1.1 Switch may access capital by acquiring a loan.
F1.2 An effective way of raising capital would be to find an investor willing to commit
capital in exchange for equity shares.
F1.3 Companies that pursue objectives similar to Switch may be approached as potential
partner organisations. This would involve a reallocation of equity shares in exchange
for financial and business support.
F2.1 One of a bank’s formal objectives is to invest money in entities in the form of
repayable loans. Switch’s need for capital, formally affects this objective.
F2.2 An equity sale refers to the sale of the common shares of a company in exchange for
capital.
F2.3 Switch may elect to raise capital by organising a token sale, otherwise known as an
initial coin offering. In essence, this would involve the sale of a digital currency that
is linked to the platform Switch utilises for electricity trading. In other words, the
value of the digital currency is a function of the rate of Switch’s development.
F2.4 Business incubators specialise in guiding newly established companies through the
early stages of their development. This includes access to an established platform
of potential investors.
F2.5 Eldo is a group of energy management companies that specialise in smart-meter
software, energy efficient generation technologies, and energy management services.
They are identified as a potential partner organisation.
F3.1 Switch’s equity sale will affect venture capitalist firms and their formal purpose of
investing in companies.
F3.2 Switch’s digital currency offering will affect token buyers and present them with an
opportunity to invest.
F3.3 The South African Renewable Energy Business Incubator was established in 2012
in order to stimulate economic development in the renewable energy sector. They
assist businesses in the various stages of development and grant them access to an
established platform of potential investors.
F3.4 Blockstarters is a blockchain business incubator that attempts to facilitate innova-
tion and resource sharing in the blockchain sector by bringing together like-minded
entrepreneurs, providing them with business support and granting them access to
an established network of potential investors.
F3.5 LaunchLab is a business incubator situated in Stellenbosch. It offers entrepreneurs
excellent networking opportunities with potential investors, and guidance from lead-
ers in the business sector in order to help them launch their business.
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Table A.1 (continued): A description of the labels in the functional network related to the problem
considered in Chapter 12.
Label Description
R1.1 Non-profit organisations with the mandate to support the development of sustainable
energy supply technologies are considered formally affected by Switch’s business
offering.
R1.2 The Department of Energy is responsible for ensuring the country’s sustainable en-
ergy needs. As Switch’s business offering addresses this concern, they are considered
formally affected.
R2.1 The International Renewable Energy Agency works toward furthering the develop-
ment of renewable energy in South Africa.
R2.2 The overall objective of Switch Africa Green is to support a select group of African
countries (including South Africa) to transition into an exclusively green economy.
R2.3 GreenCape is a non-profit organisation, situated in the Western Cape, that drives
the widespread adoption of economically viable green technology solutions. It works
with businesses, investors, academia and government to help unlock the investment
and employment potential of green technologies and services.
R2.4 The main objective of the South African Renewable Energy Council is to stimu-
late economic development in renewable energy technologies. It formally exists as
an umbrella body representing several industrial associations that are involved in
renewable energy technologies.
R2.5 The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research is a world-class African research
and development organisation established in 1945. It is dedicated to conducting
research and supporting technological innovations that contribute to the improved
quality of life of South African citizens. As Switch’s value offering overlaps with
these goals, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research is considered formally
affected.
R2.6 The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative is a transformative, Africa-owned and
Africa-led inclusive effort to accelerate and scale up the harnessing of the conti-
nent’s huge renewable energy potential under the mandate of the African Union.
RF1.1 The combination of Switch’s financial needs and its renewable energy mandate in-
duces a unique propagation of effect.
RF2.1 Switch may access capital by applying for grants that are targeted at low-carbon
and/or renewable energy initiatives.
RF3.1 The South African National Energy Development Institute was established in 2011
under the National Energy Act with the mandate to direct, monitor and conduct
energy research and to support technological innovation that promotes the efficient
use of energy throughout the South African economy.
RF3.2 The Development Bank of Southern Africa seeks to play a pivotal role in delivering
sustainable developmental infrastructure in South Africa and the rest of the African
continent.
RF4.1 The Green Finance Desk is an acting partner of the South African National Energy
Development Institute. It works with businesses, investors, academia and govern-
ment to help unlock the investment and employment potential of green technologies
and services.
RF4.2 One of the directors of the Development Bank of Southern Africa is a personal
acquaintance of one of the founders of Switch.
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APPENDIX B
Feedback from a practitioner
This appendix is dedicated to an account of the feedback received from one of Switch’s founders,
Mr Andrew Murray [335], in respect of the application of the method for stakeholder identi-
fication and the decision making checklist to the context of interest in Chapter 12. Notably,
what follows is an exact copy of the feedback received from the founder in question. Neither the
format, nor the wording has been altered.
Stakeholder identification
• The stakeholder mapping process was useful for getting a picture of how the various
stakeholders and decisions fitted together.
• This helped me to consider exactly who needed to be engaged with depending on the
decisions made.
• The map was also useful because it illustrated my thought process and helped me see
which decisions were underdeveloped and would benefit from additional exploration.
• It was useful because it made me realise where I was making assumptions that might not
necessarily be true and because it helped me see which decisions needed further investiga-
tion to find more relevant stakeholders.
Decision-making checklist
Anchoring bias and affective failures — This helped me see that with little effort we could
include a water-metering and billing solution into our electricity trading solution.
Affective Failures — This helped me because it made me see that we should not neglect the
option of acting as a third party trader because the consequences of doing so might be unac-
ceptable, especially if legislation loosens and a third party trading becomes a more attainable
option.
Optimistic bias etc. – This made me aware that I was optimistic about the potential for munici-
palities to want to adopt and use our software even though that might not be the case. It helped
me see that there would be value in including them early on in the developmental process so
that we ensure that we design the solution with their needs in mind.
255
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
256 Appendix B. Feedback from a practitioner
Groupthink – This helped us discover that there were issues we might face that we were not
discussing. One was the challenge associated with translating power purchasing agreements into
smart contracts, which might not be a possibility.
Final remarks
The process overall was truly useful and beneficial and helped me see how the various decisions
and stakeholders fitted together. An area that I feel could use further development is in the
identification of decisions/options, and stakeholders that I may not have considered. The model
is somewhat limited to the knowledge of the person mapping out the process, and that knowledge
might not be accurate (i.e. my information) — a way to pressure test and validate that knowledge
and my assumptions would be useful. The decision making checklist helped me to consider
elements that I would likely not have otherwise considered which I’m sure will prove beneficial
in the long term sustainability of what we are doing.
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